Nuclear Posture Review

April 6, 2010
2010 NPR in Context

• Third comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear policies and posture
  – Previous reviews in 1994 and 2001

• Conducted by DoD in close consultation with the Departments of State and Energy

• Builds on QDR and BMDR (released Feb. 1, 2010)

• Close consultation with Congress and allies throughout

Roadmap for implementing the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers
Adapting to a Changed Security Environment

• Focus on most urgent dangers: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism
  – Transnational terrorist groups seeking to acquire and use nuclear weapons
  – States pursuing nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community

• Enhance regional security architectures to strengthen deterrence of regional aggression and reassure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to their defense

• Reinforce strategic stability with Russia and China
  – U.S. and Russia still have more nuclear weapons than needed for stable deterrence

“Put an end to Cold War thinking”
NPR Policy Framework

1. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism

2. Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

3. Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels

4. Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners

5. Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism – Key Initiatives

• Lead international efforts to bolster nuclear non-proliferation regime
  – Strengthen IAEA safeguards and enforce compliance
  – Increase DOE non-proliferation programs by 25 percent (to $2.7 billion)

• Accelerate efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years
  – Enhance capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear materials

• Reaffirm U.S. commitment to fulfill NPT obligations including Article VI
  – New START, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
  – Comprehensive national R&D program on verification

• Renew U.S. commitment: to “hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD”
For Non-Nuclear Weapons States Compliant with Non-Proliferation Obligations:

• Strengthen the U.S. “negative security assurance”
  – “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations”
  – These states face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response if use CBW against the United States or its allies and partners
  – If biological threat grows, U.S. reserves right to adjust assurance

For Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Compliant States:

• The U.S. would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, our allies and partners
• For these states, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional or CBW attack

As long as nuclear weapons exist

• The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners
• Continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons
Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels

• New START: An essential next step
  – Treaty Limits
    ➢ 1,550 accountable strategic warheads (30 percent lower than SORT)
    ➢ 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
    ➢ 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers (50 percent lower than START I)
  – Retain nuclear Triad under New START
  – “De-Mirv” ICBMs to one warhead each to enhance crisis stability
  – Does not constrain U.S. missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities

• Make new investments in the U.S. command and control system to maximize Presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis

• Seek high-level dialogues with Russia and China to promote more stable and transparent strategic relationships
Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassurance of U.S. Allies and Partners

• U.S. committed to working with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence
  – Continue to enhance conventional capabilities, field regional missile defenses, and improve counter-WMD capabilities

• Key regional security architectures retain a nuclear component as long as nuclear threats to U.S. forces and allies remain
  – Retain capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter- and heavy bombers
  – Proceed with full scope life extension of B61 bomb
  – Retire nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N)

• Continue close consultations with allies and partners to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent
Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Arsenal

• **U.S. stockpile management principles:**
  – No nuclear testing – pursue ratification of CTBT
  – No new nuclear warheads: Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will only use previously tested designs and not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities
  – Study warhead sustainment options on case-by-case basis, considering all LEP approaches
  – Strong preference for refurbishment or re-use; replacement of nuclear components would require special Presidential authorization

• **Increase investments in the nuclear weapons complex**
  – Address aging infrastructure
  – Support Science, Technology, and Engineering
  – Recruit and retain key human capital in DoD and DoE
  – Continued leadership focus on the nuclear mission
Looking Ahead: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons

• Continue focus on preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism

• Strengthen regional security architectures while placing increased reliance on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities

• Engage Russia, after ratification and entry into force of New START, in negotiations aimed at achieving substantial further nuclear force reductions

• Following further reductions with Russia, engage other nuclear weapons states, over time, in a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide

• Continue to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist