WEBVTT

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- We want to welcome them to our hearing

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on the fiscal year 2019 budget request

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for missile defense and defeat activities.

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I want to thank our witnesses for their

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service to our country,

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but also for being here in the preparation

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you have to put in to these hearings,

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I know it takes a lot of time and energy but

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it is very helpful to us.

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Our witnesses today are the honorable John Ruud,

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undersecretary of defense for policy,

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General Lori Robinson, commander Northern Command,

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North American Aerospace Defense Command,

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I want to take a moment to especially

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recognized General Robinson,

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you have been a friend of this committee,

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and not only the commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD,

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but also across your 37 years of service

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to this great nation,

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and I speak on behalf of this committee

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and the house as a whole,

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I thank you for your dedicated and unwavering service,

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and we wish you well in your retirement.

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- I'd like to give a round of applause.

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(people applaud)

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- General Lieutenant Sam Greaves,

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I know he's not retiring,

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he's just getting warmed up,

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he is a director of Missile Defense Agency,

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and General congratulations on your assignment

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as director of MDA,

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you're no stranger to this committee,

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and we look forward to continuing

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to work together with you on missile

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defense for a long time.

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And lieutenant,

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it's got Lieutenant down here,

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I don't think you want me to,

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Lieutenant General James Dickinson,

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commander Army Space and Missile Defense Command,

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Army Forces Strategic Command and Joint Functional Component

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Command for integrated missile defense

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for the US Strategic Command.

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Let me start by just highlighting some of what we have

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seen since our previous missile defense

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hearing in June of last year,

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North Korea has tested a missile with ICBM range,

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Iran continues to develop their own ICBMs

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under the guise of space launch programs.

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Putin boasted in his recent national

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speech about quote, "invincible missile",

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targeted at the United States.

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And China's surging ahead with their own missile programs,

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most notably the hypersonic and the hypersonic realm.

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Fortunately I think this administration gets

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the budget amendment we received last year

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for an additional four billion dollars for missile defense,

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and the FY 19 request which includes

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about 12 billion across the board for missile defense,

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seemed appropriate given the rising threat

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levels around the globe.

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As is highlighted in the national defense strategy,

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quote, "We cannot expect success in fighting

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"tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's weapons or equipment.

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"To address the scope and pace of our competitors,

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"and adversaries ambitions and capabilities,

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"we must invest in modernization

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"of key capabilities through sustained predictable budgets."

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Close quote.

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Now we are waiting on this administration

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to release the missile defense review,

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hopefully in the coming weeks we we'll see it.

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We have developed the best missile defenses in the world,

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but for the most part they are technologies

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that were started 15 years ago,

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the increasing threat makes it essential

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that we expand and enhance our missile defenses,

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not only with capacity,

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but also through steps of leaps in technology,

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right now and not five years from now,

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increasing our GBI inventory,

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land-based sensors,

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and regional interceptor hit capacity is critical,

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but cannot come at the cost of seriously going

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after technologies like directed energy,

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space sensing and boost phase capability.

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I want to thank our witnesses again,

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I look forward to the discussion,

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but right now I'd like to turn the ranking member,

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my friend and colleague from Tennessee,

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Mr Cooper for any opening statement he may have.

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- Thank you Mr Chairman I would also like

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to welcome the witnesses,

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and in particular wish General Robinson the best of luck,

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you served your nation well,

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you should be very proud.

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I will hold most of my questions for

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the classified portion of the hearing,

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so I'll abbreviate my remarks now,

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I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.

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- Great,

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Now we'll ask each of the witnesses

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to summarize their opening statements,

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you will be allowed five minutes,

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I'll let you know each of your opening statements

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and their full will be taken into

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the record without objection,

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so ordered,

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Mr Ruud I recognize you first for your opening statement.

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- Mr Chairman thank you,

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Chairman Rogers,

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Ranking Member Cooper and distinguished

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members of the committee,

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thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today

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to testify on behalf of the presidents fiscal

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year 19 budget request in support of our efforts

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to improve our missile defense capabilities,

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so that we remain ahead of the evolving threat,

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while providing effective, integrated and interoperable

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regional missile defenses,

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in support of our global defense strategy.

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As the national defense strategy points out,

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the United States allies and partners confront

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a security environment that is more complex

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and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory,

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today over 20 states possess offensive missiles

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and potential adversaries are expanding

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there missile capabilities

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in three directions simultaneously,

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They are increasing the capabilities

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of their existing missile systems,

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adding new and unprecedented types of missile capabilities,

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and integrating offensive missiles

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more thoroughly in the course of threats,

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military exercises and war planning.

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As you mentioned Mr Chairman in your opening statement,

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over the past several years North Korea

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has made substantial improvements in their ICBM program,

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Iran is extending the range of

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its ballistic missile systems,

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with the goal of achieving an operational ICBM capability,

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and through its space launch vehicle program,

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could shorten the pathway to an ICBM,

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because space launch vehicles use similar technologies.

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Potential adversaries are also fielding

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an increasingly diverse and expansive modern range

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of regional offensive missile systems

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that can threaten American forces abroad,

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allies and partners.

