WEBVTT

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(gavel bangs)

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- The hearing will come to order.

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The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today

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to review the Administration's FY2019 budget request

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for missile defense spending

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and to discuss related policies with our witnesses.

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This is an incredibly important and timely discussion,

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given the increasing missile threats facing our nation.

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Over the past year,

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we have witnessed dangerous advances

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in North Korea's ballistic missile capabilities.

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Kim Jong Un conducted a record number

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of ballistic missile tests,

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including tests of two new systems

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that appear to have range sufficient

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to hold the United States at risk.

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The Administration has responded to this growing threat.

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In September,

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the Department of Defense submitted a request

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to reprogram about $400 million in FY2017 funds

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towards urgent missile defense requirements.

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Additionally,

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in November the Administration

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amended its FY2018 budget request

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to include almost $4 billion in additional funds

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for missile defense and defeat activities,

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including the expansion of our

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ground-based midcourse defense system

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by an additional 20 interceptors by 2023.

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This robust support for missile defense

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continues in the FY2019 request,

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which includes almost a 25% increase

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in the Missile Defense Agency's budget.

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While I strongly support these increases,

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it is this Subcommittee's responsibility

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to ensure they meet the warfighters' needs today

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and invest in advanced technology

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to stay ahead of tomorrow's threats.

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Furthermore,

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while North Korea ballistic missiles

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remain the principal threat against which

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our homeland missile defenses are arrayed,

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it represents only a portion of the broader missile threat.

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A report released last year by the

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National Air and Space Intelligence Center

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noted that Russia retains the largest force

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of strategic ballistic missiles,

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while China has the most active and diverse

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ballistic missile development program in the world,

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and both nations continue to invest in hypersonic

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and cruise missiles designed to strike

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forward-deployed US forces and in some case, the homeland.

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Testifying on these issues before us today

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is a distinguished panel.

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We have John Rood, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,

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and General Lori Robinson,

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Commander of US Northern Command and NORAD,

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and General Robinson,

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as this is likely the last time we will hear from you

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in anticipation of your retirement,

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I also want to thank you for your 36 years

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of distinguished service to this country.

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- Thank you, ma'am.

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- I think I speak for all of us when I say

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it has been a pleasure to work with you

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and we wish you the best of luck.

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We're also joined by Lieutenant General Sam Greaves,

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director of the Missile Defense Agency,

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and Lieutenant General James Dickinson,

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who holds the title of Commanding General,

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United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command,

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among many others.

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Thank you all for being with us today.

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We look forward to your comments

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and I would now like to recognize our ranking member,

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Senator Donnelly,

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for any opening remarks he would like to make.

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- Thank you, Madam Chair,

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I'd like to thank all the witnesses

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and General Robinson, congratulations.

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Thank you for all your service to our country

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for all the amazing things you have done

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for our nation to make it stronger.

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I want to thank Senator Fischer for holding this hearing.

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Let me also thank today's witnesses for testifying.

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We very much appreciate your time

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and the work you do every day in service of our nation.

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Protecting our country, our forward-deployed troops,

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and our allies around the world

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is of the utmost importance,

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and the threats have not stood still

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since this Subcommittee last met on the subject.

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For just one example,

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as General Greaves and I discussed yesterday,

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North Korea has made rapid progress

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on its intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

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As we await the release of the Defense Missile Review,

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it's important we take this opportunity

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to review the fiscal year 19 budget request

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to ensure it provides sufficient resources

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to continue the work of getting our missile defense systems

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to perform reliably and effectively.

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We also need to continue improving our sensor

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and discrimination capabilities

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so we have a better picture of the threats,

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and we need to continue to conduct smart stimulation,

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simulation, and testing before we commit

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to buying new technologies.

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While we continue to improve the homeland defense systems,

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we should not take our eyes off the ball

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when it comes to protecting our deployed troops

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and reassuring our allies and partners.

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The demand from our combatant commanders

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for Aegis ships, THAAD, and Patriot batteries remains high.

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We need to consider how we can best allocate these systems

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and effectively train the warfighters who will operate them

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to provide the protection that is needed

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in today's demanding environment.

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Again, thank you for coming today.

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We look forward to the dialogue and to your testimony.

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Thank you, Madam Chair.

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- Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

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Secretary Rood, I'd like to welcome you

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if you would like to make comments to the Committee.

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- Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Donnelly,

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distinguished members of the Committee,

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thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of

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the Administration's fiscal year 19 budget request.

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With regard to the security environment today,

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the United States faces an increasingly complex

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security environment in which the central challenge

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to our prosperity and security is the re-emergence

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of long-term strategic competition

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driven by revisionist powers in China and Russia.

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Although they pose separate challenges

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with unique attributes,

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both China and Russia seek to reshape the world order

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and change territorial borders.

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Consequently,

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they pose increasing security threats

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to the United States and our allies and partners.

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Long-term competition with China and Russia requires

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increased US and allied partner military investment

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because of the magnitude of the threats they pose today

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and the potential that such threats

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will increase in the future.

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We must also simultaneously strengthen our efforts

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to deter and counter the clear and present danger

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posed by rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran.

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The US military remains the strongest in the world.

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However, our advantages are eroding

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as potential adversaries modernize and build up

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their conventional and nuclear forces.

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In particular,

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they are fielding a broad and expanding arsenal

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of new and more advanced missiles,

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capable of threatening the US,

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our forces abroad, and its allies and partners.

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Although this picture is unsettling, and not what we desire,

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as Secretary of Defense Mattis has pointed out, and I quote,

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"We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is,

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not as we wish it to be," end quote.

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The Administration has heeded this admonition

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in recent strategic reviews.

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In the National Security Strategy,

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the National Defense Strategy,

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as well as the Nuclear Posture Review,

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they reflect a consistent and pragmatic assessment

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of the threats and uncertainties we face

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in the future security environment.

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Our task at DoD is to ensure

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that the US military advantage endures,

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and in combination with other elements of national power,

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that we are fully able to meet the increasing challenges

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to our national security.

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With this as a strategic context,

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let me turn to a discussion

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of the FY19 budget request for missile defense,

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and the policies, programs, and capabilities it supports.

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The Department's budget request

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supports the President's direction

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set out in the National Security Strategy

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to deploy a layered missile defense system

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to protect the American homeland from North Korean

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and Iranian missile threats.

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The request also supports regional missile defenses

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to protect our deployed forces, allies and partners.

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Our missile defense system not only protects

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the United States.

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It strengthens deterrence of war

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and assurance of allies and partners.

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Today, the GMD,

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or Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System

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provides protection for the nation.

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General Greaves and others will discuss

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some of its attributes,

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but as noted by you, Senator Fischer,

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in September of last year DoD requested the reprogramming

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of 2017 funding of more than $400 million

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to counter the North Korean missile threat,

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and we appreciate the support that we received

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from Congress for this request.

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A portion of these funds support

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the important homeland defense activities,

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including initiating work on the procurement

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of 20 additional ground-based interceptors

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in Alaska as early as 2023,

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which will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors.

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This reprogramming also funded a service life extension

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to the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska

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and software upgrades to the sea-based x-band radar

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which are both essential elements of our homeland defense.

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Of course,

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last November the President submitted an amendment

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to the FY18 budget request for $4 million

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of additional funding for missile defense,

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which includes construction of a new missile field

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at Fort Greely, Alaska,

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and additional procurement funding

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for the necessary 20 GBIs.

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The FY 19 budget request includes $9.9 billion

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for the Missile Defense Agency and $3 billion

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for air and missile defense programs in the services.

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This budget funds a more capable ground-based interceptor

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with a redesigned kill vehicle,

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the deployment of new missile tracking

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and discrimination sensors in Alaska,

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Hawaii, and the Pacific region,

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and a new space-based kill assessment capability.

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These near-term investments will enable us to obtain

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substantially more performance and efficiency

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out of the GMD system necessary to meet the evolving threat.

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We are also moving forward to bolster homeland defenses

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against air and cruise missile threats.

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In 2018,

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we will complete the first part of a two-phase effort

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to provide effective surveillance against missile threats

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to the national capital region.

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Doing so will enhance our ability to detect, track,

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and investigate suspicious aircraft

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as well as cruise missiles,

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and when necessary cue our missile defense systems

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against the full spectrum of air threats.

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We're on track to begin the second phase

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of this effort in fiscal year 19.

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We're also looking at technologies and concepts

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that could be used to provide scalable

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and deployable options for expanding this capability.

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The Department's FY 19 budget request

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also continues deployment of regional missile defenses

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tailored to meet the missile threats to US forces abroad

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and allies and partners in Europe,

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the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region.

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The budget enhances our regional missile defense capability

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through additional Patriot missiles as well as THAAD,

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SM3 Block 1B and SM3 Block 2A interceptors.

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Our focus is on developing and fielding capabilities

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that are mobile and relocatable,

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which allows us flexibility to respond to a crisis

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or conflict wherever it emerges.

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We're also encouraging our allies and partners

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in Europe, the Middle East, and in Asia

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to acquire MD capabilities and strengthen

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missile defense cooperation in order to move towards

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a more interoperable and integrated

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missile defense architecture.

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Looking forward,

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it's clear potential adversaries are modernizing

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and expanding their missile capabilities.

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We must ensure that our missile defense investment

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and strategy enable us to meet

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the most dangerous missile threats today,

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while enabling us to counter

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future missile threats as they expand.

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Areas for work on advanced technology

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include improved discrimination in our sensor architecture,

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lasers to intercept offensive missiles

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during their most vulnerable boost phase of flight,

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evaluating space-based sensor concepts,

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and the multi-object kill vehicle.

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Let me conclude by saying that

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in an increasingly complex

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and threatening security environment,

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DoD must sustain the capabilities needed to deter

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and defend against attacks on our homeland,

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US deployed forces abroad, allies, and partners.

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We must make the investments needed

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to address the ongoing erosion

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of our operational advantages

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and remain the pre-eminent military power in the world.

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Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

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I look forward to your questions.

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- Thank you Mister Secretary.

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Your full statements will be included in the record.

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General Robinson.

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- Ma'am, sir, first of all thank you very much.

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I am certainly honored to be sitting here

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and testifying with this Committee,

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especially along with my brothers.

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It's an honor for me.

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As what's been mentioned is the strategic environment

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and threats facing our nation continue to evolve,

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as you have both mentioned,

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our adversaries are taking deliberate steps

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to extend their operational reach

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and are developing new capabilities

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to range targets in North America,

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in the United States and Canada.

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At US Northern Command and NORAD,

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we understand the urgency of keeping pace

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with these evolving threats.

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We also recognize that North Korea

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represents the most immediate threat to our homeland,

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and therefore remains NORTHCOM's highest priority.

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I'm confident that the ground-based midcourse defense system

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can defeat the threat today,

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and I've testified in front of every committee

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and have said so and I remain confident.

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And I strongly support the continued improvements

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to the ballistic missile defense enterprise

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in order to maintain our advantage.

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We continue to work with the Missile Defense Agency,

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the intelligence community, and other combatant commands

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as part of our collaborative effort to outpace the threat.

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I'm grateful, quite frankly,

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for the Committee's approval of the FY 17

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above-threshold reprogramming

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and support the budget amendment,

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and this will increase the system's capability and capacity.

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Under my NORAD responsibility,

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advanced cruise missiles with a low radar cross-section

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represent a challenge to our air defense systems.

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Russia continues to modernize its delivery systems,

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long-range bombers and strategic submarines

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capable of launching from distances not previously seen,

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reducing the indication and warnings

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we are likely to receive from a combat launch.

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To defend against these advanced cruise missiles,

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we must make prudent investments,

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as you both have talked about,

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and we appreciate in advance sensors

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and defensive weapons systems

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to protect our nation's vital assets.

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The men, the women, the warriors

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of US Northern Command and NORAD

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stand united in a common purpose,

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ready to face the threats to the United States

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and Canada today,

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and we are evolving to face the threats of tomorrow.

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Ladies and gentlemen,

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you need to know we have the watch.

