CAPTAIN JEFF DAVIS: We're pleased to be joined today by Brigadier General Cleveland, coming to us live from Kabul.
General, we'll turn it over to you.
BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES H. CLEVELAND: Great, Jeff. Thank you very much, and good morning to everybody. Again, my name is Charlie Cleveland. I had the chance to meet several of you before I went ahead and deployed out here about a month or so ago. But if I haven't had the chance to meet you yet, I do look forward to it. And overall, I look forward to meeting with everybody.
I am unfortunately beginning to catch a cold, so I hope you'll bear with me as I probably drink more water than I usually would. I hope that's not too much of a distraction.
So, about a week or so ago, I had my first opportunity to sit down really with the Kabul press corps, both the Afghan aspect of it as well as the international piece. And so what I tried to do was really give kind of a comprehensive overview of how we see the threat, as well as what we're doing from a mission standpoint.
And the purpose of all that was really to establish kind of a starting point and kind of a baseline. I don't intend to do that today with you. My sense is it's probably best if we just get to your questions as quickly as possible. But I am certainly willing to either follow up with you here today, or follow up with you later to kind of give you that background, if that's something that would be helpful to you.
So, like I said, I just want to make a couple of quick points, and then we'll open it up for your questions. The first one really is I want to talk a little bit about our U.S. unilateral counterterrorism mission. And as I think you're all very well aware, obviously U.S. Forces-Afghanistan continues to have a mission to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida. And so we do have the authority to target any Al Qaida member.
In January, of course, that authority, or the authority for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to begin targeting ISIS was also provided. So, obviously in some areas it's Islamic state, Islamic state -- Khorasan province, and then commonly referred to as Daesh.
So as context, from the first of January until the 31st of March, U.S. forces took just under 100 counterterrorism strikes. The majority of those, probably between 70 and 80, were focused on Daesh, and of those, probably the majority of those, again 70 to 80 percent, were probably focused in the Nangarhar area.
Now, what my hope is as we move forward is to be able to provide you more specifics and more details about that. What I want to be able to do is on a recurring basis, probably every couple of weeks, give you a lay-down of specifically how many strikes we took and when we took it. But I also want to make sure that what we're providing you is consistent with what you've seen from Iraq and Syria, but that it also is consistent with some of the aspects of our mission here that we do want to take into account.
So bottom line is, we will give you more information about that, and I do intend to improve that aspect of it.
The other component of the counterterrorism mission, and this is not unilateral, but it is really our partnership with the ANDSF. And as I think you're all aware, obviously we do have a train, advise and assist mission where we do help the ANDSF at multiple levels. But specific to the CT piece, we are able to partner with them at a very tactical level and specifically with their special operations forces.
And so what we're able to do from an overall counterterrorism aspect is to be able to combine the U.S. unilateral piece as well as the train, advise and assist. And the example I would give you was just over a week or so ago, there was an operation in the district of Kot in Nangarhar. And it was really about a 36-hour operation, maybe a little bit less. But what we were able to do is have U.S. unilateral strikes against Daesh targets, and then the ANDSF, specifically their SOF capabilities, were able to move in and essentially clear part of a valley.
And we do think that it is a partnership as we move forward on all of these counterterrorism operations.
So shifting to the next topic, and I think it segues well. There's always the question about where are we from a status standpoint with Daesh. And I think you're all very well aware of the history, and them raising their flag in January 2015, and some of the gains that they had over the summer and early fall.
And I think the last updates you had were probably within the last couple of months. But our overall view right now is that we are having an effect, and we are putting pressure on Daesh specifically in Nangarhar. And there are a couple of indicators for us. The first one is, again, about three months or so ago, we thought that Daesh was probably in about six to eight districts. Today, we think they're probably in about two to three districts.
And I always hesitate to really kind of give a specific number like that because as soon as I say three districts, somebody pops up someplace else and now they're in four or five. But at the end of the day, we think that we have significantly decreased the footprint that they have in Afghanistan.
The second indicator we see is that we are beginning to see them trying to move into either Kunar-Nuristan or perhaps south down to Ghazni. And we don't think they're moving because they're able to expand, because they've got additional capacity. What we think is that they're trying to survive. And we think that they're under pressure and they're trying to escape from the areas where we have been aggressively targeting them.
And of course, if you go up to Kunar-Nuristan, very difficult area, very difficult terrain, very difficult to conduct operations.
The final indicator for us is, and this is really only anecdotal, but we have seen and it's even been in the press here in Kabul over the last week or so, where you're beginning to see members of Daesh defect. They're either laying down their arms and they're coming back to the government, or else they're trying to get back into the Taliban. And so there have been a couple of those instances as well.
And assuming that that is consistent with things we're not seeing, we do think that that is an indicator that perhaps they are under pressure.
The next topic I just want to touch on very briefly is where we are with the ANDSF. And I think you're all very aware that the ANDSF started their spring offensive about three weeks or so ago. It was announced by Minister Stanekzai, as well as the chief of the general staff, General Qadam Shah.
And without getting into the details of what they intend to do in the future, the overall theme is that they are trying to switch from what was a defensive posture in 2015, into more of an offensive posture in 2016. So what they're really trying to do is they're trying to take the fight to the enemy.
So, we've already seen indicators of that and evidence of that. We've seen them engaging up in northeastern Kunduz, and engaging the Taliban there. We've seen them begin to reestablish their presence in Helmand, and we see them on the offense, particularly trying to clear some areas on the eastern part of Helmand.
And then finally again, as I mentioned earlier, the work that they are doing against Daesh in Nangarhar.
The final component that I want to touch on just briefly, and I'll say upfront, the following two topics probably are not going to be satisfying for anybody in the room, but I first want to touch on General Nicholson's assessment.
And I think you are all well aware that he is in the process of writing an assessment; he has 90 days to do that. We expect that 90 days ends at the very end of May, very beginning of June.
As you can well imagine, and I think for reasons you can all understand, he does intend to keep that assessment very close hold, and the reason for that is he wants to be able to have a very frank and candid dialogue, and a very private dialogue with his chain of command when the time comes.
And so really, the only thing I can say about the assessment right now is that General Nicholson is working it very aggressively, and he is in constant contact with his chain of command as they move forward.
The other area -- and again, I know that this is not going to be satisfying, in fact, perhaps frustrating for many of you -- but it's the topic of the release of the report on the strike on the Doctors Without Borders Hospital up in Kunduz.
As I think you're aware, it has not yet been released; it is still undergoing a security review at this point. We don't know exactly when it is going to be released. We think it is probably sometime in the next two to four weeks, but we are awaiting final word on that.
And so, I really don't have anything new on that topic. Still, the most authoritative description of what transpired really goes back to General Campbell's VTC and press conference that he did at the end of November.
So, with that said, Jeff, let me go ahead and pass it back to you. And for everybody else, I sincerely welcome your questions. My goal with you is to be as transparent as I possibly can.
As you know, there are some things that I'm just not going to know the answer to, and probably part of the new-guy syndrome. And if that's the case, then we'll take it for action, and I'll get you an answer.
And then of course, there's some areas that I just won't be able to talk about. But I'll try to distinguish the two for you as we move forward.
So, again, Jeff, let me pass it back to you. And I welcome your questions.
CAPT. DAVIS: With Tom Bowman, from National Public Radio.
Q: Hey, General. Thanks for doing this.
I'm wondering if can give us an update on how things are going in Helmand Province. Which districts have fallen to the Taliban? Roughly how many American soldiers are out there doing the training mission?
And then you also talked about operations with American S.F. and Afghan special forces going after Daesh.
Talk about, you know, the number of those kinds of operations against the Taliban out in Helmand.
And lastly, it looks like they're not going to eradicate the poppy crop out there this year. Just talk about what impact you think that will have on the fighting, getting more money to the Taliban?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Sure, Mr. Bowman. And if -- first off, thanks for the questions. If I miss one, let me redirect it, and I'll get back to you.
So, the current status in Helmand. You know, there was some reporting over the weekend suggesting that Helmand was about to fall, and that the capital of Helmand, Lashkar Gah is about to fall.
We don't believe that's the case. That said, as has been said several times, Helmand is not a rosy picture right now, it is a difficult, contested area.
And as we see the Taliban really finish the harvesting of the poppy, which again, should happen in the next week to two weeks, we think that the fighting will really increase.
So, from an overall status standpoint, Mr. Bowman, if you can imagine a map of Helmand that really -- and there's kind of an arch. And so, it really starts in the -- central Helmand, middle of Marjah, goes up through Nawzad, kind of cuts east, goes through Musa Qala, and then into Southern Kajaki.
And that really is kind of the zone where we see the most Taliban occupation and where we see their most influence.
The government in the ANDSF fits pretty well in Lashkar Gah and up the east, and that's where they're also working as well. And so bottom line is we don't think that Helmand as a province is about to fall, and we don't think that the capital Lashkar Gah is about to fall.
In terms of the coalition commitment down there, as I think you're aware, we did put additional forces down in Helmand so that they could assist in the train, advise and assist efforts that we're doing. That is ongoing.
And so really what we're doing on a day-to-day basis is a couple of things. I think you're aware, and you've probably heard this in previous briefs, that one of the things that we try to help the Afghans with is pulling some of their kandaks or their battalions off of the line and retraining them. So we do have coalition forces that are providing very hands-on training, everything from shooting rifles to being able to maneuver at the squad and the platoon level. So we're doing those kinds of things.
The other thing that we're focused on is we're trying to provide advice at the corps level. And as I think you're well aware, the Afghans did essentially replace an awful lot of leadership down there in Helmand. There was a new corps commander, all new brigade commanders. And so we've got teams that are trying to help advise that corps commander and his staff and assist them in their fight.
So, in terms of the specific U.S. presence down there, and again the coalition presence, it is a train, advise and assist capability that we're focused on.
I think the final piece you asked, Mr. Bowman, is specific to the SOF or the special operations capability. And as you can understand, I can't get into a whole lot of detail about where we specifically have either Afghan SOF or else U.S. SOF. But what I would tell you is there's a habitual relationship between each corps and its SOF element. And on any given day, the Afghan SOF is out conducting operations within the corps' area of responsibility.
And U.S. SOF or coalition SOF has the ability to choose whether or not they support and go on a mission or not. And so on any given day, coalition SOF may be providing train, advise and assist somewhere in that corps' larger region.
So let me pause there, Mr. Bowman, and make sure that that answers your question.
Q: Just on that last point about the American SOF with Afghan commandos or SOF, I understood that the American SOF were on a counterterror mission. So, if they're going out with the Taliban in that area, going out against the Taliban, I don't see how that makes it a counterterror mission. Or is this something different?
GEN. CLEVELAND: It is something different, Mr. Bowman. So, what it is is, again, the coalition writ large has the ability to provide the train, advise, and assist at a tactical level for both Ministry of Defense special operations capability, as well as Ministry of the Interior.
So when U.S. forces are providing that train, advise, and assist, it really falls under the larger Resolute Support mission set, which again is train, advise and assist.
Does that kind of answer that?
CAPT. DAVIS: Okay. Next to Idrees Ali from Reuters.
Q: Thank you.
Could you give your assessment on how many Daesh fighters there are in Afghanistan currently? Because I -- we've heard a couple of thousand in the past few months, but you've conducted CT strikes. So has that number gone down? And I guess, what is it specifically?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Sure. I don't have a great specific number for you. As you can imagine, it becomes very difficult to provide something as specific as you might be looking for. We still estimate it's someplace between 1,000 and 3,000. It's probably on the lower end of that.
You know, in terms of their composition, what we think is that they are made up primarily of disaffected Pakistan Taliban. We think they are made up of Afghan Taliban that were upset with the way that Mullah Mansour assumed power last summer.
We think that there's some Islamic movement of Uzbekistan IMU people that have joined the ranks. And then we have seen some recruiting of other Afghans.
But it's difficult for us to give you something more specific then probably on the lower end of the estimate of 1 to 3,000.
