WEBVTT 00:00.740 --> 00:02.290 - Committee will come to order. 00:03.570 --> 00:06.940 The committee meets with received testimony 00:06.940 --> 00:10.370 on the posture of US European Command, EUCOM, 00:11.382 --> 00:14.490 and we welcome our witness, General Scaparrotti. 00:15.720 --> 00:19.070 Chairman McCain asked that I submit a statement 00:19.070 --> 00:22.940 for the record on his behalf and read the following excerpt. 00:24.480 --> 00:28.140 "The United States faces a new strategic reality in Europe. 00:29.070 --> 00:32.770 "The first step in addressing it is to recognize the scope, 00:32.770 --> 00:35.970 "scale, and seriousness of the challenges Russia 00:35.970 --> 00:38.140 "presents to our national security 00:38.620 --> 00:40.420 "and to the international order. 00:40.970 --> 00:45.040 "Then we need a coherent strategy 00:45.040 --> 00:49.390 "and policy to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression 00:49.550 --> 00:52.160 "against the United States and our allies. 00:52.250 --> 00:55.100 "We must be prepared to face the world as it is, 00:55.140 --> 00:57.600 "not as we wish it to be." 00:58.440 --> 01:00.680 Your testimony today is extremely relevant, 01:00.900 --> 01:02.500 as the United States is engaged 01:02.500 --> 01:07.120 in a renewed great power competition with Russia. 01:07.160 --> 01:11.310 The National Defense Strategy prioritizes Russia and China 01:11.942 --> 01:15.680 and it's been stated by several of the top people 01:16.000 --> 01:19.360 that we're losing some of our edge 01:19.360 --> 01:20.560 that we've had in the past. 01:20.560 --> 01:24.230 We clearly see the growing threat from Russia, 01:24.230 --> 01:25.720 especially in Europe. 01:25.780 --> 01:27.860 Vladimir Putin recently discussed 01:27.860 --> 01:32.060 Russia's new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM, 01:32.210 --> 01:34.850 inter-continental hypersonic missile, 01:35.120 --> 01:39.130 nuclear powered cruise missiles and undersea drone. 01:39.370 --> 01:42.840 This is in addition to Russia's aggressive behavior 01:42.950 --> 01:45.370 in Ukraine and the cyber domain. 01:45.780 --> 01:46.680 Then there's China 01:46.800 --> 01:51.310 and their militaristic expansion in the Pacific. 01:51.430 --> 01:53.690 While this is not a part of your AOR, 01:53.690 --> 01:55.650 it's one where we, several of us, 01:56.000 --> 02:01.000 Senators Ernst and several of us just recently visited. 02:01.160 --> 02:03.070 We were watching what's going on there, 02:03.070 --> 02:06.340 and if something should happen in the East China Sea 02:06.470 --> 02:08.980 that would draw our assets over, 02:09.000 --> 02:11.840 that would have a direct effect on you, General. 02:12.640 --> 02:14.100 This week we received testimony 02:14.100 --> 02:16.000 from the Director of National Intelligence 02:16.000 --> 02:20.660 in which he stated "The risk of interstate conflict, 02:20.660 --> 02:22.890 "including among the world's great powers, 02:22.890 --> 02:26.650 "is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War." 02:26.740 --> 02:30.340 General Scaparrotti, we ask you to help this committee 02:30.490 --> 02:32.410 begin to think through the requirements 02:32.410 --> 02:34.500 necessary to implement the new strategy, 02:34.850 --> 02:37.480 and what resources and authorities you might need 02:37.610 --> 02:39.340 that you don't currently have. 02:39.580 --> 02:42.560 And thank you very much for attending, Senator Reed. 02:43.440 --> 02:44.840 - Oh, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 02:44.840 --> 02:46.160 and General Scaparrotti, 02:46.160 --> 02:47.720 thank you for joining us this morning. 02:47.720 --> 02:51.120 Let me also thank you for your service to the nation 02:51.260 --> 02:53.660 over many years, and please extend our gratitude 02:53.670 --> 02:55.140 to the military men and women 02:55.420 --> 02:56.920 and their families under your command 02:56.920 --> 02:58.760 for their commitment and service to the nation. 02:58.760 --> 02:59.593 Thank you. 02:59.720 --> 03:02.010 The new National Defense Strategy marks a shift 03:02.010 --> 03:03.980 in US defense priorities from terrorism 03:03.980 --> 03:07.250 to the reemergence of long-term strategic competition 03:07.250 --> 03:09.940 with near-peer rivals, particularly Russia and China. 03:10.370 --> 03:11.620 This morning's hearing is an opportunity 03:11.620 --> 03:14.420 to hear from General Scaparrotti on EUCOM's military plans 03:14.420 --> 03:15.720 and operational requirements 03:15.720 --> 03:17.540 for implementing the new defense strategy 03:17.540 --> 03:18.960 within the European theater. 03:19.530 --> 03:21.200 There can be no doubt that Russia 03:21.200 --> 03:23.580 poses a serious threat to US national security 03:23.620 --> 03:26.700 and that our allies and partners are also threatened. 03:27.080 --> 03:29.120 We have repeatedly heard from our intelligence leaders, 03:29.120 --> 03:31.430 including Director of National Intelligence Coats 03:31.430 --> 03:34.300 on Tuesday, that Russia is aggressively confronting 03:34.300 --> 03:35.950 the United States and its allies, 03:36.020 --> 03:38.650 seeking to destabilize the international order, 03:38.860 --> 03:41.100 which President Putin considers contrary 03:41.250 --> 03:43.440 to Russia's claim to great power status. 03:43.630 --> 03:46.330 Russia is also seeking to reassert a sphere of influence 03:46.330 --> 03:48.470 over its neighbors and has actively sought 03:48.470 --> 03:50.920 to prevent their further integration with Europe. 03:50.960 --> 03:52.540 To advance its strategic interests, 03:52.540 --> 03:54.020 Russia is using the full spectrum 03:54.020 --> 03:56.020 of capabilities at its disposal, 03:56.220 --> 03:58.270 from nuclear and conventional modernization 03:58.270 --> 04:00.760 to asymmetric operations below the threshold 04:00.760 --> 04:02.320 of direct military conflict. 04:02.770 --> 04:04.620 Just last week, President Putin engaged 04:04.620 --> 04:06.850 in nuclear and conventional saber-rattling 04:07.060 --> 04:09.260 in his annual address to the Russian nation. 04:09.780 --> 04:11.630 The Kremlin's hybrid aggression against the West 04:11.630 --> 04:14.390 includes deception, information warfare, cyber attacks, 04:14.390 --> 04:17.070 political influence, and malign financial influence. 04:17.340 --> 04:19.230 Russia is using the war in Ukraine 04:19.230 --> 04:22.200 as a test lab for new hybrid warfare tactics 04:22.200 --> 04:25.030 including, as the White House recently confirmed, 04:25.260 --> 04:29.020 the Russian military's NotPetya ransomware cyber attack 04:29.050 --> 04:30.090 against Ukraine. 04:30.690 --> 04:32.460 The intelligence community is already warning 04:32.460 --> 04:33.880 that Russia has launched an assault 04:33.880 --> 04:36.790 on the United States mid-term elections this year, 04:37.180 --> 04:39.120 with even more sophisticated tools 04:39.120 --> 04:41.240 than in the 2016 presidential election. 04:41.680 --> 04:43.060 General Scaparrotti, we will be interested 04:43.060 --> 04:45.370 in hearing what taskings, if any, you've received 04:45.370 --> 04:46.680 from the White House to disrupt 04:46.680 --> 04:49.610 and prevent Russian operations aimed at interfering 04:49.610 --> 04:51.420 with our democratic institutions 04:51.510 --> 04:53.210 as well as those of our allies. 04:53.740 --> 04:54.970 Over the last few years, 04:54.970 --> 04:57.070 Congress has authorized critical resources 04:57.070 --> 04:58.620 to reassure our allies and ensure 04:58.620 --> 05:01.960 a credible military deterrent against Russian aggression. 05:01.960 --> 05:04.670 The Fiscal Year 2019 defense budget request 05:04.670 --> 05:06.320 includes $6.5 billion 05:07.158 --> 05:09.508 for the European Deterrence Initiative, or EDI, 05:09.740 --> 05:11.540 to continue to enhance our deterrence 05:11.540 --> 05:13.440 and defense posture throughout Europe. 05:14.010 --> 05:15.230 The committee is interested in hearing 05:15.230 --> 05:18.330 your priorities for EDI for the coming fiscal year. 05:18.660 --> 05:20.340 I commend EUCOM for taking steps 05:20.340 --> 05:23.040 to start rebuilding the command's expertise on Russia, 05:23.200 --> 05:25.590 to better understand the Russian threat perception 05:25.590 --> 05:27.750 and the Kremlin's decision-making process. 05:27.940 --> 05:30.540 I remain concerned about our naval posture in Europe 05:30.540 --> 05:34.100 to counter the Russian threat, and EUCOM's cyber challenges. 05:34.550 --> 05:36.840 The US EDI funding has also been an effective tool 05:36.840 --> 05:38.450 for leveraging increased defense spending 05:38.450 --> 05:41.110 by our NATO allies, and I hope that will continue 05:41.110 --> 05:43.800 at the next NATO Summit planned for July in Brussels. 05:44.470 --> 05:45.920 As Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 05:45.920 --> 05:47.700 you play a critical role in ensuring 05:47.700 --> 05:49.570 that the Alliance is prepared to respond 05:49.570 --> 05:50.820 in the event of a crisis. 05:51.040 --> 05:53.890 In February, NATO Defense Ministers approved changes 05:53.890 --> 05:55.480 to the Alliance's command structure, 05:55.480 --> 05:56.570 including the establishment 05:56.570 --> 05:58.870 of a new joint force command for the Atlantic. 05:58.980 --> 06:00.610 An area of concern is the ability 06:00.610 --> 06:03.010 of the NATO force structure to respond quickly 06:03.010 --> 06:05.380 during the early stages of a crisis, 06:05.510 --> 06:08.050 before NATO reaches an Article 5 declaration. 06:08.480 --> 06:09.810 I would be interested in your views 06:09.810 --> 06:11.070 on whether additional authorities 06:11.070 --> 06:12.700 should be delegated to SACEUR 06:12.880 --> 06:14.480 to initiate the movement of forces 06:14.480 --> 06:16.250 as a crisis begins to unfold 06:16.480 --> 06:19.310 and before NATO members reach a political decision. 06:19.710 --> 06:21.160 Strategic competition with Russia 06:21.160 --> 06:24.240 is but one of the many challenges in the EUCOM theater. 06:24.760 --> 06:26.300 Relations with Turkey have been tense 06:26.300 --> 06:28.320 due to the instability and violence in Syria, 06:28.320 --> 06:29.700 and Turkey's decision to buy 06:29.700 --> 06:32.020 the Russian S-400 air defense system, 06:32.240 --> 06:33.650 which potentially jeopardizes 06:33.650 --> 06:36.180 the full range of US-Turkey defense cooperation. 06:36.530 --> 06:39.040 The flow of people seeking refuge across the Mediterranean 06:39.040 --> 06:40.280 into southern Europe has strained 06:40.280 --> 06:42.100 these nations' security resources, 06:42.130 --> 06:44.240 and has helped fuel the rise of nationalistic, 06:44.240 --> 06:46.790 anti-immigrant political parties in some countries. 06:46.840 --> 06:49.520 And long-standing, simmering resentments in the Balkans 06:49.520 --> 06:51.570 risk increased instability in the region. 06:51.890 --> 06:53.990 I look forward to this morning's testimony 06:54.220 --> 06:56.280 and again, thank you, General Scaparrotti 06:56.280 --> 06:58.110 for being here today and for your service. 06:58.110 --> 06:59.080 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 06:59.080 --> 07:00.530 - Thank you, Senator Reed. 07:03.250 --> 07:05.940 General, there's another hearing that's taking place 07:05.940 --> 07:06.773 at the same time. 07:06.773 --> 07:08.860 We have nine members of this committee 07:08.860 --> 07:10.640 that are also in Environment and Public Works, 07:10.640 --> 07:12.790 so if you see some movement back and forth, 07:12.910 --> 07:13.960 forgive us for that. 07:13.960 --> 07:15.790 And you're recognized for your opening statement. 07:15.790 --> 07:18.580 Anything you want, your entire statement 07:18.730 --> 07:19.563 will be part of the record 07:19.563 --> 07:21.760 and try to confine it to around five minutes. 07:23.250 --> 07:24.083 - Thank you, Chairman. 07:24.083 --> 07:26.130 Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 07:26.210 --> 07:28.120 distinguished members of the committee. 07:28.120 --> 07:30.330 Thank you for the opportunity to testify 07:30.700 --> 07:31.533 before you today 07:31.533 --> 07:34.510 as the commander of the United States European Command. 07:35.000 --> 07:38.640 It's an honor to represent more than 60,000 men and women 07:38.640 --> 07:42.320 who are forward-deployed supporting US' mission in Europe. 07:42.730 --> 07:44.720 Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, 07:44.720 --> 07:46.910 our Coast Guardsmen and civilian workforce 07:46.910 --> 07:50.200 continue to demonstrate selfless service and dedication 07:50.200 --> 07:51.620 in an increasingly complex 07:51.620 --> 07:53.530 and competitive security environment. 07:54.170 --> 07:55.590 Our adaptation to this environment 07:55.590 --> 07:58.150 has made significant progress thanks to the resourcing 07:58.150 --> 07:59.620 provided by Congress. 07:59.870 --> 08:02.940 Particularly under the European Deterrence Initiative. 08:03.710 --> 08:06.320 EUCOM deeply appreciates Congress' support for EDI, 08:07.290 --> 08:09.503 which has supported the largest reinforcement 08:09.503 --> 08:12.950 of Euro-Atlantic defense in a generation. 08:13.740 --> 08:14.910 In this reinforcement, 08:14.910 --> 08:17.660 the US has been joined by NATO alliance, 08:17.690 --> 08:20.250 which remains a keystone to our national security, 08:20.250 --> 08:22.690 as it has been for almost seven decades. 08:23.250 --> 08:25.650 I'm proud to report that the alliance is strong, 08:26.150 --> 08:29.130 it is unified, and it's committed to being fit for purpose. 08:29.420 --> 08:31.210 Our European allies and Canada 08:31.210 --> 08:33.100 have turned the corner on defense spending 08:33.100 --> 08:35.700 with increases in each of the past three years. 08:36.190 --> 08:37.500 During this time they've added 08:37.500 --> 08:39.870 $46 billion to defense spending, 08:39.870 --> 08:44.180 including a $5 billion increase from 2016 to 2017. 08:44.890 --> 08:48.920 In 2018, eight countries will meet NATO's 2% spending target 08:49.260 --> 08:52.420 with at least 15 nations on pace to reach or exceed 08:52.420 --> 08:54.700 the 2% mark by 2024. 08:55.620 --> 08:57.610 Backed by these collective commitments, 08:57.610 --> 09:00.490 NATO's adapting to ensure its vigilance in peace, 09:00.980 --> 09:02.600 responsiveness in crisis, 09:02.600 --> 09:04.740 and that it possesses the strategic depth 09:04.740 --> 09:07.750 for a high-end, large-scale, multi-domain conflict. 09:08.510 --> 09:11.890 Together with NATO, the US has made significant progress, 09:11.890 --> 09:14.010 but we have much work to do as we execute 09:14.010 --> 09:15.670 our National Defense Strategy, 09:16.100 --> 09:18.330 fueling an increasingly lethal, agile, 09:18.330 --> 09:19.890 and resilient joint force 09:19.890 --> 09:22.840 in long-term strategic competition with Russia, 09:23.030 --> 09:26.140 and ready to counter violent extremist organizations. 09:27.370 --> 09:30.150 Russia is carrying out a campaign of destabilization 09:30.730 --> 09:34.100 to change the international order, fracturing NATO, 09:34.150 --> 09:36.700 and undermine US leadership around the world. 09:37.030 --> 09:40.060 To this end, Russia's advancing asymmetric capabilities 09:40.060 --> 09:42.440 in accordance with its concept of warfare, 09:42.620 --> 09:44.970 which envisions the employment of the full spectrum 09:44.970 --> 09:47.780 of military and non-military power. 09:48.220 --> 09:50.140 Throughout Europe, along its periphery 09:50.140 --> 09:51.710 in the Middle East, and beyond, 09:52.020 --> 09:54.480 Russia has demonstrated a willingness and capability 09:54.480 --> 09:57.130 to exert influence, spread disinformation, 09:57.130 --> 09:59.110 and undermine confidence in NATO. 09:59.600 --> 10:03.130 At sea, on land, in the air, frankly every domain, 10:03.130 --> 10:05.600 Russia's increasingly modernized military 10:05.600 --> 10:08.530 is operating at levels not seen since the Cold War. 10:09.290 --> 10:10.500 In response to the challenge 10:10.500 --> 10:12.510 posed by Russia's pursuit of power, 10:12.700 --> 10:14.660 the US has increased its posture in Europe 10:14.660 --> 10:16.540 by employing rotational forces 10:16.800 --> 10:19.560 to include an Armored Brigade Combat Team, 10:20.290 --> 10:22.980 a Combat Aviation Brigade, as well. 10:23.350 --> 10:24.610 Additionally, we've implemented 10:24.610 --> 10:26.380 the framework battalion task force 10:26.380 --> 10:28.930 for NATO's enhanced foreign presence in Poland. 10:29.430 --> 10:31.130 We have pre-positioned equipment 10:31.130 --> 10:34.010 for an additional Armored Brigade Combat Team. 10:34.170 --> 10:35.960 We've doubled the maritime deployments 10:35.960 --> 10:37.100 to the Black Sea. 10:37.560 --> 10:41.130 We've exercised theater anti-submarine warfare operations. 10:41.430 --> 10:45.140 We've executed bomber assurance and deterrence missions. 10:45.390 --> 10:46.380 And for the first time, 10:46.380 --> 10:49.010 we've deployed fifth-generation fighters to Europe. 10:49.870 --> 10:52.940 The US has taken these actions in coordination with NATO, 10:53.270 --> 10:55.970 which, since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, 10:55.970 --> 10:57.550 has made significant gains 10:57.550 --> 10:59.010 in meeting its security commitments 10:59.010 --> 11:00.570 and implementing decisions 11:00.810 --> 11:02.770 to enhance our collective defense. 11:03.250 --> 11:05.610 NATO has implemented its Enhanced Forward Presence 11:05.610 --> 11:07.760 with four multi-national battle groups 11:07.760 --> 11:09.620 backed by 29 nations. 11:09.960 --> 11:12.310 It's also established a tailored forward presence 11:12.310 --> 11:13.710 in the Black Sea region. 11:14.750 --> 11:16.870 Collectively, this enhanced deterrence posture 11:16.870 --> 11:19.590 is necessary to prevent further Russian aggression, 11:20.110 --> 11:23.490 preserve stability, and reassure allies and partners. 11:24.250 --> 11:25.640 The second major threat we face 11:25.640 --> 11:27.570 throughout the European area of operation 11:27.570 --> 11:29.440 is violent extremist groups. 11:29.850 --> 11:34.220 Since 2014, Europe has endured 18 major terrorist attacks. 11:34.760 --> 11:37.700 While the defeat ISIS coalition, which include NATO, 11:37.700 --> 11:40.390 recovers seized territory in Iraq and Syria, 11:40.630 --> 11:42.270 ISIS remains active and seeks 11:42.270 --> 11:44.680 to expand its operations across Europe. 11:45.930 --> 11:49.210 EUCOM provides forces for military operations against ISIS, 11:49.210 --> 11:51.280 such as Operation Inherent Resolve, 11:51.500 --> 11:53.800 and has increased information intelligence sharing 11:53.800 --> 11:57.120 among its US agencies, international partners, 11:57.120 --> 11:58.340 and the private sector. 12:02.114 --> 12:03.365 With the EU and NATO, 12:03.410 --> 12:05.870 EUCOM supports a tri-nodal community of action 12:06.150 --> 12:08.500 to identify and counter terrorist threats. 12:08.950 --> 12:11.840 Also, EUCOM has increased coordination with Europol 12:11.840 --> 12:14.310 and Interpol to thwart terrorist activities. 12:15.060 --> 12:17.940 Our European allies deploy forces worldwide 12:18.250 --> 12:21.060 to support US-led counter-terrorism operations, 12:21.060 --> 12:24.230 including OIR and Operation Freedom Central, 12:24.800 --> 12:27.610 and to conduct national counter-terrorism missions. 12:27.650 --> 12:29.420 The allies are committed to this fight, 12:29.420 --> 12:31.240 and their support is essential 12:31.240 --> 12:33.350 to ongoing counter-terrorism efforts. 12:34.540 --> 12:36.020 In addition to deterring Russia 12:36.020 --> 12:38.110 and defeating violent extremist organizations, 12:38.810 --> 12:41.180 EUCOM is working to strengthen strategic partnerships, 12:41.180 --> 12:42.960 bolster regional security, 12:42.960 --> 12:45.800 and reinforce a free and open international order 12:46.000 --> 12:48.850 conducive to our security and prosperity. 12:49.550 --> 12:51.920 Thanks to the resources provided by Congress, 12:51.920 --> 12:55.350 particularly through the European Deterrence Initiative, 12:55.650 --> 12:57.610 EUCOM has made significant headway 12:57.610 --> 12:59.480 in establishing a defense posture 12:59.870 --> 13:02.000 that is credible, capable, and relevant 13:02.000 --> 13:03.680 to our strategic objectives. 13:04.340 --> 13:06.630 As our National Defense Strategy states, 13:06.630 --> 13:09.510 a strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles 13:09.510 --> 13:11.570 of democracy, national sovereignty, 13:11.570 --> 13:14.620 and commitment to Article 5 of NATO's Washington Treaty, 13:14.770 --> 13:16.440 is vital to our security. 13:16.970 --> 13:19.440 The service members and civilians at EUCOM 13:19.440 --> 13:21.490 stand ready to protect the homeland, 13:21.650 --> 13:23.770 strengthen the alliance, and defend a Europe 13:23.770 --> 13:25.910 that's whole, free, and at peace. 13:26.120 --> 13:27.180 Mr. Chairman, thank you, 13:27.180 --> 13:29.230 and I look forward to the committee's questions. 13:29.800 --> 13:31.910 - Thank you, General Scaparrotti. 