Good morning and thank you for this opportunity to speak with you about the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released just over two weeks ago.

My organization has worked closely over the past year with others across OSD, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Services to support the Secretary of Defense in the conduct of this review.

We engaged throughout the QDR process not only with these stakeholders inside the Department of Defense, but also across the U.S. interagency system, with Congress, with our international allies and partners, with defense industry, and with defense scholars outside government. Our goal was to elicit feedback on our approach in real time and avoid one major point of criticism leveled at some past QDRs: that the resulting report emerged as if
from a black box completely divorced from the review process itself.

I believe we have benefitted tremendously through this more open and transparent process. I cannot recall a QDR that has ever had this degree of personal involvement from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who brought together senior DoD leaders and listened to them while also driving forward their own leadership vision for the Department.

Of course, you cannot please everyone. Each time we conduct a QDR, the bar for success is elevated. Even in the weeks prior to its release, critics and critiques of this QDR were vocal. Criticism is welcome and it is part of the conversation on the defense of our nation that keeps us strong and safe. I have participated in almost every QDR, beginning with the first in 1997, and the quadrennial cycle of critique that inevitably accompanies the review is by now tradition. Today affords an opportunity to respond to the major critiques of this QDR. After all, a good debate allows for a rebuttal.
Before going any further, I must disclose to you that I had aspirations only a few years ago to become a professional QDR critic. Out of government after thirteen years in the Pentagon, I authored a report on how to improve governance of the Department of Defense. My ingoing view had been that the QDR was more pain than gain for DoD. But in the course of my research, I changed my mind. Whatever its faults, the QDR offers one of the most important tools for the Secretary to guide the Department. Imperfect as it is, there isn’t a neat or easily imagined substitute for it when trying to match ends to ways and means. That is why other government agencies—from the Department of State to the Department of Homeland Security—are now undertaking their own quadrennial reviews. I’m particularly skeptical of critiques coming from anyone who hasn’t directly lived through at least one QDR and yet has recommendations on how to radically change its practice.

The most-often repeated critique of this QDR, and the one I think is least true, is that the 2010 QDR report lacks strategic vision and an overarching conceptual framework. To the contrary, the strategy of this QDR is realistically derived from an assessment of a complex
future security environment. The 2010 QDR rebalances U.S. military capabilities and reforms defense processes and institutions to prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter future conflict; prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of potential contingencies; and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. The strategy is informed by the best possible data—the hard-won knowledge of our current operations and a detailed set of scenarios exploring the most lethal and most plausible future threats. The strategy resulting from this QDR emphasizes flexibility of the force and investment in key enablers.

The second most-often repeated critique of this QDR is that the 2010 QDR report is too closely tied to the budget—in other words, that this QDR report is budget dressed as strategy. This QDR is a continuation of Secretary Gates’ FY10 vision for rebalancing and reform of the Department, and it is further reflected in the FY11 budget. Rather than viewing the evolutionary flow of these decisions, some have charged that the QDR was, ultimately, a simple justification of the decisions already made in FY10. Having experienced the analytic process that went into the QDR, I have to say that I reject this
charge wholesale. In the case of both the FY10 and FY11 budgets—and the conduct of the QDR—program decisions were made from analysis and resulting strategy and not from preordained conclusions or prescribed toplines. There is recognition across FY10, FY11, and the QDR that the Department has an obligation to reform its processes and be a good steward of U.S. taxpayer dollars while providing the right force size and structure to protect and defend U.S. interests. The President’s decision to increase defense spending makes clear that the Administration is bringing the necessary means to bear to execute its defense strategy.

Another oft-repeated critique applied to this QDR holds that the Department is overly focused on current conflicts at the expense of the real future high-end threats to our nation. A corollary to this critique is that the 2010 QDR report will not result in adequate funding for future force modernization.

Let me respond. First, as the Secretary of Defense has said many times, we are a nation at war. It would be irresponsible to our men and women in harm’s way not to focus first and foremost on responsibly drawing down all
combat forces in Iraq and defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere around the world. We need to ensure that our personnel have the resources required to do the job that we have asked.