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Their regional offensive missile systems include

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multiple types of short medium

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and intermediate range missiles,

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intended to provide coercive political

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and military advantages in regional crises or conflicts.

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These missile systems appear to be a central element

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of Russia's frequent and explicit

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and coercive nuclear threats to the United States,

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our allies and partners.

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As you mentioned Mr Chairman,

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Russia is developing a new generation of

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advanced regional ballistic and cruise missiles

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that support it's anti-access area of denial strategy,

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intended to defeat US and allied will

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and capability in regional crises or conflicts.

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China is also engaging in substantial modernization

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efforts that are summarized in my statement

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that I will not repeat.

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So with that,

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this is the backdrop and the strategic context,

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let me turn to a discussion of the 2019 budget request,

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for missile defense and the policies

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programs and capabilities that it supports.

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The department's budget request supports

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the president's direction set out in

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the national security strategy to develop

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a layered missile defense system to protect

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the American homeland from North Korean

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and Iranian missile threats.

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The request also support regional missile defenses

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to protect our deployed forces allies and partners.

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Our missile defense system not

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only protect the United States,

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it strengthens deterrence of war,

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and ensures our allies and partners.

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Today the ground-based missile defense

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system provides protection for the nation,

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it consists of 44 ground-based interceptors

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deployed in Alaska and California,

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and land sea and space-based sensors,

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as well as a command and control system operated

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24 hours a day by trained servicemembers.

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We are strengthening this system,

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investing in technologies to ensure we can continue to

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counter rogue state missile threats to our homeland.

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In 2017 DOD requested the reprogramming

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of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than 400 million

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dollars to counter the North Korean missile threat,

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Congress approved this request for which we are grateful,

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these funds support important homeland defense activities,

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including initiating work on procurement

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of 20 additional ground-based interceptors

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in Alaska as early as 2023,

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which will bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors.

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The reprogramming also funded a service

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life extension to the co-band radar in Alaska,

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and software upgrades to the sea-based X-band radar,

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both of which are essential elements

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to our homeland defense.

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In November of 2017 the president submitted an amendment

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to the 2018 budget request for four billion dollars

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for missile defense,

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which includes construction of a new missile

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field at Fort Riley, Alaska,

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and additional procurement funding for 20 more GBI's.

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The FY 19 budget request includes 9.9 billion

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dollars for the Missile Defense Agency,

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and three billion additional dollars for air

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and missile defense activities in the military departments.

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This budget funds are more capable GBI

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with a redesigned kill-vehicle,

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the deployment of missile tracking,

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and discrimination sensors in a network

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in Alaska, Hawaii and the Pacific region,

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and a new space-based kill assessment capability.

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These near-term investments will help

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us obtain substantially more performance

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and efficiency out of the GMD system

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necessary to meet the evolving threat.

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We're also taking steps to bolster homeland defenses

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against air and cruise missile threats,

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and 2018 will complete the first part of

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a two-part effort to provide effective surveillance

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against these threats in the national capital region,

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doing so will enhance our ability to detect,

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track and investigate suspicious aircraft

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as well as cruise missiles,

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and when necessary queue our missile defense

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systems against the full spectrum of air threats.

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We are on track to begin the second phase

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of this effort in fiscal year 2019,

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which will expand our capability to detect,

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identify and take decisive action before threats

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can strike potential targets within

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the national capital region.

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We are also looking into technologies and concepts

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that can be used to provide scalable

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and deployable options for expanding this capability,

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the department's budget request also

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includes deployment of regional missile defenses,

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tailored to meet threats to US forces abroad,

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and allies and partners in Europe,

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the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region,

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the budget enhances our regional missile

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defense capability through additional Patriot missiles,

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as well as THAAD SM-3 Block 1B,

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and SM-3 Block 2A interceptors,

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our focus is on developing and fielding missile

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defense capabilities that are mobile and relocatable

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which allows us flexibility to respond to

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a crisis wherever it may emerge.

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Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD and Aegis BMD

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capable ships can be surged when and where required,

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they make it possible to deploy

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layered missile defense capabilities,

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that are responsible to regional threats as they arise.

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We are encouraging our allies and partners in Europe,

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the Middle East, and the Near East and Asia,

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to acquire missile defense capabilities,

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and to strengthen cooperation in order to move towards

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a more interoperable and integrated

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missile defense architecture,

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against hostile ballistic missile

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and cruise missile threats.

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Looking forward it's clear our potential adversaries

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are modernizing and expanding their capabilities,

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we must ensure that our missile defense

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investment strategy and priorities enable

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us to meet the most dangerous threats today,

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while also enabling us to counter future

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missile threats as they expand.

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Mr Chairman let me conclude by stating

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in this increasingly complex and threatening environment,

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DOD must sustain the capabilities needed

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to deter and defend against attacks on our homeland,

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our forces abroad and our allies and partners,

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we must make the investments needed to address

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the ongoing erosion of our operational advantages

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and remain the pre-eminent military power in the world,

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thank you again for the opportunity

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to testify before you today.

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- Thank you Mr Ruud,

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General Robinson, you're recognized.