13:32.310 --> 13:33.810 That's an excellent statement. 13:36.580 --> 13:39.550 I think we all look at Russia now 13:39.779 --> 13:42.410 and with the new strategy that we have 13:42.410 --> 13:45.500 we include both China and Russia as the threats. 13:45.500 --> 13:48.120 Of course in your AOR, it's primarily Russia, 13:48.120 --> 13:50.240 and we've seen advancements. 13:50.270 --> 13:53.990 There was a RAND report that came out yesterday. 13:53.990 --> 13:55.790 There are three things in the RAND report 13:55.790 --> 13:57.700 that I want to refer to. 13:57.700 --> 14:00.270 One was in 2016, 14:00.380 --> 14:04.790 Russia spent 5.3% of its GDP on the military. 14:05.300 --> 14:06.820 It's important as we look at similarly 14:06.820 --> 14:09.720 what we are expecting from our NATO partners 14:10.400 --> 14:12.220 to recognize this. 14:12.440 --> 14:14.000 Second thing that was in that report: 14:14.000 --> 14:17.640 Russia has the ability to defeat a NATO ally 14:17.640 --> 14:21.620 and present NATO with a strategic and operational challenge, 14:21.770 --> 14:26.710 specifically that Russian forces could reach the capitals 14:26.890 --> 14:30.030 of Estonia and Latvia in 60 hours. 14:30.260 --> 14:34.870 And third, they say Russia has approximately 32,000 troops 14:34.870 --> 14:38.550 in the Baltic region, compared to 78,000 for Russia 14:38.770 --> 14:43.770 and that NATO is outnumbered 757, 14:44.160 --> 14:44.993 that's Russia, 14:44.993 --> 14:49.350 to 129 in NATO in tanks in the AOR. 14:49.350 --> 14:51.510 In addition to the RAND report that came out, 14:51.510 --> 14:53.380 the Army Times article this morning. 14:55.680 --> 14:58.030 It says the army plans on repositioning 14:58.230 --> 15:03.150 two fully modernized armored brigade sets of equipment 15:03.230 --> 15:04.490 in Belgium and Netherlands. 15:04.490 --> 15:06.570 And as you said in your opening statement, 15:06.570 --> 15:09.130 in addition to one, I guess, 15:09.290 --> 15:12.190 rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team. 15:12.190 --> 15:16.120 So to set this hearing off, 15:16.120 --> 15:18.760 let me ask you a series of five, 15:19.240 --> 15:21.410 these should be yes or no questions. 15:21.470 --> 15:23.960 However, there's no such thing as a yes or no question 15:23.960 --> 15:25.070 in Washington. 15:26.180 --> 15:30.160 First, the national security advisor, General McMaster, 15:30.160 --> 15:33.760 stated that US ground forces are, quote, 15:33.760 --> 15:36.220 this is his quote now, 15:36.230 --> 15:38.760 "out-ranged, out-gunned, and over-matched 15:38.760 --> 15:40.580 "by Russian ground forces." 15:40.580 --> 15:41.730 Do you agree with that? 15:43.540 --> 15:45.870 - Chairman, if you look at it in a... 15:47.160 --> 15:51.740 In a concentrated way, on the border of Eastern Europe, 15:54.030 --> 15:55.720 and only on the ground force, 15:55.720 --> 15:57.420 I would agree with that statement. 15:57.700 --> 15:59.710 We fight multi-domain, however. 15:59.710 --> 16:01.060 - I understand that. 16:01.290 --> 16:04.060 The report, the RAND report, paints a pretty bleak picture 16:04.060 --> 16:06.990 and warns that NATO could be overwhelmed 16:06.990 --> 16:11.310 by superior Russian firepower in a war in Eastern Europe. 16:11.440 --> 16:13.090 Do you agree with that statement? 16:17.640 --> 16:19.530 - Chairman, would you state that again, please? 16:19.530 --> 16:22.790 - Yes, the statement that was in the report 16:23.820 --> 16:27.560 says that NATO could be overwhelmed 16:27.560 --> 16:29.830 by superior Russian firepower 16:31.240 --> 16:32.850 in a war in Eastern Europe. 16:33.780 --> 16:35.290 - Chairman, I don't agree with that. 16:35.290 --> 16:36.740 When you look at NATO writ large, 16:36.740 --> 16:38.980 it has the strength of 29 nations. 16:40.290 --> 16:42.210 The effort that's being made in NATO 16:42.240 --> 16:44.290 and the one that's being made here in the United States 16:44.290 --> 16:47.110 is to increase our capability to deter, 16:47.110 --> 16:48.610 and if necessary, defend. 16:48.610 --> 16:50.360 - Okay, that's a good statement. 16:50.770 --> 16:52.750 I'm not asking you to agree with this, 16:52.750 --> 16:56.430 but I am concerned when we have so many reports coming out. 16:56.860 --> 16:58.460 It's important for the American people 16:58.460 --> 17:00.750 to understand the threats that we do face, 17:00.840 --> 17:04.010 not just here, but in China also. 17:06.120 --> 17:07.770 And then the third thing it said: 17:07.770 --> 17:10.930 do we have adequate US forces postured throughout Europe 17:10.930 --> 17:12.100 to meet the challenge? 17:12.290 --> 17:13.260 I think you've already answered that. 17:13.260 --> 17:14.093 And it says, 17:14.093 --> 17:17.440 and then Russia has developed a ground launch cruise missile 17:17.440 --> 17:19.400 in violation of the INF Treaty. 17:19.400 --> 17:21.340 Do you agree with that? 17:21.610 --> 17:22.740 I'm sure you do. 17:23.640 --> 17:28.640 And lastly, like we saw two weeks ago in China, 17:30.017 --> 17:31.980 and what they're doing in the South China Sea, 17:31.980 --> 17:33.560 and as I've said in my opening statement, 17:33.560 --> 17:36.440 this is not something that is in your AOR. 17:36.440 --> 17:39.440 But, as we have to meet those challenges, 17:39.440 --> 17:41.300 and this was a much greater challenge 17:41.300 --> 17:44.690 than I thought it was before I was over there two weeks ago, 17:45.380 --> 17:48.230 it still would draw off resources from you 17:48.230 --> 17:49.400 and from your AOR, 17:49.860 --> 17:52.700 so it's someone you have to be very sensitive to. 17:52.870 --> 17:55.560 So I'd say, how did you partner 17:56.200 --> 17:58.170 on the cybersecurity side 17:58.950 --> 18:01.950 with the cyber command to prevent and mitigate threats 18:02.650 --> 18:04.220 that's in cyber threats now? 18:05.696 --> 18:07.290 You wanna talk a little bit about that? 18:08.190 --> 18:09.040 - Yes, Chairman. 18:09.460 --> 18:11.400 First of all, in terms of the cyber world, 18:11.400 --> 18:14.210 it's interesting, because we each have cyber centers. 18:14.560 --> 18:18.840 We each have teams committed through Cybercom to us, 18:19.240 --> 18:22.080 but cyber doesn't have boundaries like we do 18:22.080 --> 18:25.210 between I and General Waldhauser on the ground. 18:25.350 --> 18:26.640 So I think it's pretty fluid 18:26.640 --> 18:28.810 and Cybercom is the one that helps us 18:30.110 --> 18:33.100 shift resources that might need to be shifted, 18:33.100 --> 18:36.320 and certainly we share very closely with him 18:36.540 --> 18:38.310 any intelligence that we have, et cetera, 18:38.310 --> 18:39.460 that affects their AOR. 18:39.638 --> 18:40.980 So I think there's a close relationship. 18:40.980 --> 18:43.270 - Yeah, well, and this is the new threat. 18:43.430 --> 18:44.980 This is something that the general public 18:44.980 --> 18:46.320 is not very familiar with. 18:46.750 --> 18:49.950 One last thing I'd want you get on the record: 18:50.520 --> 18:53.990 we have this requirement in NATO for a 2% requirement, 18:54.140 --> 18:56.070 and as it is right now... 18:58.944 --> 18:59.777 In 2018, 19:01.360 --> 19:03.120 the secretary general estimates 19:03.120 --> 19:05.610 eight of 29 NATO allies will meet this, 19:05.610 --> 19:07.610 and then it will get up to 15 allies 19:07.610 --> 19:09.990 by the end of 2024. 19:10.170 --> 19:13.100 Now, recently there have been a lot of these countries 19:13.100 --> 19:14.640 complaining about this, 19:14.720 --> 19:18.500 and are you concerned that some of the European officials 19:18.500 --> 19:23.210 criticize the 2% requirement as arbitrary and unrealistic? 19:24.540 --> 19:25.730 - Chairman, I'm concerned. 19:25.730 --> 19:27.590 They need to invest in defense. 19:28.120 --> 19:31.240 We've discussed the complexity of this environment, 19:31.240 --> 19:32.590 and particularly in Europe, 19:32.960 --> 19:35.290 and of course we strongly encourage them 19:35.290 --> 19:36.260 to meet that 2%, 19:36.420 --> 19:39.830 but also the 20% requirement in modernization, 19:39.830 --> 19:42.620 focused at specific capabilities 19:43.290 --> 19:45.160 that are relevant to the environment we're in. 19:45.160 --> 19:46.570 - Yeah, that's was one of the first things 19:46.570 --> 19:49.930 when President Trump took office that he examined, 19:49.930 --> 19:53.400 was the burden-sharing of NATO, and I agree with that, too. 19:53.400 --> 19:54.233 Senator Reed. 19:55.418 --> 19:56.251 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 19:56.251 --> 19:57.580 Thank you, General Scaparrotti. 19:57.720 --> 20:00.850 As we all note, 20:02.010 --> 20:06.110 Russia has significant conventional power and so does NATO. 20:08.610 --> 20:10.050 They seem to be focusing their attention 20:10.050 --> 20:12.480 on asymmetric warfare, knowing that a conventional fight 20:12.480 --> 20:16.010 with NATO would probably not be something they could win. 20:16.010 --> 20:17.330 Is that your estimate? 20:18.690 --> 20:19.523 - Yes, sir. 20:19.523 --> 20:21.300 I think part of their strategy is first of all, 20:21.300 --> 20:23.550 that as you look at their doctrine, 20:23.550 --> 20:27.180 they intend to use activities below the level of conflict 20:27.180 --> 20:28.650 to undermine their opponent. 20:29.840 --> 20:32.490 And if that would go well, 20:32.490 --> 20:35.390 they would undermine their opponent without firing a shot. 20:36.358 --> 20:37.640 I would like to make the statement that I think 20:37.640 --> 20:41.080 that while they have advantages, even conventionally, 20:41.080 --> 20:43.670 due to interior alliance proximity 20:43.670 --> 20:46.900 and size of force, which was noted by the chairman, 20:47.340 --> 20:50.600 in the longer run, NATO has great advantages 20:50.600 --> 20:52.740 that they actually recognize and fear. 20:53.080 --> 20:53.913 - Thank you. 20:54.588 --> 20:55.570 Getting into the asymmetric warfare, 20:55.570 --> 20:58.940 one of the most disturbing aspects recently 20:58.940 --> 21:00.960 is the integration of information warfare 21:00.960 --> 21:02.560 in cyber operations. 21:03.800 --> 21:07.450 And as you pointed out, cyber has no real limits. 21:07.450 --> 21:11.460 So again, we've seen quite extensive activity 21:11.460 --> 21:12.550 in the Ukraine, 21:13.260 --> 21:15.810 but have you noticed that 21:16.810 --> 21:19.380 similar organizations in Russia are concentrating, 21:19.380 --> 21:21.810 not just on the Ukraine, but also on the United States? 21:21.810 --> 21:25.380 Are you beginning to pick up indications of efforts 21:25.380 --> 21:28.140 that are directed against us directly? 21:30.820 --> 21:33.340 - Chairman, I'll say that I have. 21:33.900 --> 21:36.430 I've seen activity related to... 21:39.460 --> 21:42.060 Infrastructure reconnaissance, et cetera, 21:42.060 --> 21:43.850 within the United States, and I'll leave it at that. 21:43.850 --> 21:44.683 - Fine. 21:45.700 --> 21:49.430 Are we, to your knowledge and the intelligence community 21:49.870 --> 21:51.370 and the geographic commanders, 21:51.630 --> 21:56.000 trying to map out the Russian cyber infrastructure, 21:57.580 --> 22:02.580 how it's delegated to commercial quote unquote enterprises, 22:02.700 --> 22:05.600 how it's sometimes retained by the intelligence community 22:05.600 --> 22:06.520 in Russia, etc? 22:06.810 --> 22:08.620 Have we got a good picture of that? 22:08.750 --> 22:12.050 Because if we don't, then it's hard to respond. 22:12.350 --> 22:15.410 - My personal opinion is yes, we're trying to map that out. 22:15.700 --> 22:17.520 We're getting better understanding of it. 22:17.520 --> 22:21.530 I would not characterize it as a good picture at this point. 22:22.490 --> 22:25.040 Not satisfactory to me, thank you. 22:25.250 --> 22:29.760 - Are you getting, not only the resources, 22:29.760 --> 22:33.430 but the clear direction to fill in the missing pieces 22:35.000 --> 22:37.200 from your perspective, as well as worldwide? 22:38.290 --> 22:39.123 - Yes. 22:40.960 --> 22:44.120 I have had my cyber operations center 22:44.120 --> 22:46.060 reinforced substantially. 22:46.060 --> 22:48.610 We've made good progress, and over the next two years, 22:48.610 --> 22:51.910 thanks to both the funding here in Congress 22:51.910 --> 22:53.370 as well as from Cybercom, 22:55.720 --> 22:59.260 that will continue to give me the skills 22:59.260 --> 23:01.110 that I need in my cyber center. 23:01.600 --> 23:04.520 I also, upon request, have the authorities 23:04.520 --> 23:07.100 that I've asked for with respect to Russia 23:07.710 --> 23:10.220 over the past year to 18 months. 23:11.850 --> 23:13.930 - Every time we get on this topic, 23:14.110 --> 23:18.270 very quickly the whole-of-government response comes up, 23:18.600 --> 23:21.300 so how would you assess our whole-of-government response? 23:21.300 --> 23:23.170 You have Cybercom 23:23.517 --> 23:24.400 within the DoD chain of command, et cetera, 23:25.530 --> 23:27.960 but the intelligence community, the Treasury Department, 23:27.960 --> 23:29.330 Homeland Security, 23:29.910 --> 23:32.660 do you feel there's a unified effort 23:32.770 --> 23:35.720 among all these different agencies and the State Department 23:35.800 --> 23:39.020 to effectively confront this threat? 23:39.820 --> 23:42.910 - I don't believe there's an effective unification 23:43.190 --> 23:44.690 across the inter-agency 23:45.010 --> 23:47.710 with the energy and the focus that we could attain. 23:49.801 --> 23:51.801 - And that's something that is something 23:52.580 --> 23:55.530 we should do immediately, because the nature of the threat. 23:56.170 --> 23:57.340 - Yes, Senator, it is. 24:00.480 --> 24:01.313 - Just to... 24:02.820 --> 24:04.670 Change slightly, 24:07.090 --> 24:08.250 we are, 24:09.160 --> 24:10.770 and you are, constantly trying 24:10.770 --> 24:14.000 to assess the strength, the weaknesses, 24:14.000 --> 24:16.940 of the Russian forces going forward, 24:17.130 --> 24:18.730 and not just the Russian forces. 24:19.650 --> 24:22.040 Any sort of top-line sort of estimate 24:22.120 --> 24:26.580 of long-term their ability to be competitive with us? 24:28.770 --> 24:30.150 - Senator, in this setting, 24:30.150 --> 24:32.380 I would say that given their modernization 24:32.380 --> 24:33.520 and the pace that it's on 24:33.520 --> 24:35.930 and what we are aware of they're doing, 24:36.350 --> 24:39.090 we have to maintain our modernization 24:39.090 --> 24:40.150 that we've set out 24:41.230 --> 24:42.760 so that we can remain dominant 24:42.760 --> 24:45.300 in the areas that we are dominant today. 24:45.730 --> 24:47.140 If we were not to do that, 24:47.140 --> 24:49.010 I think their pace would put us 24:49.550 --> 24:52.170 certainly challenged in almost every domain 24:52.600 --> 24:55.690 in a military perspective by, say, 2025. 24:56.725 --> 24:57.780 - Just a final question. 24:58.260 --> 25:00.860 Part of this is significant investments, 25:00.860 --> 25:03.990 not just in platforms, but in basic research, 25:04.900 --> 25:07.780 which during the Cold War they were and we were 25:07.890 --> 25:10.060 deeply engaged at our national effort. 25:10.060 --> 25:12.680 Are they engaged in this kind of basic research, 25:12.680 --> 25:14.710 quantum computing, AI, et cetera, 25:14.710 --> 25:16.600 to the same extent? 25:16.680 --> 25:17.580 - Yes, they are. 25:17.760 --> 25:18.593 - [Reed] Thank you. 25:18.593 --> 25:19.426 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 25:19.426 --> 25:20.600 - [Inhofe] Senator Wicker. 25:20.740 --> 25:23.220 - General, you did read and study 25:23.220 --> 25:26.370 that RAND report classified and unclassified, did you not? 25:27.010 --> 25:28.350 - [Scaparrotti] Yes, I did. 25:28.360 --> 25:29.193 - Okay. 25:30.450 --> 25:35.410 In that regard, Chairman McCain just asked Senator Inhofe 25:35.590 --> 25:37.170 to read a statement in which he said 25:37.170 --> 25:40.260 there's a new strategic reality in Europe. 25:40.370 --> 25:42.120 General Dunford is quoted as saying 25:42.300 --> 25:46.420 the United States is losing some of our past edge. 25:47.300 --> 25:49.550 You have the report from RAND, 25:49.660 --> 25:54.120 which none of us enjoyed listening to or studying, 25:54.120 --> 25:56.700 where it said there are plausible scenarios 25:56.700 --> 26:00.240 where the United States could lose a war with Russia. 26:02.900 --> 26:03.860 In that regard, 26:04.650 --> 26:09.140 what did we learn from the Russian Zapad exercises, 26:10.710 --> 26:13.890 war game exercises in Eastern Europe in late 2017 26:15.780 --> 26:18.470 regarding their intentions and capabilities? 26:19.140 --> 26:22.690 How well-prepared are we based on what we've learned there? 26:22.870 --> 26:26.500 And then I want to ask you to respond generally 26:27.600 --> 26:30.860 about where you think the RAND report 26:30.860 --> 26:35.680 is missing the mark and where you think they're accurate. 26:38.630 --> 26:40.550 - Senator, with regard to Zapad, 26:42.490 --> 26:44.530 for the most part, what Zapad did 26:44.530 --> 26:46.560 is reinforce what we believed 26:47.180 --> 26:49.840 was their direction in terms of their doctrine, 26:49.840 --> 26:51.770 their training, their modernization. 26:52.930 --> 26:55.940 They focused on command and control 26:55.980 --> 26:57.520 from strategic to tactical, 26:57.520 --> 26:59.850 and we saw that throughout the exercise. 27:00.670 --> 27:03.610 They focused on both conventional and nuclear, 27:03.610 --> 27:04.860 which we expected. 27:05.750 --> 27:10.750 They focused on both offensive, defensive operations, 27:11.750 --> 27:14.130 and they incorporated what I would call 27:14.130 --> 27:15.910 a whole-of-society approach. 27:15.910 --> 27:17.690 They mobilized their people, et cetera, 27:17.690 --> 27:19.340 in some aspects of this. 27:20.290 --> 27:22.960 And so for us, it was a reinforcement 27:23.220 --> 27:25.580 of the doctrine that we've seen developing 27:26.580 --> 27:28.950 over the last, I'd say 10 years. 27:31.760 --> 27:33.960 From that, we learn from watching, 27:33.960 --> 27:37.310 and it helps us posture our force 27:37.310 --> 27:39.230 and train our force. 27:39.470 --> 27:43.360 And also, the development of our plans, obviously. 27:43.360 --> 27:46.590 So we take that very seriously, watch it very closely. 27:46.590 --> 27:48.940 We had a focused effort to do so. 27:48.990 --> 27:50.100 And we'll employ it. 27:50.100 --> 27:52.410 And we'll be better as a result of that... 27:56.389 --> 27:58.120 Of that focused effort and their exercise. 27:58.120 --> 28:01.060 - [Wicker] So you were informed but we weren't shocked 28:01.100 --> 28:02.410 by anything we saw? 28:02.410 --> 28:03.400 - I was not. 28:03.610 --> 28:05.960 I was not shocked by anything that I saw. 28:06.950 --> 28:09.520 With respect to the RAND report, 28:11.290 --> 28:13.230 we have worked with RAND on this. 28:13.230 --> 28:17.320 In fact, it was 2014 or '15 when the base report was done. 28:18.250 --> 28:21.160 From the basis of the report, I don't have any argument 28:21.160 --> 28:25.150 with the basis of the report and the threat that we have, 28:25.150 --> 28:28.180 particularly in the eastern border, is what it's focused on. 28:30.950 --> 28:32.880 That report was also a basis 28:32.880 --> 28:35.740 from which we've developed our war planning in EUCOM, 28:35.740 --> 28:38.530 and since 2014, we've come a good ways, 28:38.530 --> 28:42.320 both in planning and with the posture of our forces there. 28:42.320 --> 28:45.560 So that report's been helpful in that regard. 28:46.887 --> 28:49.440 - Did you plan assuming that sequestration 28:49.440 --> 28:51.700 was gonna be lifted as it has now been? 28:52.960 --> 28:57.610 - We plan for what we need, Senator, yes. 28:57.610 --> 28:59.370 And having said that, 29:00.994 --> 29:03.530 the budget that we have before us today, 29:03.710 --> 29:07.790 with a two-year look as well that Congress has agreed to, 29:08.990 --> 29:12.940 funds all of those areas that I need in EUCOM 29:13.140 --> 29:15.440 to get my posture and my capabilities 29:15.440 --> 29:17.580 where it needs to be throughout the FYDP. 29:18.170 --> 29:20.350 So it's an important one. 29:22.180 --> 29:23.600 The last point I'll make on this 29:23.600 --> 29:27.290 is that we have re-postured forces 29:27.290 --> 29:29.270 since the RAND study was done. 29:30.110 --> 29:33.010 We've rewritten plans since that. 29:33.300 --> 29:35.050 And we would fight this differently 29:35.787 --> 29:36.840 than RAND fought it, 29:37.240 --> 29:41.490 fought that experiment or that exercise that they did. 29:42.080 --> 29:43.480 But there's elements of that 29:44.700 --> 29:46.680 that are still true today. 29:46.850 --> 29:50.760 Hence my comment that I don't have all the forces 29:50.760 --> 29:52.240 I need in Europe today, 29:52.410 --> 29:54.990 and we've got to continue to invest 29:55.430 --> 29:57.850 and establish the posture that's required. 