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Ma'am, sir, as you both have indicated,

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I'm getting to have the privilege to retire.

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I have to tell you both that after

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36 years of serving my nation,

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and after these last two years of having

15:18.260 --> 15:22.793
this sacred responsibility of defending our nation,

15:24.480 --> 15:28.223
I want you both to know, I want all of you to understand,

15:28.410 --> 15:31.510
my gratitude and my heartfelt appreciation

15:31.510 --> 15:34.410
for what you do to support NORAD

15:34.410 --> 15:36.583
and US Northern Command every day.

15:37.270 --> 15:39.603
To our nations armed forces,

15:39.940 --> 15:42.600
soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, civilians,

15:42.600 --> 15:45.713
and in my NORAD hat, the Canadians,

15:46.030 --> 15:47.960
what you do each and every day.

15:47.960 --> 15:49.603
You know, people say to me,

15:49.637 --> 15:51.737
"Hey, thank you for what you do,"

15:52.560 --> 15:56.880
but I know I can't do what I do if you don't do what you

15:57.197 --> 15:59.963
and your back-benchers do each and every day.

16:00.330 --> 16:04.313
So thank you very much. I welcome your questions.

16:04.313 --> 16:06.563
(applause)

16:11.800 --> 16:13.210
- Thank you, General.
- Yes, ma'am.

16:13.210 --> 16:14.110
- General Greaves.

16:15.370 --> 16:17.863
- Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly,

16:18.220 --> 16:20.320
distinguished members of the Subcommittee,

16:20.520 --> 16:22.340
thank you for this opportunity to testify

16:22.340 --> 16:23.730
on the Missile Defense Agency's

16:23.730 --> 16:26.343
budget request for fiscal year 2019.

16:27.300 --> 16:29.510
I would first like to express our appreciation

16:29.510 --> 16:31.450
to this Committee for its support

16:31.450 --> 16:34.460
of the Department's above-threshold reprogram request

16:34.610 --> 16:39.010
in September 2017 and the FY 2018 budget amendment,

16:39.010 --> 16:41.170
which provided reprogramming approval

16:41.470 --> 16:43.360
and emergency funding to enhance

16:43.360 --> 16:46.303
the nation's missile defeat and defense capabilities.

16:46.900 --> 16:48.760
I'm also pleased to report that we are

16:48.760 --> 16:51.563
executing those funds with the utmost urgency.

16:52.306 --> 16:54.510
I would also like to take a second to thank

16:54.510 --> 16:56.160
the thousands of men and women

16:56.160 --> 16:58.000
across government and industry

16:58.530 --> 17:00.950
who work tirelessly every single day

17:00.950 --> 17:03.660
across the globe in support of our nation's

17:03.660 --> 17:05.310
ballistic missile defense system.

17:05.770 --> 17:08.483
They remain our asymmetric advantage.

17:09.910 --> 17:11.230
Over the past year,

17:11.230 --> 17:14.230
we've been given a clear and unambiguous message

17:14.230 --> 17:16.460
from the President that we are committed

17:16.460 --> 17:18.790
to expanding and improving a state of the art

17:18.790 --> 17:21.913
missile defense system, so in my mind,

17:22.240 --> 17:25.080
the time for delays and more studies

17:25.210 --> 17:27.143
and more objections is over.

17:28.020 --> 17:28.860
As I say it,

17:28.860 --> 17:32.231
the threat has voted and continues to visibly vote

17:32.231 --> 17:34.973
through a demonstration of capabilities.

17:36.410 --> 17:37.700
Last summer I laid out three

17:37.700 --> 17:40.660
Missile Defense Agency priorities to help guide

17:40.660 --> 17:44.023
our actions, our behavior, and program planning.

17:44.910 --> 17:47.210
First, we will continue to focus

17:47.210 --> 17:49.200
on increasing system reliability

17:49.410 --> 17:51.253
to build warfighter confidence.

17:52.020 --> 17:54.960
Second, we will increase engagement capability

17:54.960 --> 17:57.940
and capacity, and third,

17:57.940 --> 17:59.853
we will address the advanced threat.

18:01.150 --> 18:02.780
I can tell you that the current

18:02.780 --> 18:05.533
ballistic missile defense system meets today's threat.

18:06.290 --> 18:08.250
However, as the threat increases

18:08.250 --> 18:10.453
in both number and lethality,

18:10.780 --> 18:14.173
we need to ensure that our systems will remain reliable,

18:14.530 --> 18:17.033
remain secure from cybersecurity threats,

18:17.560 --> 18:19.990
and that the nation's ballistic missile defense capability

18:19.990 --> 18:22.703
and capacity keep pace with that threat.

18:23.700 --> 18:26.830
We currently have 44 emplaced ground-based interceptors

18:26.830 --> 18:28.810
for homeland defense and plan

18:28.810 --> 18:31.863
to expand the fleet to 64 by 2023.

18:32.830 --> 18:35.250
In addition, improvements in sensor coverage

18:35.250 --> 18:37.490
to include the long-range discriminating radar

18:37.490 --> 18:38.653
in clear Alaska,

18:39.060 --> 18:41.050
the addition of a homeland defense radar

18:41.050 --> 18:42.653
in Hawaii is approved,

18:43.050 --> 18:45.624
and planning for a homeland defense radar in the Pacific

18:45.624 --> 18:48.720
as well as advanced discrimination improvements

18:49.020 --> 18:50.490
will enable the United States

18:50.490 --> 18:52.390
to improve protection of the homeland.

18:53.280 --> 18:54.900
The Agency will also continue

18:54.900 --> 18:58.163
its redesigned kill vehicle development efforts,

18:58.620 --> 19:01.363
enhance the stockpile liability program,

19:01.770 --> 19:04.743
and expand the ground-based interceptor battlespace.

19:06.080 --> 19:08.330
Integrated space and terrestrial sensors

19:08.330 --> 19:11.020
for cueing, tracking, discrimination,

19:11.020 --> 19:13.010
and targeting ballistic missile threats

19:13.010 --> 19:15.640
are critical to improving missile defense

19:15.640 --> 19:17.193
architectural robustness.

19:18.000 --> 19:19.760
This budget will continue to fund

19:19.760 --> 19:22.780
the space-based kill assessment demonstration program

19:23.360 --> 19:26.290
to deliver a capability to confirm intercepts

19:26.290 --> 19:28.493
for improved defense of the homeland.

19:29.200 --> 19:31.870
We're also continuing concept definition studies

19:31.870 --> 19:34.773
for space-based missile defense tracking sensors,

19:35.200 --> 19:38.170
and if pursued, space sensors will be able to detect

19:38.170 --> 19:41.370
and track traditional and emerging threats

19:41.670 --> 19:43.763
as part of the BMDS architecture.

19:45.310 --> 19:46.610
We will continue to install

19:46.610 --> 19:48.840
the Aegis ballistic missile defense weapons system

19:48.840 --> 19:50.840
on Aegis ships and deliver

19:50.840 --> 19:53.763
standard missile 3 block 1B interceptors.

19:54.450 --> 19:58.163
We're also supporting the European phase of active approach,

19:58.350 --> 19:59.980
providing coverage and protection

19:59.980 --> 20:02.360
of NATO European territory, populations,

20:02.360 --> 20:03.817
and our deployed forces

20:03.817 --> 20:06.788
against the increasing ballistic missile threat

20:06.788 --> 20:08.203
from the Middle East.

20:09.130 --> 20:11.840
Our request will support continued integration

20:11.840 --> 20:14.283
of the SM3 Block 2A missile,

20:14.520 --> 20:16.460
a co-development effort with Japan

20:16.460 --> 20:19.940
into the Aegis ballistic missile defense weapons system

20:20.360 --> 20:22.450
and the pre-production of all-up rounds

20:22.450 --> 20:25.683
to support the initial deployment for EPAA Phase Three.

20:26.920 --> 20:28.620
Currently, there is an operational

20:28.620 --> 20:30.933
Aegis Ashore site located in Romania,

20:31.430 --> 20:33.210
and while we have experienced delays

20:33.210 --> 20:35.010
in the military construction portion

20:35.020 --> 20:37.003
of the Aegis Ashore effort in Poland,

20:37.480 --> 20:40.170
we remain steadfastly committed

20:40.208 --> 20:42.460
to delivery of that capability

20:42.460 --> 20:44.713
in support of EPAA Phase Three.

20:45.850 --> 20:49.340
Finally, this budget request will continue the exploration

20:49.340 --> 20:53.173
of breakthrough technologies for integration into the BMDS,

20:53.550 --> 20:55.723
including discrimination improvements,

20:56.400 --> 20:58.723
multi-object kill vehicle technology,

20:58.960 --> 21:00.943
hypersonic defense technology,

21:01.260 --> 21:03.403
space-based intercept detect technology,

21:03.700 --> 21:06.790
and exploring high-powered lasers and interceptors

21:06.790 --> 21:09.010
that have potential use against threat missiles

21:09.010 --> 21:10.393
in a boost phase of flight.

21:11.420 --> 21:14.300
As we evaluate the elements of the missile defense system,

21:14.300 --> 21:16.620
we will actively pursue developing elements

21:16.620 --> 21:20.200
that have multi-mission and department-wide utility

21:20.200 --> 21:22.423
and leverage those systems.

21:22.760 --> 21:25.010
One such activity is with the F35

21:25.010 --> 21:28.093
that may have residual capability for missile defense.

21:29.270 --> 21:30.700
Mister Chairman and members of the,

21:30.700 --> 21:33.210
Madam Chairman, I apologize,

21:33.210 --> 21:34.823
and members of the Subcommittee,

21:34.990 --> 21:36.830
I look forward to answering your questions.

21:36.830 --> 21:37.663
Thank you.

21:39.310 --> 21:41.603
- Thank you, General. General Dickinson.

21:44.440 --> 21:46.090
- Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly,

21:46.090 --> 21:48.690
and other distinguished members of the Subcommittee,

21:48.700 --> 21:51.180
thank you for your continued support of our soldiers,

21:51.180 --> 21:52.743
civilians, and their families.

21:52.930 --> 21:55.424
I'm honored today to testify before you

21:55.424 --> 21:58.360
to emphasize the importance of air and missile defense

21:58.360 --> 22:01.743
to our nation, deployed forces, allies, and partners.

22:02.090 --> 22:04.810
Air and missile defense threats continue to increase,

22:04.810 --> 22:07.803
both in quantity and offensive capability.

22:08.090 --> 22:10.560
With this in mind, I appreciate your continued support

22:10.560 --> 22:12.910
for the nation's air and missile defense forces

22:13.060 --> 22:15.950
as we fulfill our role in securing the nation today

22:16.120 --> 22:18.880
and developing future forces and capabilities

22:18.880 --> 22:20.713
to counter tomorrow's threats.

22:21.180 --> 22:23.200
I'd like to briefly summarize the missions

22:23.200 --> 22:24.943
of the organizations I command.

22:25.410 --> 22:28.470
First, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command,

22:28.470 --> 22:31.543
Army Forces Strategic Command, SMDC/ARSTRAT,

22:32.320 --> 22:34.400
serves as a force provider in support

22:34.400 --> 22:35.943
of our combatant commanders.

22:36.170 --> 22:39.463
Our six priorities are to protect our homeland,

22:39.580 --> 22:42.433
provide combat-ready forces and capabilities,

22:42.570 --> 22:45.373
plan and conduct synchronized global operations,

22:45.590 --> 22:48.963
prepare or adapt lead-ahead concepts in technologies,

22:49.180 --> 22:52.030
preserve and account for the nation's critical resources,

22:52.090 --> 22:54.883
and promote and foster a positive command climate.

22:55.360 --> 22:57.880
We provide not only air and missile defense forces,

22:57.880 --> 22:59.983
but also Army space forces.

23:00.300 --> 23:02.040
The Army has more than 4,000

23:02.040 --> 23:04.203
military and civilian space cadre,

23:04.260 --> 23:06.648
providing continuous space-based capabilities

23:06.648 --> 23:09.513
in support to the warfighter around the world,

23:09.590 --> 23:12.093
from satellite communications to missile warning.

23:12.660 --> 23:16.290
SMDC/ARSTRAT's Future Warfare Center and Technical Center

23:16.510 --> 23:19.023
develop space and missile defense concepts,

23:19.070 --> 23:20.653
requirements, and doctrine.

23:20.960 --> 23:23.210
We provide training to the Army space cadre

23:23.210 --> 23:25.800
and missile defense operators and execute

23:25.800 --> 23:28.350
space and missile defense research and development.

23:28.630 --> 23:30.500
Within the SMDC/ARSTRAT,

23:30.500 --> 23:32.680
we are collaborating closely with the Army's

23:32.680 --> 23:35.403
Air and Missile Defense cross-functional team.

23:35.630 --> 23:38.363
This effort is key to rapidly developing requirements

23:38.363 --> 23:42.170
and ensuring these future capabilities transition quickly

23:42.380 --> 23:45.503
from concept to prototyping to fielding.

23:45.860 --> 23:48.510
We are focusing on capabilities that include mobile,

23:48.510 --> 23:51.173
short-range air defense, and directed energy.

23:52.020 --> 23:54.430
I also have the honor and the privilege to command

23:54.430 --> 23:56.380
the Joint Functional Component Command

23:56.380 --> 23:59.703
for Integrated Missile Defense, or JFCCIMD,

23:59.890 --> 24:02.370
which supports United States Strategic Command

24:02.520 --> 24:04.340
by integrating and synchronizing

24:04.400 --> 24:06.563
global missile defense operations.

24:06.850 --> 24:09.023
In support of US STRATCOM,

24:09.150 --> 24:13.483
JFCCIMD executes these five essential missile defense tasks:

24:14.190 --> 24:16.313
synchronizing operational-level planning,

24:16.370 --> 24:18.363
supporting ongoing operations,

24:18.540 --> 24:22.063
integrating training exercises and test activities globally,

24:22.230 --> 24:25.080
providing recommendations on the allocation of low-density,

24:25.080 --> 24:27.380
high-demand missile defense resources,

24:27.380 --> 24:30.223
and also advocating for future capabilities.

24:30.700 --> 24:32.010
To accomplish this,

24:32.010 --> 24:34.360
we maintain close collaborative relationships

24:34.360 --> 24:36.503
with the geographic combatant commands,

24:36.650 --> 24:38.223
the Missile Defense Agency,

24:38.270 --> 24:40.323
the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

24:40.330 --> 24:43.003
the Joint Staff, and our allies and partners.

24:43.490 --> 24:46.010
Lastly, it's important to highlight that the challenges

24:46.010 --> 24:49.540
that we face cannot be overcome without the dedication

24:49.540 --> 24:52.963
of our most precious asset, our people.

24:53.600 --> 24:55.700
The service members, civilians, and contractors,

24:55.700 --> 24:57.070
along with their families,

24:57.070 --> 24:59.203
stationed at home and globally deployed,

24:59.300 --> 25:01.900
provide support to the Army and joint warfighter

25:01.900 --> 25:03.113
each and every day.

25:03.350 --> 25:05.980
We are committed to providing trained and ready soldiers

25:05.980 --> 25:07.990
and civilians and developing effective

25:07.990 --> 25:09.769
space and missile defense capabilities

25:09.769 --> 25:12.843
to counter the threats of today and tomorrow.

25:13.390 --> 25:15.530
I appreciate the Committee's continued support

25:15.530 --> 25:18.720
of missile defense operations and especially your support

25:18.720 --> 25:21.430
of the men and women who deploy, develop,

25:21.430 --> 25:23.723
and operate these complicated systems.

25:24.320 --> 25:26.981
I have addressed in detail the full range of these missions

25:26.981 --> 25:30.663
and how we are executing them today in my written statement,

25:30.860 --> 25:33.823
which as Madam, you said will be submitted for the record.

25:33.850 --> 25:35.923
I look forward to addressing your questions.

25:35.969 --> 25:36.802
Thank you.

25:37.940 --> 25:39.440
- Thank you you all very much.

25:39.480 --> 25:42.053
We'll begin our first round of questions.

25:42.290 --> 25:44.823
General Robinson and General Greaves,

25:45.240 --> 25:50.190
you both have talked about the defense capabilities

25:50.190 --> 25:54.720
that we have currently with the most pressing threat

25:54.720 --> 25:58.670
that we have, and that's North Korea, but in your opinion,

25:58.670 --> 26:01.733
does this budget keep us on a path to stay ahead

26:01.733 --> 26:04.400
of the threat that's posed by North Korea?

26:04.400 --> 26:06.570
- So, ma'am, I'll talk first and then I'll let

26:06.570 --> 26:08.440
General Greaves since he's the smart one,

26:08.440 --> 26:11.463
and here's what I worry about.

26:11.505 --> 26:13.070
As I've paid attention,

26:13.070 --> 26:18.070
so we appreciate the ATR that was given to us last fall,

26:18.400 --> 26:20.423
it allows us to build capacity.

26:20.570 --> 26:22.580
You and I have chatted a couple of times.

26:22.580 --> 26:26.480
The fact is when we looked at what KJU was doing

26:26.480 --> 26:29.853
last May versus what happened through the summertime,

26:29.920 --> 26:33.100
this capacity and this redesigned kill vehicles

26:33.100 --> 26:34.963
will be very good for us in Alaska,

26:35.000 --> 26:35.833
but at the same time,

26:35.833 --> 26:38.114
we're not taking our eye off of

26:38.114 --> 26:41.020
having better discriminating radar,

26:41.020 --> 26:42.810
so I would tell you that where we are

26:42.810 --> 26:45.199
and what we're doing right now keeps us

26:45.199 --> 26:48.143
ahead of what's happening,

26:48.260 --> 26:49.940
we just can't keep our eye off the ball.

26:49.940 --> 26:52.240
And then I'll turn it over to General Greaves.

26:53.350 --> 26:57.310
- Chairman Fischer, the answer's yes, as I mentioned,

26:57.310 --> 26:59.550
the current ballistic missile defense system

26:59.550 --> 27:04.493
can meet today's threat, and with both, well, the FY 17 ATR,

27:05.441 --> 27:07.940
the FY 18 budget amendment, and this budget,

27:07.940 --> 27:11.983
what it does is increase our capability,

27:12.170 --> 27:14.200
our capacity, more rounds in the ground,

27:14.200 --> 27:16.965
whether it's ground-based interceptors, or THAADs,

27:16.965 --> 27:21.073
or Aegis SM3 1Bs, and ultimately the 2As,

27:21.330 --> 27:24.240
and so I believe we are perfectly positioned

27:24.240 --> 27:25.730
to defend against the threat.

27:25.730 --> 27:27.423
The other thing the budget does,

27:27.630 --> 27:30.560
it helps us keep our eye on the advancing threat

27:30.560 --> 27:34.283
as North Korea in particular and Iran,

27:34.460 --> 27:37.620
as they both increase their capability,

27:37.620 --> 27:39.857
both in numbers and lethality,

27:39.970 --> 27:43.390
we must ensure that we look ahead at what capability

27:43.390 --> 27:46.723
will be required to stay apace of that threat.

27:47.060 --> 27:48.540
One research area we're working with

27:48.540 --> 27:50.650
is in the area of space sensors

27:50.650 --> 27:55.300
or deploying the terrestrial architecture to space

27:55.306 --> 27:58.693
to supplement and augment what's on the ground.

27:59.060 --> 28:02.593
So keeping track of that capability's quite essential.

28:02.600 --> 28:03.433
Thank you.

28:03.433 --> 28:07.833
- And US Forces Korea, you submitted that GEON request,

28:08.140 --> 28:12.400
and can you talk a little bit about the request

28:12.400 --> 28:14.560
and the importance of receiving funding this year?

28:14.560 --> 28:16.020
You outlined it a little bit,

28:16.020 --> 28:20.083
but what is the priority for it this year?

28:20.650 --> 28:22.100
- It's a very high priority.

28:22.100 --> 28:24.950
In fact, it was sensitized to me

28:24.950 --> 28:28.873
during my last visit to Korea with General Brooks.

28:29.160 --> 28:34.070
We spent over an hour about two to three feet away,

28:34.070 --> 28:36.000
and he impressed upon me the importance

28:36.000 --> 28:39.483
of what's in that GEON.

28:39.810 --> 28:42.790
What it does, it, a couple of things.

28:42.790 --> 28:47.710
One, it allows us to disconnect the fiber tie

28:47.710 --> 28:51.050
between the THAAD control center and its launchers

28:51.050 --> 28:54.343
to increase the battle space by moving the launchers out.

28:54.680 --> 28:57.010
It allows the Patriot capability

28:57.061 --> 29:00.310
to essentially use the power of the THAAD radar

29:00.490 --> 29:01.990
to expand its battle space,

29:01.990 --> 29:04.910
and then it does what I believe is extremely important,

29:04.910 --> 29:09.470
integrates THAAD and Patriot to essentially optimize

29:09.470 --> 29:11.860
use of the interceptors so you minimize

29:11.860 --> 29:13.343
or eliminate wastage.

29:13.540 --> 29:16.970
So, for General Brooks being right there on the front line,

29:16.970 --> 29:18.740
that was extremely important to him

29:18.740 --> 29:20.790
to ensure that we expand the battle space

29:21.120 --> 29:23.753
and optimize use of those precious assets.

29:25.040 --> 29:28.450
- And usually, items on the EUFOR list

29:28.720 --> 29:30.380
are there because they were judged to be

29:30.380 --> 29:32.440
of lower priorities than the items

29:32.440 --> 29:36.057
that are included in the basic budget request,

29:36.057 --> 29:37.900
and as I understand it, however,

29:37.900 --> 29:40.428
this funding appears on the EUFOR list

29:40.428 --> 29:42.670
as a result of timing.

29:42.670 --> 29:43.893
Is that correct?

29:44.220 --> 29:47.159
- That's correct, and the items you see--

29:47.159 --> 29:49.540
- [Deb] It's not a reflection of the priority,

29:49.540 --> 29:50.616
then, in this case?

29:50.616 --> 29:53.793
- Not in my mind.
- It's all due to timing.

29:53.870 --> 29:54.970
- Yes, ma'am.
- Okay.

29:55.560 --> 30:00.063
And Secretary Rood, when do you expect to complete the MDR?

30:01.930 --> 30:04.780
- We're in the process of doing that work now as we speak,

30:04.780 --> 30:07.460
Senator, and we're looking in the near term here,

30:07.460 --> 30:09.483
in the spring to finish that review.

30:10.340 --> 30:11.360
There are a number of,

30:11.360 --> 30:12.433
you've highlighted in your statement

30:12.433 --> 30:14.550
some of the challenges and the threat environment

30:14.550 --> 30:17.390
that we face, so we're eager to stay ahead of that threat,

30:17.390 --> 30:20.290
and we're looking at some competing approaches to do that,

30:20.300 --> 30:22.500
but I expect we'll have that shortly to you.

30:23.090 --> 30:26.980
- General Hyten noted some difficult policy questions

30:26.980 --> 30:30.967
in there and we heard that boost-phase term

30:33.049 --> 30:37.053
on an opening statement that that's a big challenge.

30:37.420 --> 30:41.680
Is the Department formulating any policies to fill that gap

30:41.680 --> 30:46.680
so that you can address those challenges that are associated

30:47.360 --> 30:51.833
with the boost-phase intercept as part of the MDR?

30:52.970 --> 30:55.313
- Yes, we're looking at boost-phase defense.

30:55.470 --> 30:57.313
There is, as mentioned,

30:57.490 --> 30:59.840
this is a period during the missile's flight

30:59.840 --> 31:02.030
when it is vulnerable to attack.

31:02.030 --> 31:06.000
It's a challenging period to be able to execute

31:06.000 --> 31:08.130
an effective missile defense during that period

31:08.130 --> 31:10.883
due to the geographic constraints and other things,

31:11.000 --> 31:13.330
but we are looking at a variety of ways

31:13.330 --> 31:15.053
to try to accomplish that goal.

31:15.120 --> 31:17.323
- Including lasers?
- Yes.

31:17.960 --> 31:19.633
- Thank you. Senator Donnelly.

31:21.140 --> 31:22.300
- Thank you, Madam Chair,

31:22.300 --> 31:25.893
and I wanna thank all the witnesses again for being here.

31:26.501 --> 31:30.740
Undersecretary Rood, could you tell me how and why

31:30.740 --> 31:34.150
the Review changed from the Ballistic Missile Defense Review

31:34.520 --> 31:36.020
to the Missile Defense Review?

31:37.310 --> 31:39.130
- In terms of the rationale, Senator,

31:39.130 --> 31:41.490
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review is looking,

31:41.490 --> 31:43.460
of course, at ballistic missile defense,

31:43.460 --> 31:46.533
defense of missiles that fly over a ballistic trajectory.

31:46.860 --> 31:50.290
The thought process was that there are other forms

31:50.290 --> 31:52.710
of missile attack, cruise missile attack,

31:52.710 --> 31:55.183
hypersonic glide vehicles and the like,

31:55.300 --> 31:57.490
that were of a similar nature in their challenge

31:57.490 --> 32:00.240
and the integrated air and missile defense systems

32:00.240 --> 32:03.800
that the services are pursuing to provide defense

32:03.800 --> 32:05.210
for our troops in the field,

32:05.210 --> 32:07.173
our allies and things of that nature,

32:07.360 --> 32:10.040
that it was important to see a connection there

32:10.131 --> 32:11.690
and that that was the rationale.

32:11.690 --> 32:12.523
Of course,

32:12.523 --> 32:14.580
it predated my arrival at the department to do that,

32:14.580 --> 32:17.366
but I support that decision because of the integrated

32:17.366 --> 32:20.483
security challenge that we face with those threats.

32:21.300 --> 32:22.133
- General Greaves,

32:22.133 --> 32:23.610
can you tell us how you contributed

32:23.610 --> 32:25.610
and put into the Missile Defense Review?

32:28.560 --> 32:31.530
- Yes sir, we have key members of our staff

32:31.530 --> 32:33.220
from the Engineering Directorate,

32:33.220 --> 32:35.840
from our command and control battle management directorate,

32:35.840 --> 32:37.220
from other parts of the organization

32:37.220 --> 32:40.100
that have met frequently with other members

32:40.100 --> 32:44.513
within the Department and helped construct the MDR.

32:44.730 --> 32:46.363
So we've been actively involved.

32:46.680 --> 32:48.550
- General Robinson, could you please tell us

32:48.550 --> 32:49.940
how you helped contribute input

32:49.940 --> 32:52.053
into the Missile Defense Review process?

32:52.110 --> 32:54.450
- Absolutely, I think what's important

32:54.450 --> 32:56.980
as the warfighter and the one defending the United States,

32:56.980 --> 32:59.494
I've been able to contribute saying that I need

32:59.494 --> 33:03.800
to be able to detect, identify, track, and when necessary,

33:03.800 --> 33:05.730
engage to defend the United States.

33:05.730 --> 33:08.020
So whether it's ballistic missiles,

33:08.020 --> 33:09.470
whether it's cruise missiles,

33:09.810 --> 33:12.343
I've been able to give as a battle space owner

33:12.343 --> 33:17.343
my opinion and support my brothers here at the table.

33:19.480 --> 33:21.230
- General Dickinson, same question.

33:22.670 --> 33:26.490
- Yes, we've contributed in a large part to the effort

33:26.490 --> 33:30.560
in terms of JFCCIMD or the role that I play as the

33:30.560 --> 33:33.070
integrated missile defense element

33:33.070 --> 33:34.840
for US Strategic Command,

33:34.840 --> 33:38.360
so we've been participating throughout the process

33:38.360 --> 33:40.610
and what we bring to the process

33:40.610 --> 33:43.520
is we bring the representation of all the combatant commands

33:43.520 --> 33:46.417
along with NORTHCOM in terms of providing that expertise

33:46.417 --> 33:48.739
and that perspective as we help

33:48.739 --> 33:50.853
to develop and shape the document.

33:51.340 --> 33:54.047
- General Greaves, I understand you're trying to accelerate

33:54.047 --> 33:57.656
the development and fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle

33:57.656 --> 33:59.743
to address the growing threat,

34:00.170 --> 34:02.361
and what I would like to know is,

34:02.361 --> 34:04.980
can you describe for us the ways you're mitigating

34:04.980 --> 34:08.050
the risk in the program and ensuring we have a capability

34:08.050 --> 34:10.493
that is fully tested before it is deployed?

34:12.940 --> 34:17.563
- Yes, sir, this development will be a gated,

34:19.160 --> 34:23.920
milestone-driven acquisition as in specific decision points

34:23.920 --> 34:26.420
along the way where the Department,

34:26.420 --> 34:28.520
not only the Missile Defense Agency,

34:28.520 --> 34:31.310
will assess readiness to proceed to the next phase.

34:31.310 --> 34:35.197
As an example, we completed the preliminary design review

34:35.197 --> 34:39.278
last May, and used that as a decision point

34:39.278 --> 34:43.080
to convince anyone from the Cape,

34:43.080 --> 34:45.763
then AT and L and Miss Lord,

34:45.910 --> 34:48.370
and others within the building that we were ready

34:48.380 --> 34:52.227
to proceed with obligating I think it was

34:52.227 --> 34:55.253
$56 million worth of advanced procurement.

34:55.560 --> 34:59.640
So what have done is we have taken great care

34:59.640 --> 35:02.500
and we have heeded the NDAA language

35:02.790 --> 35:04.810
that addresses fly before you buy

35:04.810 --> 35:07.140
with the specific wording that talks about

35:07.140 --> 35:12.140
assessing our readiness to make these decisions

35:12.300 --> 35:16.080
to either adequately assessing through tests

35:16.080 --> 35:18.601
or some other method before we make

35:18.601 --> 35:21.423
these production and deployment decisions.

35:21.560 --> 35:25.150
So we will make decisions after, as I mentioned,

35:25.150 --> 35:26.240
the preliminary design review.

35:26.240 --> 35:29.040
We have the critical design review coming up in December,

35:29.040 --> 35:32.715
where another subset of that funding will be assessed,

35:32.715 --> 35:36.060
and we've got a decision to make

35:36.060 --> 35:39.380
after the first controlled test vehicle test,

35:39.380 --> 35:41.800
which will now include not only

35:41.800 --> 35:44.370
a fly-out of the interceptor,

35:44.370 --> 35:48.300
but a target, where we will maneuver to the target,

35:48.300 --> 35:52.100
but then maneuver away after convincing ourselves

35:52.100 --> 35:53.810
that it would have engaged the target,

35:53.810 --> 35:55.740
and we will use that extra capability

35:55.740 --> 35:58.690
to assess how well the interceptor does

35:58.750 --> 36:02.963
in the combined or expanded battle space.

36:03.160 --> 36:08.160
So, the bottom line story, sir, is a gated,

36:08.590 --> 36:11.170
milestone-driven, thoroughly reviewed

36:11.450 --> 36:12.923
assessment along the way.

36:13.473 --> 36:15.953
- Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

36:16.992 --> 36:19.013
- Thank you, Senator. Senator Cotton.

36:20.010 --> 36:21.900
- Thank you all for appearing today for your testimony.

36:21.900 --> 36:22.733
General Greaves,

36:22.733 --> 36:25.280
let's talk a little bit more about boost phase intercept.

36:25.540 --> 36:29.140
I will reveal that I am a major proponent of this technology

36:29.140 --> 36:32.920
at the outset and the boost phase missiles are big

36:32.920 --> 36:36.480
and they're hot, so easy to detect, and most importantly,

36:36.480 --> 36:39.253
they're over the bad guy's territory, not over ours.

36:39.547 --> 36:42.770
But yeah, they don't come from just anywhere on Earth.

36:42.770 --> 36:44.630
There's a limited number of countries on Earth

36:44.630 --> 36:46.110
that have this capability and the intention

36:46.110 --> 36:49.633
to challenge us and that boost phase intercept is at risk.

36:49.830 --> 36:52.673
Two obvious candidates are Russia and China,

36:52.673 --> 36:56.780
but is it fair to say that boost phase defenses

36:56.780 --> 36:59.160
are not really suitable against that threat

36:59.160 --> 37:00.750
because those countries are so large

37:00.750 --> 37:03.443
and they can position their missiles so far inland?

37:04.020 --> 37:05.220
- I would say, sir, yes,

37:05.220 --> 37:08.143
there is a geographical component of it.

37:10.249 --> 37:12.724
Boost phase intercept is, if not ideally well-suited to,

37:12.724 --> 37:15.573
say the Korean peninsula, they're very slim,

37:15.660 --> 37:18.930
where, as you say, they can't go far back.

37:18.930 --> 37:19.980
- Those are the magic words.

37:19.980 --> 37:23.200
So since Russia and China are not really susceptible

37:23.200 --> 37:25.640
to effective boost phase missile defense, where is it?

37:25.640 --> 37:27.713
North Korea, maybe Iran as well,

37:27.920 --> 37:30.220
but North Korea is where it's really suitable.

37:31.390 --> 37:32.980
You talked about lasers earlier,

37:32.980 --> 37:34.903
I wanna come back to those in a bit.

37:35.269 --> 37:39.900
What is the Agency doing to explore the feasibility

37:39.900 --> 37:44.900
of airborne hit to kill defenses, specifically on UAVs?

37:46.030 --> 37:48.713
What kind of technology gap do we have today,

37:48.720 --> 37:51.420
given what we're already capable of doing with the UAV

37:51.550 --> 37:56.550
and air-to-ground attack that might help neutralize

37:56.640 --> 37:58.890
or at least mitigate the North Korean threat?

37:59.896 --> 38:02.183
- We are doing technology development.

38:02.361 --> 38:05.923
That is the phase of acquisition that we're in,

38:06.300 --> 38:09.470
looking at both directed energy components

38:09.470 --> 38:14.180
as well as most likely taking advantage of air assets

38:14.180 --> 38:16.300
which will already be in the theaters

38:16.300 --> 38:18.513
in support of other mission sets,

38:20.290 --> 38:25.060
executing by the COCOM to look at those assets

38:25.060 --> 38:27.490
as either sensors that can be fed into

38:27.490 --> 38:29.420
the command and control battle management system

38:29.420 --> 38:33.053
within our ballistic missile defense system, or as shooters.

38:33.320 --> 38:36.150
They can be platforms for a new breed

38:36.150 --> 38:39.910
of fast interceptor weapons, that if placed appropriately,

38:39.910 --> 38:41.833
or closely, or in the right position,

38:42.090 --> 38:45.040
would be effective boost phase intercept capability.

38:45.040 --> 38:48.890
- Yeah, so a fan of manned aircraft as well,

38:48.890 --> 38:51.810
but manned aircraft have men and women in them,

38:51.810 --> 38:53.300
so they have limitations, right?

38:53.300 --> 38:55.600
They have to land, they have to eat,

38:55.600 --> 38:57.550
they have to sleep, so on and so forth.

38:57.820 --> 38:59.063
UAVs do not.

39:01.269 --> 39:04.400
How high a priority is it for the Agency

39:04.800 --> 39:07.490
to explore the possibility that we could put

39:07.490 --> 39:11.050
an effective airborne net over the Korean peninsula

39:11.360 --> 39:16.033
with UAVs, both sensor platforms and armed platforms,

39:16.050 --> 39:18.750
in international waters that could potentially prevent

39:19.420 --> 39:21.250
North Korean missiles from ever getting off

39:21.250 --> 39:22.253
of a launching pad?

39:22.760 --> 39:26.203
- It is a high priority within the Missile Defense Agency,

39:26.450 --> 39:28.210
and the phase that we're in now

39:28.210 --> 39:30.653
is the technology piece of it.

39:31.040 --> 39:32.693
For instance, directed energy.

