WEBVTT 00:01.297 --> 00:02.847 - Committee will come to order. 00:03.610 --> 00:05.940 Committee welcomes General Scaparrotti back today 00:05.940 --> 00:08.270 to testify on the threats and posture 00:08.270 --> 00:11.143 in the European Command's area of responsibility. 00:11.590 --> 00:15.330 There, he faces the full range of security challenges, 00:15.330 --> 00:18.680 from Russia's constant modernization of its nuclear weapons 00:18.680 --> 00:22.320 and delivery systems, to the hybrid and political warfare 00:22.320 --> 00:24.963 it wages against the U.S. and others. 00:25.370 --> 00:28.320 Its tactics extend, as we've been reminded this week, 00:28.320 --> 00:31.033 to targeted assassinations as well. 00:32.130 --> 00:35.310 I think that it is clear that the U.S. 00:35.310 --> 00:38.620 has neglected both ends of the warfare spectrum 00:38.620 --> 00:41.353 in recent years, and much in between. 00:41.960 --> 00:43.730 But the recent budget agreement, and the new 00:43.730 --> 00:46.660 national defense strategy, and Nuclear Posture Review, 00:46.660 --> 00:49.503 give us the chance to begin to do better. 00:50.130 --> 00:53.103 We must do better across the board. 00:53.300 --> 00:57.460 It's not enough to advocate for a more robust cyber response 00:57.460 --> 00:59.973 to Russia's attempts to meddle in our elections, 01:00.180 --> 01:02.690 but waiver on our response to their 01:02.690 --> 01:05.613 renewed nuclear or territorial ambitions. 01:05.800 --> 01:08.300 Likewise we cannot build up our missile defenses 01:08.300 --> 01:10.170 and nuclear deterrent, but leave 01:10.170 --> 01:13.133 significant cyber intrusions unanswered. 01:13.420 --> 01:15.570 It's essential, in my view that we face 01:15.590 --> 01:19.380 all of these challenges with clear-eyed objectivity 01:20.040 --> 01:22.130 and not allow domestic politics 01:22.190 --> 01:25.090 to color our view or affect our actions. 01:25.090 --> 01:27.180 The United States, and our allies, 01:27.180 --> 01:29.430 and our interests are threatened by the full range 01:29.430 --> 01:33.063 of Russian capability, and by its increasing belligerence. 01:33.300 --> 01:36.510 Our job is to address them in the military sphere 01:36.590 --> 01:39.233 in order to protect our nation's security, 01:39.530 --> 01:41.943 nothing more and nothing less. 01:42.060 --> 01:43.660 I'd yield to the Ranking Member. 01:44.680 --> 01:45.630 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:45.630 --> 01:46.900 And thank you General Scaparrotti, 01:46.900 --> 01:49.120 it's good to see you again, always appreciated your time 01:49.120 --> 01:50.660 out at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 01:50.660 --> 01:52.100 and your leadership out there, 01:52.100 --> 01:54.740 and certainly your leadership now for us in Europe. 01:54.740 --> 01:56.210 And I certainly agree with the chairman. 01:56.210 --> 01:58.597 Russia is the big issue, not the only, 01:58.597 --> 02:01.173 but the big issue in the European Command, 02:01.370 --> 02:04.663 and how we counter their increasingly aggressive behavior. 02:04.820 --> 02:06.880 I would disagree slightly, and I don't think 02:06.880 --> 02:08.070 the chairman meant it quite this way. 02:08.070 --> 02:10.443 It's not just a military challenge. 02:10.540 --> 02:13.150 Obviously, we are here in the Armed Services Committee, 02:13.150 --> 02:16.490 your the EUCOM commander, so that's your primary focus, 02:16.490 --> 02:18.817 but it is a broader challenge to confront Russia. 02:18.817 --> 02:20.460 And we had the opportunity to have a conversation 02:20.460 --> 02:22.610 with you yesterday a little bit about that. 02:23.090 --> 02:24.710 In addition, to being a military commander, 02:24.710 --> 02:27.330 you're also occasionally a diplomat, in terms of being able 02:27.330 --> 02:30.023 to stay in touch with your Russian counterparts, 02:30.360 --> 02:32.470 trying to make sure there are no misunderstandings, 02:32.470 --> 02:34.880 and we don't stumble into a conflict. 02:34.880 --> 02:37.630 And I would also be remiss again, if I didn't point out 02:37.900 --> 02:41.600 that in confronting this, diplomacy is enormously important, 02:41.600 --> 02:43.130 which means that the State Department 02:43.130 --> 02:44.220 is enormously important. 02:44.220 --> 02:47.330 They are an indispensable partner for what you, and what 02:47.330 --> 02:49.850 the rest of the Department of Defense are trying to do. 02:49.850 --> 02:53.763 And right now, the State Department is not in a good place. 02:54.080 --> 02:55.680 Certainly, they're transitioning 02:55.840 --> 02:57.423 from one leader to the next. 02:57.710 --> 03:00.210 We're not sure you know how the confirmation process 03:00.210 --> 03:03.690 is going to go, but it has been a tumultuous year 03:03.690 --> 03:04.890 at the State Department. 03:05.040 --> 03:06.540 That needs to get figured out, 03:06.790 --> 03:08.960 because diplomacy is going to be a big part of this. 03:08.960 --> 03:12.090 I agree with those folks, including many on this panel, 03:12.090 --> 03:14.860 who have identified the fact that we have moved back 03:14.860 --> 03:17.863 into an era of great power conflict. 03:18.210 --> 03:19.720 I don't agree that that conflict 03:19.720 --> 03:21.623 necessarily has to be military. 03:21.900 --> 03:24.520 You have to handle it in a variety of different ways 03:24.520 --> 03:27.507 in order to try to move it in a different direction . 03:28.300 --> 03:30.223 The one big thing on Russia, 03:30.350 --> 03:32.980 yes, they are moving forward, in terms of increasing 03:32.980 --> 03:35.483 their capabilities in a variety of areas, 03:35.690 --> 03:37.950 but the one big area where they're actually 03:37.970 --> 03:41.420 acting on a consistent basis is in their 03:41.420 --> 03:43.543 disinformation cyber campaign. 03:43.740 --> 03:46.823 And there is an area where I think we are behind. 03:47.380 --> 03:49.820 And some of these other areas that the Chairman mentioned, 03:49.820 --> 03:52.160 we are worried because the Russians are catching up, 03:52.160 --> 03:53.630 and potentially getting to the point 03:53.630 --> 03:56.403 where they could surpass us in capability. 03:56.490 --> 03:57.800 But when it comes to cyber, 03:57.800 --> 04:00.143 when it comes to disinformation campaign, 04:00.340 --> 04:03.523 we are barely on the playing field at this point. 04:03.870 --> 04:07.380 We all read about Russia's efforts to influence 04:07.380 --> 04:09.030 our election here in the U.S. 04:09.253 --> 04:11.244 They're doing it across Western Europe. 04:11.244 --> 04:14.713 And it's not just elections, they spreading a message. 04:14.910 --> 04:18.260 And that message is that authoritarian regimes 04:18.260 --> 04:20.283 are better than democracy. 04:20.800 --> 04:22.730 Backing Assad in Syria, 04:22.730 --> 04:25.523 the things that they're doing down in Libya, 04:25.690 --> 04:28.763 they are undermining the basic tenants of what we stand for, 04:29.070 --> 04:31.993 which is political freedom and economic freedom. 04:32.320 --> 04:34.110 And we have to counter that. 04:34.110 --> 04:36.430 In fact, General, you said something very interesting 04:36.430 --> 04:38.800 yesterday during our classified brief. 04:38.800 --> 04:40.700 This wasn't classified, I don't think, 04:41.780 --> 04:44.720 but that a poll of people in Western Europe 04:44.720 --> 04:47.683 asking them how important democracy was, 04:48.010 --> 04:50.123 a poll of the younger generation, 04:50.300 --> 04:53.280 it was shocking to see that it wasn't a very high percentage 04:53.280 --> 04:54.683 that said it was important. 04:55.010 --> 04:57.280 The basic notion that political freedom 04:57.280 --> 04:59.310 is the way to govern a country and to govern 04:59.310 --> 05:00.820 the world is being eroded. 05:00.820 --> 05:02.690 Now there's a lot of reasons for that, 05:02.690 --> 05:04.770 but I would submit that one of the biggest ones is 05:04.770 --> 05:08.583 a concentrated campaign by Vladimir Putin to undermine it. 05:08.890 --> 05:10.130 We need to counter that. 05:10.130 --> 05:11.930 So I'm very interested to hear today 05:12.030 --> 05:13.940 what we're doing on that information campaign. 05:13.940 --> 05:15.990 And obviously, as the chairman mentioned, 05:16.030 --> 05:17.790 there are military challenges as well. 05:17.790 --> 05:19.343 But I'll just close by saying, 05:19.550 --> 05:21.550 I think the ideal outcome here 05:21.840 --> 05:24.883 is that we figure out a way to work with Russia. 05:25.170 --> 05:27.550 I will oddly agree with the president, 05:27.550 --> 05:29.710 at least in that sentence, not necessarily 05:29.710 --> 05:31.910 in the way he's chosen to go about doing it, 05:31.920 --> 05:34.800 but the world is a better place if the great powers 05:34.800 --> 05:36.960 of the world, the United States, Russia, 05:36.960 --> 05:41.710 China, the European Union, get along 05:41.820 --> 05:43.683 and confront global challenges. 05:43.850 --> 05:45.590 Whether it's terrorism, global warming, 05:45.590 --> 05:47.630 if we work together to confront the things 05:47.630 --> 05:50.390 that challenge us all, we're better off 05:50.390 --> 05:52.760 than if we get involved in conflicts with one another. 05:52.760 --> 05:55.070 And I'm still optimistic that there are paths 05:55.070 --> 05:56.680 to get to that place. 05:56.680 --> 05:58.720 So I look forward to your testimony, 05:58.720 --> 06:00.110 I thank you for your leadership, 06:00.110 --> 06:01.140 and thank you for being here. 06:01.140 --> 06:05.100 I yield back. - Again, we welcome back 06:05.240 --> 06:08.130 General Scaparrotti, Commander U.S. European Command 06:08.130 --> 06:10.900 and supreme Allied Commander of NATO. 06:10.900 --> 06:13.230 General, without objection your full written statement 06:13.230 --> 06:14.460 will be made part of the record. 06:14.460 --> 06:15.760 And you're recognized now for any 06:15.760 --> 06:17.410 oral comments you'd like to give. 06:19.770 --> 06:21.910 - Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, 06:21.910 --> 06:24.910 distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, 06:25.040 --> 06:27.340 thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 06:27.340 --> 06:30.123 as the commander of the United States European Command. 06:30.600 --> 06:33.640 It's an honor to represent more than 60,000 men and women 06:33.690 --> 06:36.923 who are forward deployed supporting U.S. mission in Europe. 06:37.920 --> 06:41.270 Our soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, 06:41.270 --> 06:43.570 and civilian workforce continue to demonstrate 06:43.570 --> 06:47.330 selfless service and dedication in an increasingly complex 06:47.330 --> 06:49.180 and competitive security environment. 06:50.120 --> 06:51.510 Our adaptation to this environment 06:51.510 --> 06:53.960 has made significant progress, thanks to resourcing 06:53.960 --> 06:56.600 provided by Congress, particularly under 06:56.600 --> 06:58.543 the European Deterrence Initiative. 06:59.271 --> 07:02.177 EUCOM deeply appreciates Congress's support for EDI, 07:02.860 --> 07:05.110 which has supported the largest reinforcement 07:05.190 --> 07:07.793 of the Euro-Atlantic defense in a generation. 07:08.425 --> 07:10.570 In augmenting our defense, the U.S. 07:10.570 --> 07:12.520 has been joined by the NATO alliance, 07:12.520 --> 07:14.910 which remains critical to our national security 07:14.910 --> 07:17.060 and to the rules-based international order. 07:17.610 --> 07:19.410 Every challenge we face as a nation 07:19.410 --> 07:21.603 is best addressed with our allies. 07:21.870 --> 07:24.923 And I'm proud to report that NATO alliance is strong, 07:24.930 --> 07:28.483 it is united, and it's committed to being fit-for-purpose. 07:29.490 --> 07:31.560 Our European allies in Canada have turned 07:31.560 --> 07:33.000 the corner on defense spending, 07:33.000 --> 07:35.473 with increases in each of the past three years. 07:36.090 --> 07:38.260 During this time, they've added $46 billion 07:38.260 --> 07:41.580 to our collective defense, including a $5 billion 07:41.920 --> 07:44.483 increase from 2016 to 2017. 07:45.130 --> 07:47.890 In 2018, eight countries will meet NATO's 07:47.890 --> 07:52.320 2% spending target, and by 2024, at least 15 nations 07:52.320 --> 07:55.703 are on pace to reach or exceed the 2% mark. 07:56.760 --> 07:58.190 As these commitments demonstrate, 07:58.190 --> 08:01.020 NATO is adapting to ensure it is vigilant in peace, 08:01.020 --> 08:04.580 responsive in crisis, and it possesses the strategic depth 08:04.580 --> 08:07.663 for high-end large-scale multi-domain conflict. 08:08.820 --> 08:11.963 Together with NATO, the U.S. has made significant progress, 08:12.560 --> 08:14.410 but we have much work to do as we execute 08:14.410 --> 08:16.990 our national defense strategy, fueling an increasingly 08:16.990 --> 08:19.680 lethal, agile, and resilient joint force 08:19.940 --> 08:23.163 in a long-term strategic competition with Russia, 08:23.340 --> 08:26.123 and ready to counter violent extremist organizations. 08:26.870 --> 08:29.540 Russia is carrying out a campaign of destabilization 08:29.970 --> 08:32.990 to change the international order, fracture NATO, 08:32.990 --> 08:35.403 and undermine U.S. leadership around the world. 08:36.040 --> 08:40.780 At sea, on land, and in the air, Russia's increasingly 08:40.780 --> 08:42.980 modernized military is operating at levels 08:42.980 --> 08:44.653 not seen since the Cold War. 08:45.460 --> 08:48.020 At the same time, Russia's using indirect activities 08:48.020 --> 08:50.113 to advance its strategic objectives. 08:50.470 --> 08:52.483 Throughout Europe, along its periphery, 08:52.590 --> 08:55.170 in the Middle East, and beyond, Russia has demonstrated 08:55.170 --> 08:56.900 a willingness and capability to use 08:56.900 --> 09:00.287 political provocation, spread disinformation, 09:00.287 --> 09:02.683 and undermine democratic institutions. 09:03.860 --> 09:06.380 In response to the challenge posed by Russia's pursuit 09:06.380 --> 09:09.360 of power, the U.S. has increased its posture in Europe 09:09.440 --> 09:12.180 by deploying rotational forces, to include 09:12.180 --> 09:13.890 an armored brigade combat team 09:14.290 --> 09:16.053 and a combat aviation brigade. 09:16.540 --> 09:18.710 Additionally, we've implemented the framework battalion 09:18.710 --> 09:21.793 task force for NATO's enhanced forward presence in Poland. 09:22.370 --> 09:25.343 We pre-positioned equipment for additional ABCT, 09:25.860 --> 09:28.753 we've doubled our maritime deployments to the Black Sea, 09:29.220 --> 09:31.330 we've exercised theatre and anti-submarine 09:31.330 --> 09:34.940 warfare operations, we've executed bomber assurance 09:34.940 --> 09:37.960 and deterrence missions in Europe, and for the first time, 09:37.960 --> 09:40.510 we've deployed fifth-generation fighters to Europe. 09:41.900 --> 09:45.053 The U.S. has taken these actions in coordination with NATO. 09:45.610 --> 09:47.630 Since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, 09:47.630 --> 09:50.170 NATO has made significant gains in meeting 09:50.170 --> 09:52.510 its security commitments and in implementing decisions 09:52.510 --> 09:54.293 to enhance our collective defense. 09:54.870 --> 09:58.210 NATO has implemented in its enhanced forward presence 09:58.210 --> 10:02.663 with four multinational battle groups backed by 29 nations. 10:02.960 --> 10:05.460 It has also established a tailored forward presence 10:05.460 --> 10:06.753 in the Black Sea region. 10:08.020 --> 10:10.730 Additionally, the U.S. and NATO are putting a spotlight 10:10.730 --> 10:12.663 on Russian meddling and interference, 10:12.840 --> 10:14.470 countering Russian misinformation 10:14.470 --> 10:16.663 with truthful and transparent information, 10:16.880 --> 10:19.320 and reinforcing our winning narrative of sovereignty, 10:19.320 --> 10:22.883 freedom, the dignity of the individual, and the rule of law. 10:23.800 --> 10:26.340 The second major threat we face throughout the European area 10:26.340 --> 10:29.223 of operations is violent extremist terrorist groups. 10:29.620 --> 10:34.023 Since 2014, Europe has endured 18 major terrorist attacks. 10:34.490 --> 10:37.923 While the Defeat ISIS coalition, which includes NATO now, 10:38.290 --> 10:41.283 recovers territory that was seized in Iraq and Syria, 10:41.600 --> 10:43.810 ISIS remains active and seeks to expand 10:43.810 --> 10:45.463 its operations across Europe. 10:46.310 --> 10:49.793 EUCOM provides forces for military operations against ISIS, 10:50.100 --> 10:52.133 such as Operation Inherent Resolve, 10:52.300 --> 10:54.480 and has increased information and intelligence sharing 10:54.480 --> 10:57.360 among U.S. agencies, international partners, 10:57.360 --> 10:58.563 and the private sector. 10:59.970 --> 11:03.610 With the EU and NATO, EUCOM supports a tri-nodal community 11:03.610 --> 11:06.593 of action to identify and counter terrorist threats. 11:07.120 --> 11:09.860 Also, EUCOM has increased coordination with Europol 11:09.860 --> 11:12.203 and Interpol to thwart terrorist activities. 11:13.180 --> 11:15.343 Our European allies fight alongside us, 11:15.850 --> 11:17.820 deploying forces worldwide to support 11:17.820 --> 11:20.040 U.S.-led counterterrorism operations, 11:20.040 --> 11:23.053 including OIR and Operation Freedoms Sentinel, 11:23.480 --> 11:25.993 and to conduct national counterterrorism missions. 11:26.470 --> 11:29.440 The allies remain committed to defeating violent extremists, 11:29.440 --> 11:31.300 and their support is essential to our 11:31.300 --> 11:33.153 ongoing counterterrorism efforts. 11:33.680 --> 11:36.440 Thanks to the resources provided by Congress, 11:36.440 --> 11:39.040 particularly through European Deterrence Initiative, 11:39.080 --> 11:42.180 EUCOM has made significant headway in establishing 11:42.180 --> 11:44.590 a defensive posture that is credible, capable, 11:44.590 --> 11:46.640 and relevant to our strategic objectives. 11:49.346 --> 11:51.773 As our national defense strategy states, 11:52.060 --> 11:54.650 a strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles 11:54.650 --> 11:57.130 of democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment 11:57.130 --> 11:59.440 to Article 5 of NATO's Washington Treaty 11:59.750 --> 12:01.293 is vital to our security. 12:01.810 --> 12:03.730 The service members and civilians at EUCOM 12:03.730 --> 12:05.603 are making this strategy a reality. 12:06.270 --> 12:08.120 We stand ready to protect the homeland, 12:08.120 --> 12:10.820 strengthen the alliance, and ensure that Europe remains 12:10.820 --> 12:12.373 whole, free, and at peace. 12:12.620 --> 12:13.950 And, Chairman, thank you, 12:13.950 --> 12:16.350 and I look forward to the committee's questions. 12:19.820 --> 12:20.870 - Thank you, General. 12:23.700 --> 12:28.280 I want to ask a question about this chemical weapon 12:29.650 --> 12:32.963 assassination attempt in Britain. 12:33.150 --> 12:36.090 As at least as far as I know, 12:36.090 --> 12:38.170 this particular weapon that was used 12:38.170 --> 12:40.093 has only been made by the Russians. 12:40.520 --> 12:42.530 And this morning in the Washington Post, 12:42.530 --> 12:44.500 the British Foreign Secretary writes 12:44.500 --> 12:48.003 that it's part of a pattern of reckless behavior. 12:48.260 --> 12:52.070 The common thread that joins the poisonings in Salisbury 12:52.070 --> 12:53.870 with the annexation of Crimea, 12:53.870 --> 12:55.893 the cyber attacks in Ukraine, 12:55.930 --> 12:57.700 the hacking of Germans Parliament 12:57.700 --> 13:00.000 and Russian interference in foreign elections 13:00.260 --> 13:02.700 is the Kremlin's reckless defiance 13:02.700 --> 13:04.903 of essential international rule. 13:06.040 --> 13:08.730 My question is, do you agree with that statement, 13:08.730 --> 13:10.780 that this is a pattern of behavior 13:11.580 --> 13:14.610 that has in common the reckless defiance, 13:14.610 --> 13:18.133 or maybe even the attempt to undermine international rules. 13:18.360 --> 13:19.290 Do you agree with that? 13:19.290 --> 13:22.313 And do our NATO allies agree with that? 13:24.340 --> 13:27.370 - Chairman, I agree that it represents Russia's 13:27.370 --> 13:31.270 consistent disregard for international rules and norms. 13:31.270 --> 13:33.793 Each of those instance that you you talked about. 13:34.250 --> 13:38.430 You'll note in this specific incident with the nerve agent 13:39.000 --> 13:43.083 that NATO has said that they stand by their ally, UK, 13:44.130 --> 13:48.040 and believe it's highly likely that Russia 13:48.040 --> 13:50.453 was complicit in this attack. 13:51.368 --> 13:53.450 And that was a statement that they made 13:53.630 --> 13:57.713 as an alliance of 29, to my understanding. 13:57.910 --> 14:02.640 We also believe that it's highly likely 14:02.640 --> 14:05.290 that they're complicit with the chemical weapons use. 14:05.470 --> 14:07.563 And we stand by our ally. 14:08.090 --> 14:11.950 And we support their efforts to fully determine 14:11.950 --> 14:13.690 who the responsible parties were 14:13.928 --> 14:16.693 and hold them accountable. 14:18.410 --> 14:22.320 - Well, I'd just say, as I mentioned at the beginning, 14:22.320 --> 14:25.730 whether it's this incident, or cyber attacks, 14:25.730 --> 14:30.130 or Putin's boasting about new nuclear weapons, 14:30.130 --> 14:32.200 I think it's really critical for the alliance 14:32.200 --> 14:34.840 to stand together and push back against 14:35.130 --> 14:37.283 this whole range of activity. 14:39.900 --> 14:42.143 That's the only way for us to counter it. 14:42.270 --> 14:44.203 I'm gonna yield to the Ranking Member. 