29:59.610 --> 30:02.440 - Okay, based on what we're going to do 30:02.440 --> 30:04.110 the 23rd of this month 30:04.590 --> 30:07.210 regarding this fiscal year and the next fiscal year, 30:07.526 --> 30:10.000 how are you gonna get the forces you need? 30:14.350 --> 30:17.550 - The European Deterrence Initiative 30:17.570 --> 30:22.570 is a very foundational funding of the forces that I need. 30:23.090 --> 30:26.250 It is actually supporting the rotational forces 30:26.250 --> 30:28.160 that I noted in my opening statement, 30:28.700 --> 30:31.710 and my intent is to use that as well 30:31.710 --> 30:35.360 to begin to station or rotate additional forces, 30:35.360 --> 30:37.180 particularly enablers that I need. 30:38.230 --> 30:39.690 As you look across the FYDP, 30:39.690 --> 30:42.580 I can build the posture that I believe I need, 30:42.580 --> 30:45.280 given the funding that I foresee within the FYDP. 30:45.630 --> 30:46.463 - Just quickly, 30:47.055 --> 30:49.150 that's what number of troops today 30:49.150 --> 30:51.740 versus what you hope to get to? 30:51.870 --> 30:55.910 - Well, it's difficult to give you the number of troops. 30:56.660 --> 30:58.010 I could take this for the record 30:58.010 --> 31:00.410 and I can provide you by service 31:01.270 --> 31:03.670 the posture that I believe that we should be in. 31:03.700 --> 31:04.730 - [Wicker] Thank you. 31:05.310 --> 31:06.660 - [Inhofe] Senator Shaheen. 31:06.920 --> 31:07.820 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 31:07.820 --> 31:10.070 General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here 31:10.390 --> 31:11.540 and for your testimony. 31:12.660 --> 31:14.570 As we look at the potential 31:14.570 --> 31:17.130 for future Russian aggression in Europe, 31:17.360 --> 31:21.560 how important is it for them to feel some heat 31:21.560 --> 31:24.080 for what they're doing and to have 31:24.080 --> 31:26.580 that whole-of-government approach to respond 31:26.580 --> 31:27.870 to their activities? 31:28.040 --> 31:30.750 So for example, how important would it be 31:30.750 --> 31:32.400 for us to go ahead and implement 31:32.400 --> 31:36.340 the sanctions under CAATSA so they understand 31:36.340 --> 31:38.760 that if they continue their cyber intrusions, 31:38.760 --> 31:40.610 that there's gonna be a price to pay? 31:42.870 --> 31:45.630 - Senator, I think fundamental to deterrence 31:45.630 --> 31:49.030 is either denial or imposition of cost. 31:49.590 --> 31:52.510 So an effective deterrent has to have 31:52.510 --> 31:54.860 one of those elements or both, 31:54.860 --> 31:57.610 and it should have a communicate aspect to it as well 31:59.290 --> 32:03.080 that demonstrates both our capability and our will. 32:04.950 --> 32:07.620 - And do you... 32:07.620 --> 32:09.900 As you talk about that whole-of-government approach 32:09.900 --> 32:12.240 that you don't see happening right now, 32:12.790 --> 32:14.770 do you think that would accomplish 32:15.290 --> 32:17.280 a piece of the deterrence? 32:17.880 --> 32:20.380 - Well, I think yes, and you mentioned CAATSA. 32:20.380 --> 32:22.310 I think across the board 32:22.332 --> 32:23.850 that I don't necessarily ascribe 32:23.850 --> 32:25.270 that we should always do what they do. 32:25.270 --> 32:26.490 We shouldn't mirror them. 32:26.490 --> 32:28.890 But even that underscores the importance 32:28.890 --> 32:30.130 of a whole-of-government approach, 32:30.130 --> 32:32.550 that we oughta use our other elements of power 32:32.550 --> 32:36.060 as well together to demonstrate 32:37.290 --> 32:40.240 deterrence and also to establish limits 32:40.270 --> 32:41.600 on what's acceptable. 32:42.969 --> 32:44.720 - And so as you look at the potential 32:44.720 --> 32:49.260 for mischief in the future in other parts of Europe, 32:49.260 --> 32:51.440 where do you see the... 32:51.720 --> 32:53.620 Where are you most concerned 32:53.630 --> 32:57.040 about future Russian interference? 33:00.798 --> 33:02.290 - They're involved in just about every aspect 33:02.290 --> 33:04.150 of Europe in one way or another. 33:04.540 --> 33:07.060 The area that I'm concerned about today 33:07.060 --> 33:08.870 is the Balkans, actually. 33:09.440 --> 33:10.300 It's an area that, 33:10.300 --> 33:12.080 through the international community's work, 33:12.080 --> 33:13.930 and the United States in particular, 33:14.130 --> 33:17.180 we've been able to keep stability there. 33:17.470 --> 33:22.090 We've been able to work on democratic governments 33:22.090 --> 33:23.630 and to reinforce that. 33:25.340 --> 33:27.280 But Russia's at work in the Balkans 33:27.280 --> 33:30.730 and I think that we've kind of taken our eye off the area. 33:31.150 --> 33:33.230 It's an area where in terms of diplomacy 33:33.230 --> 33:36.240 we have to put some focus in my opinion, 33:36.240 --> 33:39.040 and we have to continue our security reform 33:39.040 --> 33:40.980 and our capability-building 33:40.980 --> 33:43.580 that we and the international community's engaged in 33:44.020 --> 33:45.580 in the Balkans, or that's an area 33:45.580 --> 33:48.480 that we could have problems with again here in the future. 33:49.510 --> 33:52.180 - You mentioned our diplomatic efforts. 33:52.180 --> 33:55.650 How important is it that we have those robust 33:55.650 --> 33:59.270 diplomatic and economic efforts there in the Balkans? 34:00.220 --> 34:01.580 - I think it's essential. 34:02.000 --> 34:06.220 They view that diplomatic effort and presence, frankly, 34:06.710 --> 34:09.920 the people see that as that's one way 34:10.000 --> 34:11.810 that they determine whether the West 34:11.810 --> 34:16.810 is serious about their desire to be a part of the West. 34:18.360 --> 34:21.310 So that involvement, I think, is fundamental. 34:23.710 --> 34:27.170 - One of the things that some of our European allies in NATO 34:27.170 --> 34:30.100 have suggested is that rather than looking 34:30.100 --> 34:35.100 at sort of an arbitrary 2% of GDP contribution to NATO, 34:36.810 --> 34:39.720 that we oughta be looking at capabilities instead. 34:39.720 --> 34:42.540 And in view of some of the recent reports 34:42.540 --> 34:46.390 about the readiness of some of our NATO allies, 34:47.984 --> 34:50.360 how good an argument do you think that is 34:50.360 --> 34:53.370 as we think about what may be a better way 34:53.460 --> 34:56.930 to determine whether our allies are making the contribution 34:56.930 --> 34:58.880 that we really want to seed in NATO? 34:59.970 --> 35:02.600 - Senator, I agree there's other ways. 35:02.600 --> 35:05.620 In other words, it's commonly called the three Cs in NATO. 35:05.620 --> 35:07.620 Cash is one, the 2%. 35:09.608 --> 35:11.210 Contribution is one of those, 35:11.210 --> 35:12.470 and capabilities. 35:12.720 --> 35:14.920 But I would tell you I think it's all three. 35:15.330 --> 35:16.600 It's not one or the other 35:16.600 --> 35:19.470 or more of one and less of the other, too. 35:20.270 --> 35:23.710 2% is a reasonable percent of GDP, 35:23.710 --> 35:25.710 given the threat that we're under today, 35:26.730 --> 35:27.980 in my opinion. 35:28.130 --> 35:30.530 But you have to look at also their contributions 35:30.530 --> 35:31.870 and their capabilities. 35:32.680 --> 35:35.620 There are some of the countries that aren't at 2% today, 35:35.960 --> 35:39.190 but their contributions to NATO missions 35:39.190 --> 35:42.640 and also other international missions is quite robust. 35:42.900 --> 35:44.700 That should be taken into account. 35:44.830 --> 35:47.800 And then last is the capabilities they provide. 35:47.800 --> 35:50.590 Are they using the money in their defense 35:52.140 --> 35:55.720 to develop capabilities that are interoperable 35:57.130 --> 35:59.800 and sync with our NATO planning? 36:00.010 --> 36:01.380 That's important, too, 36:01.390 --> 36:03.260 in order to have a strong NATO defense 36:03.260 --> 36:04.510 and deterrence structure. 36:05.020 --> 36:07.960 - So how worried should we be about some of those reports 36:07.960 --> 36:11.900 that have suggested that some of our NATO allies, 36:12.150 --> 36:13.940 some of the bigger NATO allies 36:14.720 --> 36:17.610 are not prepared as they should be? 36:19.130 --> 36:21.570 - I think we should continue to press them 36:22.630 --> 36:23.800 to meet the standards. 36:24.410 --> 36:27.440 NATO has very well-laid-out standards 36:27.450 --> 36:31.800 and expectations of the forces that nations provide. 36:33.120 --> 36:34.720 We should continue to press them 36:35.755 --> 36:36.588 to be a part of this defense. 36:36.588 --> 36:37.920 The alliance is strong 36:38.480 --> 36:41.470 as long as every member is strong and does their part. 36:41.900 --> 36:42.733 - [Shaheen] Thank you. 36:42.733 --> 36:43.650 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 36:44.490 --> 36:45.323 - Thank you. 36:48.030 --> 36:49.740 Several references have been made 36:49.740 --> 36:52.490 to the report, 36:52.490 --> 36:54.030 the RAND report that just came out, 36:54.030 --> 36:55.490 so I ask the members' consent 36:55.490 --> 36:57.340 this to be made a part of the record. 36:58.730 --> 37:00.480 Without objection, so ordered. 37:01.740 --> 37:02.770 Senator Cotton. 37:03.370 --> 37:04.360 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 37:04.360 --> 37:06.530 Thank you, General Scaparrotti, for joining us once again. 37:06.530 --> 37:09.230 I'd like to continue your conversation about the Balkans 37:09.230 --> 37:11.110 that you started with Senator Shaheen. 37:11.520 --> 37:13.520 Many people tend to focus on the Baltics, 37:13.520 --> 37:17.060 since they are NATO countries, exclusively, 37:17.240 --> 37:19.940 but I think that NATO status 37:19.940 --> 37:22.140 probably makes them a bit more stable 37:22.140 --> 37:23.890 in terms of the threat Russia poses 37:24.230 --> 37:26.350 in the Balkans, in which there are numerous countries 37:26.350 --> 37:27.650 that don't belong to NATO. 37:27.780 --> 37:29.360 Could you be more specific 37:29.360 --> 37:31.080 and say a little bit more about which countries 37:31.080 --> 37:33.870 in the Balkans are matters of concern for you 37:33.870 --> 37:36.840 in terms of Russian meddling and interference? 37:38.310 --> 37:40.180 - Well, I think Serbia in particular. 37:40.280 --> 37:41.540 There's a connection-- 37:41.540 --> 37:43.620 - Serbia proper or Republic of Serbia? 37:43.840 --> 37:46.740 - Well, I would tell you that it's Serbia as a nation, 37:46.740 --> 37:49.520 but then the Serb population as well 37:50.899 --> 37:52.190 within the Balkans. 37:53.270 --> 37:55.920 There's obviously a historical connection there, 37:56.320 --> 37:57.210 an affiliation. 37:58.660 --> 38:00.900 But there's also, because of that, 38:00.900 --> 38:04.240 a better opportunity for Russian influence, 38:04.240 --> 38:05.790 and they take advantage of that 38:07.030 --> 38:08.840 in terms of disinformation, 38:08.840 --> 38:11.790 influence upon those populations, 38:12.360 --> 38:14.870 the spoiling effect in some cases, 38:15.940 --> 38:18.890 perhaps with Serbia with respect to Kosovo 38:18.890 --> 38:21.230 or within the tripartite government 38:21.230 --> 38:22.610 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 38:24.304 --> 38:26.340 That's my concern, and I've seen an increase in that, 38:26.340 --> 38:28.370 I believe in the year and a half 38:28.370 --> 38:29.720 that I've been in this job. 38:30.190 --> 38:32.910 - Last year the Senate ratified 38:32.930 --> 38:34.730 the Montenegro accession treaty 38:34.730 --> 38:36.470 to have Montenegro join NATO. 38:36.470 --> 38:39.100 Obviously that was an important part of our strategy 38:39.100 --> 38:40.750 to close the Adriatic Coast. 38:40.830 --> 38:42.280 They were the last piece of that. 38:42.280 --> 38:45.230 How was Montenegro's integration into NATO gone 38:45.460 --> 38:47.360 since they had their accession? 38:47.500 --> 38:48.700 - It's going very well. 38:48.700 --> 38:50.210 I visited the country, 38:50.210 --> 38:52.340 spent time with their chief of defense. 38:54.040 --> 38:57.410 A small nation as a part of NATO at this point, 38:57.410 --> 39:02.410 but active in providing troops for our missions. 39:03.300 --> 39:07.760 Focused on their military capabilities 39:07.760 --> 39:10.700 and beginning to grow those and make them better. 39:10.700 --> 39:13.350 So I think they're gonna be a valued member here 39:13.730 --> 39:14.563 as they move on. 39:14.563 --> 39:15.440 They are a valued member, 39:15.440 --> 39:17.990 but I think they'll continue to increase in strength. 39:17.990 --> 39:19.370 Having said all of that, 39:19.950 --> 39:21.210 they're not out of the woods 39:21.210 --> 39:24.180 with respect to Russian interference in their government, 39:24.180 --> 39:26.410 influence and attempted influence in their government, 39:26.410 --> 39:27.740 which you know is very severe, 39:27.740 --> 39:31.210 just short of their application to NATO. 39:33.130 --> 39:34.570 - I was in the Balkans last August 39:34.570 --> 39:35.670 and I heard some of these points as well. 39:35.670 --> 39:36.600 One other thing we heard, 39:36.600 --> 39:37.720 and some of the things we witnessed 39:37.720 --> 39:40.050 was not just Russian influence in the Balkans, 39:40.050 --> 39:42.080 but also Turkish influence, 39:42.320 --> 39:43.830 sometimes not for the good. 39:43.830 --> 39:45.600 Could you say a little bit about what Turkey 39:45.600 --> 39:46.960 is up to in the Balkans? 39:50.160 --> 39:52.970 - Turkey primarily enters most of these countries 39:52.970 --> 39:55.580 in the Balkans with a humanitarian approach, 39:57.400 --> 39:59.760 and to assist in that regard. 40:00.610 --> 40:01.620 There are some of that have said 40:01.620 --> 40:03.960 this influence isn't helpful, as you've said, 40:03.960 --> 40:06.050 in the ways that they operate. 40:06.210 --> 40:09.190 But I haven't personally seen that myself. 40:10.840 --> 40:12.600 If I could, I'd take this for the record, 40:12.600 --> 40:14.570 and I'll give you a little more concrete 40:14.570 --> 40:16.150 and accurate response. 40:16.150 --> 40:18.200 - Sure thing, and while we're on the topic of Turkey, 40:18.200 --> 40:22.290 there have been reports that Turkey may be on the verge 40:22.290 --> 40:25.450 of acquiring the Russian S-400 air defense system. 40:26.210 --> 40:29.060 That quite possibly could trigger sanctions under CAATSA, 40:29.060 --> 40:30.980 a law that Congress passed last year. 40:32.120 --> 40:34.870 Could you give your thoughts on what Turkey is thinking 40:35.000 --> 40:36.050 in buying a Russian system, 40:36.050 --> 40:38.520 especially now that CAATSA is on the books here 40:38.860 --> 40:40.540 and might target those kind of sanctions 40:40.540 --> 40:42.130 against a NATO partner? 40:45.290 --> 40:47.520 - They've stated publicly that they intend to purchase 40:47.520 --> 40:49.270 and they've made a deal with Russia 40:49.550 --> 40:54.550 to employ the S-400 as their air defense system. 40:56.260 --> 40:57.340 I've had this discussion 40:57.340 --> 40:59.170 with their chief of defense multiple times, 40:59.170 --> 41:01.130 and we continue to discuss it. 41:02.530 --> 41:04.200 If they were to employ this system, 41:04.200 --> 41:05.950 they obviously are interoperable 41:06.460 --> 41:09.210 with the NATO systems and the US ones, 41:09.210 --> 41:10.830 and they couldn't be connected to the system. 41:10.830 --> 41:12.780 They're aware of that ramification. 41:13.360 --> 41:15.260 We've made, not only myself, 41:15.260 --> 41:16.960 but other members of our government, 41:16.960 --> 41:20.490 have made them clearly aware of the other ramifications 41:20.490 --> 41:23.260 of moving forward with the purchase of the S-400, 41:23.260 --> 41:24.580 so they're aware of that. 41:24.810 --> 41:25.830 The last thing I'll say 41:25.830 --> 41:29.410 is that we're in close discussion with Turkey 41:29.410 --> 41:31.330 with respect to air defense measures 41:31.580 --> 41:33.320 and the systems they could employ. 41:33.560 --> 41:36.500 I don't think that's a finished deal yet. 41:36.500 --> 41:40.790 I think that they're talking to us as well as others 41:41.080 --> 41:43.980 to purchase a system that's interoperable in NATO, 41:44.470 --> 41:46.940 and I think we have some time 41:46.980 --> 41:49.170 and my intention is to continue to work that aspect 41:49.170 --> 41:50.770 to convince them that the better system 41:50.770 --> 41:54.500 is, in fact, one of the NATO interoperable systems. 41:55.000 --> 41:56.140 - Good, thank you, General. 41:56.140 --> 41:57.340 My time has expired. 41:57.710 --> 41:59.010 - [Inhofe] Senator Hirono. 42:00.490 --> 42:01.860 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 42:01.860 --> 42:03.160 General Scaparrotti. 42:03.660 --> 42:04.850 Good to see you again. 42:05.440 --> 42:09.740 You were talking about the modernization, 42:09.740 --> 42:11.960 Russia's military modernization, 42:12.370 --> 42:16.740 and our big power competitors are Russia and China. 42:16.860 --> 42:21.250 Do you have, in terms of the scope and scale 42:21.250 --> 42:23.740 of Russian modernization 42:24.130 --> 42:26.600 as compared to China's modernization? 42:27.070 --> 42:29.340 Is China's modernization efforts 42:29.340 --> 42:33.720 many times more than Russia's modernization efforts? 42:36.010 --> 42:39.340 - Senator, if I could, I would say this, 42:39.340 --> 42:41.320 and I'd like to take that for the record, as well, 42:41.320 --> 42:43.780 so I could think about this a bit in comparison. 42:44.120 --> 42:46.460 But generally, having been in the Pacific, 42:48.570 --> 42:51.040 the ways in which they're modernizing, 42:51.040 --> 42:53.140 particularly with respect to their capabilities, 42:53.140 --> 42:55.090 their weapon systems, 42:56.170 --> 42:58.060 the domains that they're focused on, 42:58.060 --> 43:01.000 maritime, et cetera, there's a lot of similarity 43:02.837 --> 43:04.537 in terms of where they're focused. 43:05.000 --> 43:07.890 And so Admiral Harris and I, 43:07.890 --> 43:10.020 when you look at what we're focused on 43:10.020 --> 43:12.240 for either research and development 43:12.240 --> 43:15.140 or modernization or pacing in our forces, 43:15.140 --> 43:17.010 they very closely align. 43:17.080 --> 43:18.260 So from that perspective, 43:18.260 --> 43:21.900 I think there are common areas there. 43:21.900 --> 43:25.320 But again, I can be more specific with a little bit of time 43:25.320 --> 43:28.510 to make a very specific comparison across domains. 43:29.160 --> 43:30.840 - That is not to say of course 43:30.840 --> 43:32.250 that that kind of comparison 43:32.250 --> 43:34.880 should lead us to take our eyes off either country. 43:36.520 --> 43:39.300 One of your main priorities is to deter Russia 43:39.300 --> 43:43.150 and you noted that they use activities below the line 43:43.150 --> 43:48.140 of what might cause us to respond in some clear way. 43:48.150 --> 43:50.700 And one of the ways that (clears throat) excuse me, 43:50.860 --> 43:53.010 one of the activities that they use 43:53.010 --> 43:55.950 is to interfere with our elections 43:56.380 --> 43:59.030 using social media, cyber, etc. 43:59.030 --> 44:00.660 You would consider that one of the ways 44:00.660 --> 44:04.290 that they are using to undermine our country, 44:05.721 --> 44:07.410 and that we need a whole-of-government approach 44:07.410 --> 44:09.960 to counter what Russia is doing with our elections. 44:11.000 --> 44:11.950 - Yes, Senator, I do, 44:11.950 --> 44:13.600 and you see it in Europe as well. 44:13.600 --> 44:17.520 They've been involved in elections in Europe 44:17.920 --> 44:21.320 and the influence of political parties in Europe as well. 44:21.420 --> 44:23.330 - So that was going to be my next question. 44:23.330 --> 44:24.590 Have we, (clears throat) 44:24.590 --> 44:27.050 have we learned any lessons from Russian interference 44:27.050 --> 44:29.750 with European elections that would enable us 44:29.750 --> 44:32.130 to counter what they are continuing 44:32.845 --> 44:34.330 to do in our country? 44:35.870 --> 44:37.520 - I think we've learned from each other, 44:37.520 --> 44:38.460 I would put it that way. 44:38.460 --> 44:41.300 We helped France and Germany 44:41.300 --> 44:42.690 as they approach their elections 44:42.690 --> 44:44.260 based on what occurred here, 44:44.260 --> 44:45.630 and as they've gone through it, 44:45.630 --> 44:47.530 we've exchanged that information. 44:47.640 --> 44:50.500 And so as a result, we've got a better idea 44:50.500 --> 44:55.290 of the Russian's approach, the capabilities that they use, 44:55.290 --> 44:56.440 and how they use it. 44:57.370 --> 44:59.780 And that's all improving our ability 44:59.780 --> 45:03.220 to defend the sanctity and sovereignty 45:03.220 --> 45:04.660 of our election systems. 45:05.580 --> 45:06.413 - All well and good, 45:06.413 --> 45:11.100 but previous testimony from Director Coats and others 45:11.310 --> 45:13.570 I think is pretty clear that we do not 45:13.720 --> 45:16.270 have a whole-of-government strategy at this point 45:16.370 --> 45:18.730 to counter Russian interference with our elections. 45:18.730 --> 45:21.600 So are you part of the efforts 45:22.880 --> 45:24.300 on our country's part 45:24.300 --> 45:27.420 to come up with a whole-of-government strategy? 