Second, focusing on the future is a vital component of this QDR. As we look 20 years into the future, we cannot know with certainty what challenges we will face. We do know, however, that the operational environment appears increasingly taxing for our military forces, and particularly to their ability to project power into distant theaters in defense of allies or US interests. With a clear-eyed sense of the complex security landscape, we identified in this QDR six key mission areas that provide concrete objectives for our force. These six missions are to:

1. Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;
2. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;
3. Build the security capacity of partner states;
4. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
5. Prevent proliferation and counter WMD;
6. Operate effectively in cyberspace.

Third, ensuring force capability for future contingencies is more about what we put on our platforms and how we provide critical combat enablers than it is about raw numbers of platforms. Improvements in our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, our cyber operations, and our language and cultural skills are likely to be critical force multipliers across the entire spectrum of future conflict. Moreover, future success requires new ways of thinking, not just new end items. To that end, the Navy and Air Force have been directed to develop a new Air Sea Battle concept to address the critical future challenge posed by environments in which adversaries possess increasingly sophisticated anti-access capabilities.

In some cases the QDR has identified a capability or mission need for which there is no clear-cut solution. In areas such as long-range strike, we’ve ensured funding to maintain the research and development base while putting laser-like focus at the senior level on determining the right concept and investment mix to meet expected future operational needs in a fiscally and technologically responsible way.
It is somewhat ironic, then, that the next most common complaint about the 2010 QDR Report is that its strategic vision cannot be supported by long-term fiscal realities. In other words our wish list far exceeds our resources.

Defense spending is proposed at 4.7 percent of U.S. GDP in FY11, up from 2.9 percent in pre-9/11 spending, and up from 4.5 percent in FY09. President Obama has made clear that we need to return to fiscal discipline with the FY12 federal budget, as we emerge from the historic circumstances that necessitated continued growth in spending during a time of economic downturn. The President has also made clear that national security will be excluded from the fiscal spending freeze. The administration is strongly committed to resourcing our nation’s defense at levels consistent with the preservation of U.S. interests. The FY10 and FY11 budgets also made clear that the Department has entered an era of hard choices where paying for some programs may require cutting those that simply aren’t delivering.

I would also point out that this QDR has at its core a principle of sustainability that should reduce long-term
costs. It takes care of our people to ensure that we do not deplete our most critical national security resource. The QDR lays out a vision to reform how we do business. It also develops an enterprise-wide climate change adaptation and energy consumption strategy.

Finally, there are some critics who have charged that the QDR report is out of line with President Obama’s vision for the country. They argue that the QDR could not possibly reflect White House priorities because it was not preceded by a National Security Strategy. These critics fail to note that, dating back to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, no first-term QDR or QDR equivalent has ever been preceded by a National Security Strategy. Moreover, no QDR has even been so closely integrated with the National Security Staff and interagency to ensure the QDR’s alignment with the President’s national security priorities and in-progress National Security Strategy. The QDR is entirely consistent with the President’s vision as laid out in his Camp Lejeune, Prague, Westpoint, and Oslo speeches.

I believe that this QDR puts forward the foundations of a bipartisan defense agenda. As I was reminded by a recent
series of meetings with allies in European capitals, by and large, we have a remarkable degree of consensus in this country about what is required to defend our nation. In that spirit, I welcome critiques of this QDR as part of a long term debate over our nation’s defense. It is noteworthy to me that no one has yet proposed an alternative defense strategy, capability set, or detailed program profile for the Department in opposition to this QDR. Let us elevate our debate over national security: Critics should offer concrete alternatives, not try to score political points.

Let me close by thanking all of you for coming here today to take the time to think through the critical national security challenges ahead. Your ability to innovate and meet requirements for the dynamic and challenging world we face today and in the future. Having said my piece, I invite any questions, comments, or even further critiques you may have. Thank you.