CAPT. DAVIS: Okay. Next to Courtney Kube from NBC.
Q: Hi, General. Can you tell us a little bit about this People's Uprising Program in the east?
How many Afghans have joined it, or been recruited? And what is the -- is the U.S. playing a role in helping to train them, or paying them, or anything? There -- we just don't have a lot of fidelity on it. Can you run us through, please?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Ms. Kube, unfortunately, I don't have a lot of fidelity on it for you.
I did see the similar reporting in the press and the announcement of that aspect of it. It is not something that Resolute Support is supporting. As I think you know, we do have a fairly strenuous process to make sure that anybody we provide support to meets a variety of conditions.
So, although I've seen the same reporting, I just don't have a whole lot of information on what those organizations are, and how they are going about their business.
CAPT. DAVIS: Okay. Next to Andrew Tilghman, with Military Times.
Q: Yeah, thanks. Back on ISIS.
You mentioned that it's the lower end of that estimate, in terms of the raw numbers of fighters. And that and some other things that you and others have said have led me to get the sense over the past few months that that ISIS threat in Afghanistan is a little bit more contained than you may have thought maybe four to six months ago.
Is that fair? Do you have the sense that that -- that these airstrikes, and maybe a lack of support on the ground is making that ISIS presence in Afghanistan -- have you modified your sense of that -- of that threat at all in the past few months?
GEN. CLEVELAND: We have. And again, Daesh really does present the potential to be just an enormous threat.
Obviously, we've all seen them, how rapidly they are able to spread in other parts of the world.
Here in Afghanistan, one of the things that does appear to be common to just about everybody is that nobody really wants Daesh in the neighborhood.
And so, whether it's the Taliban attacking Daesh, whether it's locals trying to rise up against them, of course, the ANDSF operations, and now some of our unilateral strikes, we do think that they are being contained more than they probably were last fall.
Again, our concern with them is that they've got the ability to regenerate very quickly, and they've got the ability to catch fire -- as we've seen in other places.
So, we think it's incredibly important just to keep constant pressure on them, and try to get after them at every opportunity we can.
CAPT. DAVIS: Okay. Kasim Ileri from --
Q: Hi, General. This is Kasim Ileri from the Anadolu Agency.
I was going to ask about the operations on Daesh. To what extent these operations, these airstrikes are regular? And can you just give us some kind of round number about how many airstrikes the U.S. has conducted? And how many operations, like, you have conducted over the Nangarhar Province?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Sure. Again, from the first of January until the 31st of March, we took just under 100 counterterrorism strikes. We think about -- and again, this is a little rough -- but between 70 to 80 of those were focused on Daesh. And again, they were primarily in the Nangarhar area.
In terms of the number of operations that the ANDSF has conducted against Daesh, I really would refer you to the Ministry of Defense. They are really in the process of trying to put out more information about that. And they can probably give you better specifics on exactly what they are doing from a ground standpoint with their forces.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next, we have Jeff Sullivan from Voice of America.
Q: General, thank you.
You mentioned earlier on that some of the Daesh folks had either gone back to the government or were going back to the Taliban. What about the dynamic with Al Qaida? To what extent is there a competition in Afghanistan for those people between Daesh and Al Qaida? And how significant is the Al Qaida presence there? It's been described recently as resurgent.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Sure. So, the Al Qaida presence we believe, and I guess let me take a step back. One of the larger concerns we have are obviously the relationships between these various groups. As I think you're probably all aware, today in Afghanistan there are six terrorist organizations that have been designated by the State Department as foreign terrorist organizations.
On top of that, of course, you have Al Qaida and you have some other violent extremist organizations. And one of the challenges that we have to take -- to be candid with you, is determining just how these relationships work with them. In some cases, we see these -- all of these organizations, they'll work together. In other cases, they will conduct their own operations. And then in other cases, particularly with the case of Daesh, we will see them actively engage in hostilities with other organizations.