14:45.050 --> 14:46.210 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 14:46.210 --> 14:48.453 Along those lines, in terms of, 14:48.667 --> 14:49.650 'cause I think the Chairman is right. 14:49.650 --> 14:52.500 I think a huge part of this is holding Russia accountable. 14:52.500 --> 14:55.623 Russia is not altogether that powerful. 14:56.440 --> 14:58.370 They have all kinds of internal problems, 14:58.370 --> 15:01.691 and economic weakness, and even their military 15:01.691 --> 15:05.033 is still nowhere near a match for ours. 15:05.260 --> 15:08.270 But they will push as far as they can push, 15:08.270 --> 15:10.423 if they think there's not a cost to it. 15:10.730 --> 15:12.960 So one specific question about that. 15:12.960 --> 15:16.860 The administration has delayed implementation 15:16.860 --> 15:18.823 of sanctions against Russia. 15:19.770 --> 15:22.400 As I understand it, the loose justification was 15:22.400 --> 15:25.123 they're waiting for Putin's election, 15:25.700 --> 15:28.190 like he might lose or something, I don't know. 15:29.040 --> 15:32.860 Doesn't it make sense at this point to be as aggressive 15:32.860 --> 15:35.440 as possible in implementing the sanctions 15:35.440 --> 15:37.990 that Congress has made available to the president 15:37.990 --> 15:41.563 precisely to try to impose a cost upon Russia, 15:41.750 --> 15:44.960 in much the same way that we are doing with Iran and China? 15:44.960 --> 15:46.733 Or, sorry, Iran and North Korea? 15:49.260 --> 15:52.790 - Sir, I can't comment on the speed of the sanctions. 15:52.790 --> 15:54.190 I know that they're working. 15:54.340 --> 15:56.470 I would say, as you said earlier, 15:56.470 --> 15:59.440 that we have to address their activity 15:59.440 --> 16:01.263 with a whole-of-government response. 16:01.540 --> 16:04.203 And sanctions would be an appropriate part of that. 16:05.440 --> 16:07.570 - Understood, and just in something 16:07.570 --> 16:09.223 we haven't talked about yet, 16:10.000 --> 16:13.263 Turkey is perhaps the other, you know, the largest issue. 16:13.400 --> 16:15.670 Well, that and the whole issue of trying to make sure 16:15.670 --> 16:17.693 we keep NATO together and coordinated. 16:17.890 --> 16:21.070 But, you know, the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds. 16:21.070 --> 16:23.910 While Turkey is a valuable ally, 16:23.910 --> 16:25.993 without question, so are the Kurds. 16:26.080 --> 16:28.430 They were indispensable in terms of what we did 16:28.730 --> 16:31.760 in Syria and Iraq in dealing with ISIS. 16:31.760 --> 16:34.800 What's your latest on how we might get to a better place 16:34.800 --> 16:39.283 between our two allies there, Turkey and the Kurds? 16:40.810 --> 16:45.033 - Yes, sir, as you stated, Turkey is a valued ally. 16:45.640 --> 16:49.180 And EUCOM, a member of the countries in EUCOM. 16:49.180 --> 16:53.560 I work closely with them to continue our close relationship 16:53.560 --> 16:56.150 and actually restore the relationship to an extent, 16:56.150 --> 17:00.983 because of the differences here, with respect to the YPG 17:01.669 --> 17:05.503 and their alliance with us in our D-ISIS campaign. 17:06.350 --> 17:10.160 Presently, as you know, the State Department 17:10.160 --> 17:11.410 is working closely with them. 17:11.410 --> 17:12.853 We've been involved in this. 17:13.410 --> 17:17.079 And we're presently, I think, working on a way 17:17.079 --> 17:22.079 to attempt to meet their legitimate concerns. 17:22.320 --> 17:24.563 Their security concerns along the border, 17:25.500 --> 17:28.800 the terrorist attacks that they have inherent 17:28.830 --> 17:31.080 to their country, and have had for some time. 17:31.350 --> 17:34.590 As well as meet our interests to ensure that we can complete 17:34.590 --> 17:37.840 the D-ISIS campaign, which has presented a direct threat 17:37.840 --> 17:39.973 to the security of our country as well. 17:40.150 --> 17:41.680 So that discussion is ongoing. 17:41.680 --> 17:43.580 I'd prefer not to go into more depth to give-- 17:43.580 --> 17:44.640 - Understood. - We're right in the midst 17:44.640 --> 17:46.780 of them now. - I think that's 17:47.100 --> 17:49.530 crucially important that we find some way to make it. 17:49.530 --> 17:50.850 We're gonna, I understand there are 17:50.850 --> 17:52.583 legitimate concerns on both sides. 17:52.600 --> 17:56.560 The Kurds have long wanted as great a degree 17:56.560 --> 17:58.243 of independence as they can get. 17:58.510 --> 18:00.790 At the same time, you can hardly blame Turkey 18:00.790 --> 18:02.600 for being upset that they routinely have 18:02.600 --> 18:05.263 terrorist attacks committed in their country. 18:05.680 --> 18:07.040 I'll just close, and I don't have 18:07.040 --> 18:08.840 any more questions for you, but just with 18:08.840 --> 18:11.403 an editorial comment about Russia. 18:11.650 --> 18:14.310 I think we need an administration that sends 18:14.310 --> 18:16.550 a much clearer signal on Russia. 18:16.550 --> 18:20.090 The president's reluctance in instance after instance, 18:20.090 --> 18:22.990 most recently, even the one that the chairman just raised, 18:23.080 --> 18:26.150 while our a number of other government officials, 18:26.150 --> 18:27.820 I forget if it was the Secretary of State 18:27.820 --> 18:30.070 or the CIA Director, I think was the CIA Director, 18:30.070 --> 18:32.470 who soon will be the Secretary of State, who said, 18:32.470 --> 18:35.880 there's no question that Russia committed the attack 18:36.060 --> 18:38.583 that happened in England against the spies. 18:39.020 --> 18:41.020 Our own president was like, yeah, it could have been. 18:41.020 --> 18:42.640 We don't know, might have been somebody else. 18:42.640 --> 18:44.820 Sort of the same thing that he said about 18:44.820 --> 18:47.570 the interference in the elections that Russia has done. 18:47.660 --> 18:52.480 The longer the leader of our country gives Russia a pass, 18:52.480 --> 18:54.580 and keeps saying, well, maybe they're doing bad stuff, 18:54.580 --> 18:57.433 maybe they're not, the tougher your job's gonna be. 18:57.760 --> 19:00.490 The tougher it's gonna be to truly hold them accountable. 19:00.490 --> 19:04.010 So whatever the reason for that is, I don't even know, 19:04.010 --> 19:07.040 wouldn't even begin to guess, the president needs to speak 19:07.040 --> 19:10.480 clearly and forcefully against these Russian actions, 19:10.480 --> 19:13.033 and stop acting like maybe they didn't happen. 19:13.230 --> 19:15.620 I think it really undermines our ability to confront 19:15.620 --> 19:17.810 what Russia's doing on all fronts that have been discussed 19:17.810 --> 19:19.190 both by the Chairman and me. 19:19.190 --> 19:20.690 And with that I'll yield back. 19:21.603 --> 19:24.043 - Mr. Wilson's recognized for five minutes. 19:24.830 --> 19:25.663 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 19:25.663 --> 19:26.810 And General Scaparrotti, thank you 19:26.810 --> 19:28.680 for your successful service 19:28.720 --> 19:30.690 where your mission is absolutely critical, 19:30.690 --> 19:32.040 with little room for error. 19:32.460 --> 19:35.070 One of my primary concerns with EUCOM's ability 19:35.070 --> 19:37.850 to successfully defend its area of responsibility 19:38.080 --> 19:41.220 surrounds its ability to transport troops and/or equipment 19:41.220 --> 19:43.303 expeditiously across Europe. 19:43.710 --> 19:45.800 Antiquated infrastructure and inconsistent 19:45.800 --> 19:48.080 border-crossing standards delay and disrupt 19:48.380 --> 19:50.630 our freedom of movement throughout the region 19:50.630 --> 19:52.963 while training and exercising in the theatre. 19:53.340 --> 19:55.650 Could you please describe what role the U.S. is taking 19:55.650 --> 19:58.363 in leading the effort to resolve these issues? 19:58.430 --> 20:01.113 And what other organizations, NATO, EU, 20:01.760 --> 20:03.523 are doing to address the challenge? 20:05.100 --> 20:07.120 - Thank you, I would agree that mobility, 20:07.120 --> 20:08.993 as I will call it broadly, 20:10.360 --> 20:13.600 within the Euro-Atlantic theatre is very important 20:13.600 --> 20:17.053 to our deterrence and defensive capabilities. 20:17.490 --> 20:20.823 And it was not invested in through the years that, 20:21.620 --> 20:24.250 the past decade or more that we believed 20:24.250 --> 20:26.423 that Russia was a partner. 20:27.970 --> 20:29.460 I think we've turned the corner on that 20:29.460 --> 20:31.770 in this past year, in the sense that we have 20:31.990 --> 20:35.703 focus and energy among our European partners. 20:36.180 --> 20:40.340 As you said, to get a focus on improving our infrastructure, 20:40.340 --> 20:44.910 our rail and road, our ports, and our capability 20:44.910 --> 20:49.683 to handle the movement of military forces throughout Europe. 20:49.990 --> 20:53.743 We've done that in EUCOM through the work of, first, 20:53.970 --> 20:58.423 our logistics capacity, in an assessment early, 20:58.490 --> 21:02.480 of our ability to move and the infrastructure 21:02.480 --> 21:03.393 that supports it. 21:03.900 --> 21:06.717 We've worked closely with both NATO, the J4, 21:06.717 --> 21:10.093 and my SHAPE Headquarters and NATO Headquarters. 21:10.980 --> 21:12.803 As well as with the EU. 21:13.150 --> 21:15.920 So NATO and EU is, one of their primary 21:16.120 --> 21:19.253 cooperative efforts is, in fact, mobility. 21:19.630 --> 21:21.740 That's important because it brings to bear 21:21.990 --> 21:26.880 the other elements of national power outside of the military 21:26.890 --> 21:30.373 that the EU can bring in economic, diplomatic, et cetera. 21:30.630 --> 21:31.733 So I think we have, 21:32.160 --> 21:35.874 I think we have a good start, and we have a broad alliance 21:35.874 --> 21:38.913 of nations that are looking at this now. 21:39.200 --> 21:41.160 - And I was grateful to be with you in Munich, 21:41.160 --> 21:44.140 and also in Brussels, where I saw the high regard 21:44.140 --> 21:47.343 of our allies for your efforts to address this issue. 21:48.100 --> 21:53.030 In December 2017, the president courageously changed 21:53.030 --> 21:56.030 the U.S. policy to provide defensive lethal assistance 21:56.030 --> 21:58.830 to Ukraine, and the State Department has subsequently 21:58.830 --> 22:01.143 approved the sale of Javelins to Ukraine. 22:01.620 --> 22:04.803 It is said that nearly 10,000 Ukrainians have been killed, 22:04.990 --> 22:09.570 as Putin has illegally invaded and occupied Crimea 22:09.570 --> 22:12.713 and the eastern portion of Ukraine. 22:13.060 --> 22:15.400 High hopes for a democratic and prosperous Russia 22:15.400 --> 22:17.763 have been crushed by Putin. 22:18.140 --> 22:21.360 What is your assessment of the impact of the new aid 22:21.500 --> 22:23.563 on the fight on the ground in Ukraine? 22:23.970 --> 22:27.093 How do you assess Russia's long-term strategy in Ukraine, 22:27.160 --> 22:29.383 and has it changed since the new policy? 22:31.380 --> 22:32.960 - Well, thank you, I'll first start by saying 22:32.960 --> 22:35.360 that Ukraine is in a what I would consider 22:35.360 --> 22:37.543 a hot fight right now. 22:37.670 --> 22:39.203 It's not a frozen conflict. 22:40.150 --> 22:42.863 Daily, there's activity along the front. 22:42.863 --> 22:47.373 And unfortunately, for Ukraine, a loss of life every week. 22:48.210 --> 22:52.010 And I fully support what we're doing to help 22:52.010 --> 22:54.450 build their capability to defend their own country 22:54.450 --> 22:58.770 and reform their security institutions as well, 22:58.770 --> 23:00.270 which they're working closely. 23:01.100 --> 23:02.683 The assets that we've provided, 23:04.230 --> 23:06.560 funded by Congress, to support them, 23:06.560 --> 23:09.330 and support their development, has provided them 23:09.330 --> 23:11.210 with defensive capabilities, and with 23:11.470 --> 23:14.543 the Javelin that you specifically noted. 23:15.140 --> 23:20.140 And those assets go directly to their improved capability 23:21.070 --> 23:23.153 to establish the defense in the east. 23:23.460 --> 23:26.700 And become more and more competent and confident 23:26.700 --> 23:29.793 of their ability to secure their nation. 23:30.910 --> 23:33.980 What I've seen in Russia, is Russia has continued 23:34.454 --> 23:38.103 to support what I call a proxy force, 23:38.890 --> 23:42.460 to include providing regular military 23:44.330 --> 23:48.463 commanders in charge at company and above level, 23:48.960 --> 23:52.503 of the separatist, or the proxy forces on the other side. 23:53.180 --> 23:54.930 I think it's too early to say whether or not 23:54.930 --> 23:58.270 we've seen a change as a direct result of the decisions 23:58.270 --> 24:01.500 that we're just taking, but we'll watch that closely. 24:01.500 --> 24:04.223 I'll close by saying, it's not my, 24:06.560 --> 24:11.070 it's not my belief that Russia wants to resolve 24:11.070 --> 24:13.233 this conflict at this point. 24:13.710 --> 24:16.463 They certainly could do much more to move along, 24:18.680 --> 24:20.603 to move the Minsk Agreement forward. 24:21.100 --> 24:25.440 Things like offering protection, and allowing mobility 24:25.440 --> 24:28.513 of the mission that oversees this, which they're not doing. 24:28.730 --> 24:32.960 So I think they actually are attempting to just freeze 24:32.960 --> 24:35.003 this a bit to their advantage. 24:35.520 --> 24:36.540 - Thank you very much, again, 24:36.540 --> 24:39.080 for your leadership and the persons serving with you. 24:39.080 --> 24:41.253 God bless you. - Mr. Larsen. 24:42.070 --> 24:42.903 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 24:42.903 --> 24:44.780 I'd yield my time to Mr. Brown of Maryland. 24:45.260 --> 24:46.483 - Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 24:47.090 --> 24:48.000 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 24:48.000 --> 24:50.030 Thank you, General, for your service 24:50.030 --> 24:51.883 and your testimony here today. 24:51.990 --> 24:54.140 Appreciated the opportunity to ask questions 24:54.140 --> 24:56.083 in a classified setting yesterday. 24:56.440 --> 25:00.260 I recently returned from a codel in Eastern Europe, 25:00.260 --> 25:04.193 with Representative Stefanik, where we saw how partners, 25:04.260 --> 25:06.743 such as Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, 25:06.970 --> 25:09.510 are working with your command to deter 25:09.510 --> 25:13.760 and counter the threat of an actual Russian 25:13.760 --> 25:15.393 aggression and expansionism. 25:15.780 --> 25:18.300 A critical component of that is forward deployment 25:18.300 --> 25:20.730 of our troops and equipment in the region. 25:20.730 --> 25:24.460 In your written testimony, and at the Senate hearing 25:24.460 --> 25:27.940 last week, you highlighted NATO's increased presence 25:28.080 --> 25:29.860 in the Baltic region, and in Poland, 25:29.860 --> 25:32.150 through the European Deterrence Initiative, 25:32.150 --> 25:34.024 which includes pre-positioning equipment 25:34.024 --> 25:36.750 and deploying enhanced forward presence battalions 25:36.750 --> 25:38.850 along with armored brigade combat teams 25:39.080 --> 25:41.333 and combat aviation brigade, 25:41.390 --> 25:43.410 on heel-to-toe nine-month rotation. 25:43.410 --> 25:47.453 My question, given Russia's high tempo of exercises, 25:47.590 --> 25:49.710 and troop placement on its borders, 25:49.710 --> 25:52.030 I'd like to hear a little bit more about 25:52.300 --> 25:56.113 your thoughts on our forward force deployment. 25:56.510 --> 26:00.520 Is a heel-to-toe nine-month rotation the proper force 26:00.520 --> 26:02.730 posture for our forward deployed units? 26:02.730 --> 26:06.253 Or would a one or two year rotation be better? 26:07.015 --> 26:10.423 Or what about permanent presence of units? 26:11.930 --> 26:12.763 - Well, thank you, sir. 26:12.763 --> 26:15.630 And I appreciate your visit to those nations as well. 26:15.630 --> 26:18.213 They're strong allies, and as you know, 26:18.920 --> 26:21.027 one of the smaller nations through the Baltics, 26:21.027 --> 26:22.623 but strong and active. 26:23.910 --> 26:25.550 First of all, I would I would say 26:25.550 --> 26:27.950 that I think our rotational period 26:27.950 --> 26:29.810 of about nine months is the right one. 26:29.810 --> 26:32.297 We've had experience in our forces, 26:32.297 --> 26:35.263 and particularly, in the army, of rotating for a year, 26:35.730 --> 26:38.713 or a year and an additional three months, or less. 26:38.940 --> 26:42.140 And we found that nine months is about right 26:42.520 --> 26:44.373 for a number of reasons. 26:44.910 --> 26:49.203 And so in terms of rotation, I would stay with nine months. 26:49.710 --> 26:52.700 With a rotational force, I get someone specifically trained 26:52.700 --> 26:55.160 for that mission, ready to come in, and actually, 26:55.160 --> 26:57.840 because of the ranges, et cetera, we have available, 26:57.840 --> 27:01.320 I think I returned a force that's just as well-trained 27:01.320 --> 27:02.670 when it returns to the States. 27:02.670 --> 27:05.380 So we at least maintain the readiness, 27:05.380 --> 27:08.133 if not build some readiness through that experience. 27:08.680 --> 27:11.703 In terms of rotational versus permanent, 27:12.857 --> 27:15.310 I do believe we need more forces in Europe. 27:15.310 --> 27:16.810 I don't think we're at the posture 27:16.810 --> 27:19.573 that I believe is appropriate, or required, yet. 27:20.120 --> 27:21.960 And because of that, I think that there are 27:21.960 --> 27:24.010 some permanent forces I would like to have. 27:24.010 --> 27:25.560 The first ones I would like to have 27:25.560 --> 27:27.623 would be some of our enabling elements. 27:28.040 --> 27:29.470 For example, a fires brigade, 27:29.470 --> 27:31.823 et cetera, as a permanent force. 27:31.850 --> 27:34.720 And then continue the rotation of the the mech brigade 27:34.720 --> 27:38.113 until we reach a point that we might consider that as well. 27:38.740 --> 27:42.477 The last thing I'll say is that I lay a requirement out 27:42.477 --> 27:45.323 and the service determines how best to fill that. 27:45.720 --> 27:47.483 But I think some of these, again, 27:47.927 --> 27:50.943 are best provided in a permanent fashion. 27:51.330 --> 27:53.590 - Would you include an aviation brigade 27:53.590 --> 27:55.700 as a one of those permanent forces 27:55.700 --> 27:57.700 that you'd like to see? - I would, yes. 27:58.373 --> 27:59.880 - Could you discuss some of the logistics 27:59.880 --> 28:02.510 and infrastructure challenges facing 28:02.510 --> 28:05.720 our forward deployed troops, such as issues with 28:05.720 --> 28:08.840 freedom of movement and military construction in theater, 28:08.840 --> 28:10.830 and what steps are you taking 28:10.830 --> 28:12.580 under your command to address them? 28:14.140 --> 28:17.040 - As I said, R4 has done an assessment in the past year, 28:17.040 --> 28:18.750 or a little over a year ago, we started it, 28:18.750 --> 28:21.780 in terms of the infrastructure status across Europe 28:21.780 --> 28:23.783 and what was required. 28:24.120 --> 28:27.270 With that, we now, working with the nations involved, 28:27.270 --> 28:29.370 so that they understand their responsibilities 28:29.370 --> 28:32.273 as well, as an ally, or as a partner. 28:32.840 --> 28:35.010 And there's examples throughout Europe 28:35.010 --> 28:37.630 of them taking this on, in terms of their investment 28:37.730 --> 28:40.893 in ports, infrastructure, roads change, and rail. 28:41.680 --> 28:44.360 For instance, in NATO, at 29, 28:44.360 --> 28:47.910 they agreed to begin working the diplomatic 28:47.910 --> 28:51.540 and customs rules that allow the military to move 28:51.860 --> 28:55.630 expeditiously with less than five days notice, for instance. 28:55.630 --> 28:57.910 Those are steps that are significant 28:57.920 --> 28:59.853 and making forward progress. 29:01.060 --> 29:04.763 We have already, through Congress's support in the EDI, 29:06.544 --> 29:09.030 along with our partners, are investing 29:09.030 --> 29:14.030 in critical infrastructure, ports, 29:15.850 --> 29:19.520 things of that nature, that we identified 29:19.520 --> 29:22.453 we need to improve in order to help with our mobility. 29:22.870 --> 29:26.470 And in just about all those cases, our ally in that place 29:26.470 --> 29:28.373 also invests in that alongside of us. 29:28.373 --> 29:30.750 And invest more than we do, obviously. 29:30.750 --> 29:31.800 It's in their country. 29:31.800 --> 29:34.180 So I think we're making very good progress. 29:34.180 --> 29:35.783 We've got good examples of that. 29:36.300 --> 29:37.770 But there's a lot of work to do. 29:37.770 --> 29:39.393 - Red, yellow, or green? 29:42.590 --> 29:45.193 - I'd say yellow. - Thank you. 29:45.193 --> 29:46.960 I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 29:47.600 --> 29:50.523 - Mr. Turner. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 29:50.740 --> 29:52.780 General Scaparrotti, good to see you again. 29:52.780 --> 29:54.750 I want to echo Joe Wilson's comments, 29:54.750 --> 29:56.153 having been with you in Munich, 29:56.153 --> 29:58.250 at the Munich Security Conference, 29:58.250 --> 29:59.950 and then your presentation, also, 29:59.950 --> 30:01.700 to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 30:01.760 --> 30:06.400 I think in all, both of those, we were very proud 30:06.400 --> 30:09.550 of both your representation of the United States, 30:09.550 --> 30:11.793 but also to our our allies. 