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- Thank you,

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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper

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and distinguished members of the committee,

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I am honored to join you today,

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to testify alongside Undersecretary of Defense Ruud,

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General Greaves and General Dickinson.

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As has been mentioned the strategic environment

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and threats facing our nation continues to evolve,

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our adversaries are taking deliberate steps

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to extend their operational reach,

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and are developing new capabilities

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to ranged targets in North America and Canada.

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At USNORTHCOM and NORAD we understand

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the urgency of keeping pace with these evolving threats,

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we also recognize that North Korea represents

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the most immediate threat to our homeland,

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and therefore remains NORTHCOM's highest priority.

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I'm confident that ground-based mid-course

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defense system can defeat this threat today,

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and I strongly support the continued improvements

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to the ballistic missile defense enterprise

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in order to maintain our advantage,

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we continue to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency,

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the intelligence community,

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and others combatant commands as part of

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a collaborative effort to outpace the threat.

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I am grateful as has been mentioned for

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the committee's approval of the FY-17

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above threshold reprogramming and support the

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budget amendment that will increase

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the systems capability and capacity.

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Under my NORAD responsibilities advanced cruise

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missiles with a low radar cross section represent

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a challenge to our air defense systems,

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Russia continues to modernize its delivery systems,

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long-range bombers and strategic submarines,

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capable of launching from distances not previously seen,

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reducing the indications and warnings we

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are likely to receive prior to a combat lunch.

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To defend against advanced cruise

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missiles as has been mentioned,

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we are making prudent investments in advanced sensors

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and defensive weapon systems to protect

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our nation's vital assets,

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the men and women,

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the Warriors of USNORTHCOM and NORAD

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stand united in a common purpose ready to face the threats

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of the United States and Canada today,

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and we are evolving to face the threats of tomorrow,

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sirs as you have mentioned,

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I am getting the privilege to retire,

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I will tell you that after 37 years of serving my nation,

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and after having these last two years,

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having the sacred responsibility of defending our nation,

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I want you all to know my gratitude

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my heartfelt appreciation for your support

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to NORAD and US Northern command,

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and to our nation's armed forces,

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soldiers, sailors, airmen, marine, Coastguardsmen,

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and civilians and in my NORAD Hat Canadians.

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Thank you again For giving me the privilege

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and the opportunity to speak and I welcome your questions.

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- Thank you General Robinson,

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General Greaves you are recognized for five minutes.

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- Chairman Roberts,

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Ranking Member Cooper,

14:54.360 --> 14:56.360
distinguished members of the subcommittee,

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thank you for this opportunity to testify on

14:58.799 --> 15:00.760
the Missile Defense Agency's budget request

15:00.760 --> 15:02.453
for fiscal year 2019,

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I'd first like to express our appreciation

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to this committee for its support of

15:07.180 --> 15:09.550
the departments above threshold reprogram request

15:09.550 --> 15:12.003
in September 2017,

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and the FY 2018 budget amendment

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which provided reprogramming approval

15:17.500 --> 15:19.970
and emergency funding to enhance the nation's

15:19.970 --> 15:22.233
missile defeat and defense capabilities,

15:22.750 --> 15:24.680
I'm also very pleased to report that we

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are executing these funds with the utmost urgency.

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I would also like to thank the thousands of men

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and women across the government and industry

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who work tirelessly every day across the globe

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in support of our nation's ballistic missile defense system,

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I truly believe they remain in our asymmetric advantage.

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Over the past year we've been giving a clear

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and unambiguous message from the president that

15:48.177 --> 15:51.180
we are committed to expanding and improving

15:51.180 --> 15:53.280
a state-of-the-art missile defense system,

15:53.750 --> 15:57.590
so in my mind the time for delays and more studies

15:57.590 --> 15:59.393
and more objections is over,

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as I say it that threat has voted and continues

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to visibly vote through the demonstration

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of their capabilities.

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Last summer I laid out three

16:08.750 --> 16:10.570
Missile Defense Agency priorities,

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to help guide our actions our behavior and program planning,

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first, we will continue to focus on increasing

16:17.750 --> 16:20.963
system reliability to build more fighter confidence.

16:21.580 --> 16:25.933
Second we will increase engagement capability and capacity,

16:26.890 --> 16:29.603
and third we will address the advanced threat.

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I can confidently tell you today that

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the current BDSM system meets today's threat,

16:36.530 --> 16:38.520
however as the threat increases

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in both number and lethality,

16:40.920 --> 16:43.793
we need to ensure our systems remain reliable,

16:44.170 --> 16:46.893
remain secure from cyber security threats,

16:47.050 --> 16:48.850
and that the nation's ballistic missile defense

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capability and capacity keep pace with that threat.

16:53.350 --> 16:55.660
We currently have 44 ground-based interceptors

16:55.660 --> 16:57.950
for homeland defense and plan to expand

16:57.950 --> 17:00.563
the fleet to 64 by 2023,

17:01.300 --> 17:04.350
in addition improvements in sensor coverage to include

17:04.350 --> 17:07.323
the long-range discriminating radar in Alaska,

17:07.860 --> 17:09.350
the addition of a homeland defense

17:09.350 --> 17:11.243
radar in Hawaii if approved,

17:11.620 --> 17:13.417
and planning for a homeland defense radar in

17:13.417 --> 17:15.910
the Pacific as well as advanced discrimination

17:15.910 --> 17:18.590
improvements will enable the United States

17:18.590 --> 17:20.603
to improve protection of the homeland,

17:21.020 --> 17:23.150
the agency will also continue redesign

17:23.150 --> 17:24.943
kill-vehicle development efforts,

17:25.330 --> 17:27.820
enhance the stockpile reliability program

17:28.250 --> 17:30.683
and expand the GBI battle space.

17:31.640 --> 17:33.830
Integrated space and terrestrial sensors

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for queuing, tracking, discriminating

17:36.880 --> 17:39.750
and targeting ballistic missile threats are critical

17:39.750 --> 17:42.450
to improving missile defense architecture

17:42.450 --> 17:43.913
and its robustness.

17:44.640 --> 17:47.520
This budget will continue to fund the space-based

17:47.520 --> 17:49.632
Kill assessment demonstration program

17:49.632 --> 17:52.610
to deliver a capability to confirm intercepts

17:52.610 --> 17:54.643
for improved defense of the homeland.

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We're also continuing constant definition studies

17:57.930 --> 18:00.453
for space-based missile defense tracking sensors,

18:01.150 --> 18:03.860
if pursued, spaces sensors will be able to detect

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and track both traditional as well

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as emerging threats as part of the BDSM architecture,

18:10.920 --> 18:13.820
additionally as this space layer matures we will need

18:13.820 --> 18:15.983
an improved space test infrastructure,

18:16.270 --> 18:19.670
to support verification in such areas as concept

18:19.670 --> 18:22.470
of operations and the technical performance

18:22.470 --> 18:24.423
of space assets under development.

18:25.470 --> 18:27.340
This budget will also increase the number

18:27.340 --> 18:29.520
of terminal high altitude area defense

18:29.520 --> 18:31.403
or THAAD interceptors,

18:31.470 --> 18:33.660
to improve regional missile defenses for

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the protection of our forward deployed

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forces, allies and partners.

18:38.090 --> 18:40.530
We will continue to install the Aegis ballistic

18:40.530 --> 18:42.730
missile defense weapon system on Aegis ships

18:43.060 --> 18:44.620
and deliver standard Missile three,

18:44.620 --> 18:46.463
block 1B interceptors.

18:47.100 --> 18:50.113
We are also supporting the European phase adaptive approach,

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providing coverage and protection of NATO European

18:52.750 --> 18:55.970
territory, populations and forces against the increase

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in ballistic missile threat from the Middle East.

18:59.030 --> 19:01.230
Our request will support continued integration

19:01.230 --> 19:03.700
of the SM-3 Block 2A missile which is

19:03.700 --> 19:05.560
a co-development effort with Japan,

19:05.560 --> 19:07.923
into the Aegis BMD weapon system.

19:08.680 --> 19:10.520
Currently there is an operational Aegis source

19:10.520 --> 19:12.083
site located in Romania,

19:12.380 --> 19:14.330
and while we have experienced delays in

19:14.330 --> 19:16.460
the military construction portion of

19:16.460 --> 19:18.413
the Aegis to shore effort in Poland,

19:19.000 --> 19:21.620
we remain steadfastly committed to delivery of

19:21.620 --> 19:24.610
that capability in support of EPAA phase three

19:24.610 --> 19:25.923
as soon as possible.

19:26.860 --> 19:29.130
This budget request will continue the development

19:29.130 --> 19:32.383
of breakthrough technologies for integration into the BMDS,

19:32.620 --> 19:34.963
including discrimination improvements,

19:35.190 --> 19:37.683
multi-object kill-vehicle technology,

19:37.850 --> 19:39.713
hypersonic defense technology,

19:40.020 --> 19:42.610
and exploring high-powered lasers and interceptors

19:42.610 --> 19:44.830
that have potential against threat missiles

19:44.830 --> 19:46.283
in the boost phase of flight.

19:47.340 --> 19:49.523
Additionally as we evaluate the elements of

19:49.523 --> 19:51.292
the missile defense system we will actively

19:51.292 --> 19:54.455
pursue developing elements that have multi mission

19:54.455 --> 19:57.040
and department wide utility and leveraged

19:57.040 --> 19:58.943
systems such as the F-35,

19:59.410 --> 20:02.390
which likely has the sensor communications

20:02.390 --> 20:04.620
and shooter capability in support of

20:04.620 --> 20:06.470
the ballistic missile defense system.

20:07.273 --> 20:09.750
Finally, we take the financial audit

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and our fiscal stewardship role very seriously,

20:12.770 --> 20:14.820
and MDA has robust and accountable

20:14.820 --> 20:17.373
financial management processes in place,

20:18.140 --> 20:22.690
as a note we closed down FY-17 with 151 dollars

20:22.690 --> 20:25.670
of expiring funds out of an 8.6 billion

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dollars budget that's on our books,

20:28.156 --> 20:29.560
we are now in the midst of

20:29.560 --> 20:32.313
the FY-18 full financial statement audit,

20:32.430 --> 20:34.693
and have received no findings to date.