So from an Al Qaida standpoint, one of our concerns right now is we are beginning to see more of an increased relationship between Al Qaida and the Taliban. The biggest indicator of that, of course, was last August. Al Zawahiri did go ahead and swear allegiance to Mullah Mansour. And we have seen more of a relationship between those types of organizations.
By itself, Al Qaida we don't believe is a tremendous threat to the government of Afghanistan by itself. But where they pose the real threat is often times Al Qaida can serve as an accelerant. And so they've got some very special skills, some capabilities. They can go and essentially assist and train the Taliban so that the Taliban is more effective.
In terms of their relationship with Daesh, obviously they have been at each other's throats for the last few years, starting in Iraq and Syria. We don't see necessarily active fighting between the two, but we certainly do see it in the form of the Taliban engaging Daesh.
In terms of numbers, this is really still a swag. We do think that Al Qaida is probably somewhere between 100 and 300 here in Afghanistan. I think you're probably all aware there's really kind of two components to Al Qaida here. There's core Al Qaida someplace in the region, again led by Zawahiri running their global efforts.
And then the most recent franchise from Al Qaida is Al Qaida in the Indian subcontinent, or AQIS. And we do see a bit of a presence from them. And they are probably more of a threat to Afghanistan and certainly Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, if you will.
And you know, on the top of Al Qaida and the way that they're spread out, what it really does reinforce to us is that going after this terrorism threat really does become a regional issue. And it requires everybody in the region to be focused on it, and everybody in the region to be trying to cut down on these ungoverned spaces where Al Qaida typically thrives, and everybody to essentially be working together to get after what is a joint problem.
CAPT. DAVIS: All right. Next to Luis Martinez, from ABC.
Q: Hi, General. If I could follow up on two points there.
You mentioned there that the Taliban has been taking on ISIS or Daesh in the east. How much of the pressure that you're talking about, that they're -- that they're moving out of the areas because of all the pressure that they're getting, how much of that is due to that infighting versus the Afghan forces taking them on?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Hi, Mr. Martinez. I don't have a good number or estimate. I don't really have a good metric for you.
What I do know is that the Taliban at a local level, and you know, from a district level will engage Daesh. And then of course, on subsequent days, ANDSF will engage Daesh, subsequent days, the U.S. will take counterterrorism strikes.
So, I don't know what is the biggest contributor to that. But again, what we do see, and as you probably know well, Kunar has historically been a safe haven, and a place to escape to and a place to run to.
What we do see is an effort by Daesh trying to escape from the pressure that they're under. I don't know if that answers your question completely, but we just don't have a good specific number for you, or a good specific way to measure who has got more influence.
Q: And those 80 airstrikes that you said have been targeting them since the start of the year.
Are these against large formations, or are these against infrastructure? What are we talking about, here?
GEN. CLEVELAND: It's primarily, Mr. Martinez, against people. And what I mean by that is we want to aggressively target every component of this network that we can.
I think historically, what we found is if you try and focus on leadership, or you try and focus on facilitators and enablers, you miss part of the bigger picture.
And so, what we're trying to do is target every aspect of this network to keep them under constant pressure. And once you keep them under constant pressure, than they're more worried about staying alive than they are about planning their attack. And it also serves as a disrupting function.
So, you're able to keep them under pressure, and you are able to disrupt whatever your future operations are.
Q: I'd like to do one more. In the north, Kunduz was taken by surprise last year because of resurgent Taliban activity there.
How would you assess the Taliban up in the north right now? And is the spring offensive that you mentioned by the Afghan forces, is it targeted in that area?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, thanks, Mr. Martinez.
I would characterize the Taliban up there as active, there's no doubt about it. They've got a strong presence up there, they have had a focus up there, particularly since they had what I think was kind of an unexpected success for them last September, when they, you know, blew open the prison, and then just kind of stormed Kunduz.
We do think that was somewhat unexpected, but we do think that they're trying to capitalize on that, so they are active.
In terms of the ANDSF operations, again, that kicked off about three weeks or so ago. We do see the fighting up into the northeast, and the intent really by the ANDSF, as I mentioned earlier, is to try and take the fight to the enemy.
And in this particular case, keep them out and keep them from threatening Kunduz.
CAPT. DAVIS: Okay. Next to Kasim again, from Anadolu.
Q: Thanks, General.
Do you -- I'm not expecting you to get into intelligence, but in general, do you have any idea what Daesh is doing in the districts that it is controlling right now?
Are they just controlling the territory, or are they imposing certain rules and laws on the public over there? Or are they just militant groups walking around, or traveling around those districts?
Could you just update us if you have any general assessments?
GEN. CLEVELAND: I think it's a combination of everything you've mentioned. In some cases, they are trying to, just as we've seen in Iraq and Syria, they are trying to implement their larger plan in kind of the way that they'll take over areas in terms of the way that they just abuse the local population. In some areas, they're probably looking to be on the offense and trying to look for opportunities to expand.
But I guess, let me pause there. Does that kind of answer your question?
Q: (inaudible)
CAPT. DAVIS: You're getting a partial shake in the affirmative.
(Laughter.)
All right. Next, Andrew Tilghman, Military Times.
Q: General, back on ISIS, you indicated that maybe the commanders there had modified their sense of the threat there a bit over the past few months. I'd like to ask you a little bit about how -- how that's playing into some of the reviews and assessments about the future mission in Afghanistan and future force levels.
I mean, a few months ago, I had the sense that maybe that was going to be -- this emergent ISIS faction was going to be a real significant factor in figuring out what the future plans and trajectory was for the mission.
Can you sort of characterize that? Is that -- is that -- would you say that's a big thing in General Nicholson's thinking on this? Or has it become kind of a peripheral thing relative to the Taliban and some of the other issues in Afghanistan?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Mr. Tilghman. If I characterized it that we think the threat from Daesh has been significantly lessened, that's probably not accurate. What I would really describe it as, the capacity of Daesh we believe has been lessened. And their overall footprint in Nangarhar, we do believe has been lessened as well.
But that said, we do think that they still pose a potential real threat. And again, just based on their past performance, they have got the ability to catch fire very quickly. So, we do want to continue to have constant pressure on them.
Regarding General Nicholson's assessment, I would tell you everything for him is on the table right now. So he is looking at all of the threat aspects of it. He's looking at again the mission that he has been giving or given, and he's looking at the resourcing for all that.
So, without giving you any specifics, Daesh certainly does fall under the category of the threat piece. And so that is something he's considering.
CAPT. DAVIS: And back to Tom Bowman.
Q: Hey, General. You talked a bit about Helmand and the challenges there. I wonder if you could talk a little bit more about the east. You mentioned Ghazni. It's always been kind of a troubled area. Talk about the Taliban presence in the east. Have they grabbed any more territory or any areas you would call contested?
And also, we were told more than a year ago that the -- the casualty rate among the Afghan forces is unsustainable. I know it's early in the fighting season, but what are you seeing with casualty rates? Are they still pretty high? And also attrition we've always been told is a particular problem. If you could address that as well.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Mr. Bowman. So, starting really from Uruzgan. Uruzgan kind of beyond Helmand and the challenges that are ongoing in Helmand. Uruzgan is another concern for us as well. And we do see a concentration of the Taliban. We do see them, you know, from a district level in various areas around Tarinkot, so not specifically in the city of Tarinkot, but really in some of the outlying districts, if you will, we do see a Taliban presence there as well.
Kandahar, by and large has been fairly calm over the last six months or so. And of course, as soon as I say that, you know, we'll see something spectacular. But by and large, Kandahar has not been as much of a concern as it historically has been. Ghazni, as you mentioned, of course, Ghazni always has the potential presence of Taliban and Al Qaida. We do see, you know, we do have concerns about the threat, but by and large, we kind of find that southeast part of Afghanistan -- so the Ghazni and then the Paktia, Paktika, Khost area has not been at the same level of risk that we've seen in Helmand or Kunduz.
So let me pause there and hit the second part of the question. Really, where are we from a retention and a recruiting standpoint? And are the casualties sustainable?