30:12.100 --> 30:14.740 You have continued to make clear the threat 30:14.740 --> 30:17.570 that Russia poses in all of your presentations, 30:17.570 --> 30:20.670 on including their meddling in elections, 30:20.670 --> 30:24.320 meddling in democracies, the threat that's posed to you 30:24.320 --> 30:28.190 and your ability to execute your job and tasks, 30:28.190 --> 30:30.670 and even the forward deployed troops, 30:30.670 --> 30:32.093 what they're experiencing. 30:33.280 --> 30:35.800 On the mobility issue, I'd like to expand a little bit 30:35.800 --> 30:37.180 on the questions that have been asked. 30:37.180 --> 30:39.130 You've done a great job in, I think, 30:39.130 --> 30:41.470 informing Congress that there are mobility issues. 30:41.470 --> 30:44.230 As we've expanded NATO, we did not undertake plans 30:44.440 --> 30:46.310 for how would we defend the space, 30:46.310 --> 30:48.710 and make sure that the infrastructure was there. 30:48.820 --> 30:50.290 But I think people would also be surprised 30:50.290 --> 30:53.280 at when we approve the European Reassurance Initiative, 30:53.280 --> 30:55.720 that there were funds, there were U.S. funds, 30:55.720 --> 30:58.350 that were necessary in order to be able to get 30:58.350 --> 31:00.270 our troops from point A to point B 31:00.270 --> 31:01.683 that went to infrastructure. 31:01.700 --> 31:02.840 You mentioned that briefly. 31:02.840 --> 31:05.110 That we were working with our NATO partners 31:05.110 --> 31:07.030 and allies, as to what they need to invest in. 31:07.030 --> 31:08.680 Could you give us some examples of the types 31:08.680 --> 31:10.853 of things that you had to fund, 31:11.070 --> 31:13.020 with the European Reassurance Initiative, 31:13.020 --> 31:14.680 that you shouldn't be funding, 31:14.680 --> 31:16.210 and that we need to work with our allies 31:16.210 --> 31:18.450 to make certain that the infrastructure has support, 31:18.450 --> 31:20.223 so that you don't have to in the future? 31:21.140 --> 31:24.630 - Yes, sir, an example might be in MK, 31:24.630 --> 31:26.140 which is a base in Romania. 31:26.140 --> 31:27.923 A very good base that they have. 31:28.760 --> 31:31.820 We're laying a concrete pad off the runway 31:32.470 --> 31:34.700 and investing in a little bit of the infrastructure 31:34.700 --> 31:37.340 that helps with the with the movement 31:37.460 --> 31:40.943 and mobility of troops through that port. 31:41.382 --> 31:43.620 And what they're doing, is they agreed, 31:43.620 --> 31:47.240 as we improved that tarmac, improve their reception point 31:47.240 --> 31:51.750 off the runway, they agreed to include a fuel line 31:51.800 --> 31:53.640 and improve the rail line into there, 31:53.640 --> 31:55.840 all helpful to make this a good hub 31:55.840 --> 31:59.143 for movement of troops and equipment. 31:59.760 --> 32:02.970 They also are investing in the base itself 32:03.020 --> 32:05.700 and accommodations for our troops 32:05.700 --> 32:07.223 that we rotate through there. 32:07.510 --> 32:10.290 So that's a really good example of where we've worked 32:10.290 --> 32:13.630 with another country in a place that we needed some mobility 32:13.630 --> 32:14.913 and a site to come into. 32:15.130 --> 32:18.720 And there's others like that, that are just improvements 32:19.370 --> 32:23.560 to aerial ports or seaports that help our mobility, 32:23.560 --> 32:26.343 help us get the capacity in that port. 32:26.760 --> 32:28.050 The other thing I'd just like to mention, 32:28.050 --> 32:30.160 and I intended to mention earlier, 32:30.160 --> 32:32.990 was that the other thing we're doing that's important 32:32.990 --> 32:36.440 is we're, as we rotate our forces, and the allies do, 32:36.440 --> 32:39.170 we're trying to bring them through different ports 32:39.320 --> 32:41.183 and move them by different means. 32:41.430 --> 32:44.763 And in doing that, we learn where we have issues. 32:45.090 --> 32:49.890 We develop that capability in those countries 32:49.890 --> 32:54.890 and their civilian infrastructure that supports that 32:55.690 --> 32:57.373 and and build muscle memory. 32:57.770 --> 33:00.000 So that's been an important part of this 33:00.140 --> 33:01.870 over the past year as well. 33:02.220 --> 33:04.120 - Well, that goes to my next question. 33:04.260 --> 33:06.970 Shortly after seeing you, I went to, 33:06.970 --> 33:10.190 I was in Germany, and saw the Toledo Air Guard, 33:10.190 --> 33:11.803 which had just left Estonia. 33:12.160 --> 33:17.160 And they reported that there was a number of their missions 33:17.500 --> 33:19.250 that they were unable to accomplish 33:19.320 --> 33:22.020 because of some of the issues that you just described. 33:22.670 --> 33:26.130 And the questions that they had, obviously, 33:26.130 --> 33:27.700 was how is that captured? 33:27.700 --> 33:32.300 How can we be assured that as we do the forward deployment 33:32.300 --> 33:34.550 of troops and they run into these impediments 33:34.640 --> 33:36.200 to be able to execute their missions, 33:36.200 --> 33:38.879 that it's captured, that it is worked, 33:38.879 --> 33:40.243 and that it's resolved, so that we 33:40.243 --> 33:41.883 do have that future capability? 33:43.060 --> 33:45.510 - Yes, sir, we capture that in a very deliberate 33:45.520 --> 33:46.853 after-action review. 33:47.180 --> 33:49.590 And all of those exercises, again, 33:49.590 --> 33:51.873 purposeful movement by certain ways, 33:52.490 --> 33:54.380 operations out of certain places, 33:54.380 --> 33:57.020 capture the issues we have, bring it back up through 33:57.300 --> 33:59.983 the EUCOM J4, out to NATO J4, 34:00.970 --> 34:05.300 and the countries that it's involved to capture that. 34:05.300 --> 34:06.530 That's exactly how we do it. 34:06.530 --> 34:08.400 we have examples, for instance, in movement 34:08.400 --> 34:10.810 of troops here this last summer for exercises, 34:10.810 --> 34:15.183 where they were stopped at a border, 34:15.320 --> 34:18.270 put on a sidetrack for like two days, three days. 34:18.270 --> 34:19.820 We had to work through customs. 34:20.580 --> 34:21.782 First, we had to discover it. 34:21.782 --> 34:26.782 We had troops sitting on a rail alongside a border. 34:27.580 --> 34:29.083 But those things occur. 34:29.100 --> 34:31.590 We capture that back up, and then we drove back down 34:31.590 --> 34:33.680 into it, whether it's a customs issue, 34:33.680 --> 34:36.803 a coordination issue, or it's an infrastructure issue. 34:38.320 --> 34:40.053 - Thank you, General, thank you, Chairman. 34:40.660 --> 34:42.883 - Mr. Courtney. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 34:43.210 --> 34:46.963 Thank you, General, for your testimony yesterday and today. 34:47.710 --> 34:50.990 The Office of Naval Intelligence issued a report in 2015 34:50.990 --> 34:53.603 called the Russian Navy, a Historic Transition. 34:53.610 --> 34:57.410 Again, public document, and it states here 34:57.410 --> 35:00.700 that submarines are the capital ships of the Russian Navy. 35:00.700 --> 35:02.730 This is dictated by Russia's geography, 35:02.730 --> 35:06.100 constrained direct access to major ocean areas everywhere 35:06.100 --> 35:08.960 but in the Pacific make surface ship operations vulnerable 35:08.960 --> 35:10.653 to potential enemy action. 35:10.870 --> 35:12.900 The inherent covert nature of submarines 35:12.900 --> 35:15.590 enhances their survivability, whether operating locally, 35:15.590 --> 35:18.080 or when transiting into more open sea areas. 35:18.080 --> 35:21.080 And then it goes on to quote Admiral Chirkov of the Navy, 35:21.080 --> 35:23.810 stating that the nuclear submarine fleet is the priority 35:23.810 --> 35:25.563 of the Navy shipbuilding program. 35:25.860 --> 35:28.470 Again one of your predecessors, Admiral Stavridis, 35:28.470 --> 35:30.240 testified here a couple of years ago. 35:30.240 --> 35:34.360 And kind of caught people's attention by stating 35:34.360 --> 35:38.030 that the submarine activity is roughly about 70% 35:38.030 --> 35:40.250 of what it was during the the Cold War era. 35:40.250 --> 35:41.960 And he knows what he's talking about 35:41.960 --> 35:44.550 because he sort of was there during a lot of that. 35:44.550 --> 35:47.310 And you mentioned in your your opening remarks 35:47.310 --> 35:50.723 about the fact that anti-submarine activities is now, 35:52.040 --> 35:57.040 kind of a restart, in terms of our forces, 35:57.120 --> 35:58.480 as well as the region. 35:58.480 --> 36:00.160 I realize some of this is classified, 36:00.160 --> 36:01.660 and you talked about a little bit yesterday, 36:01.660 --> 36:04.673 but I think it's important still to talk, 36:05.010 --> 36:06.930 create at least some picture, 36:06.930 --> 36:09.410 in terms of what you're dealing with, 36:09.410 --> 36:11.450 and what you're seeing, and I was wondering if you could 36:11.450 --> 36:14.323 comment a little more. - Yes, thank you. 36:15.020 --> 36:16.850 Well, Admiral Stavridis noted that he gave 36:16.850 --> 36:18.280 an estimate of what it was then. 36:18.280 --> 36:21.503 Just this last year, since the last time I testified here, 36:21.950 --> 36:25.780 we've seen activity in the Russian Navy, 36:25.780 --> 36:29.063 and particularly undersea, and their submarine activity. 36:30.280 --> 36:32.823 That we haven't seen since the '80s. 36:33.570 --> 36:37.003 So the level of activity is up yet again. 36:37.440 --> 36:41.980 And as you know, they're producing maritime enhancements 36:41.980 --> 36:45.110 to existing ships and a new submarine 36:46.440 --> 36:50.073 that is definitely more modern and more challenging. 36:50.530 --> 36:52.663 While we remain dominant undersea, 36:52.800 --> 36:55.730 we've got to continue our investment, as the Navy 36:55.730 --> 36:58.900 has laid out, in order to maintain that dominance. 36:58.900 --> 37:00.470 Just given their modernization 37:00.470 --> 37:04.083 and their increased activity with their forces. 37:04.910 --> 37:07.980 - And as far as working with, again, 37:07.980 --> 37:10.013 some of our allies in the region, 37:10.740 --> 37:11.970 again, this is something, again, 37:11.970 --> 37:14.423 that's sort of a restart, as I mentioned. 37:14.460 --> 37:15.810 - Yes, sir, it's important. 37:19.090 --> 37:21.710 Most of the allies and the United States doesn't have 37:21.710 --> 37:25.083 the same capacity that it had during the Cold War, 37:25.170 --> 37:26.840 when we were used to doing this together, 37:26.840 --> 37:30.033 particularly, anti-submarine warfare, maritime operations. 37:30.270 --> 37:32.230 So we're all rebuilding our capacities. 37:32.230 --> 37:34.470 We're improving our capacities to meet 37:35.215 --> 37:37.920 the challenges we have in this new environment 37:37.920 --> 37:39.483 and Russia's modernization. 37:40.680 --> 37:42.490 Together, we can handle this. 37:42.490 --> 37:44.593 We've proven that in this past year. 37:45.110 --> 37:47.130 But it does take all of us working together, 37:47.130 --> 37:48.310 and the other thing I would mention, 37:48.310 --> 37:50.223 it takes a mix of the forces. 37:50.890 --> 37:52.420 Particularly, anti-submarine warfare. 37:52.420 --> 37:56.703 You're talking to air, surface, subsurface, sensors, 37:57.040 --> 37:59.427 it's a mix that allows us, along with our allies 37:59.427 --> 38:01.853 and their capabilities, to be successful. 38:02.300 --> 38:05.003 - Thank you, last year's NDAA, 38:05.040 --> 38:06.940 we included some language that allowed 38:06.950 --> 38:09.060 wounded Ukrainian soldiers to be treated 38:09.060 --> 38:13.573 in U.S. medical facilities, in accordance with DoD rules. 38:14.100 --> 38:17.320 And again, I know that was just signed a couple months ago, 38:17.320 --> 38:20.060 but I wonder if you had any sort of comment, 38:20.060 --> 38:22.340 in terms of just, A, how that was received 38:22.494 --> 38:24.723 by our friends in the Ukraine, 38:24.770 --> 38:28.300 and whether or not you see that as a process 38:28.300 --> 38:30.483 that's actually going to happen. 38:31.670 --> 38:34.943 - I would say, I'm sure it was received very well. 38:35.864 --> 38:38.380 It's a very deliberate demonstration 38:38.800 --> 38:40.547 of our support for them. 38:40.547 --> 38:42.133 And our close partnership. 38:43.070 --> 38:44.720 To care for one of their wounded. 38:44.960 --> 38:47.190 - Great. - And so without a doubt, 38:47.190 --> 38:48.527 And I know they're CHOD well, 38:48.527 --> 38:51.023 he's, their Chief of Defense, 38:52.980 --> 38:57.520 truly cares about his forces and their care 38:57.770 --> 39:00.980 as well as their training, so that they can fight 39:00.980 --> 39:02.963 and protect that country. 39:03.230 --> 39:04.260 - [Joe] Great, thank you, I yield back. 39:04.260 --> 39:06.853 - Thank you. - Mr. Coffman. 39:11.650 --> 39:12.957 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 39:13.280 --> 39:16.003 General, thanks so much for your service. 39:16.757 --> 39:20.860 My concern is we're at an untenable position 39:21.460 --> 39:22.690 with Russia right now. 39:22.690 --> 39:25.363 And I want to get clarification of Article 5, 39:25.460 --> 39:26.570 your interpretation of it, 39:26.570 --> 39:29.183 because they've developed a hybrid system. 39:29.490 --> 39:33.970 Or sort of a, I guess you could call it hybrid tactics 39:34.220 --> 39:37.883 that involve information operations, 39:38.350 --> 39:41.433 I guess you can say, an element of psychological warfare, 39:41.960 --> 39:46.500 as well as using covert forces 39:47.180 --> 39:50.450 as proxies, and so when we look at something 39:50.450 --> 39:53.250 like the Baltic States, that I think 39:53.250 --> 39:56.923 have Russian minorities in them, much like the Ukraine, 39:57.260 --> 40:00.463 that they could do the same pattern there. 40:00.890 --> 40:04.603 And I'm concerned that would, 40:05.500 --> 40:07.643 that NATO would acquiesce to that, 40:08.050 --> 40:09.880 because they might not consider it 40:10.165 --> 40:12.550 a conventional attack under Article 5. 40:12.550 --> 40:14.523 What's your interpretation of that? 40:16.380 --> 40:19.810 - Well, first of all, NATO recognizes the difficulty in an 40:20.970 --> 40:24.163 indirect or asymmetric activity that Russia's practicing. 40:24.780 --> 40:26.590 Activities below the level of conflict, 40:26.590 --> 40:28.610 and in fact, we've inserted that for the first time 40:28.610 --> 40:32.823 into our NATO exercise that we did this past year, 40:33.220 --> 40:37.690 with some ambiguous activities that are consistent 40:37.690 --> 40:40.580 with what they would typically do, in order to 40:41.320 --> 40:45.043 bring this about and have that discussion at 29. 40:45.820 --> 40:49.790 And so they're actually dealing with the issue around this, 40:49.790 --> 40:53.370 and in cyber, and working to define 40:54.460 --> 40:59.040 an understanding of what would be a trigger for Article 5? 40:59.040 --> 41:01.710 So they're working that and they recognize it. 41:01.710 --> 41:02.700 I would just share with you, 41:02.700 --> 41:05.273 that's the most difficult scenario I see, 41:05.440 --> 41:08.683 potentially, is because of the way that they typically work, 41:09.000 --> 41:11.233 in a fashion that would be ambiguous, 41:11.930 --> 41:16.930 it would be most difficult to come to a decision. 41:17.220 --> 41:19.660 But I would share that NATO's aware of this. 41:19.660 --> 41:21.080 And they're actually working on it. 41:21.080 --> 41:23.070 - But don't you think that, 41:23.070 --> 41:25.400 you said that that's the most difficult scenario, 41:25.400 --> 41:28.067 don't you think that's the most probable scenario right now? 41:28.067 --> 41:32.240 And don't you think one of the objectives of Russia 41:32.840 --> 41:36.433 is clearly, is to break NATO. 41:37.943 --> 41:41.000 And to test this, for instance, 41:41.000 --> 41:42.400 in one of the Baltic States? 41:42.940 --> 41:45.140 - I think that absolutely are trying 41:45.140 --> 41:48.713 to undermine and splinter NATO. 41:49.810 --> 41:52.330 It is a difficult situation when they operate that way, 41:52.330 --> 41:54.643 but I'm confident of NATO. 41:54.690 --> 41:56.110 I've seen the discussions. 41:56.110 --> 42:00.900 And I think in something that they agree 42:02.328 --> 42:05.000 is an attack warranting Article 5, 42:05.000 --> 42:06.423 that they can come together. 42:07.440 --> 42:09.590 I've seen them come together in other things 42:09.590 --> 42:13.920 less than this, that was perhaps divisive at the time, 42:13.920 --> 42:15.823 but they can reach a conclusion. 42:16.370 --> 42:17.950 - Well, let me express to you 42:19.010 --> 42:22.533 that I don't necessarily share the confidence in our allies, 42:23.010 --> 42:27.470 because of the, there was an agreed-upon 2% 42:28.112 --> 42:32.330 of GDP to be spent on defense. 42:32.410 --> 42:36.570 And the majority of our NATO allies are nowhere near 42:36.810 --> 42:38.773 that 2% requirement. 42:39.020 --> 42:44.020 And so it's, is it that, well, obviously, 42:44.490 --> 42:46.510 they have other priorities within their budget, 42:46.510 --> 42:51.230 but that's a real concern, when they're not doing that. 42:51.230 --> 42:53.700 And there's an over reliance upon the United States. 42:53.700 --> 42:55.000 Could you comment on that? 42:55.800 --> 42:57.063 - I share your concern. 42:57.200 --> 43:00.900 And I press that, as well as the Secretary-General, 43:00.900 --> 43:01.733 I press it as the SACEUR, 43:01.733 --> 43:04.363 and as a EUCOM commander every place I go. 43:04.720 --> 43:06.220 They have to demonstrate a change. 43:06.220 --> 43:08.400 They have, as I stated in my opening statement. 43:08.400 --> 43:11.243 There will be eight that have made that 2%, 43:11.243 --> 43:13.420 and 15 that plan to make it, and we'll continue 43:13.420 --> 43:16.150 to press that as being a part of the alliance 43:16.150 --> 43:19.390 is also contributing as a part of the alliance, 43:19.390 --> 43:23.150 both in cash, and contributions, and capability. 43:23.150 --> 43:24.400 So that's what we're watching. 43:24.400 --> 43:26.350 And I agree that we need to press that. 43:27.670 --> 43:31.060 I would add that if you if you look at NATO, 43:31.060 --> 43:34.203 and say, since Warsaw, for instance, and the adaptation. 43:34.700 --> 43:39.570 The recognition is Russia as a threat here, 43:39.570 --> 43:42.733 a competitive nation. 43:44.090 --> 43:46.860 All of those things that I noted about the forward posture 43:46.860 --> 43:51.040 of troops in the east, our air policing activity, 43:51.040 --> 43:54.010 a much more increased maritime activity, 43:54.010 --> 43:56.360 particularly, in the Black Sea, in the Baltics, 43:56.520 --> 43:59.980 everything that I do there as the SACEUR was agreed at 29. 43:59.980 --> 44:02.730 That's why I have confidence in NATO. 44:02.730 --> 44:04.220 These are tough decisions for them, 44:04.220 --> 44:05.360 and within their countries, 44:05.360 --> 44:08.403 and they've been able to act over the past year. 44:08.882 --> 44:10.882 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 44:11.170 --> 44:14.710 - Mr. Veasey. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 44:14.710 --> 44:16.830 I wanted to specifically talk with you 44:16.830 --> 44:19.240 about Russia and the Balkans. 44:19.240 --> 44:22.230 I know that there have been several investments 44:22.230 --> 44:24.527 that Russians have wanted to make in the Balkans, 44:24.527 --> 44:26.770 there was a pipeline project, I believe, 44:26.770 --> 44:29.780 about a year or so ago that didn't quite work out 44:29.780 --> 44:31.163 the way they anticipated. 44:31.530 --> 44:35.193 There have also been some credit and remittance issues, 44:35.370 --> 44:37.820 some other foreign trade things that didn't quite 44:37.990 --> 44:40.903 go the Russians way, but it's definitely, 44:41.220 --> 44:42.790 it's clear that they want to continue 44:42.790 --> 44:44.203 to have influence there. 44:44.300 --> 44:48.000 In your opinion, how far are they willing to go 44:48.330 --> 44:51.680 to make sure that they can continue to have 44:51.880 --> 44:54.230 a certain amount of influence there in that region, 44:54.230 --> 44:56.470 even though some of the things that they're working on, 44:56.470 --> 44:59.653 economically, just haven't bared any fruit? 45:01.650 --> 45:04.420 - Well, what I see is offers, for instance, 45:04.420 --> 45:07.740 of military equipment and military assistance. 45:07.740 --> 45:10.070 And sometimes the military equipment is surely 45:10.070 --> 45:11.513 below the cost to them. 45:11.980 --> 45:13.990 But as you watch them work in Europe, 45:13.990 --> 45:17.080 and on the periphery, in countries that they work with, 45:17.080 --> 45:20.520 they'll offer that equipment at a very low cost 45:20.520 --> 45:23.333 in order to ensure that they will take it. 45:23.340 --> 45:25.763 They'll offer them support and bring in troops, 45:26.160 --> 45:28.670 and then they'll decide that the troops need to stay. 45:28.670 --> 45:31.870 As a matter of influence, and some leverage, 45:31.870 --> 45:33.313 I would say, over time. 45:34.470 --> 45:35.950 Those are the things that I see them doing 45:35.950 --> 45:37.620 on the military side. 45:37.620 --> 45:41.733 Beyond that, very common, disinformation. 45:42.260 --> 45:46.493 Campaigns in the nations, within the Balkans, 45:47.940 --> 45:49.763 stirring political debate, 45:51.050 --> 45:54.363 support for French political parties, 45:55.340 --> 45:56.700 in order to stir that debate, 45:56.700 --> 45:59.700 and a very consistent message that is 45:59.700 --> 46:03.883 anti-West, anti-NATO, anti-U.S. 46:04.920 --> 46:08.453 - If their demographic crisis is real, 46:08.600 --> 46:12.423 and it's been reported that they're losing population, 46:13.760 --> 46:17.380 and these investments that they're offering to people 46:17.380 --> 46:19.760 aren't going through and, again, they're just, 46:19.760 --> 46:22.763 they're not, you know, yielding anything. 