20:35.480 --> 20:37.630
The bottom line is we are committed across

20:37.630 --> 20:41.200
the entire agency to achieving fully auditable books,

20:41.200 --> 20:43.280
and maintaining the confidence of the Congress

20:43.280 --> 20:44.553
and the American public.

20:44.951 --> 20:46.130
Mr Chairman,

20:46.130 --> 20:47.210
Ranking Member Cooper,

20:47.210 --> 20:48.330
members of the subcommittee,

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I look forward to answering your questions,

20:49.950 --> 20:50.783
thank you.

20:51.550 --> 20:52.732
- Thank you General Greaves,

20:52.732 --> 20:55.432
General Dickinson you are recognized for five minutes.

20:55.440 --> 20:56.273
- Chairman Rogers,

20:56.273 --> 20:57.630
Ranking Member Cooper and the other

20:57.630 --> 20:59.730
distinguished members of the subcommittee,

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thank you for your support of our soldiers

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and civilians and their families,

21:03.400 --> 21:05.531
I'm honored to testify before you today to emphasize

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the importance of air and missile defense to our nation,

21:08.550 --> 21:10.400
deployed forces, partners and allies.

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Air and missile threats continue

21:12.740 --> 21:15.963
to increase both in quantity and offensive capability,

21:16.220 --> 21:18.150
with this in mind thank you for the passage of

21:18.150 --> 21:21.560
the FY-18 appropriations act and your continuing support

21:21.560 --> 21:23.960
for the nation's air and missile defense forces,

21:24.020 --> 21:27.290
your support enables us to continue fulfilling our role

21:27.290 --> 21:29.680
in securing the nation today and developing

21:29.680 --> 21:31.385
future forces and capabilities to

21:31.385 --> 21:34.053
deter and counter tomorrow's threats.

21:34.510 --> 21:36.310
I'd like to briefly summarize the missions of

21:36.310 --> 21:38.333
the organizations I represent today,

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first the United States Army Space

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and Missile Defense Command,

21:41.480 --> 21:43.313
Army Forces Strategic Command,

21:43.650 --> 21:44.780
SMDCR Strat

21:44.860 --> 21:46.750
serves as a force provider in support

21:46.750 --> 21:48.083
of our combatant commands,

21:48.370 --> 21:49.470
SMDCR Strat,

21:49.470 --> 21:52.093
a multi-faceted multi-compound command,

21:52.220 --> 21:54.010
consists of two were fighting brigades,

21:54.010 --> 21:56.840
a technical center and a future war fighting center

21:57.000 --> 21:58.606
that provides trained and ready space

21:58.606 --> 22:01.520
and missile defense forces and capabilities

22:01.520 --> 22:03.220
to the war fighter and the nation,

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stretching across 11 different time zones

22:05.470 --> 22:07.433
the 23 dispersed locations,

22:07.500 --> 22:10.230
we provide low density high demand capabilities

22:10.300 --> 22:12.797
for today's fight as well as build future space

22:12.797 --> 22:15.430
and missile defense capabilities for tomorrow

22:15.430 --> 22:18.460
by researching testing and integrating space,

22:18.460 --> 22:22.213
missile defense, cyber and directed energy technologies.

22:22.570 --> 22:24.370
The changing operational environment

22:24.430 --> 22:27.120
and evolving threat requires to provide the army

22:27.120 --> 22:29.230
and the joint force with enhanced air

22:29.230 --> 22:31.723
and missile defense capacity and capability,

22:31.860 --> 22:33.890
and maintain readiness while managing

22:33.890 --> 22:37.373
the high operational demands of our low density forces,

22:37.590 --> 22:41.020
within SMDCR Strat we are collaborating closely with

22:41.020 --> 22:43.680
the army's air and missile defense cross functional team

22:43.680 --> 22:46.140
on capabilities to increase the lethality

22:46.300 --> 22:48.200
of the army and the joint force,

22:48.200 --> 22:50.493
including maneuver short range air defense,

22:50.550 --> 22:51.833
and directed energy.

22:53.040 --> 22:55.130
A cross functional team as a key part of

22:55.130 --> 22:57.033
the army's new modernization effort,

22:57.050 --> 22:59.750
that will enable us to rapidly develop requirements

22:59.910 --> 23:02.949
and ensure future capabilities transition quickly

23:02.949 --> 23:06.573
from concept to prototyping to fielding.

23:07.024 --> 23:08.950
I also have the privilege of commanding

23:08.950 --> 23:10.630
the Joint Functional Component Command

23:10.630 --> 23:12.203
for Integrated Missile Defense,

23:12.460 --> 23:13.923
JFCCIMD,

23:14.070 --> 23:16.183
which supports United States Strategic Command

23:16.183 --> 23:18.230
by integrating and synchronizing

23:18.230 --> 23:20.148
global missile defense operations,

23:20.148 --> 23:22.580
JFCCIMD conducts global missile

23:22.580 --> 23:24.043
defense operation supports,

23:24.300 --> 23:26.810
advocates for and recommends acceptance

23:26.810 --> 23:29.313
of missile defense capabilities and executes joint

23:29.313 --> 23:31.760
and combined global missile defense

23:31.760 --> 23:34.733
training and education for the nation.

23:35.120 --> 23:37.100
To accomplish this we maintain close

23:37.100 --> 23:38.830
collaborative relationships with

23:38.830 --> 23:40.730
the geographic combatant and commands,

23:40.750 --> 23:42.293
the Missile Defense Agency,

23:42.360 --> 23:44.020
the office of the Secretary of Defense,

23:44.020 --> 23:45.033
the joint staff,

23:45.210 --> 23:47.153
and our allies and partners,

23:47.340 --> 23:48.940
despite their unique missions,

23:48.940 --> 23:53.940
a unifying principle for both SMDCR Strat and JFCCIMD,

23:54.140 --> 23:57.563
is our number one priority to protect our homeland,

23:58.140 --> 24:00.540
both commands will remain bold and innovative

24:00.740 --> 24:02.767
offering solutions to ensure our nation's forces

24:02.767 --> 24:06.017
are prepared to fight across multiple domains,

24:06.017 --> 24:09.962
finally the challenges we face cannot be met without

24:09.962 --> 24:12.873
the dedication of our greatest asset,

24:12.980 --> 24:13.813
our people,

24:14.180 --> 24:16.350
the remarkable service members, civilians

24:17.287 --> 24:19.340
and contractors along with their families stationed

24:19.340 --> 24:21.773
at home and globally deployed,

24:21.880 --> 24:24.070
provide support to the army and the joint

24:24.070 --> 24:25.913
war fighter each and every day,

24:26.300 --> 24:28.220
I have the utmost confidence and respect for

24:28.220 --> 24:29.930
the Warriors who volunteered to operate

24:29.930 --> 24:32.653
these highly complex systems around the world,

24:33.060 --> 24:34.840
thank you for your continued support for

24:34.840 --> 24:36.710
the committed professionals to develop,

24:36.710 --> 24:40.143
deploy and operate our nation's air missile defense systems,

24:40.400 --> 24:42.857
I've addressed in detail the full range of these missions,

24:42.857 --> 24:44.773
and how we are executing them,

24:44.830 --> 24:47.820
and I ask that my statement be submitted for the record,

24:47.820 --> 24:49.810
and I look forward to addressing your questions,

24:49.810 --> 24:50.823
thank you.

24:51.290 --> 24:52.950
- Without objection this statement is accepted

24:52.950 --> 24:53.813
into the record,

24:54.260 --> 24:56.673
and I'll recognize myself for questions,

24:56.970 --> 24:58.540
to let you know what we're planning,

24:58.540 --> 25:00.310
we're going to be calling for votes around five,

25:00.310 --> 25:01.680
so it's my hope that we can get through

25:01.680 --> 25:03.620
one round of questions in open session,

25:03.620 --> 25:06.630
and then trot down to the skiff for

25:06.630 --> 25:08.680
the closed portion before votes,

25:08.680 --> 25:11.180
because I don't know how long we'll be over there.

25:11.473 --> 25:12.423
First,

25:12.550 --> 25:13.653
General Greaves you made reference to

25:13.653 --> 25:16.593
that Romanian and Polish Aegis ashore sites,

25:16.743 --> 25:19.393
I'm curious as to the Romanian site,

25:20.460 --> 25:22.987
how the new AEW system that we put into

25:22.987 --> 25:24.490
the NDAA is coming along,

25:24.490 --> 25:25.835
can you give us a progress report on

25:25.835 --> 25:27.653
that air defense system?

25:29.135 --> 25:29.968
- Mr Chairman,

25:30.509 --> 25:34.313
the AEW system is not operational today,

25:35.310 --> 25:36.840
within the Missile Defense Agency,

25:36.840 --> 25:39.500
my predecessor initiated and we completed

25:39.500 --> 25:43.670
two demonstrations of potential capability

25:43.670 --> 25:48.020
as inflowing data from simulated source and then

25:48.020 --> 25:50.620
from actual tracks into the Aegis weapon system

25:50.620 --> 25:55.283
to demonstrate that the capability would work,

25:56.250 --> 25:59.923
as of right now we are waiting funds to complete the,

26:01.097 --> 26:05.450
demonstration of an actual system which would include

26:07.103 --> 26:11.807
an army low-cost radar as a potential candidate

26:13.320 --> 26:15.683
as well as the SeaRAM system,

26:16.020 --> 26:17.740
so as of today it is not operational.

26:17.740 --> 26:18.573
- Great,

26:18.660 --> 26:21.310
and looking at the President's budget request for 19,

26:21.310 --> 26:23.640
it appears that the Missile Defense Agency has

26:23.640 --> 26:26.420
a gap in developing critical advanced technology such

26:26.420 --> 26:27.780
as high-powered directed energy

26:27.780 --> 26:30.793
for boost phase missile defense and space sensing,

26:31.380 --> 26:33.713
as you quoted secretary Maddis,

26:33.890 --> 26:36.467
quote, "If we fail to adapt to speed of relevance

26:36.467 --> 26:37.860
"our focus will lose."