45:27.500 --> 45:29.360 Have they come to you? 45:30.990 --> 45:33.860 The executive branch. (chuckles) 45:34.590 --> 45:36.150 - With respect to our elections, 45:36.150 --> 45:38.760 that's not really within my portfolio 45:38.760 --> 45:40.260 as the EUCOM commander. 45:41.090 --> 45:46.090 That is at Cybercom, OSD, joint staff level. 45:46.720 --> 45:49.910 If there's a specific area that I would be involved in, 45:50.040 --> 45:51.540 they would bring me into that. 45:52.750 --> 45:54.530 We have connections. 45:54.530 --> 45:58.090 We have discussions on cyber operations, 45:58.090 --> 46:01.080 information operations, et cetera, frequently. 46:01.950 --> 46:04.870 But it wouldn't be one that I'm directly involved in. 46:05.260 --> 46:07.790 - There doesn't seem to be any one agency 46:07.790 --> 46:09.280 that is taking the lead on this, 46:09.280 --> 46:12.270 and that is a cause of concern for many of us. 46:12.270 --> 46:13.750 Let me turn to another subject. 46:13.750 --> 46:16.410 You know many times that it will require 46:16.410 --> 46:19.180 a whole-of-government approach for us to... 46:20.560 --> 46:25.380 Maintain our position, let's say, in the world. 46:25.830 --> 46:28.130 So concerns of the administration's cuts 46:28.130 --> 46:29.980 to the State Department and Treasury, 46:31.701 --> 46:32.710 along with the effects that these cuts 46:32.710 --> 46:34.910 would have foreign diplomacy, 46:34.910 --> 46:37.360 which you have already noted as really important. 46:38.400 --> 46:41.480 Can you talk a little bit about the effects 46:41.480 --> 46:44.010 of these cuts to State Department and Treasury personnel 46:44.010 --> 46:45.480 on your mission? 46:48.140 --> 46:48.973 - Yes. 46:49.400 --> 46:52.440 I can't speak to the cuts themselves 46:52.440 --> 46:54.580 and how that impacts inside of State, 46:54.580 --> 46:57.900 that's best to go to them, but I will say this, 46:57.900 --> 47:00.730 that everything we do in EUCOM, 47:01.220 --> 47:05.750 we look at it as an inter-agency activity. 47:06.820 --> 47:09.630 Generally with State in the lead as diplomacy leads 47:10.373 --> 47:13.180 is the way that we work here in a democracy. 47:13.710 --> 47:15.660 And so everything I do we look at 47:15.660 --> 47:17.490 from a whole-of-government approach, 47:17.490 --> 47:18.770 we look at it usually 47:18.770 --> 47:20.810 with one of the other agencies in the lead 47:20.810 --> 47:22.520 in most of what we do in Europe. 47:22.520 --> 47:25.580 And in each country my first goal 47:25.580 --> 47:28.150 is to ensure, or objective, I should say, 47:28.350 --> 47:30.820 is that we support the ambassador 47:30.820 --> 47:32.980 and the ambassador's country team 47:32.980 --> 47:34.880 and their efforts within that country. 47:35.220 --> 47:38.380 So a reduction of their abilities 47:38.850 --> 47:41.040 would not be a positive. 47:42.780 --> 47:45.410 - Thank you, including a 26% cut to the State Department 47:45.410 --> 47:48.580 and the departure of many senior personnel. 47:48.590 --> 47:50.290 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 47:50.440 --> 47:51.690 - [Inhofe] Senator Ernst. 47:52.270 --> 47:53.210 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 47:53.210 --> 47:55.730 General Scaparrotti, thank you so much for your service 47:55.730 --> 47:57.970 and your willingness to come in front of us 47:57.970 --> 48:00.060 and give us important updates today. 48:01.050 --> 48:03.719 As the US is turning its focus 48:03.719 --> 48:07.090 to great powers and near-peer threats, 48:07.590 --> 48:09.640 it is important for us to consider ways 48:09.640 --> 48:12.520 that we can best leverage our resources, 48:12.650 --> 48:16.340 and one way that the United States has begun doing this 48:17.070 --> 48:20.140 is by putting into place 48:20.140 --> 48:23.300 the army's new security force assistance battalions, 48:23.300 --> 48:25.680 or the SFAB that's located at Fort Benning. 48:26.300 --> 48:29.750 We are currently leveraging the SFAB in the Middle East 48:29.750 --> 48:31.510 and in Afghanistan, 48:31.760 --> 48:36.760 and perhaps this unit, with its unique capabilities 48:37.360 --> 48:39.400 in the train, advise, and assist areas, 48:39.400 --> 48:43.640 could be used to take stress off of our special operators, 48:43.750 --> 48:44.840 especially in EUCOM. 48:46.270 --> 48:49.040 Could EUCOM benefit from those capabilities, 48:49.040 --> 48:54.040 and if so, where could you see us using the SFABs in EUCOM? 48:55.310 --> 48:57.820 - Well, first of all, it's not necessarily in EUCOM, 48:57.820 --> 49:00.870 but I'll respond, given that I'm also the SACEUR, 49:00.900 --> 49:04.530 and US is a part of Resolute Support, 49:04.720 --> 49:06.640 the mission within Afghanistan, 49:06.640 --> 49:08.910 which is where they're deploying the SFABs. 49:09.050 --> 49:11.490 I was just in Afghanistan last weekend. 49:12.370 --> 49:16.200 This is gonna be a great boost to the mission there, 49:16.200 --> 49:18.420 because they're trained specifically 49:18.650 --> 49:20.390 for train, advise, and assist. 49:20.390 --> 49:23.440 They're organized for that, they're prepared for the mission 49:23.480 --> 49:25.280 and the place that they're going to. 49:26.187 --> 49:27.660 And that's what we need in Afghanistan. 49:27.660 --> 49:29.660 We need to focus on train, advise, and assist 49:29.660 --> 49:32.960 to continue to build the capability of their force. 49:32.960 --> 49:34.580 So I'm fully supportive of this, 49:34.580 --> 49:37.950 and I think it is an efficient use of resources 49:37.950 --> 49:41.430 and also helps us to maintain the readiness 49:41.430 --> 49:44.890 of our army units as a fighting force 49:44.890 --> 49:46.440 in terms of those other brigades 49:46.440 --> 49:49.650 as opposed to pulling one apart to do the SFAB job. 49:49.970 --> 49:52.470 Within Europe, there's a time and place. 49:53.310 --> 49:54.310 There's two ways. 49:54.750 --> 49:57.910 We do capability development throughout Europe 49:57.910 --> 49:59.950 with our allies and our partners. 50:00.070 --> 50:01.840 There may be an application there 50:01.840 --> 50:04.390 as we get into a focused training effort, 50:04.920 --> 50:08.280 like we do in Ukraine, for instance. 50:08.570 --> 50:11.360 Or in a projecting stability type of effort, 50:11.360 --> 50:14.600 where we assist in some counties 50:14.600 --> 50:16.270 in northern Africa, perhaps, 50:16.270 --> 50:18.310 in order to build their capability 50:18.310 --> 50:20.370 and prevent destabilization. 50:20.740 --> 50:23.200 Those are just a couple of quick ideas, 50:23.200 --> 50:24.920 but I think having that force, 50:24.920 --> 50:28.837 there's certainly plenty of opportunity 50:28.837 --> 50:31.220 when it comes to strengthening our partners 50:31.220 --> 50:32.680 and using a force like that. 50:32.680 --> 50:34.050 - Right, well, I agree, 50:34.050 --> 50:36.080 and I'm excited to see how their deployment 50:36.080 --> 50:39.310 goes in Afghanistan and how we can utilize their, 50:40.600 --> 50:42.630 the adeptness of that type of unit 50:42.630 --> 50:45.190 in other cultural situations as well. 50:45.190 --> 50:46.890 And as we look to Europe 50:46.890 --> 50:49.068 and what we see going on in Ukraine, 50:49.068 --> 50:52.790 it might be another opportunity for our SFABs to excel, 50:52.790 --> 50:55.640 so I appreciate your feedback there. 50:56.740 --> 50:59.720 Now, we know that Russia, 50:59.720 --> 51:01.920 that's the topic it seems this morning, 51:01.920 --> 51:05.020 but the malign activity across the EUCOM AOR 51:05.020 --> 51:07.060 is of course extremely concerning. 51:07.060 --> 51:09.910 I think you've seen that demonstrated from all of us here 51:10.640 --> 51:12.170 sitting with you today, 51:12.270 --> 51:15.710 whether it's the illegal presence in Crimea, 51:15.830 --> 51:19.250 whether it is their information operations, 51:19.250 --> 51:20.680 their gray zone activities, 51:20.680 --> 51:23.070 we've talked about a lot of that day. 51:23.100 --> 51:25.300 Violations of the INF treaty. 51:26.520 --> 51:28.860 We need to bolster our posture 51:28.860 --> 51:31.720 in their destabilizing actions. 51:31.850 --> 51:33.290 We need to push against that. 51:33.290 --> 51:36.780 So the DoD's budget request for fiscal year 19 51:36.780 --> 51:40.770 is $2 billion, or a near $2 billion increase 51:40.920 --> 51:43.320 for the European Deterrence Initiative. 51:43.530 --> 51:47.510 If it weren't for that funding provided by the EDI, 51:47.510 --> 51:52.300 do you think that EUCOM could fully perform its mission 51:52.300 --> 51:56.000 to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression in Europe, 51:56.310 --> 51:59.990 and what if we no longer had those dollars? 52:01.760 --> 52:04.360 - Senator, I could not do my mission without the EDI 52:04.810 --> 52:05.950 and the increase. 52:05.950 --> 52:06.930 That, as I have said, 52:06.930 --> 52:10.380 it not only continues what I have today, what we've built, 52:10.380 --> 52:14.100 but through the FYDP, this is what's going to establish 52:14.100 --> 52:15.680 the full posture that we need 52:15.808 --> 52:18.360 in conjunction with our allies. 52:18.550 --> 52:21.920 - And if you had one dollar more, where would you spend it? 52:25.460 --> 52:26.293 - Well, that's, 52:26.920 --> 52:28.640 I would probably go, 52:29.350 --> 52:32.500 if you look at where we need to continue development, 52:34.880 --> 52:38.170 I would most likely start at C4ISR, 52:38.170 --> 52:42.430 because our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 52:42.430 --> 52:43.690 is so important to me, 52:43.690 --> 52:46.330 particularly when you don't have the posture you want. 52:46.330 --> 52:48.230 You've got to be able to get ahead of, 52:48.360 --> 52:51.010 and be able to predict what your posture needs to be. 52:51.310 --> 52:53.490 And so that's probably the area 52:53.490 --> 52:56.380 that I'd put my next dollar into if it were up to me. 52:56.610 --> 52:57.560 - That is exceptional, 52:57.560 --> 52:59.850 because I think we hear from many of our other commanders 52:59.850 --> 53:02.890 as well that ISR is in high, high demand. 53:02.890 --> 53:04.900 So thank you very much, General. 53:04.900 --> 53:05.733 Thank you. 53:06.300 --> 53:07.133 - [Inhofe] Thank you. 53:07.133 --> 53:08.470 Senator Peters. 53:09.212 --> 53:10.045 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 53:10.045 --> 53:12.290 And General, thank you for being here again today 53:12.830 --> 53:15.180 and thank you for your service, as always. 53:15.540 --> 53:19.620 General, how would you define the term political warfare? 53:24.020 --> 53:25.160 - Political warfare. 53:25.160 --> 53:29.540 Well, I think it would be the attack 53:29.540 --> 53:34.540 or efforts to spoil policyor politics within a government. 53:35.180 --> 53:39.520 And that could cover a range of its governmental activities, 53:39.520 --> 53:41.360 its individual agencies, 53:42.170 --> 53:44.290 its policy, and its values. 53:45.990 --> 53:48.490 - And that's certainly been an element of strategy 53:50.228 --> 53:51.061 since the beginning of warfare, 53:51.061 --> 53:52.610 just different types of technologies. 53:52.610 --> 53:54.990 However, in today's digital domain, 53:55.640 --> 53:57.870 the ability to use political warfare 53:57.870 --> 53:59.670 is leveraged dramatically. 53:59.670 --> 54:01.770 I think most observers see that that's gonna 54:01.770 --> 54:04.060 be a major part of conflict going forward. 54:04.060 --> 54:06.360 It's a part of conflict that we're seeing right now 54:06.360 --> 54:10.470 with Russians, and I had the opportunity 54:10.470 --> 54:13.480 when I was in Latvia and Lithuania recently 54:13.480 --> 54:15.010 to be there for Saber Strike, 54:15.010 --> 54:19.380 an exercise that went on with a number of countries. 54:19.570 --> 54:21.320 I had the chance to visit StratCom. 54:21.750 --> 54:23.620 That was dealing with communications 54:23.620 --> 54:25.070 that were coming from the Russians 54:25.070 --> 54:27.330 that were really, in my mind, 54:27.570 --> 54:29.700 kind of the classic definition of political warfare, 54:29.700 --> 54:34.700 to sow confusion, to create distrust. 54:34.930 --> 54:37.410 In fact, some of the communications that I saw 54:37.410 --> 54:40.180 were put out by Russians on social media 54:40.180 --> 54:42.470 that the Americans had dropped a bomb 54:42.470 --> 54:45.160 on a farmhouse or a store, 54:45.160 --> 54:46.730 some sort of civilian building, 54:46.730 --> 54:49.140 and that the Americans simply can't be trusted 54:49.140 --> 54:52.650 because when you're in their country, bad things happen. 54:52.820 --> 54:54.560 I'm sure there are other examples. 54:54.560 --> 54:57.440 Could you give us a sense of the types of things 54:57.440 --> 54:59.400 that the Russians are doing on a regular basis 54:59.400 --> 55:01.950 that interfere with NATO's ability 55:01.950 --> 55:04.910 to have the trust and confidence 55:04.910 --> 55:06.950 of the citizens of those countries? 55:08.030 --> 55:08.930 - Yeah, thank you. 55:09.482 --> 55:10.970 I would just tell you that the kinds of things 55:10.970 --> 55:12.780 you described that you saw there 55:12.780 --> 55:15.740 is not uncommon throughout particularly the East, 55:15.740 --> 55:17.550 but even into the depth of Europe. 55:18.330 --> 55:21.650 Typically when you look at their disinformation, 55:21.650 --> 55:23.080 their social media, 55:25.740 --> 55:27.520 it is generally targeted 55:27.520 --> 55:30.920 at the undermining of Western values, 55:31.510 --> 55:33.530 confidence in that government, 55:33.570 --> 55:35.810 confidence in their governmental leaders, 55:36.390 --> 55:40.420 almost always subtly just hedging away at that. 55:40.580 --> 55:43.340 And because of today's capabilities in information, 55:43.340 --> 55:47.410 where they can use multiple platforms 55:47.410 --> 55:49.900 and generate great volume, 55:50.923 --> 55:54.110 that it can really undermine a nation. 55:54.110 --> 55:55.460 Because all they have to do 55:55.520 --> 55:58.670 is just sow some confusion, primarily. 55:59.180 --> 56:00.350 Sow enough confusion 56:00.350 --> 56:01.890 that there's distrust in the government, 56:01.890 --> 56:03.840 and it's not an uncommon thing to see. 56:04.050 --> 56:06.820 - In fact, it's going on constantly, is it not? 56:06.960 --> 56:07.793 - It is. 56:07.793 --> 56:10.120 It's subtle, but it is constant. 56:10.120 --> 56:13.660 It is at greater volume in the countries in the East 56:13.690 --> 56:17.020 than it is perhaps in the south, southwest of Europe. 56:18.520 --> 56:20.360 - When I use the term political warfare, 56:20.360 --> 56:22.570 they are engaged in political warfare 56:22.570 --> 56:24.180 with the West, generally? 56:25.290 --> 56:27.060 As a result of these activities 56:27.240 --> 56:29.070 in trying to sow this, 56:29.500 --> 56:32.610 this distrust which undermines? 56:32.900 --> 56:35.770 The fundamental basis of democracy 56:35.770 --> 56:37.430 is that people have trust in their government 56:37.430 --> 56:40.670 and their ability to affect the changes in that government, 56:40.670 --> 56:44.220 and if you sow distrust, it undermines it. 56:44.480 --> 56:46.440 So we have to combat this. 56:46.440 --> 56:48.200 Obviously we have to understand the Russians 56:48.200 --> 56:49.070 are not our friends. 56:49.070 --> 56:50.010 They're engaged in these activities, 56:50.010 --> 56:51.310 not just in the United States, 56:51.310 --> 56:53.560 but all across Europe and other parts of the world. 56:53.560 --> 56:56.120 What would be the role for, in your mind, 56:56.630 --> 57:00.620 in your capacity for US versus our allies 57:01.230 --> 57:02.670 and the role of government operations 57:02.670 --> 57:05.370 versus what the private sector should be expected to do 57:05.370 --> 57:06.880 in civil society generally? 57:06.880 --> 57:08.600 How do we grapple with this? 57:08.990 --> 57:12.100 - Well, I think one way is that... 57:13.880 --> 57:16.630 We in the military reinforce 57:16.870 --> 57:19.180 all of these civilian agencies and capabilities 57:19.180 --> 57:23.240 to include national media, etc. 57:24.092 --> 57:27.600 And we have to continue to focus on the values 57:28.360 --> 57:33.360 and the values that democracies profess, 57:35.360 --> 57:38.810 democratic institutions, international rule of law. 57:39.730 --> 57:43.280 That's a very high-level, general statement. 57:43.280 --> 57:44.910 But we've kinda left that. 57:45.070 --> 57:48.170 Western democracies have kind of assumed 57:48.520 --> 57:51.660 that our people understood what was important 57:51.660 --> 57:54.080 about a democracy in the way that we live. 57:54.490 --> 57:56.040 We've got to reinforce that, 57:56.040 --> 57:57.720 and it needs to be done across 57:57.816 --> 57:59.880 all the different levers that we can do it. 57:59.880 --> 58:01.850 And that takes focus and it takes volume. 58:01.850 --> 58:04.540 It takes information and volume to do that. 58:05.527 --> 58:07.070 - And do you believe that we should actively engage 58:07.070 --> 58:08.930 some of the major tech platforms 58:08.930 --> 58:10.150 to be part of the solution 58:10.150 --> 58:13.700 and to be more active in this space than they are now? 58:13.760 --> 58:15.590 - Yes I do, and on our side, 58:15.590 --> 58:18.160 in conjunction with NATO and the other nations 58:18.660 --> 58:20.950 who are actually employing our capabilities 58:21.050 --> 58:25.480 to get our messages out at volume. 58:26.546 --> 58:29.039 - Great, thank you, General. - Thank you. 58:29.039 --> 58:30.770 - [Inhofe] Senator Tillis. 58:30.770 --> 58:31.603 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 58:31.603 --> 58:33.190 General Scaparrotti, it's good to see you again. 58:33.190 --> 58:36.620 Thank you for the time that you've spent in my office 58:36.620 --> 58:38.820 and also being at the official launch 58:38.820 --> 58:41.300 of the Senate NATO Observer Group. 58:41.300 --> 58:43.040 I appreciate all the work you're doing, 58:43.040 --> 58:44.400 and Ambassador Hutchison, 58:44.400 --> 58:46.920 and we look forward with Senator Shaheen 58:46.920 --> 58:50.740 in getting more engaged as we continue the rollout. 58:52.210 --> 58:55.050 I wanna probably talk about something 58:55.050 --> 58:57.240 you would have anticipated today, 58:57.240 --> 58:58.640 and it has to do with trade. 58:59.030 --> 59:02.350 We know that the discussions 59:02.350 --> 59:05.790 around the tariffs, we know that China's a bad actor 59:05.790 --> 59:08.290 and that there are legitimate, I think, 59:08.290 --> 59:09.990 national defense concerns there, 59:09.990 --> 59:13.100 but the way that the tariffs get implemented, 59:13.100 --> 59:15.890 it could sweep in even some of our NATO allies 59:15.890 --> 59:17.140 if we don't get it right. 59:17.240 --> 59:19.200 I know this is a fairly new discussion, 59:19.200 --> 59:22.060 but I was wondering if in your role 59:22.060 --> 59:23.920 you have heard any of the discussions 59:24.120 --> 59:26.970 among some of our allies about concerns 59:26.970 --> 59:28.470 with how that gets rolled out. 59:29.740 --> 59:31.600 - Senator, actually I haven't at this point, 59:31.600 --> 59:33.450 because I was back in the States here 59:33.683 --> 59:36.160 for meetings and then hearings. 59:36.160 --> 59:39.350 So as this has been a topic in the news and discussion, 59:39.350 --> 59:41.620 I've actually been in the States. 59:41.620 --> 59:43.150 - Oh, well, that'd be very interesting, 59:43.150 --> 59:46.630 maybe we can get a readout once you get back over there, 59:46.630 --> 59:51.630 because since these tariffs are moving forward 59:51.690 --> 59:55.380 on the basis of national defense concerns, 59:55.790 --> 59:56.660 it would seem to me that 59:56.660 --> 01:00:00.060 that that will probably weigh into the discussion. 01:00:00.060 --> 01:00:02.510 The other reason I'd be very interested in the feedback, 01:00:02.510 --> 01:00:03.980 I won't press you more on the question, 01:00:03.980 --> 01:00:07.460 but I know that we're making great progress 01:00:07.460 --> 01:00:11.080 on our NATO partners' contributions 01:00:11.080 --> 01:00:12.750 as a percentage of GDP. 01:00:12.910 --> 01:00:17.080 A part of what's going to help sustain that upward trend 01:00:17.760 --> 01:00:22.250 is going to be good economic performance in those nations. 01:00:22.250 --> 01:00:24.250 If they start seeing a dip in their economy, 01:00:24.250 --> 01:00:26.900 then my guess is this is one area where they may look at 01:00:26.900 --> 01:00:30.140 and move their continuing contribution to the right 01:00:30.140 --> 01:00:32.180 as they move up to the 2% target. 01:00:32.640 --> 01:00:35.320 So I think it's very important for us to get feedback 01:00:35.320 --> 01:00:37.620 and have that feedback get back to the administration 01:00:37.620 --> 01:00:39.110 so that when they tailor it, 01:00:39.360 --> 01:00:41.420 they do it in a way that's not disruptive 01:00:41.420 --> 01:00:43.080 to the chemistry and the relationship 01:00:43.080 --> 01:00:44.930 that we have with our partners. 