Of course, the ANDSF had a very, very difficult year last year. And they, you know, we think they probably had about in the range of 5,500 or so killed; very difficult for any military to sustain. What we think, though, is when we look at 2015, and despite how tough it was, and despite how they were on the defense, what we really saw too is that the military did not collapse.
While they certainly took some hits, they were able to keep themselves together. So we don't have a Mosul here in Afghanistan. We don't have a Ramadi or a Fallujah or anything like that. This very young military was able to keep themselves together. And essentially, while they did lose some ground, essentially they were able to keep what they had from the beginning of the fighting season.
Recruiting and retention is a challenge for us, and it's an issue. And it's something that the Afghans are very focused on, and we're trying to help them with that as well. As we move into this fighting season, ultimately we do think that they are going to be more successful than they were last year.
First and foremost, they have got another year of fighting under their belt. And again, as you know, Mr. Bowman, very young military; very young security infrastructure. And so they've got another year of experience now under their belt.
The second piece is we have tried to collectively focus their efforts on a few key things. So as you've heard before, pulling them off these checkpoints; trying to get them to the point where they've got a capability in a strong point that they can then launch on the offense. We've also tried, as you're well aware, to really take a close look at the leadership. And kind of at the operational level, at the corps level and the tactical level, the Afghans have really replaced a lot of their leaders.
And then the final piece is they've gotten more capability than they had this time last year. So, I think you're all aware the Afghans now have a total of eight A-29 aircraft to be able to provide close-air support. The first four arrived in January. They've now hit their initial operating capability. And in fact, they are beginning to take their first strikes.
The next four arrive beginning of April. And we think in a couple of months, they will be up and moving. They've also got these MD-530 helicopters that they have been using now to provide fire support. And they've also increased some of their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability, where they've just now started employing their Scan Eagles, particularly down in Helmand.
So, I know that's a long way of telling you 5,500 casualties is incredibly difficult and incredibly difficult for any military to sustain. We do think, though, that we will see some improvement in their overall performance based on what I described to you previously.
Does that answer the question?
Q: That's good. And the 5,500 killed, how does that compare to '14? Do you have that figure?
GEN. CLEVELAND: I don't, unfortunately.
CAPT. DAVIS: Excuse me. To Courtney Kube.
Q: So, in addition to Tom's question about the attrition and the casualties of ANDSF, there were some reports this week of several members of ANDSF who left and joined the Taliban, and they took their training and equipment and uniforms and everything with them.
It was -- is this sort of a one-off? Or is this a trend that you're seeing around the country? Do you have any numbers of how many ANDSF troops may actually have turned to the Taliban?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, I saw the same reporting. I unfortunately don't have any numbers to kind of support that. Obviously, it's more than anecdotal, though. I saw the same reporting I think. And as we know over the last, you know, five, six, eight months, we saw unfortunately a drum beat of one person at a checkpoint turning against his comrades and either murdering his comrades or stealing their equipment.
It is a concern. I know it's a concern for the ANDSF leadership. We do believe that there is a tie back to the concept of having good, solid leadership so that at the very operational and tactical level, they're focused on trying to take care of their soldiers and make sure they get paid and fed and they've got ammunition and fuel.
And when you don't have that, it obviously does provide the opportunity, of course, or at least one motivation for some of those security forces to join the enemy.
So, again a long way of saying I don't have any specific numbers. We do hear those types of reports. But I just don't have a good way to characterize it for you in relation to the much larger security force capability.
Q: So you haven't seen any kind of trends of any Taliban infiltration of the ANDSF that's increased recently? Anything like that?
GEN. CLEVELAND: I haven't seen anything that's increased recently. You know, historically that has been a challenge. And again, sadly, we have seen at these various checkpoints where one person will turn, and then they end up killing their entire team.
But I don't know that I've seen it increase in the brief time that I've been here.
CAPT. DAVIS: All right. Anybody else?
With that, General, we thank you for your time, for your evening, and appreciate you coming to talk to us. We look forward to seeing you again. Thank you.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Great. Thank you very much to everybody, and I do appreciate your time today. And please let us know if we can assist you in any way.
Thanks, Jeff.
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