46:22.990 --> 46:25.770 How long can they continue to keep up 46:25.770 --> 46:27.483 that sort of disinformation, 46:27.660 --> 46:30.593 and continue to be a powerful player there, 46:30.790 --> 46:34.293 if they're suffering in all these areas, economically? 46:36.710 --> 46:38.700 - There are some that look at their demographics, 46:38.700 --> 46:43.700 they look at their economy, health issues, et cetera, 46:44.800 --> 46:48.070 and would say that while they're in 46:48.070 --> 46:51.203 a great power competition, as you look long range, 46:51.520 --> 46:53.223 they just can't sustain this. 46:54.800 --> 46:58.370 My view would be that the Russian people 46:58.564 --> 47:00.150 are used to adversity. 47:00.150 --> 47:03.883 They almost, as a culture, embrace that. 47:04.410 --> 47:06.893 And that even with a difficult economy, 47:08.070 --> 47:11.010 President Putin has been able to reverse the trend. 47:11.010 --> 47:13.473 And it's I think approaching 2%t growth. 47:14.440 --> 47:15.800 I think they have great resilience. 47:15.800 --> 47:17.530 And that's not what we should count on. 47:17.530 --> 47:20.433 We should count on our ensuring that we are strong, 47:20.900 --> 47:23.973 and we deter their activities. 47:24.770 --> 47:26.790 - How do you think that we should continue 47:26.790 --> 47:29.900 to try to influence the countries there in the Balkans 47:29.900 --> 47:32.223 to make positive steps towards NATO? 47:32.900 --> 47:34.190 - I think it's important that we have 47:34.190 --> 47:35.740 a whole-of-government approach. 47:37.851 --> 47:40.767 Diplomatic engagement there, which we do, 47:40.900 --> 47:44.313 but also encouragement from our allies there. 47:44.740 --> 47:48.150 We need to work with them to build 47:48.360 --> 47:51.703 Western democratic institutions. 47:52.180 --> 47:55.260 There's clearly a desire among the population 47:55.260 --> 47:57.453 in the Balkans to come West. 47:58.230 --> 47:59.790 But we've got to show them that we're just 47:59.790 --> 48:01.490 as interested in that as they are. 48:02.520 --> 48:04.420 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 48:05.100 --> 48:07.700 - Mr. Scott. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 48:07.700 --> 48:11.190 General, it's nice to see see you again. 48:11.190 --> 48:13.990 I want to follow up on a little bit of the line of questions 48:13.990 --> 48:16.363 that my colleague Mr. Veasey was asking. 48:16.680 --> 48:21.660 Russia is a huge country landmass, largest country. 48:21.660 --> 48:23.573 My understanding is on the Earth. 48:24.400 --> 48:27.563 They border, depending on how you count them, 48:28.560 --> 48:33.560 over 12 countries, including North Korea and China, 48:33.700 --> 48:35.053 on the eastern side. 48:36.208 --> 48:38.420 But then, when you come back to to the part 48:38.420 --> 48:41.090 of the world that that you're in charge of, 48:41.090 --> 48:46.090 they border a number of countries in the European theatre. 48:47.360 --> 48:52.360 My question is, are they engaging in maligned activities 48:52.930 --> 48:55.610 against all of them, and if not, which countries 48:55.610 --> 49:00.380 are they not engaging in these activities against? 49:02.370 --> 49:04.330 - I think, you know, I've probably seen 49:04.330 --> 49:06.840 some activity in most countries. 49:06.840 --> 49:10.613 And those that they don't have a certain focus on, 49:11.470 --> 49:14.593 you still see that activity in their media, 49:15.030 --> 49:19.793 because their media is laced with a an anti-Western, 49:21.510 --> 49:24.580 anti-international order kind of message, 49:24.580 --> 49:27.593 undercutting democratic countries, 49:27.910 --> 49:29.500 undercutting governments that they're in. 49:29.500 --> 49:31.450 And that's kind of where they're light. 49:31.970 --> 49:34.363 And then focused more particularly in the east. 49:34.760 --> 49:38.733 The countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union, 49:38.990 --> 49:41.150 you know, they see that as their strategic space, 49:41.150 --> 49:42.840 and they think they should have some 49:42.840 --> 49:45.240 preferential influence in those nations. 49:45.240 --> 49:46.703 So it's much heavier there. 49:47.380 --> 49:50.253 But even in the other countries of Europe, 49:50.470 --> 49:54.083 if you go to the west, Italy, France, Germany, et cetera, 49:54.840 --> 49:57.080 there's examples there of same, you know, 49:57.080 --> 49:59.693 use of disinformation, social media, 50:00.335 --> 50:02.663 and those kinds of activities as well. 50:04.220 --> 50:06.390 - I've only been over there a few weeks 50:06.390 --> 50:07.330 in the last couple of years, 50:07.330 --> 50:10.523 but the perception that I had was that they are engaged, 50:10.610 --> 50:13.268 in all of those, and basically, 50:13.268 --> 50:15.340 they're going to stir chaos wherever they can, 50:15.340 --> 50:16.649 and then when they see a weakness, 50:16.649 --> 50:19.963 they would take advantage of it. 50:20.180 --> 50:22.993 And you answered this question earlier, 50:23.060 --> 50:26.450 when Mr. Veasey asked it, but the question I had is, 50:26.450 --> 50:30.770 how long can they sustain that against all of the countries? 50:30.770 --> 50:33.930 And how long do all the other countries go, 50:33.930 --> 50:38.930 without at some point, taking an action against Russia 50:39.310 --> 50:41.993 to actually stop, stop this? 50:42.140 --> 50:44.520 I mean. - Yeah, I can't answer 50:44.520 --> 50:45.470 how long they could go. 50:45.470 --> 50:50.470 I would say they're a resilient nation, and a culture. 50:50.560 --> 50:52.703 And so I think we have to take action, 50:52.850 --> 50:54.970 in order to establish a deterrent effect. 50:54.970 --> 50:59.790 And that is to respond, to demonstrate capability, 50:59.790 --> 51:02.190 and demonstrate the will to use it if necessary. 51:03.240 --> 51:07.530 - I worry, and I'm just making this as a statement, 51:07.530 --> 51:10.273 with regard to Turkey being on their border. 51:10.910 --> 51:15.766 I worry about them using their activities 51:15.766 --> 51:19.323 to create a disturbance in Turkey, 51:19.810 --> 51:23.610 potentially a coup there, where somebody friendly to them 51:26.230 --> 51:28.830 took over, even if they took over for only a day or two, 51:28.830 --> 51:32.810 with our assets in that country, the potential damage 51:34.570 --> 51:39.363 that they could do simply by seizing some of our assets. 51:40.370 --> 51:44.310 Are you comfortable that that relationship with Turkey 51:44.310 --> 51:47.500 is strong enough, and we have enough insight into that, 51:47.500 --> 51:49.510 that if that began to happen, that we would have 51:49.510 --> 51:52.360 the ability to protect all of our assets in that country? 51:52.970 --> 51:54.420 - Yes, sir, I'm comfortable with that. 51:54.420 --> 51:57.070 We have a very good mil-to-mil relationship with Turkey. 51:57.070 --> 51:59.320 I speak to their Chief of Defense often. 51:59.320 --> 52:01.633 Our staffs have have interchange. 52:01.890 --> 52:03.700 They've been very responsive to us, 52:03.700 --> 52:06.083 in terms of force protection as well. 52:06.820 --> 52:09.410 So any concern that either through their intelligence, 52:09.410 --> 52:11.927 or ours, about a threat to our forces that are stationed 52:11.927 --> 52:15.140 there, et cetera, they've taken immediate action. 52:15.140 --> 52:18.290 So in terms of their demonstration 52:18.290 --> 52:22.177 in a relationship we have, I'm confident of that, 52:22.177 --> 52:24.133 and the protection of our force there. 52:24.390 --> 52:25.710 If I could follow up on the other, 52:25.710 --> 52:27.913 when I talk about we have to demonstrate, 52:28.220 --> 52:31.157 I want to emphasize that we, as the alliance, 52:31.157 --> 52:35.180 and our partners, because our strength versus Russia, 52:35.180 --> 52:37.920 strategically, really is the fact that we have such a great 52:37.920 --> 52:39.623 alliance and such great partners. 52:39.650 --> 52:42.853 That's important, and they recognize that. 52:43.730 --> 52:45.730 - Absolutely, and they don't seem to be, 52:46.060 --> 52:49.257 they don't seem to have many, which is good. 52:49.257 --> 52:52.010 Well, I want to just thank you for your service, 52:52.010 --> 52:55.060 and for being here, and I look forward to making it back 52:55.060 --> 52:57.473 to that part of the world to see it. 52:59.120 --> 53:02.513 - Mr. O'Rourke. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 53:02.880 --> 53:05.900 General, could you briefly give us an idea 53:05.900 --> 53:08.170 of what the capacity is on the Russian side 53:08.520 --> 53:12.633 to continue, or accelerate, this level of military spending? 53:15.410 --> 53:18.960 - Well, I think that, just from what I understand 53:18.980 --> 53:20.600 of their budget and what they're doing, 53:20.600 --> 53:24.030 their budget is improving, but they do have 53:24.030 --> 53:25.530 a difficult hand to play here. 53:25.530 --> 53:27.300 So and what we've seen is 53:27.430 --> 53:29.820 they've slowed down their modernization. 53:29.820 --> 53:33.233 And I think you'll continue to see decisions in that regard, 53:34.260 --> 53:38.150 but not enough to make a huge difference. 53:38.150 --> 53:40.350 In other words, it'll draw it out by, maybe, 53:40.650 --> 53:45.650 two to five years, but I think they know what they want to, 53:46.270 --> 53:47.620 they know what they want to establish, 53:47.620 --> 53:49.550 the capabilities they need, and they've been 53:49.550 --> 53:51.763 very focused on that over a number of years. 53:51.950 --> 53:54.040 So I think you may see it drawn out, 53:54.040 --> 53:56.110 but I don't think you'll see them stop, 53:56.110 --> 53:58.150 in terms of what they believe they need 53:59.010 --> 54:01.233 as a part of their military capabilities. 54:01.390 --> 54:05.290 - Thank you, in February, Admiral Rogers, 54:05.290 --> 54:08.090 Head of Cyber Command and NSA said, and I'm quoting him, 54:08.117 --> 54:10.657 "President Putin has come clearly to the conclusion 54:10.657 --> 54:12.357 "that there's little price to pay. 54:12.407 --> 54:14.457 "And therefore," and then he's quoting Putin, 54:14.457 --> 54:16.347 "I can continue this activity." 54:16.800 --> 54:19.010 Clearly, what we have done has not been enough, 54:19.010 --> 54:20.590 in regards to what action we've taken 54:20.590 --> 54:23.423 to deter Russia in election meddling. 54:23.660 --> 54:26.163 And perhaps we could get to extend that to Syria, 54:26.260 --> 54:30.280 to Crimea, to Ukraine, to involvement in European elections, 54:30.280 --> 54:31.990 to the involvement in the 2018 elections 54:31.990 --> 54:32.823 in the United States, 54:32.823 --> 54:34.943 to the involvement in the 2020 elections. 54:34.950 --> 54:38.747 you said to the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, 54:38.747 --> 54:41.487 "I don't believe there is an effective unification 54:41.487 --> 54:43.207 "across the interagency with the energy 54:43.207 --> 54:45.477 "and focus that we could attain." 54:46.610 --> 54:49.853 Wow can you assure us that we are going to achieve that? 54:49.990 --> 54:52.960 And to follow up on the ranking member's question, 54:52.960 --> 54:55.440 that there is a price to pay for Russia 54:55.440 --> 54:58.040 that will deter this kind of activity going forward? 54:59.180 --> 55:02.030 - Well, I can tell you that within Department of Defense, 55:02.190 --> 55:05.320 and as far as I'm concerned, we're working closely 55:05.610 --> 55:10.030 within the interagency to develop 55:10.360 --> 55:14.680 both the structure and enhance the energy 55:14.680 --> 55:15.550 that I talked about. 55:15.550 --> 55:16.963 I think that's the issue. 55:17.090 --> 55:20.633 We've got to, we have a lot of capacity. 55:20.660 --> 55:22.160 We have a lot of talent, particularly, 55:22.160 --> 55:24.610 that was directly from a question about activity 55:24.610 --> 55:26.053 below the level of conflict. 55:26.550 --> 55:29.113 And so when it comes to information operations, 55:29.680 --> 55:34.283 our capacity in cyber, our ability in diplomacy, 55:34.460 --> 55:37.570 and truthful media, we have great capacity. 55:37.570 --> 55:40.680 We've got to focus that capacity as a whole-of-government 55:41.195 --> 55:45.410 on this problem set, so that they know there is a response, 55:45.410 --> 55:47.070 and we can overcome that. 55:47.070 --> 55:50.050 And we've seen instances in Europe now, 55:50.050 --> 55:53.030 where we've developed the structure and the volume 55:53.030 --> 55:56.333 at specific times within the media, 55:56.680 --> 55:59.393 to influence their disinformation, 55:59.890 --> 56:01.970 to influence their actions as a result. 56:01.970 --> 56:03.040 This can be done. 56:03.040 --> 56:06.803 We've gotta pull this together and get after it. 56:06.910 --> 56:11.910 - Yeah, I am convinced of your intent 56:12.077 --> 56:15.350 and the will and the dedication, excellence, 56:15.350 --> 56:17.083 of those who serve under you. 56:17.250 --> 56:18.980 I'm not convinced of the strategy 56:18.980 --> 56:21.263 or the efficacy at this point. 56:21.410 --> 56:23.923 I don't understand, I wouldn't expect you to tell me 56:23.923 --> 56:25.817 that everything is okay, because it's definitely not. 56:25.817 --> 56:28.603 And you, yourself, have said that it's not, 56:29.030 --> 56:31.637 you said,"We are getting a better understanding of it. 56:31.637 --> 56:33.407 "I would not characterize it as a good picture 56:33.407 --> 56:35.607 "at this point, not satisfactory to me." 56:35.670 --> 56:38.940 You've talked about Russian activity related, 56:38.940 --> 56:41.120 in the United States, to infrastructure reconnaissance, 56:41.120 --> 56:43.220 et cetera, you said I'll leave it at that. 56:44.730 --> 56:47.540 What I would like, though, is not to be assured 56:47.540 --> 56:49.440 that it's okay, but to have some assurance 56:49.440 --> 56:53.223 in a strategy that we can all understand and articulate, 56:53.400 --> 56:55.500 and a commitment to this threat 56:55.710 --> 56:57.908 articulated by the president on down. 56:57.908 --> 57:00.180 And I'm not, I'm not seeing that, 57:00.180 --> 57:01.410 my constituents are not seeing that, 57:01.410 --> 57:03.110 I'm getting asked those questions, 57:03.130 --> 57:06.830 that's why I'm asking them of you today, so that I can 57:06.830 --> 57:10.120 go back to them, and have an understanding of what that is. 57:10.120 --> 57:12.913 It does not sound, it does not look like, 57:13.160 --> 57:15.910 if we just connect the dots from Russia's activity 57:15.910 --> 57:19.210 from Georgia to today, that anything we've done 57:19.210 --> 57:21.583 has deterred them, convince me to the contrary. 57:23.780 --> 57:26.363 - Well, I can't, you know, broadly, 57:27.220 --> 57:28.350 they've not been deterred. 57:28.350 --> 57:30.080 They act today in the information realm, 57:30.080 --> 57:33.810 they continue to take activity below the level of conflict. 57:33.810 --> 57:35.430 - Is there anything you're doing now, 57:35.430 --> 57:38.180 or plan to do in the near future, that will deter them? 57:38.290 --> 57:39.940 - We're taking actions that do deter them. 57:39.940 --> 57:42.960 As I said, in specific areas, 57:42.960 --> 57:44.903 we have the capacity to do this. 57:45.970 --> 57:48.380 We're taking all kinds of activities. 57:48.380 --> 57:51.180 And I think it's across the whole-of-government as well. 57:51.960 --> 57:53.740 We have a deterrent effect in the east, 57:53.740 --> 57:55.660 no doubt about it, with respect to, 57:55.660 --> 57:58.363 and it's not just a military component that does that. 57:59.770 --> 58:02.323 We have a deterrent effect, conventionally. 58:02.600 --> 58:05.893 Within information cycle, it's a new domain. 58:06.700 --> 58:10.763 It's a domain today that is connected, 58:11.180 --> 58:14.203 it's fast, so this isn't easy. 58:14.550 --> 58:17.373 And it's new, and that's the area that we, 58:17.660 --> 58:20.410 and probably one of the toughest areas to deter, enact. 58:20.630 --> 58:22.120 - Thank you for your answers and for your service. 58:22.120 --> 58:24.083 - Yep. - Mr. Byrne. 58:24.780 --> 58:26.080 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 58:26.270 --> 58:27.420 General, I'm over here. 58:28.260 --> 58:30.330 First of all, thank you for your service to our country. 58:30.330 --> 58:32.800 We genuinely appreciate what you continue 58:32.800 --> 58:34.283 to do for us every day. 58:34.910 --> 58:36.670 All of us have watched with dismay 58:36.670 --> 58:39.013 what's happened in eastern Ukraine. 58:39.370 --> 58:41.263 Over 10,000 people are dead. 58:41.340 --> 58:44.117 And I'm glad to see that we're now beginning to give them 58:44.117 --> 58:46.717 the help that they've been asking for for some time. 58:46.950 --> 58:50.263 But as you know, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, 58:50.690 --> 58:52.750 whereas there are other countries in that region, 58:52.750 --> 58:54.973 I'm thinking specifically of the Baltics, 58:55.010 --> 58:57.930 that are members of NATO, and to which, 58:57.930 --> 59:00.060 by virtue of the fact that we're members of NATO, 59:00.060 --> 59:03.660 we owe them a substantial obligation 59:03.920 --> 59:07.513 if somebody does something to them, somebody invades them. 59:07.920 --> 59:10.790 So two questions, do you think something 59:10.790 --> 59:13.050 like what has happened in eastern Ukraine 59:13.600 --> 59:14.930 could happen in the Baltics? 59:14.930 --> 59:17.380 And if so, what would U.S. involvement look like 59:17.960 --> 59:20.423 to honor our obligations to those countries? 59:22.170 --> 59:24.650 - Well, in answer to that, I don't want to speculate 59:24.650 --> 59:27.500 about what we would do, et cetera, I would just say this. 59:27.600 --> 59:30.770 We have an agreement with members of NATO 59:30.770 --> 59:33.853 that an Article 5 attack on one is an attack on all. 59:34.820 --> 59:35.860 And we would honor that. 59:35.860 --> 59:37.480 There's no doubt in my mind about it. 59:37.480 --> 59:39.283 We'd come to their assistance. 59:41.590 --> 59:46.290 I think Russia is deterred from taking an action like that, 59:46.290 --> 59:49.580 like trying to seize a portion of one of the countries 59:49.580 --> 59:54.580 in the border, because they know NATO is 29 nations. 59:55.570 --> 01:00:00.570 It's much stronger, and that we would win that conflict. 01:00:01.900 --> 01:00:03.730 They don't want a conflict in that regard. 01:00:03.730 --> 01:00:06.330 So I personally don't believe they'd take that step. 01:00:07.270 --> 01:00:09.300 - Well, I would hope they would not as well. 01:00:09.300 --> 01:00:10.133 - [Curtis] I would hope not, too. 01:00:10.133 --> 01:00:13.740 - But hoping is not a plan, as you know. 01:00:13.740 --> 01:00:16.220 I assume, whether you can tell us about the details 01:00:16.220 --> 01:00:18.560 of it or not, I assume but there is a plan 01:00:18.560 --> 01:00:20.060 if they tried to do something. 01:00:20.730 --> 01:00:22.113 - There is a plan. - Good. 01:00:23.130 --> 01:00:25.550 - Are we providing you, is Congress providing you, 01:00:25.550 --> 01:00:27.810 with the authorization and resources you need 01:00:27.810 --> 01:00:29.133 to implement that plan? 01:00:30.770 --> 01:00:32.500 - Sir, the budget that's presented here, 01:00:32.500 --> 01:00:33.730 and when I talk about the budget, 01:00:33.730 --> 01:00:37.003 I'm also looking at the FYDP, you know, the out years. 01:00:38.120 --> 01:00:41.640 Since I've been in this job, this is the first time 01:00:41.640 --> 01:00:44.079 in the budget that I've said here are my requirements 01:00:44.079 --> 01:00:47.360 and they're being addressed in some way 01:00:47.360 --> 01:00:50.283 throughout the FYDP, so I'm very pleased with this. 01:00:50.301 --> 01:00:52.601 And I think with that regard, it's sufficient. 01:00:52.970 --> 01:00:55.340 But listen, it will take us those years 01:00:56.580 --> 01:00:58.780 to really put us in a posture that I believe 01:00:59.220 --> 01:01:01.410 that we should be and we we're best in, 01:01:01.410 --> 01:01:03.160 to assure deterrence of Russia, 01:01:03.160 --> 01:01:06.333 and any idea that they might have to take an act. 01:01:06.840 --> 01:01:11.040 To ensure that we deter any thoughts or opportunities 01:01:11.040 --> 01:01:13.103 they might think they have. 01:01:13.550 --> 01:01:15.200 - Well, I want to make sure that, 01:01:16.150 --> 01:01:17.657 I believe with all my heart you're doing, 01:01:17.657 --> 01:01:18.793 and the people under you are doing 01:01:18.793 --> 01:01:20.493 what they're supposed to be doing, 01:01:20.840 --> 01:01:24.030 but sometimes you have to tell us what we need to do 01:01:24.670 --> 01:01:27.140 to provide you with both the authorization 01:01:27.160 --> 01:01:30.143 and the resources to do what you need to do. 01:01:30.510 --> 01:01:33.740 And I hope you will not be reticent about telling us 01:01:33.740 --> 01:01:36.053 what you need, because until we know that, 01:01:36.190 --> 01:01:37.810 it's hard for us to do what we've got to do. 01:01:37.810 --> 01:01:40.520 There was, as you probably know, we had quite 01:01:40.520 --> 01:01:43.910 an effort to get the level of spending up 01:01:43.910 --> 01:01:45.350 for the Department of Defense, 01:01:45.350 --> 01:01:47.913 for both this fiscal year and next fiscal year. 01:01:48.220 --> 01:01:51.100 That didn't come about by happenstance. 01:01:51.100 --> 01:01:53.150 And it took an enormous amount of effort. 