39:33.140 --> 39:33.977
Can we--

39:34.160 --> 39:35.791
- [Tom] Can we get to directed energy in just a moment?

39:35.791 --> 39:36.624
- Sure.

39:36.624 --> 39:39.670
- So what is the gap, given what we can do with the UAV,

39:39.670 --> 39:41.633
and air-to-ground attack right now,

39:41.730 --> 39:44.520
what is the gap of taking that kind of demonstrated

39:44.520 --> 39:47.680
and deployed technology and deploying it

39:47.680 --> 39:49.750
in that kind of system against North Korea,

39:49.750 --> 39:53.283
and rather than aiming it at a terrorist's home or car,

39:53.300 --> 39:56.033
aiming at a North Korean missile on the launch pad?

39:56.492 --> 39:59.330
- The full answer will have to be coordinated

39:59.330 --> 40:00.440
with the combatant commander,

40:00.440 --> 40:05.440
but the gap or limitation is numbers and altitude

40:07.569 --> 40:11.123
and duration for the platforms of interest.

40:11.320 --> 40:13.420
And we have been doing some preliminary work

40:13.420 --> 40:15.133
on that over the past few years.

40:15.390 --> 40:17.820
And again, we're not talking directed energy,

40:17.820 --> 40:22.793
but doing things such as bean pointing, stability,

40:22.970 --> 40:27.220
duration, and pseudo-conops development on it,

40:27.220 --> 40:31.080
but the actual placement above, around,

40:31.080 --> 40:35.513
in vicinity of the targets, that's a co-conversation.

40:36.030 --> 40:39.000
- Okay, I just think it's an extremely high priority

40:39.787 --> 40:41.900
and most people probably underestimate

40:41.900 --> 40:43.900
how close we are to that kind of solution.

40:43.900 --> 40:45.390
I know that's not the long-term solution.

40:45.390 --> 40:47.460
That's why I wanted to put directed energy or lasers

40:47.460 --> 40:49.593
to the end of the conversation.

40:49.593 --> 40:52.243
I know it's a little bit longer and that's ultimately

40:52.250 --> 40:53.763
the right solution I think,

40:53.810 --> 40:56.240
once lasers get shrunken down so the power source

40:56.240 --> 40:57.877
can actually fit on the aircraft like that,

40:57.877 --> 41:00.003
and I strongly support that as well,

41:00.166 --> 41:02.790
but I think we have a real opportunity

41:02.790 --> 41:05.150
in the very short term, not a matter of months,

41:05.150 --> 41:07.013
but not a matter of decades either,

41:07.300 --> 41:09.780
to if not neutralize the North Korean threat

41:09.780 --> 41:11.470
with airborne boost phase systems,

41:11.470 --> 41:13.238
at least severely mitigate it.

41:13.238 --> 41:15.283
- [Sam] Yes, sir.
- Thank you.

41:17.001 --> 41:17.834
- [Deb] Thank you, Senator. Senator Sullivan.

41:17.834 --> 41:19.880
- Thank you, Madam Chair, and just to follow up

41:19.880 --> 41:23.503
on Senator Cotton's questioning, General Greaves,

41:23.790 --> 41:26.593
is the technology available right now to do that?

41:27.780 --> 41:30.300
- Sir, I'd say portions of the technology are available.

41:30.300 --> 41:33.570
For instance, the current suite of kinetic weapons

41:33.570 --> 41:36.270
that we have that could potentially fulfill that role,

41:36.470 --> 41:38.810
they may not have the distance,

41:38.810 --> 41:41.010
the legs as we call it, to execute,

41:41.010 --> 41:44.913
even if we had the UAV technology flying and ready to go.

41:45.222 --> 41:48.080
The concept of operations or the ops concept

41:48.080 --> 41:50.810
is extremely important with respect to

41:50.960 --> 41:52.300
how many caps you're flying,

41:52.300 --> 41:53.610
where those caps are located,

41:53.610 --> 41:55.340
the resources tail that goes behind it,

41:55.340 --> 41:57.310
but those are not my areas of responsibility,

41:57.310 --> 42:01.213
that's the COCOM, but the technology is getting closer.

42:01.350 --> 42:03.050
- Okay, good, that's good to know.

42:03.920 --> 42:05.640
General Robinson, thank you.

42:05.640 --> 42:07.240
I missed your opening statement,

42:07.240 --> 42:08.760
but I understand you had an announcement

42:08.760 --> 42:12.920
which we're kind of shocked,

42:12.920 --> 42:15.960
and wow, you've been an historic figure.

42:15.960 --> 42:17.400
I wanna thank you for your service,

42:17.400 --> 42:20.030
first female combatant commander

42:20.030 --> 42:22.053
in the history of the United States.

42:22.630 --> 42:25.690
Thanks for coming up to Alaska so much, we appreciate that.

42:25.690 --> 42:28.780
Recently, at the event that we both were at

42:28.780 --> 42:30.610
was a great evening, so thank you.

42:30.610 --> 42:32.563
Thank you for your wonderful service.

42:33.003 --> 42:35.833
I wanted to talk a little bit,

42:35.870 --> 42:39.695
I mentioned to a number of you, General Greaves as well,

42:39.695 --> 42:43.270
so we made good progress in the last year, I think,

42:43.270 --> 42:46.983
with regard to a missile defense bill from this Committee,

42:47.170 --> 42:50.123
passes in the NDA, fully funded in December,

42:50.500 --> 42:55.470
and I was out on a CODEL led by the current Chairman,

42:55.470 --> 42:58.503
acting Chairman of the Armed Services, Senator Inhofe,

42:58.750 --> 43:01.233
we're in Alaska, we went out to Fort Greeley,

43:02.230 --> 43:05.590
part of the funding in the new authorization

43:05.590 --> 43:07.313
is for a new field out there.

43:07.800 --> 43:10.500
Lot of excitement, we're on the ground, looking at it,

43:11.220 --> 43:14.463
and then we hear five to six years,

43:15.210 --> 43:19.260
five to six years before we get this field operational.

43:19.260 --> 43:23.173
Now, we won World War II in a shorter amount of time.

43:24.000 --> 43:26.023
I can go through a whole list,

43:26.540 --> 43:28.890
and the Chair is very focused on these issues,

43:28.890 --> 43:31.993
not just in the military, but even building roads, whatever,

43:33.690 --> 43:36.560
why on Earth should this take five to six years

43:36.560 --> 43:37.470
and what do you need?

43:37.470 --> 43:39.420
I've already talked to a number of you.

43:39.660 --> 43:40.820
Legislatively,

43:40.820 --> 43:43.797
'cause I'm sure it would be bipartisan to say,

43:43.797 --> 43:45.697
"Hey, we're doing all this, the threat is here,

43:45.697 --> 43:46.817
"the threat is here right now.

43:46.817 --> 43:49.243
"We need more capacity,

43:49.760 --> 43:52.193
a new field at Fort Greeley is more capacity.

43:52.340 --> 43:55.860
What can we do to help you make this so it's not

43:55.860 --> 43:59.763
five to six years, a half a decade,

44:00.090 --> 44:01.950
to get a new field operational?

44:01.950 --> 44:03.130
We should try and get that done

44:03.130 --> 44:04.813
in a year and a half, in a year.

44:05.260 --> 44:06.280
So General Greaves,

44:06.280 --> 44:09.700
I know I just pitched this to you just the other day,

44:09.700 --> 44:13.113
but we wanna get this in the NDAA to help you,

44:13.220 --> 44:15.610
to help America defend itself

44:15.980 --> 44:18.170
when there's enormous bipartisan support to do it.

44:18.170 --> 44:20.233
Five to six years to me is lunacy.

44:21.020 --> 44:21.853
What can we do?

44:21.853 --> 44:23.960
And I'll throw this out to any of the witnesses.

44:24.990 --> 44:26.090
- Sir, if I can start,

44:26.320 --> 44:29.163
one update to our conversation yesterday,

44:29.523 --> 44:33.490
the environmental impact statement for Fort Greeley

44:33.490 --> 44:36.210
was done for a 100 interceptor base

44:36.210 --> 44:39.070
when the field was--
- Right, right.

44:39.070 --> 44:40.803
- was first developed.

44:40.970 --> 44:43.820
So what we have to do for the additional 20

44:43.820 --> 44:45.370
is an environment assessment,

44:45.370 --> 44:46.970
and that work's just about done.

44:47.000 --> 44:47.833
- Okay.
- So--

44:47.833 --> 44:49.743
- Good.
- That's off the table.

44:50.020 --> 44:52.811
The construction of the missile field itself

44:52.811 --> 44:55.653
is an approximately 36-month effort,

44:56.030 --> 44:58.610
and the limitations involved are--

44:58.721 --> 45:00.380
- [Dan] We built the Al-Can Highway in 11 months.

45:00.380 --> 45:01.213
- Yes, sir.

45:01.410 --> 45:03.620
- I mean, there's a long list of things

45:03.620 --> 45:05.700
in America we used to build quickly.

45:05.700 --> 45:09.403
Even three years is pretty darn long, right?

45:09.610 --> 45:13.220
- Yes, sir, and those three years are paced

45:13.220 --> 45:18.190
by the standard building timeframe

45:18.190 --> 45:20.623
up in Alaska, April through October.

45:20.678 --> 45:22.617
Now there are things that can be done--

45:22.617 --> 45:23.910
- [Dan] We've built year-round in Alaska on occasion.

45:23.910 --> 45:24.860
- Yes, sir, I was about to say,

45:24.860 --> 45:26.960
there are things that can be done

45:27.230 --> 45:31.193
to essentially reduce that time,

45:31.580 --> 45:35.960
but the pacing item for the additional 20 GBIs

45:35.960 --> 45:38.420
in the ground are the GBIs themselves

45:38.690 --> 45:40.690
and the fact that they were being procured

45:40.690 --> 45:44.253
as all-up rounds with the redesigned kill vehicle on top.

45:44.620 --> 45:45.730
And the approach,

45:45.730 --> 45:48.490
unlike what was done for the initial deployment

45:48.490 --> 45:51.859
of the initial interceptors where we essentially

45:51.859 --> 45:54.363
have done exactly what you're asking,

45:55.320 --> 46:00.210
we are taking a series of steps

46:00.450 --> 46:03.330
to ensure that what we are designing, building, testing,

46:03.330 --> 46:06.233
and delivering are more reliable, more maintainable,

46:06.400 --> 46:08.883
and for the long term, more sustainable.

46:09.110 --> 46:11.870
So, and the acquisition of that

46:11.870 --> 46:13.660
under the current set of guidelines,

46:13.660 --> 46:15.560
we talked about that a little earlier,

46:15.580 --> 46:20.023
is a gated and milestone-driven decision process.

46:20.050 --> 46:21.683
So there are a number of folks,

46:21.800 --> 46:24.720
other areas within the Department that are involved,

46:24.720 --> 46:27.000
all the way from the operational testers

46:27.140 --> 46:31.000
to the folks in Cape to the folks in now A and S,

46:31.000 --> 46:32.400
Acquisition and Sustainment,

46:32.680 --> 46:36.070
that have to be involved and ensure

46:36.070 --> 46:38.250
that we are minimizing risks to this deployment.

46:38.250 --> 46:43.250
Now if it was stated that there is some national security

46:43.310 --> 46:45.522
waiver to get them into the ground now,

46:45.522 --> 46:48.980
and to provide the Missile Defense Agency and others

46:48.980 --> 46:51.130
with complete authority to do things,

46:51.130 --> 46:53.370
then we could of course move out faster

46:53.370 --> 46:54.883
at a higher level of risk.

46:55.260 --> 46:56.960
But we learned some significant lessons

46:56.960 --> 47:00.100
from the deployment of the initial set of GBIs

47:00.100 --> 47:03.261
where we had to go back and complete the systems engineering

47:03.261 --> 47:05.733
for those rounds,

47:05.870 --> 47:08.190
and it's taken us quite a bit of time to do it,

47:08.190 --> 47:09.810
and we've now completed that.