01:00:45.280 --> 01:00:47.330 And I'd appreciate getting that feedback. 01:00:49.690 --> 01:00:50.990 The other question I have: 01:00:52.345 --> 01:00:54.920 how would you grade the mood 01:00:54.920 --> 01:00:58.470 of our NATO allies and their sense 01:00:58.542 --> 01:01:02.510 that the US is absolutely committed to moving forward 01:01:02.510 --> 01:01:03.950 and building on the partnership? 01:01:03.950 --> 01:01:04.783 Strong? 01:01:05.320 --> 01:01:06.670 - Yes, I'd say it's strong. 01:01:06.860 --> 01:01:10.190 What they see is investments like EDI, 01:01:12.270 --> 01:01:13.520 $5 billion to $6 billion, 01:01:14.560 --> 01:01:16.210 and then the presence of our troops. 01:01:16.210 --> 01:01:18.180 And that's a strong statement. 01:01:18.380 --> 01:01:21.250 - Could you talk a little bit about the, 01:01:21.970 --> 01:01:25.040 I think some people believe that, 01:01:25.280 --> 01:01:27.090 this is for the benefit of the public. 01:01:27.090 --> 01:01:29.130 When you're trying to get to that 2% margin, 01:01:29.130 --> 01:01:31.300 it's not like it's going into some NATO account 01:01:31.300 --> 01:01:32.830 and being spent on the new building 01:01:32.830 --> 01:01:34.100 and all the other things there. 01:01:34.100 --> 01:01:37.330 Can you talk about the inherent capabilities 01:01:37.330 --> 01:01:40.180 and the readiness, the benefits to the nations themselves 01:01:41.080 --> 01:01:43.770 by virtue of upping their investment 01:01:44.050 --> 01:01:45.230 as a NATO partner? 01:01:46.380 --> 01:01:47.213 - Roger. 01:01:47.400 --> 01:01:49.620 First of all, we live in an environment today 01:01:49.620 --> 01:01:52.310 that's changed dramatically in the last even five years, 01:01:52.310 --> 01:01:56.830 but certainly 10 in terms of the threats that we have 01:01:57.410 --> 01:01:58.280 and the environment, 01:01:58.280 --> 01:02:01.610 European, the Euro-Atlantic environment. 01:02:01.820 --> 01:02:04.010 So they need a force that's relevant to that, 01:02:04.010 --> 01:02:05.780 and the force that they had five years ago, 01:02:05.780 --> 01:02:08.440 that we had five years ago, is not fully relevant. 01:02:08.820 --> 01:02:11.860 Take the cyber domain, for instance, as just one example. 01:02:12.830 --> 01:02:14.870 The increase in precision weaponry 01:02:14.870 --> 01:02:16.790 and the types of weaponry is another. 01:02:17.200 --> 01:02:20.420 So to secure their population, their own sovereignty, 01:02:20.420 --> 01:02:23.690 which is a requirement of Article 3 and 4, 01:02:24.980 --> 01:02:26.940 and also to have the benefit of Article 5, 01:02:26.940 --> 01:02:28.400 they have to invest in this 01:02:28.400 --> 01:02:30.400 and they have to have a force that's relevant. 01:02:32.160 --> 01:02:35.700 It's for their own population's security and good, 01:02:35.870 --> 01:02:38.620 but it's also for us as an alliance, 01:02:38.920 --> 01:02:41.470 the good of the NATO alliance. 01:02:41.680 --> 01:02:45.120 NATO alliance secures 50% of the GDP 01:02:45.270 --> 01:02:48.530 of our nation's and theirs in the Euro-Atlantic alone, 01:02:48.530 --> 01:02:50.410 so when you talk about prosperity, 01:02:52.680 --> 01:02:53.520 their increasing economy, 01:02:53.520 --> 01:02:55.200 which it is improving right now, 01:02:55.200 --> 01:02:58.670 I think that security in NATO's foundational security 01:02:58.700 --> 01:02:59.600 is a part of that. 01:03:00.190 --> 01:03:03.240 - Well, thank you, and just in closing, 01:03:03.280 --> 01:03:05.670 when you get back and you get an opportunity, 01:03:05.670 --> 01:03:09.480 it may be that nobody's talking about the looming concern 01:03:09.480 --> 01:03:10.320 over the... 01:03:12.860 --> 01:03:15.660 What the president described may be a trade war. 01:03:15.660 --> 01:03:17.340 I'd be very interesting in seeing 01:03:17.340 --> 01:03:19.250 if that is having any sort of an effect 01:03:19.250 --> 01:03:22.470 on the relationships that you're most concerned with. 01:03:22.522 --> 01:03:23.685 Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:03:23.685 --> 01:03:24.518 - [Inhofe] Thank you. 01:03:24.518 --> 01:03:25.351 Senator Warren. 01:03:25.351 --> 01:03:26.500 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 01:03:26.500 --> 01:03:29.100 and thank you, General, for meeting with me last week 01:03:29.100 --> 01:03:30.850 and thank you for your service. 01:03:31.290 --> 01:03:34.100 Now Russia continues to actively work 01:03:34.100 --> 01:03:36.490 to meddle in countries along its border 01:03:36.490 --> 01:03:40.050 and undermine unity within the NATO alliance. 01:03:40.350 --> 01:03:42.210 They do it through cyber attacks, 01:03:42.210 --> 01:03:43.900 they spread disinformation, 01:03:43.900 --> 01:03:47.100 they spread false stories through social media. 01:03:47.380 --> 01:03:50.360 They foment institutional corruption 01:03:50.360 --> 01:03:53.020 and use a lot of other manipulative measures. 01:03:53.380 --> 01:03:56.410 One of the countries in your area of responsibility 01:03:56.410 --> 01:03:59.180 is Sweden, which is not a member of NATO, 01:03:59.370 --> 01:04:03.040 but which did conduct major military exercises 01:04:03.040 --> 01:04:04.990 with the NATO troops last year. 01:04:05.250 --> 01:04:08.470 Sweden has a general election coming up in September, 01:04:08.470 --> 01:04:12.940 and I understand that they are taking preemptive steps 01:04:12.940 --> 01:04:15.730 to deter Russian interference. 01:04:16.040 --> 01:04:19.720 So General, without divulging classified information, 01:04:19.990 --> 01:04:21.490 can you talk just a little bit 01:04:21.490 --> 01:04:23.570 about how you're working with Sweden 01:04:23.570 --> 01:04:26.795 and other countries in your area of responsibility 01:04:26.795 --> 01:04:31.190 to deter this kind of Russian information warfare 01:04:31.560 --> 01:04:33.880 and what you've learned that we might apply 01:04:33.880 --> 01:04:35.640 here in the United States? 01:04:38.040 --> 01:04:41.420 - First of all, I'd say that Sweden 01:04:41.420 --> 01:04:43.140 is one of those countries that I think 01:04:43.140 --> 01:04:45.740 is more advanced than us in terms of just my perspective, 01:04:45.740 --> 01:04:47.100 it's a personal opinion, 01:04:47.200 --> 01:04:49.250 looking at the nations throughout Europe, 01:04:51.040 --> 01:04:54.670 in terms of their willingness to take it on. 01:04:54.750 --> 01:04:57.980 One of their techniques is they're very open 01:04:57.980 --> 01:04:59.510 about an attack. 01:04:59.720 --> 01:05:01.210 They publicize it. 01:05:02.415 --> 01:05:04.530 They push back against it. 01:05:06.170 --> 01:05:10.270 They're, I think, very forward-leaning 01:05:10.270 --> 01:05:13.410 with respect to the population and the education 01:05:13.410 --> 01:05:17.510 and how to question information that they get broadly 01:05:18.472 --> 01:05:21.300 and ensure they know the source, etc. 01:05:21.770 --> 01:05:24.050 With respect to Sweden, they're a very close partner, 01:05:24.050 --> 01:05:26.280 a great partner, within Europe, 01:05:26.467 --> 01:05:30.440 both as a partner to NATO, but also with the United States. 01:05:30.600 --> 01:05:33.610 We work with them and several of the other Nordic countries 01:05:33.865 --> 01:05:36.810 together in a routine conference 01:05:36.810 --> 01:05:39.760 in order to look at ways that we can strengthen our defense 01:05:39.790 --> 01:05:43.800 and also conduct training that's helpful to all of us. 01:05:44.540 --> 01:05:46.090 - I think that's really helpful. 01:05:46.090 --> 01:05:48.590 You know, whether it's Sweden or the United States 01:05:48.590 --> 01:05:51.070 or a whole lot of other countries, 01:05:51.580 --> 01:05:55.700 Russia is hellbent on undermining democracy. 01:05:56.000 --> 01:05:59.550 Putin and his online trolls are not going away, 01:05:59.550 --> 01:06:00.970 and we face a choice: 01:06:01.260 --> 01:06:03.610 we can sit on our hands and let the Russians 01:06:03.610 --> 01:06:06.600 interfere in our elections, or we can be proactive 01:06:07.030 --> 01:06:10.940 and work with our allies to deter Russia 01:06:11.270 --> 01:06:14.110 and Russia's information warfare. 01:06:14.510 --> 01:06:17.270 Now, there's one other topic I wanna ask you about, 01:06:17.270 --> 01:06:19.410 and that is, last year I asked you 01:06:19.410 --> 01:06:21.550 about your support for the State Department. 01:06:21.550 --> 01:06:24.950 And you told me that you believe our military 01:06:24.950 --> 01:06:27.720 and diplomatic agencies need to work together 01:06:28.080 --> 01:06:30.900 to confront threats to our security 01:06:30.900 --> 01:06:32.640 and threats to our allies. 01:06:32.640 --> 01:06:34.370 And I understand from your comments 01:06:34.370 --> 01:06:36.700 to Senator Hirono that it's safe to assume 01:06:36.700 --> 01:06:38.130 you haven't changed your position on that. 01:06:38.130 --> 01:06:39.020 Is that fair? 01:06:39.070 --> 01:06:40.330 - That's correct. - Good. 01:06:40.330 --> 01:06:41.270 I thought so. 01:06:41.960 --> 01:06:46.780 I wanna explore one aspect of how this works in practice. 01:06:46.780 --> 01:06:50.480 In order to have robust diplomacy, 01:06:50.480 --> 01:06:53.850 we need to have the personnel to carry it out. 01:06:54.250 --> 01:06:57.710 Out of the countries in your area of responsibility 01:06:57.710 --> 01:07:00.070 as the head of European Command, 01:07:00.400 --> 01:07:03.050 the United States currently does not have 01:07:03.050 --> 01:07:07.400 a confirmed ambassador or even an official nominee 01:07:07.460 --> 01:07:09.440 for six of them: 01:07:09.760 --> 01:07:14.140 Belarus, Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, and Turkey. 01:07:14.390 --> 01:07:16.830 So General, as an operational commander, 01:07:16.830 --> 01:07:20.040 do these diplomatic vacancies concern you 01:07:20.400 --> 01:07:22.470 as you carry out your mission, 01:07:22.470 --> 01:07:24.210 and if so, why? 01:07:26.290 --> 01:07:28.820 - Yes, Senator, it does concern me. 01:07:28.820 --> 01:07:31.320 There's other organizations that have an ambassador 01:07:31.320 --> 01:07:32.800 that don't have them as well yet, 01:07:32.800 --> 01:07:34.390 beyond the number you've given. 01:07:35.710 --> 01:07:37.150 The country teams, for instance, 01:07:37.150 --> 01:07:39.700 in the embassies have great stats, 01:07:39.700 --> 01:07:41.510 and we work very closely with them. 01:07:41.890 --> 01:07:45.330 But the ambassador is a key individual, 01:07:45.330 --> 01:07:48.230 appointed by the government, recognized by their government, 01:07:48.230 --> 01:07:49.310 as the ambassador. 01:07:49.310 --> 01:07:53.160 And so we need to fill those in each one of these countries. 01:07:53.740 --> 01:07:55.470 Particularly in a country, for instance, 01:07:55.470 --> 01:07:59.670 where Turkey today where we don't have an ambassador now, 01:07:59.980 --> 01:08:04.940 and we are in very sensitive discussions 01:08:05.210 --> 01:08:09.610 in order to continue to reinforce 01:08:09.610 --> 01:08:14.020 and strengthen our relationship with a key NATO ally. 01:08:15.050 --> 01:08:16.730 The ambassador position is key. 01:08:17.500 --> 01:08:18.880 - Thank you very much, General. 01:08:18.880 --> 01:08:21.870 You know, we need to have both a strong military 01:08:21.870 --> 01:08:23.920 and a fully staffed State Department 01:08:23.920 --> 01:08:26.740 to best defend America and its allies, 01:08:26.740 --> 01:08:30.740 and we can't do that with empty ambassadorial posts 01:08:30.740 --> 01:08:33.770 and vacant positions throughout the State Department 01:08:34.150 --> 01:08:35.580 and around the world. 01:08:35.780 --> 01:08:37.490 The Trump administration's failure 01:08:37.490 --> 01:08:39.590 to fill major diplomatic posts 01:08:39.590 --> 01:08:42.360 has damaged our diplomatic readiness, 01:08:42.360 --> 01:08:44.820 and that makes our military's job harder. 01:08:44.970 --> 01:08:45.803 Thank you. 01:08:45.803 --> 01:08:46.729 Thank you, General. 01:08:46.729 --> 01:08:47.930 - [Inhofe] Senator Sasse. 01:08:47.930 --> 01:08:49.230 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:08:49.260 --> 01:08:50.790 General, thank you for being here. 01:08:50.790 --> 01:08:53.100 Thanks for your generosity with your time 01:08:53.100 --> 01:08:55.600 the last few weeks, as you've been back in the US. 01:08:56.323 --> 01:08:57.970 A bunch of us have a lot of respect for you 01:08:57.970 --> 01:09:00.540 and appreciate the tutorials you've given us. 01:09:00.800 --> 01:09:02.090 I think you said earlier, 01:09:02.090 --> 01:09:03.370 you said it in your written statement 01:09:03.370 --> 01:09:06.300 and I think you also said earlier in response to a question 01:09:06.300 --> 01:09:08.880 that Russia is now employing a broad menu 01:09:08.900 --> 01:09:13.150 of tactics and tools to manipulate and destabilize 01:09:13.150 --> 01:09:16.310 lots of nations and to manipulate and distort 01:09:16.310 --> 01:09:18.460 public information in a lot of the nations 01:09:18.460 --> 01:09:20.080 in your areas of responsibility. 01:09:20.160 --> 01:09:21.920 I think at one point you also said 01:09:22.080 --> 01:09:25.080 that a lot of their tactics are just short of war. 01:09:25.710 --> 01:09:28.850 Could you unpack what the line is in information warfare 01:09:28.850 --> 01:09:32.270 between just short of war and being at actual cyber war? 01:09:34.950 --> 01:09:36.620 - I think that's the key question, 01:09:36.620 --> 01:09:38.130 and it's something we've gotta explore, 01:09:38.130 --> 01:09:40.930 and it's particularly important in cyber as well. 01:09:41.400 --> 01:09:43.880 And there are discussions being had here, 01:09:43.880 --> 01:09:46.090 in NATO, et cetera, to determine 01:09:46.090 --> 01:09:47.990 what the definition of that is. 01:09:48.830 --> 01:09:51.010 But it would have to do with an attack 01:09:51.010 --> 01:09:54.960 that damages the vital interests of the United States, 01:09:54.960 --> 01:09:58.330 I think is the first place I would start to define that. 01:09:59.210 --> 01:10:02.250 And particularly true within cyber as well. 01:10:05.470 --> 01:10:07.590 That's probably at this point what I would say. 01:10:07.590 --> 01:10:09.770 I would start at the vital interests and go from there. 01:10:09.770 --> 01:10:13.110 But a better definition of that within our government, 01:10:13.110 --> 01:10:16.880 within NATO, then helps us when we're in a situation 01:10:16.880 --> 01:10:21.020 where we see a crisis or an attack that's approaching that 01:10:21.330 --> 01:10:24.730 and we can have greater agility, greater flexibility, 01:10:24.890 --> 01:10:26.710 in determining how to respond. 01:10:27.540 --> 01:10:30.090 - Public trust is at an all-time low. 01:10:30.090 --> 01:10:32.810 We've had decent polling in this country since the 1930s. 01:10:32.810 --> 01:10:34.490 Public trust is at an all-time low 01:10:34.490 --> 01:10:36.230 in most of our institutions right now, 01:10:36.230 --> 01:10:40.010 and when you look at every major culture war dispute 01:10:40.010 --> 01:10:41.210 that happens amongst us, 01:10:41.210 --> 01:10:43.930 I think about when the president decided to pick the scab 01:10:43.930 --> 01:10:48.930 at the Kaepernick and NFL kneeling before the flag issue. 01:10:49.290 --> 01:10:51.240 It's public information now. 01:10:51.240 --> 01:10:53.390 I think it's been in the press enough times 01:10:53.850 --> 01:10:55.380 that in the two or three days 01:10:55.380 --> 01:10:58.150 after the president decided to reignite that fight, 01:10:58.420 --> 01:11:02.140 two of the fastest-trending hashtags on Twitter, Facebook, 01:11:02.140 --> 01:11:04.560 Instagram, Snapchat, were #TakeAKneeNFL 01:11:05.680 --> 01:11:06.960 and #StandForTheAnthem. 01:11:07.940 --> 01:11:10.010 I think those of us who've spent a lot of time on this issue 01:11:10.010 --> 01:11:10.940 are well aware. 01:11:10.940 --> 01:11:14.050 I think the percentage is probably still classified, 01:11:14.050 --> 01:11:18.500 but the huge share of that culture warring in the US 01:11:18.500 --> 01:11:20.070 was actually of Russian origin. 01:11:20.140 --> 01:11:21.980 Both sides of our culture wars. 01:11:22.618 --> 01:11:25.180 TakeAKnee, StandForTheAnthem, Putin loves it. 01:11:25.180 --> 01:11:26.680 When Americans hate Americans 01:11:26.720 --> 01:11:29.280 and we fight with each other, Russia wins. 01:11:29.280 --> 01:11:31.810 And I know that you've seen lots and lots 01:11:31.810 --> 01:11:34.500 of similar things happening in European nations. 01:11:34.760 --> 01:11:37.430 I don't know how that is really different 01:11:37.430 --> 01:11:40.850 in terms of the ultimate public negative consequences 01:11:40.850 --> 01:11:44.300 than if this was done to a specific US corporation 01:11:44.390 --> 01:11:48.230 who then saw its market cap and its economy value collapse. 01:11:48.230 --> 01:11:50.380 And we're nuts if we don't understand 01:11:50.380 --> 01:11:51.940 that the next round of this 01:11:51.940 --> 01:11:55.300 is gonna include lots of specific economic warfare. 01:11:55.550 --> 01:11:57.770 So when we see attacks on public trust, 01:11:57.770 --> 01:11:59.480 we're not sure that it's warfare. 01:11:59.590 --> 01:12:01.220 If it were an economic action 01:12:01.220 --> 01:12:03.140 and you saw a specific US company 01:12:03.200 --> 01:12:05.530 devalued because of fake information 01:12:05.530 --> 01:12:08.250 that was out there from the Russians, would that be war? 01:12:13.080 --> 01:12:13.913 - I don't know. 01:12:13.913 --> 01:12:15.850 This is a policy question, actually, when you get to it, 01:12:15.850 --> 01:12:18.750 but I think what you're driving at is what I said earlier, 01:12:18.920 --> 01:12:21.110 and that is that we live in a different world today. 01:12:23.478 --> 01:12:26.550 The change in what is considered part of our environment, 01:12:26.550 --> 01:12:28.310 particularly having to do with information, 01:12:28.310 --> 01:12:30.230 the speed of it, the connectivity of it, 01:12:30.230 --> 01:12:34.160 the ability to, what I call develop volume, 01:12:34.740 --> 01:12:37.640 the impact of its cyber activity, 01:12:37.890 --> 01:12:39.410 are all things that we're wrestling with. 01:12:39.410 --> 01:12:41.400 But we need to wrestle with it, 01:12:41.400 --> 01:12:43.550 because we've gotta get a better definition 01:12:45.770 --> 01:12:48.930 of our activity within those and what's acceptable. 01:12:49.060 --> 01:12:52.090 In the international community, when it comes to conflict, 01:12:52.090 --> 01:12:55.870 what we've done since the end of the Second World War 01:12:55.870 --> 01:12:58.170 was help to establish institutions 01:12:58.730 --> 01:13:02.660 that established an international rule of order 01:13:04.029 --> 01:13:05.790 that nations are expected to follow. 01:13:05.790 --> 01:13:07.930 And I think in these new dynamics here, 01:13:08.120 --> 01:13:09.960 the new strategic environment we're in, 01:13:09.960 --> 01:13:12.380 we've not done that and we have to begin 01:13:12.380 --> 01:13:14.030 to move forward in some means 01:13:14.840 --> 01:13:18.420 to determine how we discipline particularly 01:13:18.420 --> 01:13:21.210 the cyber and information domains, et cetera, 01:13:21.210 --> 01:13:22.270 to a certain extent. 01:13:23.702 --> 01:13:25.380 - One of the things that's unfortunate about the ways 01:13:25.380 --> 01:13:27.120 that we're deliberating about where we are 01:13:27.120 --> 01:13:28.510 in the evolution of warfare 01:13:28.510 --> 01:13:30.100 and the emergence of cyber warfare 01:13:30.100 --> 01:13:32.010 is that it's people in the uniform 01:13:32.010 --> 01:13:33.500 who are doing the hardest work, 01:13:33.500 --> 01:13:35.770 and then come and stand before committees like this, 01:13:35.770 --> 01:13:37.990 and you and your colleagues 01:13:37.990 --> 01:13:39.480 end up taking a lot of the beating 01:13:39.480 --> 01:13:42.090 for what is really a failure of political leadership 01:13:42.200 --> 01:13:44.720 in both the legislative and executive branches, 01:13:44.720 --> 01:13:46.190 and both parties, right? 01:13:46.500 --> 01:13:50.850 After the Chinese attack on OPM three years ago, 01:13:51.110 --> 01:13:53.540 the last administration had no real response. 01:13:53.540 --> 01:13:55.620 In the current moment with Russian attacks, 01:13:55.620 --> 01:13:58.020 the current administration has no real response. 01:13:59.062 --> 01:14:01.030 The legislature is not nearly serious enough 01:14:01.030 --> 01:14:02.840 about this issue, and so regularly 01:14:02.840 --> 01:14:04.690 we take people who are in your position 01:14:04.690 --> 01:14:06.780 who are trying to help develop a menu of options 01:14:06.780 --> 01:14:08.420 for us to understand the problem, 01:14:08.420 --> 01:14:10.600 we're not active in response, 01:14:10.600 --> 01:14:13.380 and you're the one who ends up having to take 01:14:13.380 --> 01:14:14.880 some of the brunt of the heat. 01:14:15.360 --> 01:14:16.540 I would love to follow up with you. 01:14:16.540 --> 01:14:19.030 You and I have discussed this in private 01:14:19.030 --> 01:14:20.790 and in the SCIF in the past. 01:14:20.790 --> 01:14:22.980 I'd like to follow up with you in a formal letter 01:14:22.980 --> 01:14:25.600 and ask a question about this policymaking issue 01:14:25.650 --> 01:14:26.980 in the definition of war 01:14:27.020 --> 01:14:28.790 and in the cyber rules of engagement, 01:14:28.790 --> 01:14:30.940 because we'd like to help push forward 01:14:31.410 --> 01:14:32.980 at the more senior levels of the Pentagon 01:14:32.980 --> 01:14:34.990 and then ultimately the handoff to the White House 01:14:34.990 --> 01:14:36.700 where those discussions are. 01:14:36.700 --> 01:14:38.490 Because I've been here for only three years, 01:14:38.490 --> 01:14:39.820 I'm one of five people in this body 01:14:39.820 --> 01:14:41.380 who's never been a politician before. 01:14:41.380 --> 01:14:42.730 I've been here for three years 01:14:42.730 --> 01:14:44.260 and I've asked these questions 01:14:44.510 --> 01:14:47.210 every two, three months for 36 months straight, 01:14:47.210 --> 01:14:50.080 and frankly, it doesn't seem like we're any closer now 01:14:50.190 --> 01:14:51.670 than we were 36 months ago 01:14:51.670 --> 01:14:53.570 to having answers to these questions. 01:14:53.940 --> 01:14:56.670 And that's ultimately chiefly the responsibility 01:14:56.670 --> 01:14:58.740 of the Congress, the Article 1 branch, 01:14:58.740 --> 01:15:00.180 but we need the help of people like you 01:15:00.180 --> 01:15:01.280 to tee up those questions, 01:15:01.280 --> 01:15:02.630 so I'll follow up in letter to you. 01:15:02.630 --> 01:15:04.410 - Thanks, Senator. - Thank you, General. 01:15:04.520 --> 01:15:05.570 - [Inhofe] Thank you. 01:15:05.615 --> 01:15:06.782 Senator Kaine. 01:15:07.520 --> 01:15:08.353 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:15:08.353 --> 01:15:10.010 General Scaparrotti, thank you for your service 01:15:10.010 --> 01:15:11.260 and your testimony today. 01:15:11.300 --> 01:15:12.670 You've been asked a couple of questions 01:15:12.670 --> 01:15:15.690 about the RAND study, the unclassified version of which 01:15:15.690 --> 01:15:17.520 was entered into the record, 01:15:17.520 --> 01:15:19.640 and I wanna ask you a question about that, too. 01:15:19.640 --> 01:15:20.880 We've been briefed about it, 01:15:20.880 --> 01:15:21.760 and one of the things I noticed 01:15:21.760 --> 01:15:23.310 that was interesting about that study 01:15:23.310 --> 01:15:28.310 is it analyzed the state power competitors 01:15:30.200 --> 01:15:32.330 we have in terms of their capacities. 01:15:32.720 --> 01:15:34.230 But it didn't really look at 01:15:34.510 --> 01:15:36.850 what if a couple of them combined capacities. 01:15:36.850 --> 01:15:40.520 That really was not covered in this part that I read. 01:15:41.230 --> 01:15:43.190 We always talk about our combined capacity 01:15:43.190 --> 01:15:44.670 with NATO, for example, 01:15:45.440 --> 01:15:47.930 but if you look at the RAND report, 01:15:47.930 --> 01:15:50.290 you would assume that we would face potentially 01:15:50.290 --> 01:15:52.800 a set of discrete competitors, 01:15:52.800 --> 01:15:55.930 but there's little thought in the sections I've read 01:15:55.930 --> 01:15:58.790 about what their relationships are with one another. 01:15:58.790 --> 01:16:01.240 We're not the only country that has allies, 01:16:01.240 --> 01:16:02.730 even military alliances. 01:16:03.540 --> 01:16:05.860 The area that I would probably have the most concern 01:16:05.860 --> 01:16:08.090 would be a Russia-China relationship 01:16:08.090 --> 01:16:12.780 that would seek to exert more influence to our detriment. 01:16:12.830 --> 01:16:14.530 Although you see Russia and Turkey 01:16:14.730 --> 01:16:16.720 start to have some cooperation in areas 01:16:17.010 --> 01:16:18.500 that maybe is a little bit unusual, 01:16:18.500 --> 01:16:20.900 given the history between those two countries. 01:16:21.460 --> 01:16:24.370 I'm wondering if you could first maybe address this issue 01:16:24.370 --> 01:16:25.420 from your standpoint. 01:16:25.420 --> 01:16:28.790 Are you seeing anything in the Russia-China relationship 01:16:28.790 --> 01:16:32.120 that would signify that they are growing closer together 01:16:32.120 --> 01:16:34.860 in terms of mil-to-mil activity or other activities 01:16:35.230 --> 01:16:37.390 where the combined effect of their capacity 01:16:37.390 --> 01:16:38.820 should pose us concern? 01:16:41.010 --> 01:16:43.510 - I would still start by saying 01:16:43.510 --> 01:16:44.820 I think that there's not, 01:16:45.640 --> 01:16:48.070 I think they still have issues 01:16:48.070 --> 01:16:50.580 that wouldn't make them natural partners. 01:16:51.080 --> 01:16:53.250 But what we have seen, I think, 01:16:54.410 --> 01:16:58.420 in the last, I'll just go for this past year, for instance. 01:16:58.750 --> 01:17:03.750 We've seen Russian and Chinese naval operations 01:17:04.070 --> 01:17:06.630 training together in the European theater 01:17:07.777 --> 01:17:09.290 on a couple of occasions now. 01:17:09.290 --> 01:17:10.700 - [Kaine] In the European theater. 01:17:10.700 --> 01:17:12.000 - In the European theater. 01:17:12.750 --> 01:17:14.180 Maritime operations. 01:17:15.777 --> 01:17:20.777 We know that there has been some work together, 01:17:21.450 --> 01:17:25.100 at least we think in the port in Djibouti, 01:17:25.220 --> 01:17:27.710 a little bit of subsistence for each other there. 01:17:27.860 --> 01:17:29.980 So we've seen other areas, mil-to-mil, 01:17:30.140 --> 01:17:31.080 where they've come together 01:17:31.080 --> 01:17:34.670 for specific training purposes, etc. 01:17:34.670 --> 01:17:36.420 So there's a little more collaboration there 01:17:36.420 --> 01:17:37.820 than we've seen in the past. 01:17:38.170 --> 01:17:40.970 And of course that is somewhat worrisome. 01:17:40.970 --> 01:17:42.470 - How about Russia and Turkey? 01:17:43.480 --> 01:17:44.313 - Yes. 01:17:44.990 --> 01:17:46.880 But there again, I think... 01:17:50.340 --> 01:17:53.750 They've always had an economic relationship. 01:17:54.340 --> 01:17:56.080 It was disturbed with the shoot-down 01:17:56.080 --> 01:17:57.650 of the Russian aircraft. 01:17:57.650 --> 01:17:59.960 I think part of what the government has tried to do 01:17:59.960 --> 01:18:02.470 is reestablish the economic relationship. 01:18:03.080 --> 01:18:07.080 There has been obviously with respect to Syria 01:18:07.080 --> 01:18:08.580 and their operations there, 01:18:10.090 --> 01:18:12.610 at a minimum, deconfliction, if not support 01:18:12.610 --> 01:18:13.960 between Russia and Turkey. 01:18:14.010 --> 01:18:15.750 - And then how about Russia and Iran? 01:18:15.750 --> 01:18:17.690 Obviously we know they are both backers 01:18:17.690 --> 01:18:19.120 of the Assad regime in Syria, 01:18:19.120 --> 01:18:21.290 but are you seeing Russia and Iran engaging 01:18:21.290 --> 01:18:24.950 in mil-to-mil activities, training, 01:18:24.950 --> 01:18:26.460 other things that would make you worry 01:18:26.460 --> 01:18:28.060 about their combined capacities? 01:18:29.440 --> 01:18:31.590 - There are activities where they work together. 01:18:31.590 --> 01:18:33.800 I think it's one of convenience. 01:18:34.710 --> 01:18:36.790 But obviously any of these, 01:18:37.460 --> 01:18:41.420 any of these nations that might be able to come together, 01:18:41.490 --> 01:18:45.120 particularly with respect to areas that we're operating in, 01:18:45.120 --> 01:18:46.750 would be of concern mil-to-mil. 01:18:46.750 --> 01:18:49.460 - Let me switch quickly to one last Turkey question. 01:18:50.210 --> 01:18:51.730 The Turkey issue is very vexing. 01:18:51.730 --> 01:18:55.890 A NATO ally, we use the base at Incirlik 01:18:56.150 --> 01:19:00.180 for important tasks in the fight against ISIS. 01:19:00.630 --> 01:19:03.970 Turkey's been very discouraged at the US alliance 01:19:03.970 --> 01:19:07.070 with the Kurds in northern Syria in the ISIS battle, 01:19:07.070 --> 01:19:10.400 and that is a very serious point of contention 01:19:10.450 --> 01:19:12.700 between the Turkish government and the United States. 01:19:12.700 --> 01:19:15.160 Just give us a little bit of a future look 01:19:15.160 --> 01:19:17.990 at the US-Kurd relationship in northern Syria. 01:19:18.180 --> 01:19:20.550 The Kurds have been great fighting partners for the US 01:19:20.550 --> 01:19:22.720 in defeating ISIS in northern Syria, 01:19:22.990 --> 01:19:25.540 but the US has also been a great partner to the Kurds 01:19:25.540 --> 01:19:30.540 in enabling them to take back land that is theirs from ISIS. 01:19:32.315 --> 01:19:34.340 Are we at a state now in northern Syria 01:19:34.570 --> 01:19:37.570 where we are now sort of reducing 01:19:37.980 --> 01:19:40.610 the work we do together with Syrian Kurds 01:19:40.610 --> 01:19:42.680 because of the diminished threat of ISIS 01:19:42.910 --> 01:19:46.150 in a way that should cool the temperature 01:19:46.480 --> 01:19:49.230 of this challenge between Turkey and the United States? 01:19:50.950 --> 01:19:54.120 - In this process, I work closely with Turkey. 01:19:54.330 --> 01:19:55.570 That's within EUCOM. 01:19:56.450 --> 01:20:00.820 The Kurds and those operations in Syria are with CENTCOM. 01:20:01.240 --> 01:20:05.468 So we, I and Joe Votel, as you can imagine, 01:20:05.468 --> 01:20:06.930 talk frequently on this, 01:20:06.930 --> 01:20:09.070 as well as our staffs working together. 01:20:10.070 --> 01:20:12.440 My approach to this is that we work, 01:20:12.440 --> 01:20:16.910 not only look at the immediate interest of both nations, 01:20:17.008 --> 01:20:18.980 but we look at the long-term interests. 01:20:18.980 --> 01:20:21.960 Where do we wanna be in year, two years, and five years? 01:20:22.120 --> 01:20:23.680 And with that perspective, 01:20:24.980 --> 01:20:27.140 with a close NATO ally like Turkey, 01:20:27.140 --> 01:20:28.720 we know that we want to maintain 01:20:28.720 --> 01:20:30.180 and strengthen our relationship. 01:20:30.180 --> 01:20:32.040 So that's the long-term objective. 01:20:32.040 --> 01:20:34.560 And I think if we look at that long-term objective, 01:20:34.560 --> 01:20:36.900 it can begin to inform what we're doing today 01:20:36.900 --> 01:20:39.030 with respect to NATO as an ally 01:20:39.804 --> 01:20:44.650 and the Kurds, who are our partner in defeating ISIS. 01:20:46.230 --> 01:20:50.050 Although it's a very difficult and complex situation, 01:20:50.200 --> 01:20:53.820 I'm hopeful that we can walk this path 01:20:55.040 --> 01:20:56.640 and attain both interests. 01:20:57.550 --> 01:20:58.980 - Mr. Chair, thank you. - Thank you. 01:20:58.980 --> 01:21:00.010 Senator Sullivan. 01:21:00.930 --> 01:21:02.250 - Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to thank 01:21:02.250 --> 01:21:04.820 my friend from Georgia here for letting me cut in line 01:21:04.820 --> 01:21:06.550 on the questioning. 01:21:06.550 --> 01:21:08.060 General, good to see you again, 01:21:08.060 --> 01:21:09.700 and thanks for all you're doing. 01:21:09.700 --> 01:21:11.470 I think there's, safe to say, 01:21:11.470 --> 01:21:12.710 there's a lot of us who are glad 01:21:12.710 --> 01:21:14.960 you're in the position you're in, 01:21:14.960 --> 01:21:18.130 and I know it's a difficult challenge, 01:21:18.130 --> 01:21:19.790 so thanks for your service. 01:21:20.760 --> 01:21:22.670 A lot of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle here 01:21:22.670 --> 01:21:24.840 have been talking about the importance of allies. 01:21:24.840 --> 01:21:25.700 I know you get it. 01:21:25.700 --> 01:21:27.010 I think we all get it, 01:21:27.940 --> 01:21:30.970 whether it's China, Russia, having our allies on board 01:21:31.135 --> 01:21:33.900 and expanding that network is really important. 01:21:33.900 --> 01:21:37.370 So you have all our full support on that. 01:21:37.760 --> 01:21:40.520 I do want to respond on Senator Warren's comment. 01:21:41.220 --> 01:21:42.940 The second time in the last two days 01:21:42.940 --> 01:21:44.390 we've heard colleagues, 01:21:44.390 --> 01:21:46.720 and I have the utmost respect for my colleagues 01:21:46.720 --> 01:21:48.980 on the other side, particularly on this committee, 01:21:48.980 --> 01:21:52.290 about how the president needs to get his people out 01:21:52.800 --> 01:21:54.830 to get people in positions, 01:21:54.830 --> 01:21:57.050 ambassadors, assistant secretaries. 01:21:57.260 --> 01:21:59.810 I agree, and I think we could have maybe a little deal here 01:21:59.810 --> 01:22:01.610 among Democrats and Republicans. 01:22:01.610 --> 01:22:04.230 We'll encourage the White House to get more nominees out, 01:22:04.230 --> 01:22:07.170 but my colleagues on the other side can't complain about it, 01:22:07.170 --> 01:22:08.710 like Senator Warren was just doing, 01:22:08.710 --> 01:22:12.080 and then go to the unprecedented lengths 01:22:12.080 --> 01:22:14.560 that they have been doing to block and delay 01:22:14.940 --> 01:22:16.490 and make sure President Trump 01:22:16.605 --> 01:22:18.790 doesn't get his nominees confirmed. 01:22:18.790 --> 01:22:20.360 So we can't have it both ways, 01:22:20.690 --> 01:22:22.060 Senator Warren and others. 01:22:22.240 --> 01:22:23.740 We'll work with the president, 01:22:23.980 --> 01:22:25.760 and when they come to the floor, let's move 'em, 01:22:25.760 --> 01:22:28.570 not unprecedented blocking which has been happening 01:22:28.800 --> 01:22:29.990 which doesn't help the country, 01:22:29.990 --> 01:22:31.810 doesn't help our national security, 01:22:32.180 --> 01:22:35.590 and it's a little hypocritical to be complaining. 01:22:35.634 --> 01:22:39.370 When they get to the floor, they never get moved. 01:22:39.370 --> 01:22:40.570 But that's not your problem. 01:22:40.570 --> 01:22:41.520 That's our problem. 01:22:43.160 --> 01:22:45.900 I'd actually like to talk about the Arctic. 01:22:46.340 --> 01:22:49.380 And I know it's an area that you've been focusing on 01:22:49.380 --> 01:22:50.460 and we appreciate that. 01:22:50.460 --> 01:22:52.400 There's a number of us beyond just me 01:22:52.400 --> 01:22:54.900 being from Alaska who are concerned about it. 01:22:55.270 --> 01:22:58.670 How many bases are the Russians building 01:22:58.670 --> 01:23:01.120 or refurbishing in the Arctic? 01:23:01.120 --> 01:23:02.520 Do you have a sense of that? 01:23:02.540 --> 01:23:07.170 Which would include their new Arctic military command. 01:23:07.170 --> 01:23:09.020 Can you talk a little bit about that? 01:23:09.770 --> 01:23:10.603 - Yes. 01:23:11.960 --> 01:23:14.950 Essentially the majority of this is refurbishing old bases, 01:23:14.950 --> 01:23:16.510 probably seven to nine, 01:23:17.711 --> 01:23:20.270 in particular those that are at the beginning and the end 01:23:20.270 --> 01:23:23.370 of what is the Northern Sea Route across there, 01:23:23.370 --> 01:23:24.950 and those are the key places. 01:23:25.570 --> 01:23:27.020 So we're watching that closely 01:23:27.020 --> 01:23:29.470 in terms of militarization of the Arctic. 01:23:30.400 --> 01:23:31.750 - And what do you think their intentions are, 01:23:31.750 --> 01:23:35.730 and let me ask, are they installing any systems, 01:23:37.120 --> 01:23:42.120 including the fielding of major ice breakers 01:23:43.830 --> 01:23:46.130 that would give them defacto control 01:23:46.260 --> 01:23:47.520 of the Northern Sea Route? 01:23:47.520 --> 01:23:50.110 Is that what they're trying to do, do you think? 01:23:50.110 --> 01:23:51.280 What are their intentions? 01:23:51.280 --> 01:23:54.910 I mean, they're clearly militarizing that part of the world. 01:23:54.970 --> 01:23:57.180 What do you think they're trying to achieve? 01:23:57.490 --> 01:24:00.060 - Their stated intent is to provide 01:24:02.260 --> 01:24:05.580 safeguards, security, 01:24:06.620 --> 01:24:09.100 for the economic wellbeing of the Arctic. 01:24:10.270 --> 01:24:11.790 Their statement is along those lines. 01:24:11.790 --> 01:24:13.660 But if you look at what they're putting into place, 01:24:13.660 --> 01:24:16.610 they would have the capability, I think, in some time, 01:24:18.800 --> 01:24:20.470 perhaps two or three years, 01:24:20.700 --> 01:24:24.150 to control the Northern Sea Route, if they chose to do so. 01:24:24.150 --> 01:24:26.490 - And do you think that's in the interest 01:24:26.490 --> 01:24:27.650 of the United States, 01:24:27.947 --> 01:24:31.560 a country like Russia would have a de facto control 01:24:31.560 --> 01:24:34.432 over a new and potentially incredibly important 01:24:34.432 --> 01:24:37.290 line of communication through the world? 01:24:37.440 --> 01:24:38.530 - No, I don't. 01:24:38.570 --> 01:24:39.930 - So in our Arctic policy, 01:24:39.930 --> 01:24:43.320 that this committee recommended, or actually, requested 01:24:43.320 --> 01:24:47.820 that the secretary of defense promulgate two years ago, 01:24:48.420 --> 01:24:51.210 we talked about the ability to control that sea route, 01:24:51.210 --> 01:24:52.980 to run FONOPs there. 01:24:53.490 --> 01:24:56.040 Are we falling behind in terms of the capabilities 01:24:56.040 --> 01:24:58.840 that we have vis-a-vis the Russians to do that? 01:25:00.220 --> 01:25:01.470 - We're not keeping pace. 01:25:02.140 --> 01:25:03.190 - Thank you, General. 01:25:03.980 --> 01:25:05.130 I wanted to ask another issue. 01:25:05.130 --> 01:25:09.750 With regard to shortfalls that you may or may not have 01:25:09.750 --> 01:25:12.890 in the EUCOM AOR to counter and deter 01:25:13.790 --> 01:25:15.670 increasing Russian aggression, 01:25:16.270 --> 01:25:18.720 what's your thought of our shortfalls 01:25:19.350 --> 01:25:21.580 with regard to missile defense, 01:25:21.580 --> 01:25:24.050 and how do we need to address that? 01:25:27.400 --> 01:25:30.300 - We have capable missile defense systems. 01:25:31.850 --> 01:25:33.520 When you look at missile defense, though, 01:25:33.520 --> 01:25:35.480 I think the things that we need to focus on 01:25:35.480 --> 01:25:37.900 are first of all, we need to focus again 01:25:37.900 --> 01:25:40.950 on short-range and medium-range missile technology. 01:25:41.770 --> 01:25:45.680 You know, we have been operating in environments 01:25:45.680 --> 01:25:49.780 where it wasn't a contested environment, etc. 01:25:50.050 --> 01:25:51.860 That's not the case any longer. 01:25:52.320 --> 01:25:54.330 So we need to look at those systems. 01:25:54.530 --> 01:25:56.890 We need to look at the inter-operability with our allies, 01:25:56.890 --> 01:25:58.680 because we can't do this in Europe 01:25:58.680 --> 01:26:01.470 without doing it correctly together. 01:26:02.270 --> 01:26:04.030 And then we need to look at other parts of this, 01:26:04.030 --> 01:26:08.650 passive parts of our integrated air missile defense as well. 01:26:10.686 --> 01:26:11.550 So that's how I would answer that. 01:26:11.550 --> 01:26:14.740 I think it's a holistic system that we gotta put together, 01:26:15.070 --> 01:26:17.280 and it's the systems within the mid-range 01:26:17.800 --> 01:26:19.020 and probably short-range 01:26:19.020 --> 01:26:20.820 that I'm most concerned about today. 01:26:21.100 --> 01:26:23.370 - Okay, thank you very much, General. 01:26:25.900 --> 01:26:27.190 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:26:27.190 --> 01:26:28.890 General, welcome to the committee. 01:26:29.880 --> 01:26:31.190 First I want to associate myself 01:26:31.190 --> 01:26:33.300 with the comments of Senator Sasse. 01:26:33.690 --> 01:26:35.260 We've talked about this a great deal. 01:26:35.260 --> 01:26:37.940 We really need to develop a cyber doctrine 01:26:38.240 --> 01:26:42.450 and a strategy in order to have a credible deterrent, 01:26:42.450 --> 01:26:45.050 and I think that's one of the things that's lacking, 01:26:45.160 --> 01:26:47.410 prior administration, current administration. 01:26:47.710 --> 01:26:48.620 Let's just get it done, 01:26:48.620 --> 01:26:50.520 and I hope you will take that message back, 01:26:50.520 --> 01:26:52.680 'cause if all we do is try to defend, 01:26:52.910 --> 01:26:55.700 ultimately, as you know, 01:26:55.800 --> 01:26:57.510 the whole idea of your forces, 01:26:57.510 --> 01:26:59.760 and the whole idea of our nuclear forces is deterrence. 01:26:59.760 --> 01:27:01.380 We don't want to have to use 'em. 01:27:01.380 --> 01:27:04.790 And we don't have a deterrent force in terms of cyber, 01:27:04.870 --> 01:27:06.150 and I think it's something 01:27:07.062 --> 01:27:08.080 that we certainly need to develop. 01:27:08.080 --> 01:27:09.180 Do you agree, General? 01:27:10.270 --> 01:27:11.103 Thank you. 01:27:12.740 --> 01:27:14.260 It seems to me that what's going on, 01:27:14.260 --> 01:27:15.540 and we've had a series of questions 01:27:15.540 --> 01:27:17.810 about what the Russians are doing in Europe, 01:27:17.810 --> 01:27:19.220 and I think it will be interesting 01:27:19.220 --> 01:27:20.540 to learn whether they were involved 01:27:20.540 --> 01:27:22.990 in the recent Italian elections over the weekend. 01:27:23.150 --> 01:27:24.580 What we're seeing before our eyes 01:27:24.580 --> 01:27:26.840 is a kind of deunification of Europe. 01:27:27.100 --> 01:27:30.960 We've had Brexit, we've had a populist election in Italy. 01:27:31.740 --> 01:27:34.680 We've had a very difficult election in Germany. 01:27:34.680 --> 01:27:36.190 We know they attempted to interfere 01:27:36.190 --> 01:27:37.610 in the election in France. 01:27:37.710 --> 01:27:39.930 So they're trying to split the countries, 01:27:40.210 --> 01:27:42.470 and it strikes me that that what they are doing 01:27:42.470 --> 01:27:44.690 is a kind of geopolitical jiu-jitsu. 01:27:45.340 --> 01:27:47.470 My memory of judo and jiu-jitsu 01:27:47.470 --> 01:27:50.330 was you use your opponent's strength against them, 01:27:50.370 --> 01:27:51.920 and our strength is our freedom 01:27:52.240 --> 01:27:54.620 and our first amendment and our free press 01:27:54.620 --> 01:27:58.230 and our open society, and that's exactly what they're using 01:27:58.230 --> 01:28:02.130 in order to turn it back on us and to divide us, 01:28:02.220 --> 01:28:03.750 not only within countries, 01:28:03.750 --> 01:28:05.450 but also within the alliance. 01:28:05.450 --> 01:28:08.920 I presume you see this Russian activity all the time 01:28:09.030 --> 01:28:12.110 from your position in EUCOM. 01:28:14.540 --> 01:28:15.400 - Yes sir, I do. 01:28:16.380 --> 01:28:17.730 I agree with your thoughts. 01:28:20.420 --> 01:28:24.040 A democratic government, the values that we profess, 01:28:24.040 --> 01:28:26.140 the freedom of the press, those kinds of things, 01:28:26.140 --> 01:28:28.140 those are the things that are vulnerabilities 01:28:28.140 --> 01:28:30.160 with respect to Russia's attack. 01:28:30.160 --> 01:28:31.640 - [King] That's exactly what they're exploiting. 01:28:31.640 --> 01:28:32.473 - That's what they're exploiting. 01:28:32.473 --> 01:28:33.470 That's what they're leveraging. 01:28:33.470 --> 01:28:35.020 I said earlier in my comments 01:28:35.020 --> 01:28:37.130 that it's important today 01:28:37.130 --> 01:28:38.660 that we not take for granted 01:28:38.660 --> 01:28:43.260 the importance of these values, our active individuals, 01:28:43.260 --> 01:28:47.220 active participation as a member of democracy, 01:28:47.220 --> 01:28:49.080 to protect all of those things. 01:28:49.470 --> 01:28:51.410 There's a certain sense that I have, 01:28:51.410 --> 01:28:52.430 both here and in Europe, 01:28:52.430 --> 01:28:55.410 that we've kinda begun to take that for granted 01:28:55.410 --> 01:28:56.670 and now it's being attacked. 01:28:56.670 --> 01:28:59.400 We have to think about it that way 01:28:59.590 --> 01:29:01.440 and begin to come together to protect 01:29:01.800 --> 01:29:03.730 the values and our way of life, 01:29:03.750 --> 01:29:05.465 because that's essentially what they don't have. 01:29:05.465 --> 01:29:06.800 - That leads us back to the issue 01:29:06.800 --> 01:29:08.740 of some kind of strategy and doctrine 01:29:09.010 --> 01:29:11.890 that we can develop, not unlike NATO 01:29:12.680 --> 01:29:13.790 at the end of the World War II. 01:29:13.790 --> 01:29:16.100 Not unlike the strategy of deterrence 01:29:16.100 --> 01:29:18.670 that underlay our nuclear policy for 70 years, 01:29:18.670 --> 01:29:20.260 which has worked. 01:29:21.300 --> 01:29:23.230 Let me change the subject for a moment. 01:29:23.230 --> 01:29:25.310 Javelins to Ukraine. 01:29:26.130 --> 01:29:30.910 Any concern about that leading to an escalation 01:29:30.910 --> 01:29:33.100 on the other side, particularly given the fact 01:29:33.100 --> 01:29:36.040 that Russia is so much more proximate to the battle field? 01:29:36.656 --> 01:29:38.700 Give me your thoughts about that. 01:29:40.040 --> 01:29:41.880 - I wouldn't say I have zero concern, 01:29:41.880 --> 01:29:43.980 but it's not a lot of concern. 01:29:46.300 --> 01:29:50.230 Particularly because if you look at the Russian proxies 01:29:50.960 --> 01:29:54.070 and the force structures, the kinds of equipment 01:29:54.070 --> 01:29:58.210 provided by Russia, the presence of the Russian leadership, 01:29:59.830 --> 01:30:01.870 and the proximity of Russian units 01:30:03.080 --> 01:30:05.710 on the border to eastern Ukraine, 01:30:06.970 --> 01:30:08.770 they would obviously take advantage 01:30:08.770 --> 01:30:10.750 of this information warfare to say 01:30:10.750 --> 01:30:13.980 that it's of concern to them, but it should not be. 01:30:14.930 --> 01:30:16.830 - In the few seconds that I have left, 01:30:17.280 --> 01:30:19.680 your thoughts about the status of that conflict. 01:30:19.680 --> 01:30:21.860 It seems to be, at least from the point of view 01:30:21.860 --> 01:30:26.860 of our attention, in a kind of limbo and a kind of standoff. 01:30:28.190 --> 01:30:29.440 Is that the situation? 01:30:30.250 --> 01:30:32.250 - Well, you know, sometimes there will be those 01:30:32.250 --> 01:30:34.470 that add this to the frozen conflicts 01:30:34.470 --> 01:30:36.490 that we see in Europe, particularly in the East, 01:30:36.490 --> 01:30:38.010 but I would say it's not that. 01:30:38.210 --> 01:30:39.530 It's a hot war yet. 01:30:40.290 --> 01:30:42.030 They take casualties on both sides, 01:30:42.030 --> 01:30:46.210 but particularly in Ukraine, every week to this date. 01:30:46.480 --> 01:30:49.760 We have seen the violence level go down of late, 01:30:50.030 --> 01:30:51.580 but I would tell you what you don't see 01:30:51.580 --> 01:30:53.350 is within that lower violence level, 01:30:53.350 --> 01:30:57.910 it's less heavy artillery and more things like snipers, etc. 01:30:58.170 --> 01:30:59.870 So the casualties haven't gone down. 01:30:59.870 --> 01:31:01.060 In fact, they've gone up a bit. 01:31:01.060 --> 01:31:02.600 - [King] But it's still a hot war. 01:31:02.600 --> 01:31:03.840 - It's still a hot war, 01:31:03.840 --> 01:31:08.470 and my personal opinion is that although Russia 01:31:09.140 --> 01:31:11.210 states that it's Ukraine's problem 01:31:11.210 --> 01:31:12.410 that we're not moving forward 01:31:12.410 --> 01:31:13.650 with the Minsk agreement, et cetera, 01:31:13.650 --> 01:31:14.900 I think it's actually Russia 01:31:14.900 --> 01:31:16.430 who doesn't want it to move forward. 01:31:16.430 --> 01:31:17.960 They can certainly do more 01:31:18.887 --> 01:31:20.880 than they're doing today with respect 01:31:20.880 --> 01:31:22.980 of helping us move in the right direction. 01:31:23.080 --> 01:31:26.480 Protection of the mission monitors, for instance, 01:31:26.945 --> 01:31:31.800 in the Donbass, which they don't help with at all, etc. 01:31:32.240 --> 01:31:33.850 - Final question on a different subject 01:31:33.850 --> 01:31:35.020 that could be a yes or no answer. 01:31:35.020 --> 01:31:37.300 You note in your testimony on page four, 01:31:37.400 --> 01:31:39.600 Russia is revitalizing its northern fleet, 01:31:39.600 --> 01:31:42.640 as you just discussed with Senator Sullivan. 01:31:42.640 --> 01:31:45.700 In anticipation of increased military commercial activity, 01:31:45.930 --> 01:31:47.270 they intend to assert sovereignty 01:31:47.270 --> 01:31:49.100 over the Northern Sea Route in violation 01:31:49.100 --> 01:31:51.900 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 01:31:52.640 --> 01:31:54.270 Would it be advantageous to our country 01:31:54.270 --> 01:31:57.590 for us to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 01:31:57.590 --> 01:32:00.400 so that we could be a participant in those proceedings? 01:32:00.989 --> 01:32:02.489 - Yes. - Thank you. 01:32:02.870 --> 01:32:03.830 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:32:03.970 --> 01:32:05.540 - [Inhofe] Senator Perdue. 01:32:05.920 --> 01:32:07.210 - General, thank you for being here 01:32:07.210 --> 01:32:08.760 and for your decade of service. 01:32:10.392 --> 01:32:11.480 I want to talk about Russia in just a minute, 01:32:11.480 --> 01:32:13.020 but particularly about Georgia 01:32:13.120 --> 01:32:15.420 and their intent there and our strategy there. 01:32:15.950 --> 01:32:18.840 It seems to me when you look at their facilities 01:32:18.840 --> 01:32:21.380 in Murmansk, Kaliningrad, 01:32:21.830 --> 01:32:24.550 Sevastopol now in the Crimea region, 01:32:24.550 --> 01:32:26.000 what they've done in Georgia, 01:32:26.290 --> 01:32:27.810 and now that we look at like they've done 01:32:27.810 --> 01:32:30.050 in Latakia and Tartus in Syria, 01:32:32.140 --> 01:32:33.820 I'm concerned about these frozen conflicts. 01:32:33.820 --> 01:32:36.500 I'd like to get your update on the Georgia frozen conflict. 01:32:36.500 --> 01:32:38.880 I guess we still call that a frozen conflict. 01:32:40.525 --> 01:32:44.710 What's our posture there and what's the long-term strategy 01:32:44.970 --> 01:32:46.730 regarding specifically Georgia, 01:32:46.730 --> 01:32:48.380 but also you talked about the current situation 01:32:48.380 --> 01:32:49.213 in the Ukraine. 01:32:49.213 --> 01:32:52.600 I'd love for you to also update us on your current thinking, 01:32:52.600 --> 01:32:56.060 the US current posture with regard to Ukraine and Georgia 01:32:56.060 --> 01:32:59.950 relative to what looks to be a solidification 01:32:59.950 --> 01:33:02.970 of Russia's positioning 01:33:03.200 --> 01:33:05.220 in a crescent around Eastern Europe. 01:33:09.670 --> 01:33:11.550 - First, Senator, with respect to Georgia, one, 01:33:11.550 --> 01:33:13.300 I would state that as a partner, 01:33:13.300 --> 01:33:15.460 Georgia as a partner is a strong one. 01:33:16.290 --> 01:33:19.990 They provide forces in Afghanistan and others. 01:33:21.560 --> 01:33:24.650 Not a large country, but a good fighting force 01:33:24.650 --> 01:33:26.700 and a good partner. 01:33:28.030 --> 01:33:29.630 What we see there today 01:33:30.090 --> 01:33:33.190 when you look into the two areas 01:33:33.190 --> 01:33:34.880 that Russians have presence, 01:33:35.130 --> 01:33:37.410 those breakaway portions 01:33:37.410 --> 01:33:38.270 of Georgia, 01:33:39.960 --> 01:33:41.870 Ossetia, et cetera, 01:33:42.720 --> 01:33:46.230 they are now working 01:33:46.230 --> 01:33:51.230 to bring them into, I think, almost the Russian Federation, 01:33:51.690 --> 01:33:53.760 in the sense that what you begin to see 01:33:53.760 --> 01:33:58.000 is the use of Russian administration within those. 01:33:59.080 --> 01:34:01.030 - Putin calls them independent states now, 01:34:01.030 --> 01:34:01.863 those two states. - He does, 01:34:01.863 --> 01:34:04.070 but it's not recognized internationally 01:34:04.070 --> 01:34:06.290 as independent states, neither one of them. 01:34:06.570 --> 01:34:07.750 They call it that. 01:34:07.750 --> 01:34:10.620 I don't think there is maybe more than three nations 01:34:10.620 --> 01:34:13.600 or four in the world that accept his definition. 01:34:13.920 --> 01:34:15.570 But my point is what he's doing 01:34:15.570 --> 01:34:18.840 is he's drawing them into their administration. 01:34:19.950 --> 01:34:21.300 In some of these countries, 01:34:21.300 --> 01:34:23.250 and I can't recall if Georgia is one of them, 01:34:23.250 --> 01:34:24.560 but in some of those countries, 01:34:24.560 --> 01:34:27.950 for those areas that they have a presence, 01:34:28.970 --> 01:34:31.340 they have declared those soldiers 01:34:31.340 --> 01:34:33.130 either ability to become part 01:34:33.130 --> 01:34:36.270 of the Russian Federation military forces, 01:34:36.520 --> 01:34:37.710 or they have agreements 01:34:37.710 --> 01:34:41.000 that they would become a part that if there were conflict. 01:34:41.700 --> 01:34:43.170 My point is you can just see them 01:34:43.170 --> 01:34:44.840 drawing them into their orbit. 01:34:45.330 --> 01:34:47.080 Now, you asked about others. 01:34:47.780 --> 01:34:51.980 I think if you go to Moldova or other areas 01:34:51.980 --> 01:34:54.300 where we have frozen conflicts, 01:34:55.280 --> 01:34:56.640 this is to their advantage 01:34:56.640 --> 01:35:01.640 because they use that in order to help secure 01:35:04.023 --> 01:35:05.760 what they see as part of their strategic depth 01:35:05.760 --> 01:35:06.790 on the periphery, 01:35:07.637 --> 01:35:09.290 once they're in their area of influence. 01:35:09.290 --> 01:35:12.180 - So what is our strategy in those frozen conflicts? 01:35:12.300 --> 01:35:13.730 And I'd like a brief answer, 01:35:13.730 --> 01:35:15.646 'cause I wanna ask a quick question on Israel 01:35:15.646 --> 01:35:17.030 as you finish up. 01:35:18.220 --> 01:35:20.490 - Well, our strategy is diplomatically 01:35:21.380 --> 01:35:24.530 to stay very involved in a different areas, 01:35:24.530 --> 01:35:25.600 whether it's OSCE, 01:35:26.010 --> 01:35:28.760 Minsk, which is what it is for a couple of those, 01:35:29.030 --> 01:35:32.510 diplomatically in order to resolve the conflicts 01:35:34.350 --> 01:35:37.550 and at the same time respect the sovereignty 01:35:37.550 --> 01:35:40.520 of the nations and the determination 01:35:40.520 --> 01:35:42.380 of the people in involved, 01:35:42.380 --> 01:35:45.910 like in Nagorno-Karabakh, for instance, 01:35:46.690 --> 01:35:50.550 their desire to determine their own governments. 01:35:50.550 --> 01:35:52.240 We generally follow that track, 01:35:52.240 --> 01:35:54.500 but a better question for the diplomats 01:35:54.500 --> 01:35:57.040 who are working that in our regard, 01:35:57.450 --> 01:35:59.930 we have a relationship with each of these countries 01:35:59.930 --> 01:36:04.480 where we help them with security reform 01:36:04.480 --> 01:36:06.490 and also capacity building. 01:36:06.770 --> 01:36:10.060 Because in each case, they're looking to the West, 01:36:10.060 --> 01:36:12.160 and they would prefer to come to the West. 01:36:12.450 --> 01:36:16.140 Russia's continuation of this frozen conflict 01:36:16.140 --> 01:36:19.430 is one way that they freeze that ability of a nation 01:36:19.430 --> 01:36:22.360 to then look to the West for either NATO or EU. 01:36:22.570 --> 01:36:23.403 - Thank you. 01:36:23.680 --> 01:36:25.270 In the remaining time I've got, 01:36:25.270 --> 01:36:27.680 just a quick question about Iran 01:36:27.680 --> 01:36:30.500 and their increased activity in Syria. 01:36:30.500 --> 01:36:32.450 It seems that they've built the permanent base now 01:36:32.450 --> 01:36:34.330 outside Damascus that has a warehouse 01:36:34.330 --> 01:36:35.910 that's capable of storing missiles 01:36:35.910 --> 01:36:37.020 that could hit Israel. 01:36:37.510 --> 01:36:39.300 We know that they talk openly 01:36:39.300 --> 01:36:42.110 about a land bridge from Tehran to Beirut. 01:36:42.700 --> 01:36:45.890 The changing situation in Syria certainly raises questions, 01:36:46.140 --> 01:36:47.840 particularly with the latest aggression 01:36:47.840 --> 01:36:50.010 with the drone incident in Israel. 01:36:50.610 --> 01:36:52.010 How does that situation in Syria, 01:36:52.010 --> 01:36:54.280 Israel's part of your area of responsibility, 01:36:54.280 --> 01:36:55.113 if I understand correct. 01:36:55.113 --> 01:36:55.946 Correct? 01:36:55.946 --> 01:36:56.779 - That's correct, it is. 01:36:56.779 --> 01:36:58.780 - So what is the current situation? 01:36:58.850 --> 01:37:02.900 How do you assess that, and what is your command's posture 01:37:02.900 --> 01:37:06.220 relative to the security of our ally, Israel? 01:37:06.730 --> 01:37:08.830 - My mission in EUCOM with respect to Israel 01:37:08.830 --> 01:37:10.600 is to support the defense of Israel. 01:37:10.600 --> 01:37:14.080 In fact, we have a large contingent there today 01:37:14.280 --> 01:37:17.350 doing a defense and rehearsing. 01:37:18.230 --> 01:37:21.300 Basically those operations 01:37:21.300 --> 01:37:24.150 that we planned in defense of Israel, should it be needed. 01:37:24.150 --> 01:37:25.980 I'm going there tonight, in fact. 01:37:28.019 --> 01:37:29.460 So we continue to work closely with them 01:37:29.460 --> 01:37:31.700 in a defensive means, 01:37:31.840 --> 01:37:34.640 but also to stay very closely to them with intelligence. 01:37:34.670 --> 01:37:36.000 And as you know, they see Iran 01:37:36.000 --> 01:37:37.440 as an existential threat. 01:37:37.910 --> 01:37:41.360 They're concerned about the posture 01:37:41.360 --> 01:37:46.360 of Iranian forces or Iranian-supported forces in Syria, 01:37:46.440 --> 01:37:48.170 and perhaps that they might be 01:37:48.170 --> 01:37:51.280 intending to remain in Syria as this is resolved. 01:37:52.460 --> 01:37:54.680 They're concerned about the missile technology 01:37:54.680 --> 01:37:57.210 they believe may be transferred from Iran 01:37:57.210 --> 01:38:00.192 to any of these extremist organizations 01:38:00.192 --> 01:38:03.130 or to Lebanese Hezbollah to their north. 01:38:04.500 --> 01:38:07.000 And so we're watching this very closely with them. 01:38:07.290 --> 01:38:10.030 I agree that a land bridge 01:38:11.260 --> 01:38:13.550 between Iran into Syria 01:38:13.550 --> 01:38:16.190 would not be a good outcome. 01:38:16.730 --> 01:38:18.004 - Thank you, sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:38:18.004 --> 01:38:18.837 - [Inhofe] Thank you. 01:38:18.837 --> 01:38:20.337 Senator Gillibrand 01:38:20.353 --> 01:38:21.550 - Thank you so much, General. 01:38:21.550 --> 01:38:23.300 I want to continue the conversation 01:38:23.400 --> 01:38:24.990 you're having with my colleague. 01:38:24.990 --> 01:38:28.540 This week more than 2,500 US personnel are taking part 01:38:28.540 --> 01:38:32.820 in EUCOM's Juniper Cobra missile defense exercise 01:38:32.820 --> 01:38:35.500 with the Israel Defense Forces. 01:38:35.760 --> 01:38:37.130 According to Israeli media, 01:38:37.130 --> 01:38:39.480 this year's exercise will simulate 01:38:39.480 --> 01:38:42.180 a large-scale ballistic missile attack against Israel. 01:38:42.330 --> 01:38:43.610 Will the Arrow, Iron Dome, 01:38:43.610 --> 01:38:45.160 and David's Sling missile defense systems 01:38:45.160 --> 01:38:47.600 be involved in this exercise, and am I correct 01:38:47.600 --> 01:38:49.140 that this is the first such exercise 01:38:49.140 --> 01:38:51.030 since David's Sling system went operation 01:38:51.030 --> 01:38:52.130 in April of last week? 01:38:55.779 --> 01:38:59.300 - This will involve their systems as well as ours, 01:38:59.300 --> 01:39:02.090 and in particular, the interoperability of those systems 01:39:02.090 --> 01:39:04.300 and the interoperability and the connection 01:39:04.300 --> 01:39:06.220 of our command and control systems. 01:39:07.690 --> 01:39:09.960 In terms of their systems specifically, 01:39:10.200 --> 01:39:11.130 if it's a new system, 01:39:11.130 --> 01:39:12.990 this is the first exercise that we've done, 01:39:12.990 --> 01:39:13.910 but I couldn't comment. 01:39:13.910 --> 01:39:16.030 I can come back for the record after I look at it. 01:39:16.030 --> 01:39:17.670 I'm going there this evening 01:39:18.650 --> 01:39:21.900 to spend a few days as we conduct this exercise. 01:39:21.960 --> 01:39:23.630 - And do you think this exercise 01:39:23.630 --> 01:39:27.920 can effectively counter some of the threats to Israel? 01:39:29.190 --> 01:39:30.030 - Yes, I think it does. 01:39:30.030 --> 01:39:31.450 It's a matter of deterrence. 01:39:31.500 --> 01:39:36.500 It is making sure that those who may 01:39:38.200 --> 01:39:39.890 think about doing them harm 01:39:40.330 --> 01:39:42.120 knows that we have a credible 01:39:43.641 --> 01:39:47.300 and an expert defense that we can establish rather rapidly. 01:39:47.500 --> 01:39:48.333 - Mm-hmm. 01:39:48.333 --> 01:39:53.150 And have you discussed with Israel our commitment 01:39:53.150 --> 01:39:55.640 to maintaining their qualitative military edge? 01:39:56.400 --> 01:39:58.210 - Yes, and I support that, 01:39:58.640 --> 01:40:00.030 and we work very closely. 01:40:01.260 --> 01:40:04.610 In terms of our daily activity, 01:40:04.610 --> 01:40:06.980 it's one of the closest nations with EUCOM. 01:40:07.472 --> 01:40:08.472 - Thank you. 01:40:08.740 --> 01:40:11.550 Switching gears, media reported that on Feb. 7, 8, 01:40:11.550 --> 01:40:14.150 hundreds of Russian military contractors were killed 01:40:14.150 --> 01:40:17.180 when US forces and Kurdish allies repelled an attack 01:40:17.180 --> 01:40:18.990 against a base in eastern Syria. 01:40:19.340 --> 01:40:20.820 Based on what you have seen in Europe, 01:40:20.820 --> 01:40:24.480 how does Russia tend to use military contractors, 01:40:24.480 --> 01:40:27.230 and what is your assessment of the goal of this attack? 01:40:27.400 --> 01:40:29.320 From your viewpoint in EUCOM, 01:40:29.630 --> 01:40:32.630 what do you believe Russia is trying to accomplish in Syria? 01:40:35.040 --> 01:40:38.850 - I won't comment specifically on Syria that you noted. 01:40:39.120 --> 01:40:40.920 That's in CENTCOM's AOR. 01:40:41.150 --> 01:40:45.170 I would just say generally that Russia is known 01:40:46.780 --> 01:40:49.680 through their oligarchs or some businesses 01:40:51.760 --> 01:40:56.340 to establish and use private military forces, 01:40:56.340 --> 01:40:59.000 which is why I'd call them private military forces. 01:41:02.080 --> 01:41:04.170 - I was very interested in your exchange 01:41:04.470 --> 01:41:08.020 earlier about Russian cyber attack, 01:41:09.050 --> 01:41:12.600 and I understand from many of your colleagues 01:41:12.600 --> 01:41:13.940 that this is something that the president 01:41:13.940 --> 01:41:15.870 has not asked you to do. 01:41:16.610 --> 01:41:19.520 What recommendations would you make to the president 01:41:19.520 --> 01:41:22.840 to protect our country from a cyber attack 01:41:22.840 --> 01:41:26.410 that could harm America's vital infrastructure? 