01:01:53.340 --> 01:01:57.800 We need the information, and the push sometimes, 01:01:57.800 --> 01:02:00.293 from you and people that are working with you, 01:02:00.620 --> 01:02:02.610 so that we get what we need to get done 01:02:02.610 --> 01:02:03.863 here in Congress for you. 01:02:04.836 --> 01:02:06.410 - Well, sir, first of all, thank you. 01:02:06.410 --> 01:02:09.513 I understand this has not been easy. 01:02:10.700 --> 01:02:13.080 My message to you is, is you'll know clearly 01:02:13.080 --> 01:02:14.693 what my assessments are. 01:02:15.150 --> 01:02:17.960 And in a number of these things, in a classified document, 01:02:17.960 --> 01:02:20.310 I'll tell you exactly what my requirements are. 01:02:20.810 --> 01:02:23.550 And to the extent that you can look at it across the FYDP, 01:02:23.550 --> 01:02:25.590 and see actually whether they're being addressed, 01:02:25.590 --> 01:02:26.967 and how quickly they're being addressed. 01:02:26.967 --> 01:02:28.510 But I'll be very clear about that. 01:02:28.510 --> 01:02:31.407 And I appreciate Congress, 01:02:31.407 --> 01:02:35.293 and the committee's, diligence in this, thank you. 01:02:35.530 --> 01:02:37.010 - Well, I think everybody on the committee 01:02:37.010 --> 01:02:39.683 appreciates your directness with us. 01:02:39.840 --> 01:02:41.960 Sometimes the more direct you are, 01:02:41.960 --> 01:02:44.900 the more likely we are to be responsive to you. 01:02:44.900 --> 01:02:46.690 And I just want to encourage you to do that, 01:02:46.690 --> 01:02:48.920 because I believe you do have a plan, 01:02:48.920 --> 01:02:51.080 we probably will learn about it another time, 01:02:51.080 --> 01:02:52.423 when it's appropriate. 01:02:52.740 --> 01:02:55.650 But I always worry that you've got a great plan 01:02:55.660 --> 01:02:57.540 and we've not always given you the authorization 01:02:57.540 --> 01:02:59.163 and the appropriations you need. 01:02:59.260 --> 01:03:00.720 Tell us what you need, and I think you'll find 01:03:00.720 --> 01:03:01.893 this committee ready to work with you. 01:03:01.893 --> 01:03:04.333 I yield back, Mr. Chairman. - Mr. Gallego. 01:03:08.373 --> 01:03:09.310 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 01:03:09.310 --> 01:03:10.470 General, one of the things that I've been 01:03:10.470 --> 01:03:13.020 advocating for since getting here is moving the EDI 01:03:14.200 --> 01:03:18.763 from being based on OCO funds to the base budget. 01:03:18.853 --> 01:03:20.940 I certainly think that if we want to talk about 01:03:20.940 --> 01:03:23.963 a commitment, and a show of force, at least to Russia, 01:03:24.043 --> 01:03:26.070 that we're committed to Europe, 01:03:26.070 --> 01:03:29.050 that would be the route to do it. 01:03:29.050 --> 01:03:32.030 And of course, also to assure our NATO allies 01:03:32.030 --> 01:03:34.017 that we're there with them in the fight, 01:03:34.017 --> 01:03:35.767 and not just in a one-year process. 01:03:36.120 --> 01:03:39.400 What would change, from your perspective, 01:03:39.400 --> 01:03:43.760 in terms of planning, if we moved EDI out of OCO 01:03:43.760 --> 01:03:45.010 and into the base budget? 01:03:47.120 --> 01:03:49.410 - First of all, I would support 01:03:49.410 --> 01:03:51.433 going to a base budget, out of OCO. 01:03:53.380 --> 01:03:55.590 What would change in that is that at some point, 01:03:55.590 --> 01:03:59.880 it would be under the services to then prioritize 01:03:59.880 --> 01:04:04.693 and fund, and deliver the assets within their service, 01:04:05.830 --> 01:04:09.290 and that's my one concern, is that the way 01:04:09.290 --> 01:04:14.290 that we develop EDI today, between I and the department, 01:04:14.840 --> 01:04:17.280 is that we lay out the priorities 01:04:17.280 --> 01:04:19.333 from a commander's perspective, EUCOM. 01:04:19.990 --> 01:04:21.893 And that's a bit different than a service perspective, 01:04:21.893 --> 01:04:24.060 because I'm looking at the synchronization 01:04:24.060 --> 01:04:26.320 and the combination of all the services 01:04:26.500 --> 01:04:29.350 and resources to get the best benefit 01:04:29.680 --> 01:04:31.280 in terms of deterrence and defense. 01:04:31.280 --> 01:04:34.030 And so as we move to the budget, I would like some means 01:04:34.030 --> 01:04:37.530 within the planning to protect that prioritization 01:04:37.530 --> 01:04:38.943 by the combatant commander. 01:04:40.059 --> 01:04:43.360 - And in terms of the message it would send to our allies 01:04:43.360 --> 01:04:47.513 if we actually went that route, in your opinion? 01:04:50.150 --> 01:04:54.050 - Well I think that the message would be 01:04:54.050 --> 01:04:57.290 that we're committed to funding our needs, 01:04:57.290 --> 01:04:59.720 and particularly, those needs that have to do 01:04:59.720 --> 01:05:02.390 with the Euro-Atlantic, where we are a member of NATO, 01:05:02.390 --> 01:05:03.943 and we have partners in Europe, 01:05:04.120 --> 01:05:05.330 as a part of the base budget. 01:05:05.330 --> 01:05:09.170 But again, the key there would be that they see 01:05:09.640 --> 01:05:12.280 the investment that's also inherent 01:05:12.280 --> 01:05:15.933 in our alliance activity and capabilities. 01:05:16.570 --> 01:05:20.300 - Excellent, I'd like to talk, moving on 01:05:20.300 --> 01:05:25.300 into especially, what we recently just saw occur in England, 01:05:26.490 --> 01:05:28.760 is Russia will likely never, in my opinion, 01:05:28.760 --> 01:05:32.603 present a clear violation of NATO's Article 5, 01:05:33.080 --> 01:05:36.630 but they'll always try to be like the petulant teenager 01:05:36.630 --> 01:05:39.473 that they are, and just kind of testing and probing below, 01:05:40.270 --> 01:05:42.023 below actually crossing the line. 01:05:42.330 --> 01:05:44.340 So what are we doing with our NATO members, 01:05:44.340 --> 01:05:47.653 and with our non-NATO partners like Finland and Sweden, 01:05:47.860 --> 01:05:50.600 to kind of build up the resilience of the alliance, 01:05:50.600 --> 01:05:54.333 of their capabilities, of their domestic capabilities, 01:05:54.600 --> 01:05:58.423 and to prevent Russian incursion that, 01:05:58.600 --> 01:06:01.270 the pre-Russian incursion that happens when there is 01:06:01.580 --> 01:06:04.417 such activities around hybrid warfare, things like that. 01:06:04.417 --> 01:06:07.770 And so the overall steps, I would say, 01:06:07.770 --> 01:06:10.120 I guess, the inoculation that we should be doing 01:06:10.120 --> 01:06:14.440 to stop Russia incursion or influence 01:06:14.620 --> 01:06:16.803 on our allies and near allies? 01:06:17.430 --> 01:06:19.260 - So there's a number of activities 01:06:19.260 --> 01:06:24.260 ongoing in Europe right now that are U.S. to partners, 01:06:24.680 --> 01:06:26.663 and U.S. within the alliance. 01:06:27.590 --> 01:06:29.590 I would first point out with any alliance, 01:06:29.590 --> 01:06:33.853 that we've noted that that cyber is a domain, 01:06:33.880 --> 01:06:36.770 and we're now working as a domain, 01:06:36.770 --> 01:06:38.520 both at a diplomatic level, 01:06:38.520 --> 01:06:40.297 as well as the military aspects of that. 01:06:40.297 --> 01:06:42.653 And we've established cyber centers, 01:06:42.880 --> 01:06:44.143 we're beginning to take, 01:06:45.330 --> 01:06:47.670 we're beginning to conduct activities in that regard. 01:06:47.670 --> 01:06:49.410 And that touches all 29 nations, 01:06:49.410 --> 01:06:51.690 but it also touches the partners of NATO, 01:06:51.690 --> 01:06:53.043 which there are about 40. 01:06:54.250 --> 01:06:56.980 Within NATO, you've got a hybrid Center of Excellence. 01:06:56.980 --> 01:06:58.880 We have a Cyber Center of Excellence 01:06:58.880 --> 01:07:03.880 among different nations, those also are in place 01:07:04.610 --> 01:07:09.483 to help assess the environment, determine best responses, 01:07:09.760 --> 01:07:12.653 educate the other nations' capabilities in this, 01:07:12.770 --> 01:07:14.913 and then help them in applying it. 01:07:15.450 --> 01:07:18.980 And within NATO, all of our actions are to help us do this 01:07:19.400 --> 01:07:20.963 in a synchronized pattern. 01:07:21.510 --> 01:07:23.900 So while there's much work to do, 01:07:23.900 --> 01:07:26.370 there's a lot of good work going on right now, 01:07:26.370 --> 01:07:30.193 in each of these areas that shares information, 01:07:30.320 --> 01:07:34.470 shares best practices, shares information, 01:07:34.470 --> 01:07:37.190 so that we're fully aware of what's 01:07:37.190 --> 01:07:38.683 going on in our environment. 01:07:39.110 --> 01:07:43.960 And I'm positive about this, but there's a lot of work 01:07:43.960 --> 01:07:45.060 that needs to be done. 01:07:47.290 --> 01:07:49.813 - I yield back. - Mr. Lamborn. 01:07:50.720 --> 01:07:51.600 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:07:51.600 --> 01:07:54.033 Thank you, General, for the great work that you're doing. 01:07:54.260 --> 01:07:55.610 I had to be in another committee, 01:07:55.610 --> 01:07:58.960 so please excuse me if you already addressed this question, 01:07:58.960 --> 01:08:00.593 but feel free to amplify. 01:08:01.300 --> 01:08:02.680 I'd like to ask you about Iran. 01:08:02.680 --> 01:08:06.540 As North Korea continues to expand its ballistic missile 01:08:06.540 --> 01:08:09.540 and nuclear capabilities, it's also been testing 01:08:10.310 --> 01:08:14.533 newly developed systems, which I think is a real problem. 01:08:15.410 --> 01:08:18.260 While the U.S. has arguably shifted focus in the last 01:08:18.260 --> 01:08:21.423 two to five years to address the threats from North Korea, 01:08:21.660 --> 01:08:23.850 how would you assess our ability to counter 01:08:23.850 --> 01:08:28.083 an Iranian threat to U.S. interests in EUCOM, 01:08:28.650 --> 01:08:31.210 including the ability to protect our deployed forces 01:08:31.210 --> 01:08:32.783 in your area of responsibility? 01:08:33.940 --> 01:08:36.793 - Sir, I'd assess our capabilities as good. 01:08:37.400 --> 01:08:39.410 As you know, our defense system, 01:08:39.410 --> 01:08:41.640 particularly, our air and missile defense system, 01:08:41.640 --> 01:08:43.573 has, as a focus, Iran as well. 01:08:45.000 --> 01:08:47.683 We do, in EUCOM, watch closely, 01:08:48.180 --> 01:08:50.890 Iranian activity, and particularly, their malign influence, 01:08:50.890 --> 01:08:53.023 as Israel is a part of EUCOM. 01:08:53.480 --> 01:08:55.450 And Iran, as they consider Iran 01:08:55.450 --> 01:08:57.170 an existential threat to them. 01:08:57.170 --> 01:08:59.890 And I, one of my responsibilities is to support 01:08:59.890 --> 01:09:01.073 the defense of Israel. 01:09:01.630 --> 01:09:06.630 So we work closely with Israel, and we keep a very close eye 01:09:06.800 --> 01:09:09.533 on Iran's capabilities and activities, 01:09:09.980 --> 01:09:12.453 in close coordination with with CENTCOM. 01:09:12.870 --> 01:09:15.303 - Thank you, and as kind of a follow on to that, 01:09:15.980 --> 01:09:19.203 we have Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. 01:09:20.030 --> 01:09:23.900 What are we doing to protect them from cruise missile 01:09:23.900 --> 01:09:25.773 or other kinds of attacks? 01:09:27.520 --> 01:09:31.330 - Sir, that's addressed among a layered defensive system. 01:09:31.330 --> 01:09:32.550 I'll leave it at that. 01:09:32.550 --> 01:09:34.360 And steps that we're taking in that regard, 01:09:34.360 --> 01:09:36.540 and I'd prefer to give you that response 01:09:36.540 --> 01:09:40.863 more fully than that in a classified document, if I could. 01:09:41.000 --> 01:09:42.863 - Okay, that would certainly work. 01:09:43.370 --> 01:09:48.070 And lastly, on Asian modernizations, give us an update 01:09:48.070 --> 01:09:51.810 on the Russian military modernization programs. 01:09:51.810 --> 01:09:55.350 And, you know, General, excuse me, 01:09:55.350 --> 01:09:58.870 President Putin talked about these, I think, 01:09:58.870 --> 01:10:03.663 kind of far-fetched nuclear-tipped torpedoes, 01:10:04.010 --> 01:10:07.760 nuclear-powered cruise missiles, things like that. 01:10:07.760 --> 01:10:11.500 But what are they realistically doing 01:10:11.500 --> 01:10:12.900 that you're concerned about? 01:10:14.500 --> 01:10:17.510 - Well, they you know they are modernizing their force. 01:10:17.510 --> 01:10:20.420 So let's go to the conventional and nuclear force, first. 01:10:20.420 --> 01:10:22.620 And just generally, in this environment, 01:10:22.620 --> 01:10:25.120 I can talk to you, I can provide you a more 01:10:25.120 --> 01:10:29.150 in-depth response in in a classified document. 01:10:29.150 --> 01:10:33.960 But it's well known that they are modernizing 01:10:33.960 --> 01:10:36.610 their conventional force, they're primarily doing that 01:10:36.610 --> 01:10:39.850 through the respect, with the weapon systems, 01:10:39.850 --> 01:10:42.350 that they put on them, as well as the missiles 01:10:43.332 --> 01:10:44.670 that they've developed that give them 01:10:44.670 --> 01:10:46.623 greater range, greater precision. 01:10:47.100 --> 01:10:49.943 And in most of these systems that they employ, 01:10:50.180 --> 01:10:53.063 they can be either conventional or nuclear. 01:10:55.020 --> 01:10:57.690 So in many ways, they're improving the ships 01:10:57.690 --> 01:10:59.380 that they have in the maritime, 01:10:59.380 --> 01:11:02.330 they're improving the planes that they have, their bombers, 01:11:03.274 --> 01:11:07.010 and their submarines, with advanced systems 01:11:07.918 --> 01:11:11.603 that we need to pace and be able to deal with. 01:11:12.500 --> 01:11:14.600 They're improving their nuclear capability 01:11:15.090 --> 01:11:18.240 across all their systems and modernizing those. 01:11:18.240 --> 01:11:21.223 That's why NPR is so important for us, 01:11:21.700 --> 01:11:25.880 to maintain our nuclear deterrent across the range 01:11:25.880 --> 01:11:29.233 of scenarios that they might present. 01:11:35.195 --> 01:11:36.552 And the last thing I would note is, 01:11:36.552 --> 01:11:39.620 is that you know they're working hard to modernize both 01:11:39.620 --> 01:11:43.163 their C4 systems, their command control communications, 01:11:43.660 --> 01:11:46.063 and also a capabilities in space. 01:11:47.260 --> 01:11:49.773 And then hypersonics as well. 01:11:50.190 --> 01:11:53.063 - When it comes to the Nuclear Posture Review, 01:11:53.140 --> 01:11:55.940 I believe that it is a good thing that it's being proposed 01:11:55.940 --> 01:12:00.610 that we have more options like low-yield weapons, 01:12:00.610 --> 01:12:04.483 or sea-launched intermediate cruise missiles. 01:12:04.940 --> 01:12:07.680 Some people think that we should have fewer options. 01:12:07.680 --> 01:12:09.640 just as a philosophical matter. 01:12:09.640 --> 01:12:12.490 Where do you come down on the number of options 01:12:12.490 --> 01:12:14.140 that we should or shouldn't have? 01:12:15.220 --> 01:12:17.730 - I support the Nuclear Posture Review 01:12:17.730 --> 01:12:19.573 that we should close any gaps. 01:12:20.030 --> 01:12:22.250 That we should have a deterrent that can respond 01:12:22.250 --> 01:12:25.920 across the spectrum of scenarios that they might present us, 01:12:25.920 --> 01:12:28.073 or an adversary might present us. 01:12:28.880 --> 01:12:32.563 I think this designs a tailorable force that does just that. 01:12:32.940 --> 01:12:35.040 And it doesn't lower the threshold. 01:12:35.040 --> 01:12:39.670 Actually, by closing those gaps and ensuring they understand 01:12:39.670 --> 01:12:42.033 that we have a deterrent a capable posture, 01:12:42.360 --> 01:12:46.653 that it raises that, it raises that threshold, in my view. 01:12:46.960 --> 01:12:47.793 - Thank you so much. 01:12:47.793 --> 01:12:48.890 I yield back Mr. Chairman. 01:12:49.280 --> 01:12:52.643 - Mr. Panetta - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:12:53.000 --> 01:12:54.700 General, good morning, thank you for being here. 01:12:54.700 --> 01:12:56.150 Thank you for your testimony. 01:12:56.670 --> 01:12:59.563 As you can tell by most of the questioning, 01:13:00.100 --> 01:13:03.550 hybrid warfare is a concern as to what's going on, 01:13:03.550 --> 01:13:06.053 obviously, with Russia and what they're doing. 01:13:09.410 --> 01:13:12.143 When you look at Article 5, though, 01:13:12.260 --> 01:13:14.760 and I, you know, I just looked it up, to be frank. 01:13:16.110 --> 01:13:20.080 It says armed attack, armed attack, 01:13:20.080 --> 01:13:21.713 each goes through that. 01:13:22.370 --> 01:13:25.880 In your opinion, do you think Article 5 needs to be updated 01:13:26.260 --> 01:13:28.360 in order to deal with this hybrid warfare? 01:13:28.710 --> 01:13:31.463 So that there can be more of a joint response? 01:13:33.060 --> 01:13:35.770 - Well, I'm not gonna try and get into, 01:13:35.770 --> 01:13:38.610 that's really the North Atlantic Council's job there. 01:13:38.610 --> 01:13:40.270 But, you know, I talk to them. 01:13:40.270 --> 01:13:44.040 I think they're actually working on the structures 01:13:44.040 --> 01:13:47.223 and the definitions that inform that treaty. 01:13:47.950 --> 01:13:50.130 And I'm confident that they're wrestling 01:13:50.130 --> 01:13:51.930 with the hard question you're talking about, 01:13:51.930 --> 01:13:53.200 whether or not it's a change to the, 01:13:53.200 --> 01:13:55.470 literally, to the wording of Article 5, or whether 01:13:55.470 --> 01:14:00.470 it's the process and the understandings that they develop. 01:14:00.650 --> 01:14:04.213 Short of that, I'll let them be the determinant of that. 01:14:04.360 --> 01:14:06.760 - Do you feel it limits you now, in its current state, 01:14:06.760 --> 01:14:08.890 in regards to your response to this hybrid warfare? 01:14:08.890 --> 01:14:10.010 - No, I don't think it limits me. 01:14:10.010 --> 01:14:13.680 I think there's an understanding of the the basis, 01:14:13.680 --> 01:14:16.470 the spirit of Article 5, and an understanding 01:14:16.470 --> 01:14:18.570 that the character of warfare is changing. 01:14:19.260 --> 01:14:20.310 - Fair enough, fair enough. 01:14:20.310 --> 01:14:23.640 Great, thank you, pivoting, moving up north, 01:14:23.640 --> 01:14:25.270 in regards to the Arctic, can you speak 01:14:25.270 --> 01:14:29.003 to the Russian buildup up there and our response? 01:14:30.600 --> 01:14:34.690 - Clearly, they're they're modernizing 01:14:34.930 --> 01:14:36.320 some of their older bases there. 01:14:36.320 --> 01:14:37.870 They're building some new ones. 01:14:38.000 --> 01:14:43.000 They are placing radar systems, et cetera, in place. 01:14:43.220 --> 01:14:46.413 And they have moved air defense systems back and forth, 01:14:46.413 --> 01:14:48.853 as a part of their exercises, as well. 01:14:50.080 --> 01:14:55.080 They're developing capabilities, in terms of ships 01:14:55.530 --> 01:14:58.413 capable to operate in that environment, 01:14:59.110 --> 01:15:04.110 in numbers that will outpace us, if we're not diligent here. 01:15:04.812 --> 01:15:08.960 And so in the in-state, in several years, 01:15:08.960 --> 01:15:10.730 they probably would be in a position, 01:15:10.730 --> 01:15:12.650 given their modernization, that they could, 01:15:12.650 --> 01:15:15.823 if they chose to, control the Northern Sea Route. 01:15:17.960 --> 01:15:20.950 They state their intent is for safety, 01:15:20.950 --> 01:15:25.810 security, economy, rescue of those at sea, 01:15:25.810 --> 01:15:27.810 et cetera, but I think we have to pay attention 01:15:27.810 --> 01:15:29.363 to what we're seeing there. 01:15:29.840 --> 01:15:32.223 - And we are paying attention, clearly. 01:15:32.290 --> 01:15:35.270 - We are, but we need to, we also need to look, 01:15:35.270 --> 01:15:37.280 with our allies and across our government, 01:15:37.280 --> 01:15:42.060 at what assets and capabilities we should 01:15:42.060 --> 01:15:44.323 have in place, given their modernization. 01:15:44.570 --> 01:15:46.903 - And beyond looking, are we actually doing something? 01:15:47.500 --> 01:15:50.590 - We are. - Okay, all right. 01:15:53.350 --> 01:15:55.300 Thank you, appreciate it, I yield back. 01:15:56.040 --> 01:15:57.910 - Ms. Stefnaik. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:15:57.910 --> 01:16:00.110 Great to see you again, General Scaparrotti. 01:16:00.360 --> 01:16:02.670 You stated recently that you do not believe 01:16:02.670 --> 01:16:05.460 that the U.S. has an effective and unified approach 01:16:05.460 --> 01:16:07.340 to dealing with Russia's cyber threat. 01:16:07.340 --> 01:16:09.857 Specifically, quote, "I don't believe there is an effective 01:16:09.857 --> 01:16:12.007 "unification across the interagency 01:16:12.007 --> 01:16:14.877 "with the energy and the focus that we could attain." 01:16:15.100 --> 01:16:17.023 What are we doing to address this? 01:16:17.680 --> 01:16:19.630 And what specifically do we need to do? 01:16:20.690 --> 01:16:23.380 - Well, I'll speak from my point of view here, 01:16:23.380 --> 01:16:26.100 as a EUCOM commander, what we're doing is we're working 01:16:26.100 --> 01:16:28.683 with the Russian Information Group, 01:16:28.960 --> 01:16:31.043 which is the RIG, commonly called. 01:16:31.200 --> 01:16:32.893 It's an interagency board. 01:16:33.550 --> 01:16:36.083 I co-Chair that with the Undersecretary of State. 01:16:37.050 --> 01:16:39.460 That gives us a platform to bring together 01:16:40.170 --> 01:16:42.870 the interagency in a whole-of-government approach 01:16:42.870 --> 01:16:44.660 in response to activity below the level 01:16:44.660 --> 01:16:47.013 of warfare, for instance. 01:16:47.991 --> 01:16:49.793 The GEC is under State, 01:16:50.240 --> 01:16:53.495 which is the Global-- 01:16:53.495 --> 01:16:55.990 - Engagement Center. - Engagement Center. 01:16:55.990 --> 01:16:57.890 I think it's probably, at least in my view, 01:16:57.890 --> 01:17:00.270 the central point, now, within the government, 01:17:00.270 --> 01:17:02.370 State being responsible for, particularly, 01:17:02.680 --> 01:17:05.323 information, counter disinformation. 01:17:05.780 --> 01:17:07.133 So that's what we're doing. 