47:09.810 --> 47:14.210
So the intent here is to, keeping the threat in mind,

47:14.210 --> 47:16.960
we've already accelerated the planned deployment

47:17.240 --> 47:21.120
of those GBIs by at least a year, to 2023.

47:21.120 --> 47:24.063
Beginning in 2021, going out to 2023,

47:24.750 --> 47:29.750
but to accelerate it further brings increased risk.

47:30.070 --> 47:32.580
We feel very confident we can deliver it

47:32.580 --> 47:34.157
per the timeline that we've got.

47:34.157 --> 47:36.223
- [Dan] Well, we wanna work with you on--

47:36.223 --> 47:37.056
- Yes, sir.

47:37.056 --> 47:38.800
- Accelerating, all of you, on accelerating that.

47:40.600 --> 47:42.100
- Thank you, Senator Sullivan.

47:43.710 --> 47:46.830
Secretary Rood, if I could continue with another issue

47:46.830 --> 47:49.373
on the missile defense enterprise.

47:49.530 --> 47:52.360
We know it struggled with the increasing portion

47:52.360 --> 47:55.325
of the MDA's budget that's going to procurement

47:55.325 --> 47:57.750
and taking money away from what

47:57.870 --> 48:00.050
really is the MDA's chief purpose,

48:00.050 --> 48:01.943
and that's research and development,

48:02.260 --> 48:04.790
and while we all support this significant increase

48:04.790 --> 48:08.363
in the MDA's top line that's included in this year's budget,

48:08.432 --> 48:12.040
I think it actually exasperates this issue.

48:12.040 --> 48:14.480
MDA's budget grew by almost $2 billion

48:14.742 --> 48:18.160
compared to the projections in last year's budget

48:18.160 --> 48:21.793
and about 45% of that increase went to procurement.

48:22.060 --> 48:26.623
So do you expect the MDR to look into this issue?

48:28.620 --> 48:31.490
- One of the things that is a challenge facing us

48:31.730 --> 48:34.550
in the Department is the Missile Defense Agency's role,

48:34.550 --> 48:36.880
as you say, is a research, development,

48:36.880 --> 48:38.993
testing, and evaluation organization.

48:39.030 --> 48:41.443
They've also played a substantial role in operations

48:41.443 --> 48:46.443
and sustainment assistance once we have them in the field,

48:46.880 --> 48:48.760
and one of the organizational issues

48:48.760 --> 48:51.368
that we need to work through is the transition,

48:51.368 --> 48:55.810
at what point and how do we transition those capabilities

48:55.810 --> 48:57.270
to the services to manage.

48:57.270 --> 48:59.350
That's been something the Department has

48:59.350 --> 49:01.363
struggled with for quite some time,

49:02.110 --> 49:04.250
for the past decade and a half about,

49:04.250 --> 49:05.590
that's been a discussion item,

49:05.590 --> 49:07.220
and so that is one of the things

49:07.220 --> 49:09.730
in the Missile Defense Review that we are looking at,

49:09.730 --> 49:12.378
because we wanna make sure that we get the balance correct

49:12.378 --> 49:16.000
where MDA's work on near-term production,

49:16.000 --> 49:17.640
that is to say current systems,

49:17.640 --> 49:20.110
and the balance about new system development,

49:20.110 --> 49:22.800
advanced capabilities, there's always a balance

49:22.800 --> 49:24.150
about how much do you invest today

49:24.150 --> 49:25.983
and how much in future technology,

49:26.290 --> 49:28.570
and getting that balance correct

49:28.570 --> 49:30.270
is one of things we're looking at.

49:31.030 --> 49:32.973
- I hope you are able to do that.

49:33.780 --> 49:36.720
And Secretary, for all of Russia's talk about

49:36.720 --> 49:41.350
how the US missile defenses jeopardize strategic stability

49:41.350 --> 49:44.963
and justifies their violation of arms control treaties,

49:45.140 --> 49:48.033
or pursuit of new nuclear weapons,

49:48.270 --> 49:51.853
President Putin's speech was the latest example of that,

49:52.240 --> 49:54.950
isn't it true that Moscow deploys

49:54.950 --> 49:58.343
a highly capable ballistic missile defense system?

49:59.480 --> 50:02.710
- They do, the Russians have maintained and indeed,

50:02.710 --> 50:05.020
at the times when their budgets were most stressed,

50:05.020 --> 50:06.630
they continued to modernize

50:06.630 --> 50:09.943
the Moscow anti-ballistic missile defense system.

50:10.876 --> 50:12.900
I can say from the time when I previously served

50:12.900 --> 50:17.160
in government in the 2001-2008 period,

50:17.160 --> 50:20.013
having routine discussions with the Russians about that,

50:20.448 --> 50:23.030
and they're very blunt about the fact

50:23.030 --> 50:26.080
that that's a high priority for them to defend their capital

50:26.080 --> 50:27.530
and their people where the majority

50:27.530 --> 50:30.730
of their population lives against ballistic missile attack.

50:30.730 --> 50:32.780
Their basic argument is that they don't wish

50:32.780 --> 50:34.740
the United States to do that. (chuckles)

50:34.740 --> 50:37.910
And so I don't accept that argument,

50:37.910 --> 50:40.690
and I would note it's a new argument from President Putin.

50:40.690 --> 50:43.100
In 2001, when the United States

50:43.100 --> 50:45.643
announced its withdrawal from the ABM treaty,

50:45.750 --> 50:47.760
President Putin gave a national address

50:47.760 --> 50:49.910
in which he stated this posed no threat

50:49.910 --> 50:51.583
to Russia's national security,

50:51.900 --> 50:54.240
and shortly thereafter he agreed to the conclusion

50:54.240 --> 50:57.380
of the Moscow treaty, which at that time and to date,

50:57.380 --> 51:00.510
is the largest reduction in strategic nuclear forces

51:00.640 --> 51:02.290
that our two countries have done.

51:02.780 --> 51:05.500
So I read very carefully his recent statement,

51:05.500 --> 51:08.060
and we weren't surprised by what was announced,

51:08.060 --> 51:11.700
certainly disappointed by the tone in that statement,

51:11.700 --> 51:15.890
but it's a new discussion item, it's a new characterization,

51:15.890 --> 51:18.190
I think, of what has led to those capabilities

51:18.190 --> 51:20.140
that we're seeing from President Putin.

51:20.290 --> 51:23.040
- Do you have any thoughts that you can share with us

51:23.040 --> 51:28.040
on why you think President Putin is making this new case?

51:32.140 --> 51:34.030
- I think there is twofold.

51:34.030 --> 51:35.870
One, the context of that speech,

51:35.870 --> 51:38.480
the vast majority of it dealt with domestic issues.

51:38.480 --> 51:41.630
It was a bit of a state of the union speech

51:43.910 --> 51:46.560
wouldn't be exactly the right description of it,

51:46.560 --> 51:49.140
but it covered a whole range of topics,

51:49.140 --> 51:51.393
mostly focused on domestic issues.

51:51.680 --> 51:54.740
The tail end did focus on defense capabilities

51:54.740 --> 51:56.440
and those particular capabilities.

51:56.720 --> 51:57.553
The one--

51:57.553 --> 51:58.877
- [Deb] Was it a political speech, do you believe, then?

51:58.877 --> 52:01.423
- It, yes, but it was more than that,

52:01.500 --> 52:03.860
and certainly was messaging to the rest of the world

52:03.860 --> 52:06.460
and the United States, so we should see it for both.

52:06.580 --> 52:11.320
And it was noteworthy that President Putin showed animation

52:11.320 --> 52:14.223
of a missile strike on the United States.

52:14.370 --> 52:15.440
There's only one other country

52:15.440 --> 52:17.223
that has done that, in North Korea.

52:17.900 --> 52:20.360
It was also noteworthy that it's not the only time

52:20.360 --> 52:22.960
or effort where the Russians have signaled things

52:22.960 --> 52:23.930
to us in the United States.

52:23.930 --> 52:27.180
So I think, while it was a political speech,

52:27.180 --> 52:28.960
it was also a message to the United States

52:28.960 --> 52:31.890
and the rest of the world about how they see us

52:31.890 --> 52:33.540
and that security environment

52:33.540 --> 52:36.393
and the capabilities that Russia is pursuing.

52:37.230 --> 52:39.930
- [Deb] Thank you, Mister Secretary. Senator Donnelly.

52:41.760 --> 52:43.010
- Thank you, Madam Chair.

52:44.360 --> 52:47.660
General Dickinson, DoTE continues to find

52:47.660 --> 52:50.340
that Army's training of its soldiers to conduct testing

52:50.340 --> 52:52.593
of THAAD and Patriot is insufficient.

52:53.160 --> 52:56.390
In the FY 17 report, DoTE found that flight testing

52:56.390 --> 53:00.680
in FY 17 demonstrated that THAAD training and documentation

53:00.680 --> 53:03.319
deficiencies worsened in FY 17

53:03.319 --> 53:06.073
and Patriot training remained inadequate

53:06.073 --> 53:09.723
to prepare operators for complex Patriot engagements.

53:10.390 --> 53:12.113
In your role as Commander of Army's

53:12.113 --> 53:14.103
Base and Missile Defense Command,

53:15.500 --> 53:18.210
you have are responsibility to organize, train, and equip

53:18.210 --> 53:22.793
Army's space and global ballistic missile defense forces.

53:23.550 --> 53:25.993
Do these deficiencies concern you

53:26.190 --> 53:28.490
and what are we doing to improve the training?

53:30.860 --> 53:33.920
- So the air and missile defenders in the Army in particular

53:34.580 --> 53:36.090
that I can speak for go through

53:36.090 --> 53:39.140
a very rigorous training program

53:39.330 --> 53:43.223
from the time that they come into their initial assignments

53:43.223 --> 53:46.320
into their units, they go through a very detailed

53:46.320 --> 53:48.310
and comprehensive training strategy

53:48.310 --> 53:49.927
that's codified and developed

53:49.927 --> 53:52.453
into what we call table training,

53:52.600 --> 53:55.230
very similar to what you may see in a Armor unit

53:55.230 --> 53:57.104
that has tables one through 12

53:57.104 --> 53:59.810
that are very proscriptive and descriptive

53:59.814 --> 54:03.200
in highlighting the tasks that need to be completed

54:03.450 --> 54:07.103
as they move along from an individual type of qualification

54:07.103 --> 54:09.400
as an individual soldier or operator

54:09.400 --> 54:11.693
into a team or into a crew.

54:12.220 --> 54:14.660
That spans from a Patriot unit

54:14.670 --> 54:17.833
to a THAAD unit, even to a GM unit,

54:17.833 --> 54:22.010
and I'm responsible for providing trained and ready forces

54:22.010 --> 54:24.650
to General Robinson in the GMD world

54:24.800 --> 54:28.010
in terms of the 100th and the 49th Missile Defense units.

54:28.010 --> 54:31.790
But I can assure you that that training development

54:31.790 --> 54:33.860
and that training proficiency is measured

54:33.860 --> 54:35.433
on a very frequent basis,

54:35.600 --> 54:39.650
and it is tested frequently on the actual equipment,

54:39.650 --> 54:42.100
and we also use a host of simulations

54:42.100 --> 54:44.213
in order to develop that.

54:44.690 --> 54:49.690
- So then is the FY 17 DoTE report wrong in its conclusions?

54:51.600 --> 54:53.170
- I wouldn't say it was wrong.

54:53.170 --> 54:55.590
I would have to look closely at the scenarios

54:55.590 --> 54:57.390
in which they were evaluating those.

54:57.707 --> 55:00.340
I will tell you from my experience as a commander

55:00.340 --> 55:03.453
on the ground and through the evaluations that I run,

55:03.710 --> 55:05.640
that the training proficiencies,

55:05.640 --> 55:09.413
particularly with the GM system, are at a very high state,

55:09.660 --> 55:11.720
and I don't believe DoT and E

55:11.980 --> 55:14.180
was evaluating the GM soldiers.

55:14.180 --> 55:16.480
I know they were on the THAAD and the Patriot.