01:41:28.490 --> 01:41:30.940 - First of all, the president wouldn't, 01:41:32.399 --> 01:41:34.570 it wouldn't be normal that he'd provide direction 01:41:34.570 --> 01:41:36.850 directly to me at EUCOM at my level 01:41:37.010 --> 01:41:38.780 with respect to this topic. 01:41:39.590 --> 01:41:42.360 It would be Cybercom's area, and Cybercom's commander 01:41:42.360 --> 01:41:46.210 would be the best to give him best military advice. 01:41:46.210 --> 01:41:50.580 So to that aspect, I'd probably go to Admiral Rogers. 01:41:50.900 --> 01:41:54.700 Mine would be if asked for best military advice 01:41:54.700 --> 01:41:59.390 is that we continue to develop the capabilities we have. 01:41:59.390 --> 01:42:01.550 I think we have excellent capabilities 01:42:02.390 --> 01:42:06.380 and we need to consider what a deterrent effect 01:42:06.380 --> 01:42:08.320 we want or need to have. 01:42:08.720 --> 01:42:10.320 But I would leave it very generally at that 01:42:10.320 --> 01:42:12.350 and go to the specifics to the person 01:42:12.350 --> 01:42:16.490 that he turns to normally, being the secretary, 01:42:16.610 --> 01:42:19.330 and within cocoms, the Cybercom commander. 01:42:20.170 --> 01:42:22.090 - The NATO secretary general has said 01:42:22.090 --> 01:42:25.270 that alliance members agreed that a serious cyber attack 01:42:25.270 --> 01:42:28.090 threatening critical military and civilian infrastructure 01:42:28.090 --> 01:42:30.940 could trigger Article 5 of the NATO treaty 01:42:30.940 --> 01:42:34.420 in the same way that a conventional military assault would. 01:42:34.420 --> 01:42:38.240 Is this a possibility that your forces are training for 01:42:38.240 --> 01:42:39.790 in cooperation with our allies, 01:42:39.830 --> 01:42:41.780 and what can you tell us about any collaboration 01:42:41.780 --> 01:42:42.613 on this front? 01:42:43.570 --> 01:42:44.403 - Yes. 01:42:45.660 --> 01:42:47.480 We train, we're a member of NATO. 01:42:47.480 --> 01:42:49.590 So within NATO, for example, 01:42:51.442 --> 01:42:56.442 we are defining the domain with US as a part of that. 01:42:57.340 --> 01:43:01.840 And we've actually conducted exercises, one this past year 01:43:02.400 --> 01:43:07.400 that involved ambiguous cyber activity or attacks 01:43:08.310 --> 01:43:11.380 that involved attacks on infrastructure, et cetera, 01:43:11.380 --> 01:43:12.910 in order to get right at your point, 01:43:12.910 --> 01:43:15.720 and that is to get better clarity 01:43:15.720 --> 01:43:20.720 on attacks on infrastructure, when is that of an attack 01:43:21.310 --> 01:43:22.750 on a vital national interest, 01:43:22.750 --> 01:43:24.360 and then how do we respond to that? 01:43:24.360 --> 01:43:27.840 So there is both the United States and within NATO at large 01:43:27.840 --> 01:43:29.500 work on this very question. 01:43:29.520 --> 01:43:30.353 - Thank you. 01:43:30.402 --> 01:43:32.370 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. - Senator Scott. 01:43:32.370 --> 01:43:34.000 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, General. 01:43:34.000 --> 01:43:35.100 Good to see you again. 01:43:36.840 --> 01:43:39.560 My concern, we've had a lot of conversation 01:43:39.560 --> 01:43:41.090 over the last several weeks 01:43:41.350 --> 01:43:45.500 about the safety of Turkey and the region, 01:43:45.800 --> 01:43:48.410 especially as a NATO partner of ours. 01:43:48.860 --> 01:43:50.870 Much of my concern has been focused 01:43:50.870 --> 01:43:54.640 on the fact that what used to be a very secular Turkey 01:43:54.960 --> 01:43:56.840 is moved in the direction of becoming 01:43:56.840 --> 01:43:58.580 a more religious Turkey. 01:43:58.730 --> 01:44:01.050 And the cultural shift seems to have had 01:44:01.250 --> 01:44:04.860 a significant impact on the behavior of Turkey. 01:44:04.860 --> 01:44:08.660 Can you walk me through your assessment? 01:44:10.590 --> 01:44:12.860 - Well, I think that in Turkey overall, 01:44:12.860 --> 01:44:17.570 there is a shift of some note, 01:44:19.240 --> 01:44:20.730 specifically within the government, 01:44:20.730 --> 01:44:24.800 perhaps to be a government that's more Islamist 01:44:25.330 --> 01:44:28.540 based on its religion than in the past, 01:44:28.890 --> 01:44:31.480 and perhaps you might say it's less secular. 01:44:31.910 --> 01:44:35.360 But I think the outcome of this remains to be seen. 01:44:35.770 --> 01:44:39.210 Most of this has happened just as they, 01:44:39.210 --> 01:44:41.180 result of an attempted coup. 01:44:42.670 --> 01:44:44.770 And President Erdogan has taken steps 01:44:44.770 --> 01:44:49.450 to, in his mind, secure his country 01:44:49.450 --> 01:44:51.430 and secure his form of government. 01:44:51.610 --> 01:44:54.470 So I think we have to watch this 01:44:54.470 --> 01:44:55.720 and look a little deeper. 01:44:56.000 --> 01:44:57.450 Having said all of that, 01:44:58.650 --> 01:45:03.650 I have routine conversations with my counterpart in Turkey 01:45:05.180 --> 01:45:06.880 and their security officials. 01:45:07.570 --> 01:45:09.820 We have a close mil-to-mil relationship. 01:45:10.620 --> 01:45:14.540 They're a valued member as an ally and as a NATO ally. 01:45:16.390 --> 01:45:19.560 And we're gonna continue to develop that relationship 01:45:19.840 --> 01:45:21.920 and strengthen it, and I think that, too, 01:45:22.720 --> 01:45:24.180 can have an influence 01:45:25.670 --> 01:45:28.490 on the government as a whole. 01:45:28.490 --> 01:45:30.370 And because they intend, I am sure, 01:45:30.370 --> 01:45:32.700 they intend to remain a member of NATO, 01:45:33.900 --> 01:45:36.300 that is based on the Washington Treaty 01:45:36.410 --> 01:45:38.430 and the values that all of us profess. 01:45:40.600 --> 01:45:41.650 - Thank you, General. 01:45:41.850 --> 01:45:44.550 Russia's violated the Open Skies Treaty, 01:45:44.550 --> 01:45:45.830 refused to implement 01:45:45.830 --> 01:45:48.280 the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 01:45:48.580 --> 01:45:50.010 and the Vienna Document, 01:45:50.010 --> 01:45:52.020 suspended the PMDA, 01:45:52.380 --> 01:45:56.040 while placing outrageous and unreasonable conditions 01:45:56.040 --> 01:46:00.150 on resuming and undermined the Chemical Weapons Convention 01:46:00.150 --> 01:46:04.210 through support to Syria and its chemical weapons program. 01:46:04.210 --> 01:46:06.700 What conclusions do you draw from this record 01:46:06.700 --> 01:46:08.650 about the reliability of Vladimir Putin 01:46:08.830 --> 01:46:11.340 and the Russian government as negotiating partners? 01:46:11.340 --> 01:46:14.630 And I would just point out that the PMDA, 01:46:15.790 --> 01:46:19.190 from my research, suggests that the 34 metric tons 01:46:19.190 --> 01:46:22.280 that we had agreed to dispose of 01:46:22.610 --> 01:46:26.640 would lead each side to having about 17,000 metric tons, 01:46:26.640 --> 01:46:28.650 which could create multiple, 01:46:28.650 --> 01:46:32.140 thousands and thousands of weapons 01:46:32.450 --> 01:46:34.260 out of that weapons-grade plutonium. 01:46:36.150 --> 01:46:38.700 - Well, the short answer is I think with the Russians, 01:46:38.700 --> 01:46:40.610 just based on what you walked through, 01:46:40.610 --> 01:46:43.110 and it's obvious to us in terms of their treaties, 01:46:43.740 --> 01:46:46.460 is that I believe in the treaty system, 01:46:46.460 --> 01:46:48.390 I believe in non-proliferation 01:46:48.390 --> 01:46:51.480 and to continue our weapons control treaties 01:46:51.480 --> 01:46:52.820 that we have in place. 01:46:53.710 --> 01:46:56.180 But we have to verify what they say they're doing, 01:46:56.180 --> 01:46:57.360 and that's what it's based on. 01:46:57.360 --> 01:46:58.320 It's not a trust. 01:46:58.320 --> 01:47:00.010 It's a verification. 01:47:00.290 --> 01:47:03.080 And then secondly, while they've stepped away 01:47:03.630 --> 01:47:05.140 from the CFE and others 01:47:06.010 --> 01:47:07.160 and a violation of INF, 01:47:08.520 --> 01:47:11.390 I think we take steps as this administration is doing, 01:47:11.390 --> 01:47:13.600 as the secretary of defense has laid out. 01:47:14.580 --> 01:47:17.630 That is, using the different levers of power 01:47:17.680 --> 01:47:20.210 in order to bring them back into compliance 01:47:20.920 --> 01:47:23.280 with the INF Treaty, in particular. 01:47:23.280 --> 01:47:25.220 I think that's the right way to go. 01:47:26.100 --> 01:47:27.560 I think we had spent some time 01:47:27.560 --> 01:47:29.210 where we weren't confronting them 01:47:30.030 --> 01:47:34.710 with either their violations of that treaty or some others, 01:47:35.020 --> 01:47:36.770 and we need to take a strong stand. 01:47:37.250 --> 01:47:38.250 - [Scott] Thank you. 01:47:38.410 --> 01:47:39.243 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:47:39.243 --> 01:47:40.076 - [Inhofe] Thank you. 01:47:40.076 --> 01:47:41.400 Senator Blumenthal. 01:47:43.460 --> 01:47:44.860 - Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 01:47:46.380 --> 01:47:49.490 I have advocated for some time strong measures 01:47:49.490 --> 01:47:51.840 to deter and counter 01:47:53.630 --> 01:47:56.880 the blatant Russian aggression in Ukraine 01:47:58.150 --> 01:48:00.030 and around the globe, 01:48:00.120 --> 01:48:04.650 the assault on democracies through cyber and disinformation, 01:48:05.630 --> 01:48:10.630 but Ukraine is a blatant ongoing instance 01:48:12.080 --> 01:48:15.500 of physical force 01:48:15.750 --> 01:48:19.660 that violates standards of common decency 01:48:19.660 --> 01:48:22.380 and norms of international law. 01:48:24.680 --> 01:48:26.670 The obligation of the United States 01:48:26.670 --> 01:48:30.040 to provide lethal military assistance I think is clear. 01:48:30.920 --> 01:48:33.240 I've advocated for some time and we've included it 01:48:33.240 --> 01:48:35.350 in the National Defense Authorization Act. 01:48:35.830 --> 01:48:38.030 The Department of State has cleared the sale 01:48:38.320 --> 01:48:42.920 of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, 01:48:43.080 --> 01:48:46.020 which is a long overdue move 01:48:46.540 --> 01:48:49.540 to increase Ukraine's defense capabilities. 01:48:50.260 --> 01:48:51.530 Although lethal, 01:48:51.710 --> 01:48:54.850 these arms are essentially defensive in nature. 01:48:55.660 --> 01:48:56.590 Would you agree with me 01:48:56.590 --> 01:49:00.100 that more of these type of weapons are necessary 01:49:00.100 --> 01:49:03.640 to deter and counter Russian aggression against Ukraine? 01:49:05.750 --> 01:49:09.030 - I think for what we're providing 01:49:09.100 --> 01:49:11.120 of those types of weapons right now, 01:49:11.150 --> 01:49:13.500 I would personally, my best military advice 01:49:13.500 --> 01:49:15.570 is to say, let's put this into play. 01:49:15.570 --> 01:49:18.070 We've got training, et cetera, that we need to do. 01:49:18.310 --> 01:49:22.070 And then take a look at the situation from that point. 01:49:23.670 --> 01:49:25.890 There is more, and there is equipment 01:49:26.200 --> 01:49:28.070 that they can use effectively 01:49:28.800 --> 01:49:32.320 that we in EUCOM will continue to advise Congress 01:49:33.303 --> 01:49:35.230 and provide our best advice 01:49:35.230 --> 01:49:37.500 for what will help them the most. 01:49:38.210 --> 01:49:42.300 - Let me ask a very simple question 01:49:43.270 --> 01:49:45.620 which may be overly simplistic, 01:49:45.620 --> 01:49:47.830 but are we winning in Ukraine? 01:49:47.830 --> 01:49:49.750 Aren't the Russians effectively 01:49:49.970 --> 01:49:52.790 winning in accomplishing their objective? 01:49:58.917 --> 01:50:00.470 - It depends on your definition of win. 01:50:00.470 --> 01:50:02.250 I would say that we're not progressing, 01:50:02.250 --> 01:50:05.010 'cause our interest there is to resolve this conflict. 01:50:05.010 --> 01:50:06.650 - [Blumenthal] And if we're not progressing, 01:50:07.200 --> 01:50:10.620 we, meaning we and Ukraine, are losing. 01:50:14.170 --> 01:50:16.090 - I don't know that I would say we're losing. 01:50:16.090 --> 01:50:18.150 I would say, again, we're not progressing. 01:50:18.150 --> 01:50:20.640 We're more or less at a stalemate in where we're at. 01:50:20.640 --> 01:50:21.610 If you look at Ukraine, 01:50:21.610 --> 01:50:23.290 the reason I would say we're not losing 01:50:23.290 --> 01:50:25.510 is Ukraine's forces, for instance, 01:50:25.880 --> 01:50:28.940 are steadily getting stronger and much more confident. 01:50:30.610 --> 01:50:32.870 The nation itself is-- 01:50:32.870 --> 01:50:33.840 - Excuse me, General. 01:50:33.840 --> 01:50:35.450 Let me interrupt for just a moment. 01:50:35.450 --> 01:50:38.540 Forgive me for this, but Senator Scott presiding. 01:50:39.300 --> 01:50:40.220 Go ahead. 01:50:42.000 --> 01:50:42.833 Thank you. 01:50:44.700 --> 01:50:47.020 - And the government itself in terms of the reforms 01:50:47.020 --> 01:50:49.860 that they want and we expect as well, 01:50:49.860 --> 01:50:50.890 is moving forward. 01:50:50.890 --> 01:50:53.450 Not at the pace we want, but it is moving forward. 01:50:54.879 --> 01:50:59.879 So even within that conflict still residing, 01:51:00.750 --> 01:51:03.240 I think we're making progress in important ways, 01:51:03.310 --> 01:51:05.570 and we should continue to press in that direction. 01:51:05.570 --> 01:51:07.620 - We're making progress, do you think, 01:51:07.620 --> 01:51:12.620 in countering the endemic corruption that has existed? 01:51:12.670 --> 01:51:14.370 Is that what you meant by reforms? 01:51:15.050 --> 01:51:16.620 - That's part of it, yes. 01:51:17.180 --> 01:51:19.580 They just voted for their anti-corruption law, 01:51:19.580 --> 01:51:22.230 the first vote of three they think they have to take. 01:51:22.390 --> 01:51:24.510 That law is not everything we wanted in it, 01:51:24.510 --> 01:51:26.970 but it's a step in the right direction as well. 01:51:28.040 --> 01:51:30.990 - Because two years ago at this hearing, 01:51:30.990 --> 01:51:33.250 exactly this kind of hearing, 01:51:33.250 --> 01:51:36.750 I asked your predecessor, General Breedlove, 01:51:36.750 --> 01:51:37.920 about the issue of corruption, 01:51:37.920 --> 01:51:41.500 and he acknowledged that there was a lot to be done. 01:51:41.500 --> 01:51:45.140 It was a very unfortunate problem, 01:51:45.420 --> 01:51:48.830 and I wonder whether there's more that can be done 01:51:49.710 --> 01:51:54.010 by your command to counter it? 01:51:54.010 --> 01:51:56.810 - It is still a problem, as I just noted, in the law. 01:51:57.290 --> 01:51:59.610 Between us and our inter-agency, 01:51:59.610 --> 01:52:01.830 particularly State, we continue to press. 01:52:03.956 --> 01:52:07.490 We have personnel both in a mission there with the embassy, 01:52:07.490 --> 01:52:10.740 but also a multi-national joint committee 01:52:11.150 --> 01:52:13.410 that meets regularly, works with State 01:52:13.410 --> 01:52:16.180 and with the other nations that are involved, as well, 01:52:16.610 --> 01:52:19.260 in progressing both capability building 01:52:19.260 --> 01:52:21.740 and the reform of their security institution. 01:52:22.250 --> 01:52:24.740 We need to continue to press in that regard. 01:52:25.150 --> 01:52:27.090 I think that there is more that can be done 01:52:27.090 --> 01:52:30.440 in terms of other assets that we can bring to bear. 01:52:31.710 --> 01:52:34.700 - I just wanna note, finally the, 01:52:35.716 --> 01:52:36.549 'cause I'm almost out of time, 01:52:36.549 --> 01:52:39.780 the FY19 budget request includes increases 01:52:39.780 --> 01:52:43.650 for the European Deterrence Initiative 01:52:44.070 --> 01:52:48.290 and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. 01:52:48.800 --> 01:52:52.790 There is 200 million for the Ukraine Security Initiative, 01:52:52.790 --> 01:52:56.450 50 million above the president's request 01:52:56.450 --> 01:52:57.910 from the previous year. 01:52:58.010 --> 01:53:01.230 In addition, the president's asked for 6.5 billion 01:53:01.870 --> 01:53:06.870 for EDI, 1.7 billion more than last year. 01:53:07.170 --> 01:53:09.880 I assume, I hope that you would agree 01:53:10.360 --> 01:53:14.060 these investments in our defensive capability 01:53:14.060 --> 01:53:18.570 are important in Ukraine because they demonstrate resolve 01:53:19.120 --> 01:53:22.420 against Russian aggression there, 01:53:22.530 --> 01:53:25.040 but also in Europe generally and around the world. 01:53:25.380 --> 01:53:26.213 - I agree. 01:53:26.213 --> 01:53:27.860 They're foundational in Ukraine 01:53:27.860 --> 01:53:29.920 to the activity we have there 01:53:29.940 --> 01:53:32.140 and the progress that both we and their nation, 01:53:32.140 --> 01:53:34.240 and particularly their forces, are making. 01:53:34.670 --> 01:53:35.503 - Thank you. 01:53:35.503 --> 01:53:36.500 Thank you, General, and thank you for your service. 01:53:36.500 --> 01:53:37.580 - [Scaparrotti] You're welcome. 01:53:39.930 --> 01:53:40.970 - Thank you, Senator. 01:53:41.610 --> 01:53:44.050 Just a couple more questions for you, General. 01:53:44.830 --> 01:53:46.460 Angus, do you have any questions? 01:53:46.830 --> 01:53:48.230 - [Angus] I just want to compliment the chairman 01:53:48.230 --> 01:53:49.900 on his meteoric rise. 01:53:50.194 --> 01:53:51.710 (laughter) 01:53:51.710 --> 01:53:54.730 - As fast as you go up, you typically go back down, 01:53:54.730 --> 01:53:57.390 by the way, so you may see me in the corner. 01:53:57.390 --> 01:53:58.630 Yes, yes, yes. 01:53:58.630 --> 01:53:59.463 Realize that. 01:53:59.870 --> 01:54:02.810 General, in my office, you and I had a robust conversation 01:54:02.810 --> 01:54:07.030 about the resources that you might need to make sure 01:54:07.030 --> 01:54:08.920 that we have the quickest response, 01:54:08.920 --> 01:54:10.310 rapid response is what I called it, 01:54:10.310 --> 01:54:12.680 not what you called it, in your command 01:54:12.680 --> 01:54:14.240 and your responsibilities. 01:54:14.740 --> 01:54:19.080 Can you perhaps remind me of the issues or the items 01:54:19.080 --> 01:54:23.290 that you would want to see included in the FY19 budget 01:54:23.290 --> 01:54:26.390 so as to make sure that you have all the resources 01:54:26.390 --> 01:54:30.500 necessary to meet what we expect you to accomplish? 01:54:30.540 --> 01:54:33.900 And second, the problem of the Anti Access/Area Denial, 01:54:33.900 --> 01:54:36.340 or the A2/AD, is a big one, 01:54:36.720 --> 01:54:39.420 but if you can overcome it, it may help us avoid 01:54:39.420 --> 01:54:41.500 the escalate-to-dominate scenario. 01:54:41.630 --> 01:54:44.830 Which items in the budget request specifically help you 01:54:45.677 --> 01:54:49.340 to deal with the A2/AD problem? 01:54:50.710 --> 01:54:51.543 - Yeah, thank you. 01:54:51.543 --> 01:54:53.830 I'll give you a general answer, Senator, here, 01:54:53.830 --> 01:54:56.300 and if you want more detail, I'd be happy to do this 01:54:56.300 --> 01:54:58.650 in a classified means, as well. 01:54:59.970 --> 01:55:01.980 First of all, in terms of resources, 01:55:02.030 --> 01:55:05.280 generally if you look at our budget proposal 01:55:05.290 --> 01:55:06.210 and the way it's being used, 01:55:06.210 --> 01:55:07.370 I'd start by saying 01:55:07.370 --> 01:55:10.750 that of those requirements that I've had, 01:55:11.970 --> 01:55:13.630 this budget and the FYDP 01:55:13.630 --> 01:55:17.530 gets after virtually every one of those areas in some means, 01:55:17.530 --> 01:55:19.970 so I'm very appreciative to Congress of that. 01:55:20.720 --> 01:55:22.350 If I were to categorize them, 01:55:22.350 --> 01:55:24.340 I would start, as I said before, 01:55:24.340 --> 01:55:26.980 with the command and control computers, 01:55:27.610 --> 01:55:31.010 information, surveillance, and reconnaissance, C4ISR. 01:55:32.020 --> 01:55:33.430 Areas that have to do 01:55:33.430 --> 01:55:36.070 with the integrated air and missile defense. 01:55:36.770 --> 01:55:39.330 There are, across each of the services, 01:55:39.330 --> 01:55:43.710 specific areas that I could give you in a classified vein. 01:55:43.710 --> 01:55:45.820 And then lastly, munitions. 01:55:46.130 --> 01:55:48.210 So as you look at A2/AD, 01:55:48.210 --> 01:55:52.210 or the Anti Access/Area Denial problem set 01:55:52.210 --> 01:55:53.840 with respect to Russia, 01:55:54.170 --> 01:55:59.170 the combination of the services requirements 01:56:00.610 --> 01:56:03.340 that I've laid out, as well as precision munitions, 01:56:03.340 --> 01:56:08.340 helps me with that second threat that you noted of A2/AD. 01:56:09.990 --> 01:56:12.110 The combination of those together, 01:56:12.530 --> 01:56:15.350 I can undermine those systems. 01:56:17.670 --> 01:56:19.030 - [Scott] Thank you, General. 01:56:19.470 --> 01:56:20.303 Senator? 01:56:24.530 --> 01:56:25.860 Thank you, General, for your time. 01:56:25.860 --> 01:56:27.090 Hope you have a great day. 01:56:27.090 --> 01:56:27.923 - Thank you.