01:17:09.221 --> 01:17:10.793 And the GEC has been, 01:17:11.710 --> 01:17:14.143 received additional funding, and guidance. 01:17:14.620 --> 01:17:19.080 My point that you quoted is, I think we have the structure 01:17:19.300 --> 01:17:21.240 that we could expand on, but we're not, 01:17:21.240 --> 01:17:23.090 we just don't have the focus and the energy 01:17:23.090 --> 01:17:25.673 that I think that we're capable of. 01:17:26.180 --> 01:17:29.540 Or we should put into this, in order to deter 01:17:29.820 --> 01:17:32.233 this disinformation campaign that's going on. 01:17:32.690 --> 01:17:34.333 - So I agree with you. 01:17:34.450 --> 01:17:37.730 But I want to hear specifically, what steps we need to take 01:17:37.730 --> 01:17:41.040 to ensure that we have the focus and the energy. 01:17:41.040 --> 01:17:43.720 And I know I have concerns with the lack 01:17:43.720 --> 01:17:46.110 of implementation of the appropriations 01:17:46.110 --> 01:17:49.020 when it comes to the GEC, but I want to hear from you, 01:17:49.020 --> 01:17:51.310 specifically, what steps we need to take? 01:17:51.310 --> 01:17:53.230 So a year from now the answer 01:17:53.230 --> 01:17:54.780 to this question isn't the same 01:17:55.530 --> 01:17:57.630 - Okay, I'm going to give you my response. 01:17:57.650 --> 01:17:59.930 I'm not in State, this is really a question 01:17:59.930 --> 01:18:02.990 that, you know, frankly, I will admit here publicly 01:18:02.990 --> 01:18:05.670 that this is their business. 01:18:05.670 --> 01:18:10.670 But from someone that takes part in this, as a part of DoD, 01:18:10.960 --> 01:18:15.423 I personally believe that greater clarity in role, 01:18:16.480 --> 01:18:18.910 greater direction across the interagency, 01:18:18.910 --> 01:18:20.943 with respect to how this will work, 01:18:22.276 --> 01:18:25.463 as the central agency for information, 01:18:25.790 --> 01:18:28.460 and perhaps resources, in order to develop 01:18:28.460 --> 01:18:30.410 the energy and the focus that I talked about. 01:18:30.410 --> 01:18:32.150 I'd prefer not to go beyond that, because, 01:18:32.150 --> 01:18:35.150 again, this is really a question for State. 01:18:35.150 --> 01:18:37.576 But I think, from my point of view in working with them, 01:18:37.576 --> 01:18:39.993 they're good people, we're making good headway, 01:18:40.030 --> 01:18:41.080 but we could do more. 01:18:41.960 --> 01:18:44.130 - You and I have discussed, and I think it would be 01:18:44.130 --> 01:18:46.893 worthy for the the committee to hear your assessment. 01:18:47.000 --> 01:18:48.913 Are we seeing new trends? 01:18:49.530 --> 01:18:51.670 And the context of this question comes from, 01:18:51.670 --> 01:18:53.430 we're heading into the midterm elections. 01:18:53.430 --> 01:18:55.560 Are we seeing new trends when it comes to Russia's 01:18:55.560 --> 01:18:59.660 use of disinformation among our allies? 01:18:59.660 --> 01:19:02.350 Obviously, we saw that leading up to the French elections, 01:19:02.350 --> 01:19:05.820 and the German elections, and I think both countries 01:19:05.920 --> 01:19:08.800 were pretty capable, in terms of how they ensured 01:19:08.800 --> 01:19:11.350 that this disinformation campaign from Russia 01:19:11.350 --> 01:19:15.313 didn't meddle with their electoral process. 01:19:15.340 --> 01:19:16.410 What can we learn from that? 01:19:16.410 --> 01:19:18.400 What trends do we need to look for 01:19:18.400 --> 01:19:19.943 as we head to the midterms? 01:19:20.800 --> 01:19:21.990 - Well, I think the one that's apparent 01:19:21.990 --> 01:19:23.630 is just use of social media 01:19:23.882 --> 01:19:26.300 and using factories in order to get out 01:19:26.300 --> 01:19:28.973 a lot of volume with disruptive messaging. 01:19:29.030 --> 01:19:31.740 And that was seen here, it was seen in Europe 01:19:31.740 --> 01:19:33.453 in the elections there, as well. 01:19:34.090 --> 01:19:37.270 But that's one of the trends that has been identified, 01:19:37.270 --> 01:19:39.300 and as other nations as, we progressed through 01:19:39.300 --> 01:19:40.910 some of the elections in Europe, 01:19:40.910 --> 01:19:42.140 they were better able to handle, 01:19:42.140 --> 01:19:45.253 because they recognized this may be coming about. 01:19:45.690 --> 01:19:48.530 And they've learned how to begin to counter that. 01:19:48.530 --> 01:19:50.470 How to be prepared to counter it, et cetera. 01:19:50.470 --> 01:19:52.503 So there is progress being made, 01:19:53.380 --> 01:19:55.100 but that's one of those that I would note. 01:19:55.100 --> 01:19:59.375 And I think as an alliance, we've assisted 01:19:59.375 --> 01:20:01.790 with their elections, et cetera. 01:20:01.790 --> 01:20:03.700 And they've exchanged information as well, 01:20:03.700 --> 01:20:04.850 from what they learned. 01:20:05.200 --> 01:20:09.590 And my general view is that we've been better able, 01:20:09.590 --> 01:20:11.600 at least in Europe, to deal with this 01:20:11.600 --> 01:20:13.373 as this is has progressed. 01:20:14.380 --> 01:20:16.593 - And my last question, if I have time, is, 01:20:17.360 --> 01:20:21.790 who, from your perspective, has the central responsibility, 01:20:21.790 --> 01:20:24.403 when it comes to countering propaganda? 01:20:24.630 --> 01:20:28.393 whether it's from Russia, or frankly, other adversaries? 01:20:30.025 --> 01:20:31.530 - In my understanding, it's State. 01:20:31.530 --> 01:20:34.490 - Okay, and are there country-specific strategies 01:20:34.800 --> 01:20:37.080 that are being developed, that work effectively 01:20:37.080 --> 01:20:38.803 with DoD counterparts? 01:20:39.520 --> 01:20:42.770 - Yes, what we've done within the information group, 01:20:42.770 --> 01:20:46.163 and with the GEC, and cross the interagency, 01:20:46.660 --> 01:20:50.290 is we've developed nations that are vulnerable 01:20:50.290 --> 01:20:52.310 or under threat, the ones that we thought 01:20:52.310 --> 01:20:56.710 we could have the best benefit and, from a U.S. perspective, 01:20:56.710 --> 01:21:00.683 now, we've gone to the ambassador and our country team, 01:21:01.170 --> 01:21:02.680 and said, what are your objectives 01:21:02.680 --> 01:21:04.123 and how do we support those? 01:21:04.350 --> 01:21:06.560 - My times is expired. - We're focusing on that. 01:21:06.560 --> 01:21:08.433 - Thank you. - Mr. Langevin. 01:21:09.453 --> 01:21:10.460 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:21:10.460 --> 01:21:11.550 General, good to see you again, 01:21:11.550 --> 01:21:13.100 and thank you for your service. 01:21:15.080 --> 01:21:18.480 So I know that my colleague 01:21:18.530 --> 01:21:20.620 had just talked about the Global Engagement Center, 01:21:20.620 --> 01:21:22.313 but I want to address it as well, 01:21:22.313 --> 01:21:25.433 because I think it's an important topic. 01:21:26.270 --> 01:21:28.400 From its inception, I've certainly believed 01:21:28.400 --> 01:21:30.560 that it has a critical role to play 01:21:30.560 --> 01:21:33.550 when it comes to countering the the messages 01:21:34.200 --> 01:21:36.433 perpetuated by our adversaries, 01:21:36.600 --> 01:21:41.563 both terrorist organizations and nation states. 01:21:42.100 --> 01:21:44.490 I'm certainly glad that the State Department has finally 01:21:44.490 --> 01:21:48.670 accepted the allocated transfer of funds 01:21:48.670 --> 01:21:51.593 from Department of Defense to assist in the effort. 01:21:52.370 --> 01:21:56.880 But I find it somewhat problematic that there still exists 01:21:56.880 --> 01:21:59.330 a lack of leadership within the State Department, 01:21:59.610 --> 01:22:01.633 from the bottom all the way to the top, 01:22:01.790 --> 01:22:03.690 as we've seen within the past few days, 01:22:03.690 --> 01:22:07.047 to leverage its capabilities to disrupt destabilization 01:22:07.047 --> 01:22:09.943 campaigns aimed at the United States and our allies. 01:22:10.380 --> 01:22:14.210 So can you answer for me, and touch on the topic on more, 01:22:14.210 --> 01:22:17.470 how you're working with the Global Engagement Center, 01:22:17.470 --> 01:22:20.543 and how can we better use its capabilities? 01:22:22.140 --> 01:22:24.070 - Well, I can comment on our relationship, 01:22:24.070 --> 01:22:24.903 it's a very good one. 01:22:24.903 --> 01:22:27.343 And we work with them consistently. 01:22:28.430 --> 01:22:30.707 They're a member of the RIG, which I talked about. 01:22:30.707 --> 01:22:35.707 And through that, that is the direct connection 01:22:35.810 --> 01:22:39.980 with the work that the RIG does, but even on a daily basis, 01:22:39.980 --> 01:22:42.270 we know who to go to, with respect to 01:22:43.180 --> 01:22:45.710 the information operations we in EUCOM are doing, 01:22:45.710 --> 01:22:47.090 or the things that we see. 01:22:47.090 --> 01:22:49.203 So it's a very good relationship. 01:22:50.230 --> 01:22:52.130 My comments have been directed on, 01:22:52.130 --> 01:22:56.363 I think we need a more robust effort within the GEC, 01:22:56.570 --> 01:22:59.793 and in terms of how to do that, that's really State's, 01:23:00.830 --> 01:23:03.053 that's really State's portfolio. 01:23:04.090 --> 01:23:07.890 - Okay, so you noted in your testimony that Russia 01:23:08.276 --> 01:23:10.560 is advancing its indirect and asymmetric 01:23:10.560 --> 01:23:14.030 capabilities in accordance with this concept of warfare 01:23:14.030 --> 01:23:17.807 commonly referred to as the Gerasimov doctrine. 01:23:19.380 --> 01:23:23.090 The concept here states that they non-military means 01:23:23.910 --> 01:23:27.310 have grown or surpassed the use of force 01:23:27.310 --> 01:23:30.143 to achieve political or strategic goals. 01:23:30.290 --> 01:23:33.170 Non-military factors outweigh military factors 01:23:33.170 --> 01:23:35.823 in that doctrine by a ratio of four to one. 01:23:36.550 --> 01:23:40.170 Do you feel comfortable that the non military assets 01:23:40.270 --> 01:23:43.140 of U.S. national power are being utilized effectively 01:23:43.350 --> 01:23:46.473 to adequately counter the threats posed by Russia? 01:23:46.810 --> 01:23:50.340 And can you describe the extent of your relationship 01:23:50.340 --> 01:23:54.700 with those in the U.S. responsible for the coordinating 01:23:54.700 --> 01:23:57.583 of the non-military elements with you and your staff? 01:23:59.490 --> 01:24:02.400 - Well, first of all, I'll underscore that Russia 01:24:02.860 --> 01:24:07.860 has a doctrine that, in my view, sees these activities 01:24:08.170 --> 01:24:11.120 below the level of conflict as a part of the full spectrum. 01:24:11.300 --> 01:24:14.890 With an intent that if they could undermine a target country 01:24:15.760 --> 01:24:19.390 through these types of means, political destabilization, 01:24:19.390 --> 01:24:22.740 et cetera, and never having to use a military force, 01:24:22.740 --> 01:24:23.993 that's their objective. 01:24:26.812 --> 01:24:30.700 we work every day across the interagency. 01:24:30.700 --> 01:24:34.873 I have interagency representatives that are talented, 01:24:35.141 --> 01:24:38.390 and capable, and working hard with us to ensure 01:24:38.390 --> 01:24:40.500 that what we do is an interagency effort, 01:24:40.500 --> 01:24:41.950 a whole-of-government effort. 01:24:42.800 --> 01:24:44.380 And so I don't mean to imply 01:24:44.380 --> 01:24:46.130 that we don't work that way, we do. 01:24:47.760 --> 01:24:50.790 But that's hard government work, 01:24:50.790 --> 01:24:53.413 because most of our agencies, to include DoD, 01:24:54.320 --> 01:24:57.973 are formed and focused on doing what we do best. 01:24:58.310 --> 01:24:59.620 And DoD's the same way. 01:24:59.620 --> 01:25:02.453 So you've got to break some cultural barriers here. 01:25:05.160 --> 01:25:06.983 And work on crossed interests. 01:25:07.450 --> 01:25:08.513 We can do this. 01:25:08.560 --> 01:25:09.590 We've done it in the past. 01:25:09.590 --> 01:25:12.230 So I would say we continue to do 01:25:12.990 --> 01:25:15.310 what we've set out to do as a government, 01:25:15.310 --> 01:25:18.298 We continue to reinforce the capabilities that allow us 01:25:18.298 --> 01:25:21.283 to approach these things as an interagency. 01:25:22.120 --> 01:25:23.800 - So let me follow up with this. 01:25:23.800 --> 01:25:26.660 The recently published national defense strategy 01:25:26.660 --> 01:25:29.453 states that we are competing with Russia. 01:25:29.631 --> 01:25:33.470 And I have a feeling that Russia may think it's already 01:25:33.470 --> 01:25:37.020 in a type of informational or political war 01:25:37.020 --> 01:25:38.253 with the United States. 01:25:38.420 --> 01:25:40.623 As a part of the Gerasimov doctrine, 01:25:40.840 --> 01:25:45.430 information operations are presented as integral 01:25:45.580 --> 01:25:49.023 to all six main phases of Russian conflict development. 01:25:49.560 --> 01:25:53.263 The only non-military measures spanning the entire spectrum. 01:25:53.790 --> 01:25:58.790 But as Europe is absent 01:25:59.690 --> 01:26:02.670 active armed conflict, we lacked certain authorities 01:26:02.670 --> 01:26:05.260 to conduct our own information operations. 01:26:05.260 --> 01:26:08.620 So how are you countering Russian disinformation 01:26:08.830 --> 01:26:11.500 in Europe without the broad authorities 01:26:11.500 --> 01:26:15.123 granted in larger operations, or execute orders, 01:26:15.210 --> 01:26:19.090 understanding you likely cannot get into details 01:26:19.090 --> 01:26:21.510 about how you feel we are adequately 01:26:21.510 --> 01:26:23.263 challenging Russia in this space? 01:26:23.933 --> 01:26:26.490 - I'll briefly answer that, just by saying 01:26:26.490 --> 01:26:30.387 that we in EUCOM engage, through NATO and EU, 01:26:30.450 --> 01:26:33.943 as well as our partners in individual countries, 01:26:35.010 --> 01:26:38.283 in countering the Russian message. 01:26:38.330 --> 01:26:39.903 All of this is truthful print, 01:26:40.210 --> 01:26:42.510 much of it can be done through public affairs. 01:26:43.510 --> 01:26:47.070 And then in other ways, we have military information 01:26:47.070 --> 01:26:50.367 support teams that we provide to specific countries. 01:26:50.367 --> 01:26:52.497 And all of this is in support of the embassy 01:26:52.497 --> 01:26:55.310 and their message as well, as well as foreign countries. 01:26:55.310 --> 01:26:57.497 So we work directly with some of these foreign countries, 01:26:57.497 --> 01:26:59.700 and what they see, and how best 01:27:01.017 --> 01:27:04.773 to counter this disinformation. 01:27:05.830 --> 01:27:08.377 So I would leave it at that. 01:27:08.377 --> 01:27:11.127 And well, the last thing is, you mentioned authorities. 01:27:12.180 --> 01:27:14.440 I've asked for authorities, with respect 01:27:14.440 --> 01:27:16.377 to information operations, et cetera, 01:27:16.377 --> 01:27:18.840 and those that I've requested, I've been granted. 01:27:18.840 --> 01:27:20.667 And in this forum, I'll just leave it at that. 01:27:20.667 --> 01:27:23.890 But I do want you to know that where I've asked 01:27:23.890 --> 01:27:26.900 for specific authorities, to this point, 01:27:26.900 --> 01:27:28.633 I've received what I've asked for. 01:27:29.390 --> 01:27:30.340 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 01:27:30.340 --> 01:27:32.460 and thank you for the latitude, Mr. Chairman. 01:27:32.460 --> 01:27:37.199 - Mr. Hice. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:27:37.199 --> 01:27:39.360 is EUCOM prepared for the U.S. 01:27:39.360 --> 01:27:42.373 to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem? 01:27:44.120 --> 01:27:44.953 - Say again, sir? 01:27:44.953 --> 01:27:47.160 I'm sorry. - Is EUCOM prepared, 01:27:47.160 --> 01:27:51.393 do you believe, to move our embassy to Jerusalem? 01:27:52.120 --> 01:27:53.890 - Today, we're preparing to do that. 01:27:53.890 --> 01:27:55.850 And again, faithfully, this should be 01:27:55.850 --> 01:27:57.710 a question that goes to State first, 01:27:57.710 --> 01:27:58.571 as the lead in that. 01:27:58.571 --> 01:28:01.120 I was just there, so I'm aware of the planning 01:28:01.120 --> 01:28:05.390 that's going on, and I would respectfully go to them 01:28:05.390 --> 01:28:07.403 for the question of the preparation. 01:28:07.520 --> 01:28:09.020 - Okay, fair enough with that. 01:28:10.210 --> 01:28:14.640 Going back then to Russia, and in your understanding, 01:28:14.640 --> 01:28:18.663 what are Russia's goals in the Baltic Seas? 01:28:20.090 --> 01:28:23.570 - Well, I think it's consistent with other with places. 01:28:23.570 --> 01:28:26.170 And that is is that they establish themself 01:28:26.510 --> 01:28:28.263 as a respected global power, 01:28:30.180 --> 01:28:34.390 they undermine the democratic values, 01:28:34.390 --> 01:28:36.513 and the values of the West. 01:28:37.420 --> 01:28:39.743 They obtain, to the extent that they can, 01:28:39.840 --> 01:28:44.840 some privileged influence over the nations that border them, 01:28:45.350 --> 01:28:46.183 and particularly, the ones that were 01:28:46.183 --> 01:28:47.883 in the former Soviet Union. 01:28:48.270 --> 01:28:49.780 And even in the Baltics, I think 01:28:49.780 --> 01:28:51.663 they have that similar objective. 01:28:52.510 --> 01:28:55.010 - Okay, of those type of things, 01:28:55.010 --> 01:28:57.790 what would you consider, as far as 01:28:57.790 --> 01:29:02.273 their influence in that region, what troubles you most? 01:29:03.738 --> 01:29:07.800 - Well, I think there is the presence of their, again, 01:29:07.800 --> 01:29:12.723 disinformation campaign, some political provocation> 01:29:15.840 --> 01:29:18.950 You know, we see where they purchase social media 01:29:18.980 --> 01:29:21.150 or TV stations, et cetera, and in a couple 01:29:21.150 --> 01:29:24.080 of the Baltic countries, you have a Russian population 01:29:24.610 --> 01:29:27.360 that obviously, they target their message to, 01:29:27.360 --> 01:29:29.483 and can share through language. 01:29:29.600 --> 01:29:32.500 It's a, you know, that population is harder to penetrate 01:29:32.500 --> 01:29:34.593 by the government itself, in some cases. 01:29:34.920 --> 01:29:39.920 So it's a population that's easier for Russian influence. 01:29:40.270 --> 01:29:43.283 And of course, they target that and take advantage of it. 01:29:44.290 --> 01:29:49.290 - What tools can we utilize to help aid 01:29:49.860 --> 01:29:54.450 our allies over there against Russian operations, 01:29:54.450 --> 01:29:57.233 and cyber operations, that type of thing? 01:29:58.100 --> 01:30:01.100 - A very close working relationship acrossed our government. 01:30:02.120 --> 01:30:03.670 Not simply in the military realm, 01:30:03.670 --> 01:30:05.813 but through the other forms of government, 01:30:06.140 --> 01:30:09.813 in order to help them assess, respond to, 01:30:10.200 --> 01:30:13.050 and understand the environment, and also learn from them. 01:30:14.170 --> 01:30:16.413 Estonia Cyber Center is an excellent center. 01:30:17.190 --> 01:30:19.200 The Baltic nations, since we're talking about them 01:30:19.200 --> 01:30:22.387 in particular, they have an understanding of Russia 01:30:22.387 --> 01:30:24.670 and that threat in ways that we don't. 01:30:24.670 --> 01:30:27.657 So we rely on them, so it's a team effort here. 01:30:27.657 --> 01:30:29.410 And I think it works both ways, 01:30:29.410 --> 01:30:30.670 and that's the way we approach it. 01:30:30.670 --> 01:30:32.420 - Do you believe it's working well? 01:30:32.900 --> 01:30:34.820 Those communication lines, are you pleased? 01:30:34.820 --> 01:30:35.983 - I am, yes. - Okay. 01:30:38.509 --> 01:30:41.960 Then along those lines, how does EUCOM work with other 01:30:41.960 --> 01:30:46.010 U.S. agencies to utilize a whole-of-government approach 01:30:46.660 --> 01:30:48.653 against Russia? - Well, yes, sir. 01:30:48.700 --> 01:30:52.370 - Well, in all of our challenges in EUCOM, 01:30:52.370 --> 01:30:53.970 we first approach it from a whole-of-government approach. 01:30:53.970 --> 01:30:57.840 And just to set the stage, my civilian deputy 01:30:58.480 --> 01:31:01.580 is a experienced foreign diplomat. 01:31:01.580 --> 01:31:05.803 He was just last the U.S. Ambassador to Italy. 01:31:07.170 --> 01:31:09.380 Phil Reeker, Ambassador Phil Reeker, 01:31:09.380 --> 01:31:12.490 so that tells you something right there. 01:31:12.490 --> 01:31:14.730 And he gives us a direct connection 01:31:14.730 --> 01:31:17.080 into the interagencies, and particularly State. 01:31:17.280 --> 01:31:21.103 And then we have a number of interagency, 01:31:21.200 --> 01:31:26.180 Treasury, USAID, FBI, we have a number 01:31:26.740 --> 01:31:30.453 of interagency persons that are a part of my staff, 01:31:30.760 --> 01:31:32.133 that work day-to-day. 01:31:32.530 --> 01:31:35.493 So our counter-transnational threat cell, for instance, 01:31:35.890 --> 01:31:38.270 it's a lot more civilian workforce 01:31:38.270 --> 01:31:39.963 than it is anybody in a uniform. 01:31:40.030 --> 01:31:42.117 There's an example, that's how we pull them in, 01:31:42.117 --> 01:31:44.623 and we make sure we have their expertise in this. 01:31:45.010 --> 01:31:47.363 - Very good, well, thank you for all you do. 01:31:47.660 --> 01:31:48.830 We appreciate it very much. 01:31:48.830 --> 01:31:50.580 And Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 01:31:51.940 --> 01:31:55.743 - Mr. O'Halloran. - Thank You, Mr. Chairman. 01:31:56.320 --> 01:31:58.030 General, thank you for being here today, 01:31:58.030 --> 01:32:00.760 thank you for your service to our country. 01:32:00.760 --> 01:32:04.693 I want to go back a little bit to the 2% issue in Europe. 01:32:06.060 --> 01:32:08.040 I guess what I heard you say is 01:32:08.220 --> 01:32:12.610 that it's going to be, Russia, over the next five years, 01:32:12.610 --> 01:32:14.570 is going to eventually have some issues 01:32:14.570 --> 01:32:17.513 with continuing to fund their military. 