55:16.630 --> 55:19.333
- [Lori] So, sir, Senator, if you don't mind,

55:19.410 --> 55:21.360
I had the privilege to go to Fort Greeley

55:21.360 --> 55:22.823
and watch the soldiers,

55:22.970 --> 55:25.750
and so I know from the time that I have to give

55:25.750 --> 55:28.580
some authorities that I have to the execution

55:28.580 --> 55:30.330
that happens on the ground at Fort Greeley

55:30.330 --> 55:33.440
for me to be able sit down and talk to the soldiers

55:33.440 --> 55:35.000
that do this each and every day

55:35.000 --> 55:36.573
from a training perspective.

55:36.980 --> 55:38.733
I was very proud to watch them,

55:38.842 --> 55:41.680
and I know that this training goes on

55:41.680 --> 55:44.163
more than once a day, every crew,

55:44.320 --> 55:49.010
both from my command center in Colorado Springs

55:49.010 --> 55:51.640
down to the soldiers at Fort Greeley.

55:51.640 --> 55:53.590
So I just wanted to add that as the warfighter.

55:53.590 --> 55:55.698
- General, I have great respect for them, too,

55:55.698 --> 55:58.963
and appreciate everything that they do for our country.

55:59.350 --> 56:03.733
So how does the report come up with that conclusion?

56:04.280 --> 56:05.500
- Well, I'd have to go back and do

56:05.500 --> 56:07.287
like General Dickinson said and go say,

56:07.287 --> 56:09.340
"What was the scenario that they looked at?"

56:09.340 --> 56:11.940
What did they, you know, get a little more context

56:11.940 --> 56:15.340
because of what I watched and observed myself.

56:15.340 --> 56:19.050
So I owe you my best military advice

56:19.050 --> 56:21.283
if I go back and reread what was given.

56:21.445 --> 56:25.380
- I might add, also, so I'd have to go back,

56:25.380 --> 56:26.410
as I mentioned earlier,

56:26.410 --> 56:29.793
take a look at the report and see what the scenario is.

56:29.950 --> 56:31.980
If it was a test scenario, for example,

56:31.980 --> 56:33.210
sometimes they will look at that

56:33.210 --> 56:36.203
during one of the MDA's tests, operational tests,

56:36.280 --> 56:38.700
or whether or not they were in the field

56:38.700 --> 56:40.323
with the soldiers at that time.

56:40.490 --> 56:43.597
So the circumstances are very important here,

56:43.597 --> 56:46.460
but I can attest to the fact that at every level

56:46.460 --> 56:48.900
within their training program, they are trained, certified.

56:48.900 --> 56:51.140
It's a series of written evaluations,

56:51.140 --> 56:53.563
it's a series of hands-on evaluations,

56:53.570 --> 56:57.410
and then performance-oriented evaluations

56:57.750 --> 57:01.410
conducted by and often, many times outside agencies.

57:01.410 --> 57:03.010
What I mean by that is outside

57:03.010 --> 57:04.440
their immediate chain of command.

57:04.440 --> 57:06.500
And there are pass, and there are failures,

57:06.500 --> 57:08.083
and we do that routinely,

57:08.330 --> 57:10.068
both in the United States as well as

57:10.068 --> 57:12.623
to our deployed forces overseas.

57:12.870 --> 57:15.053
- Okay, well, I am about out of time.

57:15.830 --> 57:17.573
General Robinson, thank you again.

57:18.810 --> 57:21.493
As you head toward retirement and travel around,

57:21.761 --> 57:24.590
when you go to the Air Force Academy

57:24.590 --> 57:25.760
Notre Dame football game,

57:25.760 --> 57:28.010
I am curious as to who you'll be rooting for.

57:28.340 --> 57:30.680
- Well, when your husband's an Academy graduate,

57:30.680 --> 57:32.550
and your brothers are Academy graduates,

57:32.550 --> 57:35.850
there's really not much that I can say to that,

57:35.850 --> 57:37.610
so Go Air Force. (laughter)

57:37.610 --> 57:39.353
- [Joe] There you go. Thank you.

57:41.310 --> 57:42.433
- Senator Sullivan.

57:42.690 --> 57:43.940
- Thank you, Madam Chair.

57:44.150 --> 57:45.900
Mister Secretary, good to see you again,

57:45.900 --> 57:48.250
and I'm glad you're in this position.

57:48.250 --> 57:50.810
You have a background with a lot of expertise

57:50.810 --> 57:51.713
in these areas.

57:52.000 --> 57:54.040
Let me ask on the Missile Defense Review.

57:54.040 --> 57:57.530
When are you anticipating that being done

57:57.530 --> 58:02.530
and the reason I ask is one of the things

58:02.960 --> 58:07.960
that we'll looking at with regard to the NDAA this year

58:08.818 --> 58:11.840
is building on what we did last year

58:12.100 --> 58:13.650
with regard to missile defense.

58:13.700 --> 58:16.573
And we had kind of a breakthrough, I think, politically.

58:16.860 --> 58:21.140
We had a bill that was included, part of the NDA,

58:21.140 --> 58:23.810
which was a pretty significant advancement

58:23.810 --> 58:26.743
in missile defense that was very bipartisan,

58:27.360 --> 58:30.780
and if you look at the history of missile defenses,

58:30.780 --> 58:32.640
not always been bipartisan.

58:32.640 --> 58:35.190
Matter of fact, it's kind of been a partisan issue.

58:36.040 --> 58:38.800
But in this case, I think we made a breakthrough,

58:38.800 --> 58:41.740
so I'm asking this 'cause we will be looking

58:42.100 --> 58:46.510
at kind of a missile defense 2.0 component of the NDAA,

58:46.510 --> 58:50.630
but we want it to be significantly informed

58:51.160 --> 58:54.040
by the work that the Pentagon's doing.

58:54.040 --> 58:57.540
So when do you anticipate that being done

58:57.540 --> 59:01.018
and is there a timeline we can hold you to

59:01.018 --> 59:06.018
that would be in front of the work that we're doing

59:06.520 --> 59:07.958
on the NDA, which as you know,

59:07.958 --> 59:09.743
kind of is already starting.

59:11.100 --> 59:14.160
- We're at work now on the Missile Defense Review.

59:14.160 --> 59:18.250
There is a number of, there are a number of real challenges

59:18.250 --> 59:19.500
that we're still working through,

59:19.500 --> 59:23.073
how specifically we will address in that report,

59:23.400 --> 59:26.090
but I'm pleased that we've come a long way.

59:26.090 --> 59:28.890
So I think this spring we firmly plan

59:28.890 --> 59:30.313
to complete the report.

59:30.920 --> 59:33.640
Right now we still have some internal discussions

59:33.640 --> 59:35.340
in the Department to work through,

59:35.620 --> 59:38.520
different opinions, as you'd expect, on certain questions.

59:38.660 --> 59:40.410
But I think we'll have something soon,

59:40.410 --> 59:42.940
and I understand your point about wanting

59:42.940 --> 59:45.330
to take that into account and the legislation

59:45.330 --> 59:47.660
that you sponsored last year was very noteworthy

59:47.660 --> 59:50.460
in advancing the ball down the field on missile defense.

59:50.460 --> 59:53.340
And the NDAA markup schedule is certainly something

59:53.340 --> 59:54.950
that we would want to take into account.

59:54.950 --> 59:57.663
- Great, so you think sometime in April?

59:57.840 --> 01:00:00.410
I mean, I'm gonna try and hold you to something here,

01:00:00.410 --> 01:00:01.451
Mister Secretary.

01:00:01.451 --> 01:00:05.001
- I wouldn't want to commit to--

01:00:05.001 --> 01:00:06.770
- I'm putting your feet to the fire, if you--

01:00:06.770 --> 01:00:07.980
- I feel the heat already.

01:00:07.980 --> 01:00:11.610
- All right, good. I'm glad.
- Rising around.

01:00:11.610 --> 01:00:14.250
I wouldn't want to commit to April

01:00:14.250 --> 01:00:15.280
to get it to the Committee,

01:00:15.280 --> 01:00:18.610
but certainly we'll be deeper into our discussions

01:00:18.610 --> 01:00:22.006
by that time, but I think in the next couple of months here,

01:00:22.006 --> 01:00:23.940
that is our intention to finish it.

01:00:23.940 --> 01:00:26.120
- Okay, 'cause we don't wanna miss,

01:00:26.120 --> 01:00:28.130
I know there's a lot of work,

01:00:28.130 --> 01:00:30.173
a lot of expertise going into this,

01:00:30.560 --> 01:00:34.210
but we don't wanna keep in mind the vehicle that will move

01:00:34.210 --> 01:00:39.060
legislatively to enact some of these ideas and reforms

01:00:39.060 --> 01:00:41.780
you have in the review is gonna be in the NDAA,

01:00:41.780 --> 01:00:45.020
we're gonna be marking it up late April, early June,

01:00:45.020 --> 01:00:48.010
so I think it's important to keep that in mind.

01:00:48.010 --> 01:00:51.853
One element that we started on in last year's legislation,

01:00:52.080 --> 01:00:54.001
but as I talked to the experts,

01:00:54.001 --> 01:00:56.617
essentially everybody at the table and General Hyten,

01:00:56.617 --> 01:01:00.420
there seems to be, I would say,

01:01:00.420 --> 01:01:03.060
broad-based consensus on what we need to do more

01:01:03.060 --> 01:01:08.060
with regard to the next steps is a space-based sensors

01:01:09.294 --> 01:01:11.900
that are integrating both kind of

01:01:11.900 --> 01:01:16.203
theater and homeland missile defense.

01:01:16.610 --> 01:01:19.700
Would that be something that all of you are in agreement on,

01:01:19.700 --> 01:01:24.690
the need to accelerate and really focus on

01:01:24.690 --> 01:01:26.900
kind of that unblinking eye that kind of

01:01:26.900 --> 01:01:29.870
birth to ending being able to track?

01:01:29.870 --> 01:01:31.360
Can I get an answer from each of you

01:01:31.360 --> 01:01:32.739
if that's something you think is

01:01:32.739 --> 01:01:35.163
worthy for us to be working with you on

01:01:35.163 --> 01:01:38.493
to pursue as a program on our missile defense system?

01:01:38.710 --> 01:01:40.172
- Senator Sullivan, absolutely

01:01:40.172 --> 01:01:41.913
that is where we need to start.

01:01:42.860 --> 01:01:44.230
- General Robinson, will you agree with that?

01:01:44.230 --> 01:01:47.000
- I do, but let's not forget what we need to make sure

01:01:47.000 --> 01:01:48.747
is that we can do what we need to do today

01:01:48.747 --> 01:01:50.667
as we look to the future.

01:01:50.817 --> 01:01:52.390
- [Dan] I agree. Great point.

01:01:52.390 --> 01:01:53.780
- Okay, so that's my only thing

01:01:53.780 --> 01:01:55.490
that I would add to the conversation.

01:01:55.490 --> 01:01:57.293
- Thank you. Mister Secretary?

01:01:57.620 --> 01:01:59.470
- Support, in this year's budget,

01:01:59.470 --> 01:02:01.580
we're going to talk about doing some demonstrations

01:02:01.580 --> 01:02:05.563
on space-based sensor capability as you know,

01:02:05.780 --> 01:02:07.620
and I think continuing too build on that

01:02:07.620 --> 01:02:09.820
is one of the things that we would like to do.

01:02:09.820 --> 01:02:11.240
You gotta look at that in the context

01:02:11.240 --> 01:02:14.760
of the other budget challenges as we put together the next

01:02:14.760 --> 01:02:16.740
five-year budget submission through the remainder

01:02:16.740 --> 01:02:18.560
of the year, but I'm certainly supportive

01:02:18.560 --> 01:02:19.670
of continuing to explore that.

01:02:19.670 --> 01:02:21.163
- Okay, General Dickinson.

01:02:21.270 --> 01:02:22.103
- Absolutely,

01:02:22.103 --> 01:02:25.290
I think the better you see the potential threat,

01:02:25.290 --> 01:02:28.750
the better we'll be in the redundancy and resiliency

01:02:28.750 --> 01:02:31.050
of having terrestrial-based sensors

01:02:31.050 --> 01:02:34.563
as well as space-based sensors provide us that capability,

01:02:34.640 --> 01:02:37.793
especially as we look to an increasing evolving threat.