26:37.860 --> 26:38.693
close quote,

26:39.010 --> 26:41.640
yet in these critical technology areas we continue

26:41.640 --> 26:46.500
to trade studies and analyses via starting programs

26:46.500 --> 26:48.713
with goals for operational capabilities,

26:48.950 --> 26:51.010
how does a one-year delay in Missile Defense Agency

26:51.010 --> 26:52.640
specific funding impact your ability

26:52.640 --> 26:54.037
to deliver high-powered directed energy

26:54.037 --> 26:55.763
and space sensing capabilities?

26:56.560 --> 26:58.863
- Mr Chairman I am concerned about that delay,

26:59.690 --> 27:03.913
I am very encouraged with the fact that my new boss,

27:04.660 --> 27:08.333
Doctor Griffin working with Miss Laurie in her capacity,

27:08.740 --> 27:12.670
have the focus and art re-engineering and redirecting

27:12.670 --> 27:14.170
the Department to prioritize

27:14.170 --> 27:15.530
as Doctor Griffin has testified,

27:15.530 --> 27:18.030
the number one priority being hypersonic

27:18.130 --> 27:19.933
both offense and defense,

27:20.040 --> 27:21.653
as well as directed energy,

27:21.790 --> 27:23.380
and we've had conversations,

27:23.380 --> 27:27.370
I've seen actions being taken to prioritize those

27:27.370 --> 27:29.697
two areas as well as other technology areas

27:29.697 --> 27:32.883
to deliver that capability to keep pace with the threat.

27:33.210 --> 27:34.043
- Great,

27:35.000 --> 27:37.050
and this will be to any of the witnesses,

27:37.090 --> 27:39.280
across the board there's been a consensus on

27:39.280 --> 27:41.180
the need to get to space

27:41.180 --> 27:43.363
for missile tracking and discrimination,

27:43.610 --> 27:45.190
again without the benefit of having

27:45.190 --> 27:46.540
the missile defense review,

27:46.660 --> 27:48.500
can you lay out the Department's position

27:48.500 --> 27:50.770
on how space is being looked at in regards

27:50.770 --> 27:53.173
to a war fighting domain for missile defense,

27:53.535 --> 27:56.540
are you still looking at what a space-based

27:56.540 --> 27:58.713
intercept constellation could provide,

27:59.420 --> 28:01.030
is the ultimate goal for directed energy

28:01.030 --> 28:02.293
to be used in space?

28:03.830 --> 28:06.233
And this will be for anyone of you who will take it.

28:06.590 --> 28:07.423
- I'll start,

28:08.126 --> 28:09.970
if General Greaves or the others would like

28:09.970 --> 28:10.983
to add please do,

28:11.660 --> 28:14.450
sir you are correct that we are concerned

28:14.450 --> 28:17.683
that space has become a war fighting domain,

28:18.870 --> 28:20.543
it is a contested area,

28:20.720 --> 28:23.170
what we are observing in terms of the activities

28:23.170 --> 28:25.963
of other nation is of concern,

28:26.410 --> 28:28.360
and so you have that as a backdrop with

28:28.360 --> 28:31.860
this contested and congested space domain,

28:31.860 --> 28:33.440
and then in the missile defense area,

28:33.440 --> 28:35.840
certain capabilities as highlighted

28:35.840 --> 28:37.050
in our various statements,

28:37.050 --> 28:39.080
that countries like North Korea,

28:39.080 --> 28:40.670
Iran, Russia and China,

28:40.670 --> 28:43.433
are pursuing that causes substantial concern.

28:43.810 --> 28:46.230
So we are looking at capabilities

28:46.230 --> 28:47.900
that could be employed in space,

28:47.900 --> 28:50.133
both sensor capabilities and others,

28:50.391 --> 28:53.130
it's one of the subjects we're continuing

28:53.130 --> 28:56.373
to evaluate potential alternatives in that regard,

28:56.510 --> 29:00.010
no final decisions made yet on those capabilities

29:00.010 --> 29:01.020
that will be pursued,

29:01.020 --> 29:03.245
but it's definitely an area of active

29:03.245 --> 29:04.713
study in the Department.

29:06.950 --> 29:10.196
- Mr Chairman I would add that moving

29:10.196 --> 29:15.196
our sensing layer to space to work in coordination with

29:15.610 --> 29:18.260
the ground layer is absolutely essential

29:18.260 --> 29:20.860
to keep pace with the threat that we know is coming,

29:21.650 --> 29:24.573
I'll point out one such example is the hypersonic threat,

29:25.020 --> 29:26.550
and as my deputies fond of saying,

29:26.550 --> 29:28.400
if you can't see it you can shoot it,

29:28.490 --> 29:30.480
so the first thing we need to do is ensure that

29:30.480 --> 29:35.100
we can maintain birth to death tracking of threats

29:35.100 --> 29:37.270
that are flying lower that can maneuver,

29:37.270 --> 29:40.270
that are not as predictable as the ballistic missile threat,

29:40.330 --> 29:42.770
so it is essential that we deploy

29:42.840 --> 29:45.513
and operate a space sensing layer to begin with.