01:32:18.150 --> 01:32:20.730 You had mentioned it's going to take us about 30 years 01:32:20.730 --> 01:32:22.993 to get where, the plan it wants to be. 01:32:23.220 --> 01:32:27.930 And I was wondering, does 2% get our European allies 01:32:27.930 --> 01:32:29.283 to where they need to be? 01:32:29.490 --> 01:32:31.760 And what is the real number to get them 01:32:31.760 --> 01:32:33.010 to where they need to be? 01:32:34.880 --> 01:32:37.760 - Well, sir, I haven't looked at it in that depth, 01:32:37.760 --> 01:32:39.063 in terms of a real number. 01:32:39.080 --> 01:32:40.570 It would take an assessment of each 01:32:40.570 --> 01:32:42.350 and every country to do that. 01:32:42.850 --> 01:32:46.060 I would say that an investment at 2% will make 01:32:46.060 --> 01:32:48.543 a significant difference in the other nations. 01:32:48.543 --> 01:32:51.560 And the way that we make sure that we have what we need 01:32:52.030 --> 01:32:55.533 is within NATO, we do a capabilities assessment. 01:32:56.000 --> 01:32:57.793 We just completed this cycle. 01:32:58.400 --> 01:33:01.540 And then we determine what the requirements are in NATO 01:33:01.870 --> 01:33:03.490 to have an effective deterrence and defense 01:33:03.490 --> 01:33:07.600 in the Euro-Atlantic, and we assign each of the nations 01:33:08.070 --> 01:33:10.410 capability targets that they have to meet 01:33:10.410 --> 01:33:13.133 as a part of that 2% percent and 20%. 01:33:13.170 --> 01:33:15.250 And through that, we can we can provide 01:33:15.250 --> 01:33:16.650 the force in NATO that we need. 01:33:16.650 --> 01:33:17.713 We know that now. 01:33:18.810 --> 01:33:21.560 We just have to ensure that they make those investments 01:33:22.020 --> 01:33:24.220 in the capabilities that have been outlined. 01:33:24.628 --> 01:33:27.590 If they want to invest in other areas in their military, 01:33:27.590 --> 01:33:30.760 that's fine, but they need to meet those capabilities first, 01:33:30.760 --> 01:33:33.310 that we have a synchronized and coherent force 01:33:33.640 --> 01:33:36.213 for the deterrence and defense of the Eruo-Atlantic. 01:33:36.568 --> 01:33:39.670 - Thank you, General, the sustainability of that effort, 01:33:39.670 --> 01:33:43.390 though, as we saw in the last economic downturn 01:33:43.390 --> 01:33:45.790 here in the United States, and around the world, 01:33:46.030 --> 01:33:48.130 plays a big role in that, I would imagine. 01:33:48.280 --> 01:33:51.553 I don't know if you've assessed to that level yet, 01:33:51.710 --> 01:33:54.820 but these economic cycles are something that's part 01:33:54.820 --> 01:33:57.653 of our history, but they will occur again. 01:33:57.960 --> 01:34:00.720 And a lot of these countries were hit pretty hard 01:34:01.200 --> 01:34:02.913 during the last downturn. 01:34:03.160 --> 01:34:06.800 So how much time is it going to take some of these countries 01:34:07.000 --> 01:34:08.920 to get up to speed at the 2%? 01:34:08.920 --> 01:34:12.093 I think you mentioned 15 are not there yet. 01:34:12.300 --> 01:34:15.150 How are we going to get, how are they going to get there? 01:34:15.470 --> 01:34:16.880 - Well, I think if you, and this, 01:34:16.880 --> 01:34:19.830 I could respond to this in a written form in more detail, 01:34:19.830 --> 01:34:21.943 but generally, we've taken a look at, 01:34:22.340 --> 01:34:24.190 NATO's taken a look at the countries. 01:34:24.620 --> 01:34:27.940 And there's a grouping of say five to seven that, 01:34:27.940 --> 01:34:32.650 given their financial plan, that at present, 01:34:32.650 --> 01:34:36.423 and in some cases if they're in the EU, 01:34:37.210 --> 01:34:39.360 the standards that they have to meet, 01:34:39.360 --> 01:34:41.003 with respect to debt, et cetera, 01:34:41.730 --> 01:34:43.770 they will have a very difficult time meeting 01:34:43.770 --> 01:34:47.440 the 2020 for 2%, if they adhere 01:34:47.440 --> 01:34:50.220 to both EU and NATO requirements 01:34:50.310 --> 01:34:53.363 So there is a group of countries that, 01:34:53.690 --> 01:34:56.483 with analysis, you will have a more difficult time. 01:34:58.758 --> 01:35:00.558 - One of the issues that came up was 01:35:01.180 --> 01:35:04.653 how we can address some of our issues with them, 01:35:05.640 --> 01:35:08.704 and with their ability to impact citizens 01:35:08.704 --> 01:35:11.200 in other countries, how we can do it to them? 01:35:11.200 --> 01:35:14.830 You mentioned something about that we have an advantage 01:35:14.830 --> 01:35:18.150 because of people's representation of us 01:35:18.150 --> 01:35:19.773 as having a truthful media. 01:35:20.250 --> 01:35:22.250 And here, internally, in the United States, 01:35:22.250 --> 01:35:26.883 we have this ongoing division over the media here. 01:35:27.680 --> 01:35:31.200 How do we let people know over there that we are truthful, 01:35:31.200 --> 01:35:34.570 when within our own country, we are having this struggle 01:35:34.770 --> 01:35:36.983 on the truthfulness of the media? 01:35:40.200 --> 01:35:41.880 - That's a difficult question to answer. 01:35:41.880 --> 01:35:45.480 I would say that this, the issue of truth in media 01:35:45.480 --> 01:35:48.940 is not just the United States, it's a global issue now. 01:35:48.940 --> 01:35:51.603 With the development of our social media, 01:35:52.227 --> 01:35:54.593 and the internet, et cetera, 01:35:56.020 --> 01:35:59.073 we've lost what we once had when we had print media, 01:35:59.340 --> 01:36:00.900 largely, that had editors, 01:36:00.900 --> 01:36:03.410 that had editorial standards, et cetera. 01:36:03.410 --> 01:36:07.840 There's much of this that has no discipline within it. 01:36:07.840 --> 01:36:10.670 I think that's something that, internationally, 01:36:10.670 --> 01:36:13.570 we need to come to grips with, and determine how 01:36:13.570 --> 01:36:15.070 we're going to begin to discipline that. 01:36:15.070 --> 01:36:17.250 And it's particularly important for democracies, 01:36:17.250 --> 01:36:22.250 because of the role that truthful media and journalism plays 01:36:24.130 --> 01:36:25.773 in a vibrant democracy. 01:36:26.470 --> 01:36:28.170 - Thank you, General, and I yield. 01:36:28.940 --> 01:36:31.140 - Dr. Wenstrup. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:36:31.140 --> 01:36:32.260 Thank you, General, for being here. 01:36:32.260 --> 01:36:36.623 I have kind of a general question concerning Eastern Europe, 01:36:37.130 --> 01:36:40.500 if you will, and I don't expected a deep dive answer, 01:36:40.500 --> 01:36:45.500 but you mentioned a team approach to the nations in Europe. 01:36:46.020 --> 01:36:49.660 And from your perspective, what are the Eastern European 01:36:49.660 --> 01:36:53.630 nations, for example, wanting and needing from, say, 01:36:53.630 --> 01:36:56.130 if we go down the list of the dime, right, 01:36:56.130 --> 01:36:58.573 what do they want, diplomatically, militarily, 01:36:58.740 --> 01:37:01.023 information-sharing, economically, 01:37:01.200 --> 01:37:04.163 what kind of things are they wanting, what can we provide? 01:37:05.270 --> 01:37:07.370 And I know that's a pretty broad question. 01:37:07.510 --> 01:37:11.200 - Yes, and frankly, I need to probably focus most 01:37:11.200 --> 01:37:13.183 on the on the military aspect of that. 01:37:13.610 --> 01:37:16.250 - Sure. - The first thing is 01:37:16.250 --> 01:37:18.840 is that they want a close partnership. 01:37:18.840 --> 01:37:20.500 I'm speaking as a EUCOM commander now. 01:37:20.500 --> 01:37:22.840 They want a close partnership with the United States 01:37:22.840 --> 01:37:25.083 because they recognize our leadership, 01:37:25.120 --> 01:37:27.003 they recognize our capabilities. 01:37:28.320 --> 01:37:30.510 They want to have a close partnership, 01:37:30.510 --> 01:37:33.233 so they can also develop their capabilities. 01:37:33.390 --> 01:37:37.210 - Militarily, terror-wise, or? - Diplomatically, et cetera. 01:37:37.210 --> 01:37:42.210 I mean, those nations are great allies. 01:37:42.840 --> 01:37:45.500 They're small, but they're working very hard. 01:37:45.500 --> 01:37:48.160 And you'll note that they're the ones that are above 2%, 01:37:48.160 --> 01:37:52.410 very quickly, so they're also investing in the capabilities 01:37:53.150 --> 01:37:55.683 that they believe they need to nest with ours. 01:37:56.220 --> 01:37:57.900 That's what we need to continue to do. 01:37:57.900 --> 01:38:00.570 We need to continue to help them in that regard. 01:38:00.570 --> 01:38:02.420 And I think, also, our presence there 01:38:02.950 --> 01:38:07.030 reinforces their populations' confidence 01:38:08.840 --> 01:38:13.670 in the West, and their decision to be NATO members, 01:38:13.670 --> 01:38:17.053 in some cases, or to align with the West, generally. 01:38:18.980 --> 01:38:20.980 - Obviously, all those things intertwine 01:38:20.980 --> 01:38:22.330 with our success there. 01:38:22.330 --> 01:38:25.100 And when I talk about economics, and things like that. 01:38:25.100 --> 01:38:29.580 And I've always had a concern of the dependency upon Russia 01:38:29.580 --> 01:38:31.853 for, say, natural gas, et cetera. 01:38:32.260 --> 01:38:35.620 And the stronger their economy is, 01:38:35.620 --> 01:38:37.640 the better our military relationship can be, 01:38:37.640 --> 01:38:38.863 et cetera, et cetera. 01:38:39.510 --> 01:38:40.910 Are there things, from where you sit, 01:38:40.910 --> 01:38:42.140 that you feel like you're hampered, 01:38:42.140 --> 01:38:44.270 if we only did more economically, 01:38:44.270 --> 01:38:47.130 like try to alleviate some of that dependency 01:38:47.130 --> 01:38:48.373 on Russia in some way? 01:38:49.120 --> 01:38:52.060 - Yeah, I think we are working toward relieving 01:38:52.060 --> 01:38:53.227 some of the dependency on Russia. 01:38:53.227 --> 01:38:55.140 And I know those countries are as well. 01:38:55.140 --> 01:38:58.333 So particularly, in liquefied natural gas, 01:38:58.850 --> 01:39:02.820 there's facilities being built that will allow us 01:39:02.820 --> 01:39:06.320 to transport that, and, frankly, I think we should continue 01:39:06.320 --> 01:39:07.610 to do that, because as you know, 01:39:07.610 --> 01:39:12.610 Russia uses energy to coerce and compel at times. 01:39:13.680 --> 01:39:15.062 - Yeah, thank you. - Thank you. 01:39:15.062 --> 01:39:15.895 - I appreciate it, General. 01:39:15.895 --> 01:39:18.063 I yield back. - Mr. Khanna. 01:39:18.750 --> 01:39:20.050 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:39:20.130 --> 01:39:21.930 General, thank you for your service. 01:39:22.560 --> 01:39:25.700 In discussing Ukraine, I think it's important to look at 01:39:25.700 --> 01:39:27.693 some of the historical context. 01:39:28.060 --> 01:39:31.410 When Secretary Baker met with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, 01:39:31.410 --> 01:39:34.513 there was a discussion about the expansion of NATO. 01:39:34.960 --> 01:39:38.753 Our country made no formal commitments to Gorbachev, 01:39:39.280 --> 01:39:42.290 as Putin claims, but Gorbachev recently did say 01:39:42.290 --> 01:39:44.500 that the spirit of the conversations 01:39:44.500 --> 01:39:47.663 very much suggested that we wouldn't expand NATO. 01:39:48.030 --> 01:39:51.510 Then when Yanukovych came to power in Ukraine, 01:39:51.510 --> 01:39:54.993 and wanted to do business with the European Union, 01:39:55.360 --> 01:39:57.070 the Russians asked the United States 01:39:57.070 --> 01:39:59.550 whether we would be okay with a tri-patriot 01:39:59.820 --> 01:40:02.860 economic agreement, where Europe would do business 01:40:02.860 --> 01:40:04.910 with Yanukovych, and with Russia. 01:40:04.910 --> 01:40:07.433 The European Union rejected that. 01:40:07.830 --> 01:40:10.710 Then when Yanukovych was ousted, 01:40:10.710 --> 01:40:13.433 Yanukovych came to the United States and said, 01:40:13.560 --> 01:40:16.963 why don't we call early elections and have a coalition? 01:40:17.150 --> 01:40:20.843 It's unclear whether we worked diplomatically for that. 01:40:21.000 --> 01:40:25.933 We then supported the regime change against Yanukovych. 01:40:26.220 --> 01:40:29.600 So I guess my first question, in sort of three parts is, 01:40:29.600 --> 01:40:31.760 do you think we made a strategic mistake 01:40:31.760 --> 01:40:34.923 by insisting that Ukraine join NATO? 01:40:34.990 --> 01:40:38.280 Do you believe we made a mistake by recognizing 01:40:38.280 --> 01:40:39.680 the coup against Yanukovych? 01:40:40.250 --> 01:40:42.800 And do you think we made a mistake by not having 01:40:42.940 --> 01:40:46.260 a tri-patriot agreement with Russia and Yanukovych 01:40:46.260 --> 01:40:47.573 on the economic agreement? 01:40:48.240 --> 01:40:50.010 - Yeah, I'll be honest, I haven't looked 01:40:50.010 --> 01:40:50.843 at that in enough detail, 01:40:50.843 --> 01:40:53.320 and the specific instances that you pointed out 01:40:53.320 --> 01:40:54.250 to give you an answer here. 01:40:54.250 --> 01:40:57.010 If you'd like, I'll give you one as a written statement 01:40:58.144 --> 01:40:59.294 after the hearing here. 01:40:59.950 --> 01:41:01.080 - I'd appreciate that. 01:41:01.080 --> 01:41:03.873 More broadly, and this goes to your expertise. 01:41:03.873 --> 01:41:06.540 I mean, one of the things that has served us really well 01:41:06.540 --> 01:41:08.993 in this nation is the Monroe Doctrine, 01:41:09.300 --> 01:41:10.690 made by John Quincy Adams. 01:41:10.690 --> 01:41:14.123 And we believe that no one should interfere in our region. 01:41:14.640 --> 01:41:17.040 Assume for a second that Russia is acting 01:41:17.040 --> 01:41:19.030 in a similar strategic interest. 01:41:19.030 --> 01:41:21.680 Do you really believe, even if we have arms 01:41:21.740 --> 01:41:25.080 going to Ukraine, of 50 million, 200 million, 01:41:25.080 --> 01:41:27.560 like the president wants, that we could ever 01:41:27.560 --> 01:41:30.340 out-compete the Russians in Ukraine? 01:41:30.340 --> 01:41:32.550 Won't they just increase their arms? 01:41:32.550 --> 01:41:35.960 Don't they have far more of a strategic interest to fight us 01:41:35.960 --> 01:41:37.933 than we do in Ukraine? 01:41:40.590 --> 01:41:43.453 - If one looks at proximity, et cetera, 01:41:43.610 --> 01:41:45.497 that's an advantage for Russia. 01:41:45.497 --> 01:41:49.413 And it's an advantage militarily, as you suggest. 01:41:50.000 --> 01:41:53.000 But what I go back to is, is that what we believe 01:41:53.980 --> 01:41:56.960 as a fundamental principle is that people have a right 01:41:56.960 --> 01:42:00.310 to determine their own government, 01:42:00.310 --> 01:42:03.700 and how that government is led, whether it's a democracy, 01:42:03.700 --> 01:42:06.090 or what type of democracy it might be. 01:42:06.090 --> 01:42:06.923 And I think that's the principle 01:42:06.923 --> 01:42:09.003 that we fundamentally support here. 01:42:09.430 --> 01:42:10.320 - General, I agree with you. 01:42:10.320 --> 01:42:12.710 And John Quincy Adams had a very famous passage 01:42:12.710 --> 01:42:15.800 saying the United States supports the self-determination 01:42:15.800 --> 01:42:17.840 of people around the world and we should extend 01:42:17.840 --> 01:42:20.490 our prayers and our hopes, but we shouldn't be going out 01:42:20.490 --> 01:42:22.850 for monsters to destroy, because that's not 01:42:23.060 --> 01:42:25.463 in the United States' strategic interest. 01:42:25.650 --> 01:42:27.720 What do you think is our 01:42:27.720 --> 01:42:30.283 national security strategic interest? 01:42:30.420 --> 01:42:35.420 What is being served by putting more weapons in Ukraine? 01:42:35.650 --> 01:42:38.880 I mean, how does that make the United States more secure? 01:42:38.880 --> 01:42:41.733 How does it make constituents in my district more secure? 01:42:43.330 --> 01:42:46.580 - The United States has come to the assistance 01:42:46.700 --> 01:42:51.650 of a people and a nation that seeks to establish themselves 01:42:51.650 --> 01:42:53.067 with the West in a democratic way, 01:42:53.067 --> 01:42:54.920 and make reforms to do that. 01:42:54.920 --> 01:42:57.170 And we've committed to that. 01:42:57.170 --> 01:42:59.570 I think it's important the United States be seen 01:43:00.421 --> 01:43:01.590 as a good ally in that. 01:43:01.590 --> 01:43:04.910 And of course, where that takes us here in the future 01:43:05.704 --> 01:43:10.353 will be set against our vital, 01:43:11.070 --> 01:43:11.903 our vital interest in this. 01:43:11.903 --> 01:43:13.610 And that country is moved forward. 01:43:13.610 --> 01:43:15.990 But I think it's important that we support those 01:43:15.990 --> 01:43:19.730 who seek democratic values and ways, 01:43:19.730 --> 01:43:21.423 and in the world as well. 01:43:21.480 --> 01:43:26.270 Otherwise, we forfeit that movement to others like Russia, 01:43:26.270 --> 01:43:30.570 who would like to undermine, and establish a world order 01:43:32.018 --> 01:43:33.247 that is counter to our interest. 01:43:33.247 --> 01:43:34.900 And as we've seen in past history, 01:43:34.900 --> 01:43:36.463 typically leads to conflict. 01:43:37.110 --> 01:43:38.640 - I respect your perspective. 01:43:38.640 --> 01:43:41.290 I would just say that no one disagrees that we should 01:43:41.510 --> 01:43:43.870 recognize self-determination and human rights. 01:43:43.870 --> 01:43:46.590 The question is just strategically, militarily, 01:43:46.590 --> 01:43:49.480 whether that's the most in our national interest. 01:43:49.480 --> 01:43:51.700 My final question ism do you really think 01:43:51.700 --> 01:43:54.580 being bogged down there, is Russia really 01:43:54.580 --> 01:43:57.673 our most strategic competitor, or is China? 01:43:57.800 --> 01:44:00.280 And does putting resources here 01:44:00.420 --> 01:44:02.770 hurt our ability against China? 01:44:02.770 --> 01:44:05.203 Or against fighting the war on terrorism? 01:44:06.040 --> 01:44:07.300 - Well, sir, I'd just say, I don't know 01:44:07.300 --> 01:44:08.750 that we're bogged down there. 01:44:08.880 --> 01:44:11.480 And I would remind you that we're also not fighting. 01:44:12.070 --> 01:44:14.311 They're fighting, for their own sovereignty. 01:44:14.311 --> 01:44:17.660 We're providing capability, capacity building, 01:44:17.660 --> 01:44:20.133 and reform to their government. 01:44:21.350 --> 01:44:23.403 Russia and China are both competitors. 01:44:23.950 --> 01:44:28.543 I particularly believe that in the shorter term here, 01:44:28.770 --> 01:44:33.210 Russia is an immediate threat at this point. 01:44:33.210 --> 01:44:35.420 They're a more consistent threat, 01:44:35.420 --> 01:44:36.770 maybe in a longer term, China, 01:44:36.770 --> 01:44:39.323 but that's a debate that many will have. 01:44:39.720 --> 01:44:41.970 But I think we need to pay attention to both. 01:44:43.000 --> 01:44:44.263 - Mr. Banks. - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:44:44.263 --> 01:44:46.253 Thank you, General, for being here. 01:44:46.490 --> 01:44:49.500 I wonder, first of all, if you have any thoughts 01:44:49.500 --> 01:44:51.420 or if you could explain it all, 01:44:51.420 --> 01:44:53.660 why Macedonia is having such a hard time 01:44:53.660 --> 01:44:56.600 in their hopes of being admitted into NATO? 01:44:56.600 --> 01:44:59.470 And would you agree that if they are admitted into NATO, 01:44:59.470 --> 01:45:03.070 they could be a somewhat important ally 01:45:03.070 --> 01:45:04.920 to the United States and our efforts? 01:45:06.380 --> 01:45:09.080 - Yeah, I would probably refer you to State on that, 01:45:09.080 --> 01:45:11.303 in terms of the detail of this. 01:45:13.090 --> 01:45:17.323 They would like to seek a means to enter NATO. 01:45:17.370 --> 01:45:19.970 I've talked to their Minister of Defense about that. 01:45:20.650 --> 01:45:22.970 And I think it's a matter of foremost, 01:45:22.970 --> 01:45:27.340 of being able to establish the ability to meet the map, 01:45:27.340 --> 01:45:30.840 or the accession principles that you have 01:45:30.840 --> 01:45:32.008 within NATO to do that. 01:45:32.008 --> 01:45:35.770 And being confident and showing that there's 01:45:35.770 --> 01:45:37.183 a confident means to do that. 01:45:37.183 --> 01:45:38.273 - I appreciate that. 01:45:38.650 --> 01:45:41.123 My next question, as you know, 01:45:41.210 --> 01:45:43.710 the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 01:45:43.710 --> 01:45:46.963 has been a key non-proliferation enabler of EUCOM, 01:45:47.410 --> 01:45:49.833 and the world, for over 25 years. 01:45:49.930 --> 01:45:53.060 As part of your overall security cooperation efforts, 01:45:53.060 --> 01:45:56.140 CTR has been fundamental to greatly reducing 01:45:56.140 --> 01:45:58.183 the threat of WMD proliferation. 01:45:58.540 --> 01:46:02.194 However, we continue to see WMD proliferation threat grow 01:46:02.194 --> 01:46:05.163 through terrorist networks and state sponsors. 01:46:05.540 --> 01:46:08.520 Recent efforts in Moldova and Ukraine highlight 01:46:08.520 --> 01:46:12.180 the security challenges the European Grey Zone nations face. 01:46:12.180 --> 01:46:14.640 So with that, can you comment at all 01:46:14.640 --> 01:46:19.326 on the success of CTR, and maybe any CTR efforts 01:46:19.326 --> 01:46:21.870 that have been effective in your AOR, 01:46:21.870 --> 01:46:25.030 or ways that we as Congress might change a program 01:46:25.030 --> 01:46:26.810 that's now 25 years old to confront 01:46:26.810 --> 01:46:28.510 the threats we face in the future? 