01:02:37.840 --> 01:02:39.380
So the better information we have,

01:02:39.380 --> 01:02:42.548
the better opportunity and better we'll have to defeat it.

01:02:42.548 --> 01:02:44.540
- [Sam] Senator, if I can add--

01:02:44.540 --> 01:02:46.510
- Senator, can I have time for one more question?

01:02:46.510 --> 01:02:47.800
- Yeah, just really quickly,

01:02:47.800 --> 01:02:52.800
the integration of sensors in space with terrestrial sensors

01:02:53.150 --> 01:02:55.330
are absolutely critical for the real threat

01:02:55.330 --> 01:02:57.963
that we see in front of us, the hypersonic threat.

01:02:58.180 --> 01:02:59.440
Birth to death tracking,

01:02:59.440 --> 01:03:01.563
and that's why I said absolutely.

01:03:01.580 --> 01:03:02.480
- Okay, great, thank you.

01:03:02.480 --> 01:03:04.490
Let me ask one final question,

01:03:04.490 --> 01:03:07.280
and it goes to the issue of testing.

01:03:07.280 --> 01:03:09.992
Again, what we tried to do in the legislation last year

01:03:09.992 --> 01:03:14.992
was really kind of give cover to all of you,

01:03:15.908 --> 01:03:20.908
not in terms of quote unquote failures,

01:03:21.030 --> 01:03:25.460
but to start to make the point,

01:03:25.460 --> 01:03:27.730
not only to Congress, but the American people

01:03:27.730 --> 01:03:29.683
that when you are testing,

01:03:30.190 --> 01:03:34.800
even if you're not hitting a target, or a successful flight,

01:03:34.800 --> 01:03:36.663
you're learning, you're learning.

01:03:36.900 --> 01:03:37.950
Our space program,

01:03:37.950 --> 01:03:40.280
you only have to look at that in the 1950's and 60's,

01:03:40.280 --> 01:03:42.900
we were quote "failing" all the time.

01:03:42.900 --> 01:03:44.950
But we weren't failing, we were learning.

01:03:45.010 --> 01:03:47.410
Kim Jong Un, I would never wanna use him as an example,

01:03:47.410 --> 01:03:49.960
so I'm not, but the guy is obviously testing,

01:03:49.960 --> 01:03:51.823
failing, and learning.

01:03:52.230 --> 01:03:55.500
And so we are trying to provide you

01:03:55.500 --> 01:03:58.170
with a sense from the Congress that,

01:03:58.170 --> 01:04:00.113
Hey, the next time you do a big test,

01:04:00.690 --> 01:04:02.663
and it doesn't hit the target,

01:04:03.250 --> 01:04:05.820
it certainly would be my intention not to drag

01:04:05.820 --> 01:04:07.610
all of you up in front of this Committee

01:04:07.610 --> 01:04:09.840
and pound the table and look for the TV cameras

01:04:09.840 --> 01:04:11.940
and try to berate the people with stars

01:04:11.940 --> 01:04:13.890
on their shoulders that you're failing.

01:04:14.090 --> 01:04:16.240
'cause you're not failing, you're learning.

01:04:16.480 --> 01:04:20.253
So we started that in last year's NDAA,

01:04:20.450 --> 01:04:23.250
we're trying to accelerate and put you on a schedule

01:04:23.250 --> 01:04:24.913
to do tests at least yearly,

01:04:25.200 --> 01:04:28.720
but what more can we do to help you

01:04:30.860 --> 01:04:32.253
in terms of your testing?

01:04:32.430 --> 01:04:35.023
Even if you're not always hitting the target,

01:04:35.890 --> 01:04:38.763
my understanding with talking to some of the experts,

01:04:39.130 --> 01:04:42.330
there'll be certain tests that we're stretching the envelope

01:04:42.950 --> 01:04:45.160
from physics from the activities that we're doing

01:04:45.160 --> 01:04:46.610
so much that you almost think

01:04:46.680 --> 01:04:48.110
you're gonna miss the target anyway,

01:04:48.110 --> 01:04:49.660
and you're still gonna learn a ton.

01:04:49.660 --> 01:04:53.265
So what more can we be doing to help you in the Congress

01:04:53.265 --> 01:04:58.265
so your culture of testing is not so worried

01:04:59.920 --> 01:05:02.850
about some of us calling you up here

01:05:02.850 --> 01:05:05.880
the next time there's a missed target

01:05:05.880 --> 01:05:08.123
when we're still learning tons?

01:05:09.120 --> 01:05:12.410
- Senator, I'd say what you've just stated

01:05:12.410 --> 01:05:16.510
is sufficient in my mind in that we're not only

01:05:16.550 --> 01:05:19.380
learning when we don't achieve an intercept,

01:05:19.380 --> 01:05:22.313
we're also delivering capability.

01:05:22.410 --> 01:05:25.470
One example I'll use is the recent SM3 2A mission

01:05:25.470 --> 01:05:27.383
that we just executed.

01:05:27.600 --> 01:05:29.040
We did not achieve an intercept.

01:05:29.040 --> 01:05:31.390
We believe we understand why we did not,

01:05:31.390 --> 01:05:35.223
but taking a look at what we did achieve,

01:05:35.720 --> 01:05:38.330
we achieved the demonstration of launching

01:05:39.127 --> 01:05:40.677
the SM3 2A from Aegis to shore,

01:05:40.820 --> 01:05:43.530
which is absolutely critical for the sites in Romania,

01:05:43.530 --> 01:05:46.180
in Poland, and if the Japanese continue

01:05:46.180 --> 01:05:48.903
with their acquisition of the two Aegis-shore sites,

01:05:48.920 --> 01:05:51.343
it's a clear demonstration of that capability.

01:05:51.620 --> 01:05:55.160
We also increased the battle space for that weapon system.

01:05:55.160 --> 01:05:56.940
We flew outside the radar,

01:05:56.940 --> 01:05:58.683
the organic radar's capability

01:05:58.683 --> 01:06:02.760
and demonstrated feeding offsite sensor information,

01:06:02.760 --> 01:06:04.733
engagement quality information,

01:06:04.910 --> 01:06:07.283
to that interceptor as it was in flight.

01:06:07.440 --> 01:06:10.570
We also certified the Aegis weapon system base line

01:06:10.570 --> 01:06:12.260
that accompanied all that capability.

01:06:12.260 --> 01:06:15.060
So we did not achieve that intercept,

01:06:15.060 --> 01:06:17.350
but we learned and we delivered capability

01:06:17.350 --> 01:06:20.650
and what you have stated, sir, is sufficient in my mind,

01:06:20.650 --> 01:06:24.840
because it lends a level of understanding

01:06:24.840 --> 01:06:28.430
that we do a lot more than just intercepts.

01:06:28.430 --> 01:06:30.330
- Yeah, anyone else wanna comment on that?

01:06:30.330 --> 01:06:32.210
I mean, one thing I've thought is you guys

01:06:32.210 --> 01:06:33.921
could do a background briefing through our

01:06:33.921 --> 01:06:36.090
wonderful friends in the media

01:06:36.090 --> 01:06:38.950
who love to look for quote unquote failures

01:06:39.330 --> 01:06:41.530
that don't really understand the issues,

01:06:41.530 --> 01:06:43.950
and if you can background the media on this

01:06:43.950 --> 01:06:48.120
that it's not a failure, it's a learning opportunity,

01:06:48.120 --> 01:06:50.370
but anything else, Mister Secretary, General?

01:06:52.610 --> 01:06:54.891
- I certainly concur with the approach.

01:06:54.891 --> 01:06:56.450
Throughout our history,

01:06:56.450 --> 01:06:58.753
the things where we've had some issues,

01:06:59.010 --> 01:07:01.080
first of all we generally have issues at some level

01:07:01.080 --> 01:07:03.430
in virtually every new cutting edge endeavor,

01:07:03.430 --> 01:07:06.870
and so I wholly concur with the thought process

01:07:06.870 --> 01:07:08.400
that you're taking, and it's not just us.

01:07:08.400 --> 01:07:10.590
I think in some ways, when we look at our allies

01:07:10.590 --> 01:07:12.493
like Israel and their test regimen,

01:07:12.610 --> 01:07:16.363
they're much more willing to go back out to the test range,

01:07:16.460 --> 01:07:19.423
begin a flight test regimen, work through their issues,

01:07:19.620 --> 01:07:21.580
understanding there are going to be bumps in the road.

01:07:21.580 --> 01:07:25.500
So I think I certainly second the approach

01:07:25.500 --> 01:07:27.590
that you're trying to encourage us to take.

01:07:27.590 --> 01:07:28.860
- And as you probably know, Mister Secretary,

01:07:28.860 --> 01:07:31.245
the Israelis are actually testing right now

01:07:31.245 --> 01:07:35.060
in the great state of Alaska, in Kodiak, Alaska,

01:07:35.060 --> 01:07:37.123
so they're learning a lot there as well.

01:07:37.430 --> 01:07:38.263
Thank you, Madam Chairman.

01:07:38.263 --> 01:07:39.260
- [James] Senator, if I could,

01:07:39.260 --> 01:07:40.093
just one final thought on that.

01:07:40.093 --> 01:07:40.926
- Yes, sir.

01:07:41.547 --> 01:07:42.380
- So as General Greaves described

01:07:42.380 --> 01:07:43.240
in terms of learning a lot.

01:07:43.240 --> 01:07:45.790
First of all I think your approach is right on.

01:07:45.790 --> 01:07:47.190
I think that's what we need.

01:07:47.630 --> 01:07:48.530
The other piece that goes in,

01:07:48.530 --> 01:07:49.940
not only on the learning piece

01:07:49.940 --> 01:07:52.023
to the technology under development,

01:07:52.120 --> 01:07:54.622
but there's a big learning piece between the warfighter

01:07:54.622 --> 01:07:57.723
as well as the material developer, in this case MDA.

01:07:57.770 --> 01:07:59.990
And so that's actually a relationship that we enjoy

01:07:59.990 --> 01:08:02.430
on a daily basis between the 100th and the 49th

01:08:02.430 --> 01:08:04.120
and the Missile Defense Agency.

01:08:04.120 --> 01:08:07.840
So that ability to have the warfighter working side by side

01:08:07.840 --> 01:08:11.030
with the material developer in a test scenario, for example,

01:08:11.030 --> 01:08:13.893
and I'll use the FTG15 a year ago,

01:08:14.010 --> 01:08:15.800
where we actually had a crew out of the 100th

01:08:15.800 --> 01:08:18.700
that actually executed the warfighting piece of that test,

01:08:18.720 --> 01:08:22.600
launching the interceptor and making for that engagement

01:08:22.810 --> 01:08:24.360
is the fact that we learn a lot

01:08:24.530 --> 01:08:26.020
from the warfighter's perspective,

01:08:26.020 --> 01:08:27.440
and then we are also able to inform

01:08:27.440 --> 01:08:29.920
the material developer on the road ahead.

01:08:29.920 --> 01:08:32.770
Are they developing the things that the soldiers can use?

01:08:32.770 --> 01:08:34.173
So I would just offer that.

01:08:35.580 --> 01:08:38.520
- My thanks to the panel today for your testimony

01:08:38.520 --> 01:08:42.020
and your willingness to give us some pretty blunt answers.

01:08:42.020 --> 01:08:45.040
We appreciate that, and I thank you all for your service.

01:08:45.040 --> 01:08:47.840
And thank you again, General Robinson,

01:08:47.840 --> 01:08:49.923
for your service to this nation,

01:08:50.040 --> 01:08:51.885
and we wish you all the best.

01:08:51.885 --> 01:08:52.718
- [Lori] Thank you, ma'am.

01:08:52.718 --> 01:08:54.343
- Thank you. Hearing is adjourned.

01:08:54.504 --> 01:08:57.004
(gavel bangs)