01:46:28.910 --> 01:46:31.210 - Yeah, I'd like to take that for a response as well, 01:46:31.210 --> 01:46:34.060 to you, to get into the detail of how we might change it. 01:46:34.100 --> 01:46:37.253 You know, we address this, and we work within NATO, 01:46:37.740 --> 01:46:40.853 or within EUCOM, with NATO, with our partners, 01:46:41.620 --> 01:46:44.400 to counter proliferation transnational threats 01:46:44.400 --> 01:46:45.880 that cell that I noted before, 01:46:45.880 --> 01:46:49.540 the transnational threat cell has had, 01:46:49.540 --> 01:46:51.503 as one of its fundamental tasks. 01:46:53.040 --> 01:46:55.040 I think we are having effect. 01:46:55.040 --> 01:46:57.720 I think it is positive, but I think today, 01:46:57.720 --> 01:47:00.310 more so than ever, we probably need to be more focused 01:47:00.310 --> 01:47:03.730 on this, because we know we have non-state actors today 01:47:03.730 --> 01:47:05.820 that now have the funding and a capability 01:47:05.820 --> 01:47:07.610 to attain some of these weapons systems, 01:47:07.610 --> 01:47:10.080 whereas before, it was fundamentally a nation-state 01:47:10.080 --> 01:47:12.753 capability that was passing those. 01:47:13.130 --> 01:47:16.363 So terrorists, violent extremist organizations, 01:47:16.500 --> 01:47:19.207 so I think it's important that we maintain this focus, 01:47:19.207 --> 01:47:22.270 and that we work, again, with our partners, 01:47:22.270 --> 01:47:23.983 and as an alliance to do this. 01:47:25.220 --> 01:47:27.200 - My last question, you're in your written testimony, 01:47:27.200 --> 01:47:30.327 you talked about the growing maritime threat in your AOR. 01:47:30.327 --> 01:47:32.277 And I wonder if you could maybe comment 01:47:32.290 --> 01:47:36.003 more extensively about that, with a resurgent Russia. 01:47:36.380 --> 01:47:39.220 Maybe comment specifically related to the anti-submarine 01:47:39.220 --> 01:47:42.543 capabilities under your review? 01:47:43.330 --> 01:47:45.360 - Yes, sir, if you want a detail on that, 01:47:45.360 --> 01:47:48.080 I prefer to do that in a classified document as well. 01:47:48.080 --> 01:47:50.890 Just generally, the activity level 01:47:51.080 --> 01:47:53.873 of their maritime forces is up in Europe. 01:47:54.330 --> 01:47:58.013 They're active now, coming out of the high north, 01:47:58.220 --> 01:48:01.540 and their northern fleet, into the Mediterranean, 01:48:01.540 --> 01:48:05.730 for instance, that's has not been, well, not alarming, 01:48:05.730 --> 01:48:08.430 it's not necessarily something they couldn't do. 01:48:08.430 --> 01:48:10.730 It's just not something they've normally done, 01:48:11.340 --> 01:48:13.070 in, say, recent history. 01:48:13.070 --> 01:48:14.973 So they're they're deploying more, 01:48:15.820 --> 01:48:19.623 and they're deploying at a higher rate. 01:48:20.550 --> 01:48:23.863 The forces that they're deploying are being modernized, 01:48:23.940 --> 01:48:25.653 primarily with weapon systems. 01:48:26.386 --> 01:48:31.386 So most of their ships now have a caliber system on them. 01:48:32.059 --> 01:48:35.610 It is both conventional and can be nuclear, 01:48:35.610 --> 01:48:36.660 if they choose to do. 01:48:37.810 --> 01:48:41.763 It's a very good system, provides reach and precision. 01:48:41.790 --> 01:48:43.570 And of course, wherever they have a ship, 01:48:43.570 --> 01:48:47.113 whether it's undersea or on the surface, 01:48:47.790 --> 01:48:50.590 many of their ships now have the caliber system on them. 01:48:51.040 --> 01:48:52.470 - Appreciate that, thanks for your leadership. 01:48:52.470 --> 01:48:54.863 I yield back. - Mr. Moulton. 01:48:55.240 --> 01:48:56.073 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:48:56.073 --> 01:48:58.390 General, thank you very much for holding the line 01:48:58.680 --> 01:49:00.943 for us in Europe, appreciate your service. 01:49:02.010 --> 01:49:04.600 I served under General Jim Mattis, 01:49:04.600 --> 01:49:05.880 current Secretary of Defense, 01:49:05.880 --> 01:49:07.870 and our division motto at the time was, 01:49:07.870 --> 01:49:09.763 no better friend, no worse enemy. 01:49:10.380 --> 01:49:13.720 And I often found that it was the first half of that 01:49:13.720 --> 01:49:15.910 that was sometimes harder to maintain. 01:49:15.910 --> 01:49:18.360 People understood the Marines were a tough enemy, 01:49:18.640 --> 01:49:21.240 but they weren't always sure if they could trust us. 01:49:22.030 --> 01:49:26.650 How do you make our Eastern European 01:49:27.110 --> 01:49:30.203 allies trust us in the fight against Russia, 01:49:31.220 --> 01:49:33.100 when we're not really willing to stand up to Russia 01:49:33.100 --> 01:49:34.063 right here at home? 01:49:34.110 --> 01:49:35.670 This is a consistent theme that I've heard 01:49:35.670 --> 01:49:36.790 as I've traveled around the globe, 01:49:36.790 --> 01:49:39.250 is that a lot of of our allies, right now, 01:49:39.250 --> 01:49:41.290 are just not sure whether they can trust America. 01:49:41.290 --> 01:49:43.210 - So give us a window into how you 01:49:44.230 --> 01:49:46.843 fight this fight on the day-to-day in Europe? 01:49:47.495 --> 01:49:48.400 - Well, first of all, I'll tell you, 01:49:48.400 --> 01:49:51.343 I don't see that issue, particularly in the east, 01:49:51.610 --> 01:49:54.423 within NATO, in terms of their, any distrust. 01:49:54.860 --> 01:49:56.090 The first way that I do it is, 01:49:56.090 --> 01:49:57.740 is just look at what we're doing. 01:49:58.530 --> 01:50:01.650 We're rotating an army-- - You don't think that 01:50:01.650 --> 01:50:03.127 when the president comes out against NATO, 01:50:03.127 --> 01:50:05.560 and says that we might not even be a part of NATO, 01:50:05.560 --> 01:50:06.790 maybe shouldn't even be a part of NATO, 01:50:06.790 --> 01:50:07.623 that doesn't-- 01:50:07.623 --> 01:50:11.390 - The president has stated support for Article 5 01:50:11.390 --> 01:50:12.893 and full support for NATO. 01:50:13.360 --> 01:50:16.840 And in this time, we've deployed a lot of force 01:50:16.840 --> 01:50:20.283 in this past year to Europe on behalf of NATO. 01:50:20.510 --> 01:50:23.944 So what I'm trying to say is, is what I point to 01:50:23.944 --> 01:50:25.493 is what are we doing. 01:50:26.220 --> 01:50:31.210 EDI, which Congress has budgeted, 01:50:31.210 --> 01:50:34.693 for instance, is a substantial investment, 01:50:35.070 --> 01:50:37.310 and our allies recognize that. 01:50:37.310 --> 01:50:39.140 - So General, let's talk about that for a second. 01:50:39.140 --> 01:50:42.713 The EDI, and I've witnessed this in Eastern Europe myself, 01:50:42.970 --> 01:50:46.110 seems to be very heavily focused on conventional forces, 01:50:46.110 --> 01:50:49.240 which is not the way that Russia is attacking us. 01:50:49.240 --> 01:50:52.200 I mean, Russia is attacking our Eastern European allies 01:50:52.330 --> 01:50:53.650 through the internet, through partisans, 01:50:53.650 --> 01:50:55.623 by undermining their political process, 01:50:56.100 --> 01:50:59.023 by sowing disinformation, as you earlier described. 01:50:59.500 --> 01:51:02.250 It doesn't seem like our effort is calibrated 01:51:02.250 --> 01:51:04.313 to really meet that threat at all. 01:51:05.180 --> 01:51:07.737 It certainly wasn't when I visited there in 2015, 01:51:07.737 --> 01:51:09.330 and I know that we on the committee 01:51:09.330 --> 01:51:11.410 have tried to make some modifications. 01:51:11.410 --> 01:51:13.653 I'm not sure that we've gone far enough. 01:51:13.810 --> 01:51:18.810 What could we do to improve our ability to stand up 01:51:19.560 --> 01:51:21.640 to the type of warfare that Russia 01:51:21.640 --> 01:51:23.193 is actually exercising today? 01:51:23.550 --> 01:51:25.780 - Well, first of all, sir, I'd say that 01:51:25.980 --> 01:51:27.260 we need to have all of that. 01:51:27.260 --> 01:51:32.080 So we do need that conventional capability in place 01:51:32.360 --> 01:51:35.660 as a deterrent, and it's an absolute signal to them 01:51:35.660 --> 01:51:40.130 of our commitment to Article 5 and our commitment to NATO, 01:51:40.130 --> 01:51:41.763 and them as partners. 01:51:42.940 --> 01:51:44.370 Many of the things that we are doing 01:51:44.370 --> 01:51:45.660 is what we need to continue to do. 01:51:45.660 --> 01:51:48.410 We're providing those nations, particularly in the east, 01:51:48.410 --> 01:51:51.430 with direct military information support, 01:51:51.430 --> 01:51:54.080 coupled with our embassies working with them as well. 01:51:55.840 --> 01:51:58.260 The nations themselves work with us closely, 01:51:58.260 --> 01:52:00.710 in terms of their public affairs, messaging, et cetera. 01:52:00.710 --> 01:52:02.713 That's all a part of this. 01:52:02.880 --> 01:52:06.040 And EDI does fund some of the information operations 01:52:06.040 --> 01:52:08.313 that I do in EUCOM as well. 01:52:08.710 --> 01:52:10.540 - What percentage of the budget for EDI 01:52:10.540 --> 01:52:12.313 goes to those types of activities? 01:52:12.340 --> 01:52:13.610 - A very small part of that. 01:52:13.610 --> 01:52:16.310 I can give it to you, if I sit down and figure it out, 01:52:16.320 --> 01:52:17.820 but it's a small part of that. 01:52:19.140 --> 01:52:21.580 I would first say though, that know information operations 01:52:21.580 --> 01:52:23.930 is not that expensive. 01:52:23.930 --> 01:52:27.690 - What percentage of the attacks that you see, 01:52:27.690 --> 01:52:29.500 whether they be hybrid-type attacks, 01:52:29.500 --> 01:52:31.263 the disinformation campaigns. 01:52:32.670 --> 01:52:34.690 The attacks from Russia, what percentage 01:52:34.870 --> 01:52:36.540 are these hybrid-types of attacks 01:52:36.540 --> 01:52:38.293 versus conventional attacks? 01:52:38.540 --> 01:52:42.643 - Well, we don't, in terms of attacks within NATO, 01:52:42.690 --> 01:52:45.543 most of this activity is below the level of conflict. 01:52:45.570 --> 01:52:47.220 - Right, but pretty much all, right? 01:52:47.220 --> 01:52:49.330 I mean, they're not rolling any tanks into Eastern Europe. 01:52:49.330 --> 01:52:51.950 - Well, no, and but they did annex 01:52:53.050 --> 01:52:56.403 portions of Ukraine, for instance, and Georgia in 2008. 01:52:56.770 --> 01:52:59.760 But you're correct, today's activity is purposely 01:52:59.760 --> 01:53:02.933 below the level of conflict on Russia's part. 01:53:03.370 --> 01:53:05.110 - Are there other things that we should be doing 01:53:05.110 --> 01:53:07.913 on the committee to better meet this threat? 01:53:08.220 --> 01:53:10.860 It sounds to me like we could better apportion the budget. 01:53:10.860 --> 01:53:13.660 Are there other things that we should reinforce, 01:53:13.660 --> 01:53:15.890 or ways that we could give more confidence 01:53:15.890 --> 01:53:17.650 to our allies that we will help them 01:53:17.650 --> 01:53:19.903 stand up to this serious threat? 01:53:20.020 --> 01:53:23.870 - Yeah, well, I would applaud the members of Congress 01:53:23.870 --> 01:53:24.833 for their trips to Europe, for instance. 01:53:24.833 --> 01:53:28.093 And to see our allies, like the one you took in 2015. 01:53:29.250 --> 01:53:31.863 Those visits, and open discussion with them, 01:53:32.130 --> 01:53:34.430 is very important, it's a direct demonstration 01:53:34.430 --> 01:53:37.743 of the United States interest in their security. 01:53:38.290 --> 01:53:41.883 So I would encourage those as well. 01:53:42.210 --> 01:53:44.287 Secondly, continue to do what you're doing today, 01:53:44.287 --> 01:53:48.543 and that is to have a good assessment of our security needs, 01:53:49.010 --> 01:53:51.923 and what should be funded, and how you fund them. 01:53:52.400 --> 01:53:55.810 This budget has been very important to enabling me 01:53:55.810 --> 01:53:58.220 to do what I do with our allies 01:53:58.220 --> 01:54:00.680 and the security of the Euro-Atlantic. 01:54:00.680 --> 01:54:01.990 You need to continue that. 01:54:02.902 --> 01:54:05.913 Towards the budgeting, I would say this, again, 01:54:07.500 --> 01:54:11.240 information operations is not overly expensive, 01:54:11.240 --> 01:54:14.450 when compared to, for instance, conventional force, 01:54:14.450 --> 01:54:17.653 structure, rotational forces, et cetera. 01:54:18.110 --> 01:54:22.810 And from my part, my request through EDI is structured 01:54:22.810 --> 01:54:26.973 on what I believe we most need for deterrence today. 01:54:27.400 --> 01:54:30.450 And so I take into account is at least in my portion 01:54:30.450 --> 01:54:32.833 of this, is I put it forward to DoD, 01:54:33.640 --> 01:54:35.510 the percentages of what's required 01:54:35.510 --> 01:54:38.010 and best used for a coherent defense. 01:54:38.010 --> 01:54:41.200 And I take that deliberately as I present this, 01:54:41.200 --> 01:54:44.363 my portion of that budget to the Department of Defense. 01:54:44.450 --> 01:54:45.630 - Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 01:54:45.630 --> 01:54:47.473 - Thank you. - Mr. Garamendi. 01:54:49.420 --> 01:54:52.950 - General, thank you very much for yesterday's discussion 01:54:52.950 --> 01:54:55.330 as well as today's, my apologies for not being here, 01:54:55.330 --> 01:54:59.110 there's another general at the Army Corps of Engineers 01:54:59.110 --> 01:55:02.173 that to whom I had to give some attention this morning. 01:55:04.980 --> 01:55:09.930 The EDI fund, should that be part of the base, 01:55:10.280 --> 01:55:12.030 or should it continue to be an OCO? 01:55:14.553 --> 01:55:17.623 - I've said I think eventually it should go to the base, 01:55:18.370 --> 01:55:20.030 in order to get us into the base 01:55:20.030 --> 01:55:23.533 as a fundamental part of our security. 01:55:24.650 --> 01:55:28.290 And as I stated earlier, I would just like to ensure 01:55:28.290 --> 01:55:32.573 that it's protected, Congress has set this aside as EDI, 01:55:33.400 --> 01:55:36.760 specifically, for specific objectives to be attained. 01:55:36.760 --> 01:55:39.883 And as we go into the budget, to protect that clarity. 01:55:40.930 --> 01:55:45.920 - So either way, you need EDI specifically 01:55:45.920 --> 01:55:48.120 for the work you're doing in Eastern Europe? 01:55:48.380 --> 01:55:50.990 - We do, absolutely, I need it because I don't have 01:55:50.990 --> 01:55:52.863 the force posture that I believe I need. 01:55:53.920 --> 01:55:56.163 And it's going to take EDI to build that, 01:55:56.400 --> 01:55:58.723 or that funding within the budget to do so. 01:55:59.220 --> 01:56:00.070 - I just want to make it clear. 01:56:00.070 --> 01:56:02.200 We're going to be dealing with this in the next couple 01:56:02.200 --> 01:56:04.850 of months, and we talked about it a little yesterday. 01:56:05.090 --> 01:56:07.030 It seems to me that we want to keep it separate, 01:56:07.030 --> 01:56:09.823 at least, that would be used eventually. 01:56:10.620 --> 01:56:12.520 And I'll just let that hang out there. 01:56:12.990 --> 01:56:14.280 But at least for the near term, 01:56:14.280 --> 01:56:17.520 I would think we need EDI and the OCO separate 01:56:17.520 --> 01:56:18.930 and available to you to carry out, 01:56:18.930 --> 01:56:23.490 which incidentally, in a tour of the Eastern European 01:56:23.490 --> 01:56:26.990 countries in the summer, you and your troops 01:56:26.990 --> 01:56:28.753 are doing an extraordinary job. 01:56:29.270 --> 01:56:31.730 And the heel-to-toe makes a lot of sense, I think, 01:56:31.730 --> 01:56:34.803 in the near term, as you've said in your testimony. 01:56:35.350 --> 01:56:36.713 A couple of other things. 01:56:36.820 --> 01:56:38.393 LNG, which was mentioned. 01:56:39.320 --> 01:56:42.760 It is a tool, well, gas is a tool used by Russia 01:56:42.760 --> 01:56:45.673 for economic political purposes. 01:56:46.220 --> 01:56:49.210 We are exporting gas here in the United States. 01:56:49.210 --> 01:56:51.200 It seems to me that's something we ought to consider 01:56:51.200 --> 01:56:56.200 as a strategic tool to deter Russia. 01:56:56.870 --> 01:57:01.483 And it would be in our interest to subsidize natural gas, 01:57:02.420 --> 01:57:06.490 LNG, to Europe, as a way of deterring Russia, 01:57:06.490 --> 01:57:09.363 and pushing back in the most meaningful of ways. 01:57:09.520 --> 01:57:10.833 That is their economy. 01:57:11.290 --> 01:57:13.760 I suspect we ought to do a little economic equation here 01:57:13.760 --> 01:57:18.440 and see what it would cost to provide LNG to Europe 01:57:18.440 --> 01:57:23.343 at a cost similar to what Russia is providing gas. 01:57:24.290 --> 01:57:26.313 It could give us significant leverage. 01:57:26.740 --> 01:57:28.213 with one final question, 01:57:30.150 --> 01:57:35.103 do you need a new low-yield nuclear weapon to deter Russia? 01:57:36.860 --> 01:57:41.743 - Sir, in regards to the Nuclear Posture Review, 01:57:41.900 --> 01:57:43.277 the supplemental weapon systems that are 01:57:43.277 --> 01:57:45.033 a part of that are required. 01:57:45.450 --> 01:57:50.330 What it does is it ensures that we can be confident 01:57:50.330 --> 01:57:55.330 in a response across any scenario that might be projected. 01:57:56.714 --> 01:57:59.353 So I do believe we need those systems. 01:58:00.150 --> 01:58:01.430 - Thank you, I'll yield back. 01:58:01.430 --> 01:58:02.673 Thank you very much. - Thank you. 01:58:05.420 --> 01:58:07.010 - General, you've answered lots of questions 01:58:07.010 --> 01:58:11.183 about hybrid, information, political warfare, 01:58:12.520 --> 01:58:15.410 part of the reason is I think we all are challenged 01:58:15.410 --> 01:58:19.410 by thinking of warfare in non-traditional ways, 01:58:19.410 --> 01:58:23.203 and the role of the military and in doing that. 01:58:24.470 --> 01:58:27.550 You've answered a number of questions about EDI, 01:58:27.550 --> 01:58:30.063 and I think that conversation is very interesting. 01:58:30.330 --> 01:58:34.570 I just want to ask, to Mr. Garamendi's last question 01:58:34.670 --> 01:58:38.470 on nuclear deterrent, can you step back 01:58:38.470 --> 01:58:43.470 from particular weapons systems, and talk more generally 01:58:43.740 --> 01:58:48.100 about the value of having a credible nuclear deterrent 01:58:49.130 --> 01:58:53.530 with an adversary who openly talks about using nuclear 01:58:53.530 --> 01:58:57.423 to counter conventional, about escalating to de-escalate, 01:58:59.980 --> 01:59:02.770 in a region where a lot of allies depend on 01:59:02.770 --> 01:59:06.463 our nuclear deterrent for their security? 01:59:06.553 --> 01:59:10.910 One of my concerns is, many of us thought 01:59:10.910 --> 01:59:14.113 that we didn't have to worry about that stuff anymore. 01:59:14.320 --> 01:59:16.990 And a lot of the, not only the weapons, 01:59:16.990 --> 01:59:21.020 and the delivery systems, but the thinking had atrophied 01:59:21.030 --> 01:59:23.743 after the fall of the Soviet Union. 01:59:24.190 --> 01:59:25.750 We have to pay more attention to it now. 01:59:25.750 --> 01:59:28.300 And so can you just, in a broader sense, 01:59:28.300 --> 01:59:32.650 talk about the role that a credible nuclear deterrent plays 01:59:32.650 --> 01:59:36.763 in what you're having, what you're trying to do every day? 01:59:38.010 --> 01:59:40.010 - Well, if I could I'll just focus on is 01:59:40.160 --> 01:59:42.710 as you step back, and look at a credible deterrent, 01:59:43.080 --> 01:59:45.283 and the importance of having one that, 01:59:46.000 --> 01:59:47.790 a credible deterrent that they understand 01:59:47.790 --> 01:59:49.743 is responsive across the spectrum. 01:59:50.300 --> 01:59:52.420 When you look at escalation management, 01:59:52.420 --> 01:59:54.800 you talked about the Russian comment 01:59:54.800 --> 01:59:56.930 that they'll escalate to de-escalate, 01:59:56.930 --> 01:59:58.403 or escalate to dominate. 01:59:59.480 --> 02:00:02.163 This is a a cognitive exercise. 02:00:02.710 --> 02:00:04.670 It's an influence on the decision maker, 02:00:04.670 --> 02:00:06.333 on Putin, on the other side. 02:00:07.710 --> 02:00:11.333 A credible nuclear capacity, 02:00:13.880 --> 02:00:17.580 a credible one, and our will to use it 02:00:17.580 --> 02:00:19.833 if necessary, for the extreme case, 02:00:20.720 --> 02:00:24.763 known by the adversary is paramount here. 02:00:25.410 --> 02:00:28.003 And then across the spectrum. 02:00:28.770 --> 02:00:31.430 I think their escalate to de-escalate comments 02:00:31.880 --> 02:00:36.313 were centered on a capability at a low end, 02:00:36.380 --> 02:00:38.183 to perhaps gain leverage. 02:00:38.290 --> 02:00:40.140 And what we're saying through the NPR is 02:00:40.140 --> 02:00:41.740 is you won't have that leverage. 02:00:42.350 --> 02:00:45.000 We're going to drive this back to a higher threshold. 02:00:45.800 --> 02:00:48.070 And he can be confident in that, as we enter, 02:00:48.070 --> 02:00:52.117 if we would enter any kind of an escalation at all. 02:00:52.117 --> 02:00:53.640 So that's why it's important, 02:00:53.640 --> 02:00:56.390 because it's the mental approach to this to begin with. 02:00:57.310 --> 02:00:59.363 - Well, I'd just say, from my standpoint, 02:00:59.363 --> 02:01:02.850 we talked yesterday, I guess, about deterrence 02:01:02.850 --> 02:01:05.580 when it comes to space, we talk about deterrence 02:01:05.580 --> 02:01:08.720 when it comes to cyber, one of the challenges, 02:01:08.720 --> 02:01:13.100 I think, for all of us, is to reinvigorate 02:01:13.260 --> 02:01:16.350 our deterrence thinking and intellectual prep, 02:01:16.350 --> 02:01:17.960 because as you said, deterrence is in 02:01:17.960 --> 02:01:19.313 the mind of the adversary. 02:01:19.410 --> 02:01:21.830 And whatever domain we're talking about, 02:01:21.830 --> 02:01:25.683 and I think we've got some making up to do, maybe, there. 02:01:27.070 --> 02:01:29.383 Unless you have something else, I'm good. 02:01:30.040 --> 02:01:32.600 Thank you, sir, for answering our questions. 02:01:32.600 --> 02:01:34.249 And the hearing stands adjourned. 02:01:34.249 --> 02:01:35.963 (gavel tapping) - Thank you, Chairman.