29:46.320 --> 29:50.373
The other part of it is the focus on boost phase intercept,

29:50.750 --> 29:53.660
I do not believe we have an option to not have

29:53.660 --> 29:57.510
some sort of capability for boost phase intercept,

29:57.510 --> 30:00.623
whether it be directed energy or kinetic weapons,

30:00.870 --> 30:01.910
I think there are a number of things

30:01.910 --> 30:03.040
that have to happen of course,

30:03.040 --> 30:03.873
policy,

30:04.222 --> 30:05.593
force structure,

30:05.765 --> 30:07.250
concept of operations,

30:07.250 --> 30:10.320
those things have to be developed by the

30:10.320 --> 30:12.653
COCOMS and other parts of the department,

30:12.930 --> 30:16.410
but the ability to have a boost phase intercept

30:16.410 --> 30:18.470
capability is I believe essential as

30:18.470 --> 30:19.670
we move into the future.

30:20.010 --> 30:22.263
As far as space-based interceptors,

30:22.930 --> 30:25.870
there are challenges that need to be worked through

30:25.870 --> 30:29.203
from the policy area whether or not to base it,

30:29.349 --> 30:32.140
the technologies got to be developed,

30:32.140 --> 30:35.410
but I believe we should be doing some work in

30:35.410 --> 30:39.030
that area to essentially lay the groundwork if

30:39.030 --> 30:41.530
the nation decides to deploy space-based

30:41.530 --> 30:43.170
interceptors we haven't lost that time,

30:43.170 --> 30:44.313
time is the key,

30:44.685 --> 30:46.333
the threat is time,

30:46.520 --> 30:49.240
because as a nation we can do anything given enough

30:49.240 --> 30:52.200
time to develop and deploy the capability,

30:52.200 --> 30:54.183
so that's my input sir.

30:55.020 --> 30:55.853
- Thank you general,

30:55.853 --> 30:57.090
I now recognize the ranking member for

30:57.090 --> 30:58.390
any questions he may have.

30:58.550 --> 30:59.580
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

30:59.580 --> 31:01.740
all of the witnesses are interested

31:01.740 --> 31:03.453
in protecting all of America,

31:04.020 --> 31:06.440
but the one exception to that is Secretary Ruud's

31:06.440 --> 31:09.490
testimony he gave special protection coming

31:09.490 --> 31:11.423
to the National Capital Region.

31:12.673 --> 31:15.940
How do we tell our friends in New York or Boston,

31:15.940 --> 31:17.603
or Norfolk, Newport News,

31:18.218 --> 31:19.068
or South Florida,

31:19.090 --> 31:21.140
they get less protection than we do here?

31:22.570 --> 31:25.870
- Sir the policy is to protect the entire United States,

31:25.870 --> 31:28.550
and that is in fact the capability that

31:28.550 --> 31:30.280
the ballistic missile defense system

31:30.280 --> 31:32.693
that's been deployed for the nation possesses,

31:33.380 --> 31:35.250
what I was referring to in my statement is there

31:35.250 --> 31:37.931
are some improvements that are being made for

31:37.931 --> 31:41.720
the ability to detect aircraft and cruise missiles

31:41.720 --> 31:43.690
as part of a two phased program

31:43.960 --> 31:45.290
that provide that enhancement,

31:45.290 --> 31:46.860
that does not mean the rest of the country

31:46.860 --> 31:49.040
will not enjoy protection as well,

31:49.040 --> 31:52.290
as you know through our air defense system,

31:52.290 --> 31:54.222
that General Robinson and others execute,

31:54.222 --> 31:58.403
we do surveil threats to all 50 states,

31:58.620 --> 32:00.430
where we look at those threats,

32:00.430 --> 32:01.290
evaluate them,

32:01.290 --> 32:04.183
and certainly work through those defense systems.

32:07.790 --> 32:09.520
- I think it's pretty clear in your paragraph

32:09.520 --> 32:10.750
on the bottom of page two,

32:10.750 --> 32:12.103
and the top of page three,

32:12.560 --> 32:15.433
that the National capital region comes first,

32:15.600 --> 32:17.850
at least as far as aircraft or cruise

32:17.850 --> 32:19.853
missile threats are concerned,

32:20.370 --> 32:22.197
and your exact quote is,

32:22.197 --> 32:24.927
"We are also looking into technologies and concepts

32:24.927 --> 32:26.937
"that could be used to provide scalable

32:26.937 --> 32:29.145
"and deployable options for expanding

32:29.145 --> 32:31.427
"this defensive capability."

32:32.080 --> 32:33.980
Presumably to the rest of the country?

32:35.070 --> 32:37.880
- There are options like that for improving

32:37.880 --> 32:39.740
the capabilities that would be applied,

32:39.740 --> 32:41.150
not only the rest of the country,

32:41.150 --> 32:43.550
but elsewhere outside of this country

32:43.800 --> 32:45.053
that we are looking at,

32:45.220 --> 32:47.150
but in terms of the ability to defend

32:47.150 --> 32:49.623
the country against cruise missile threats,

32:49.680 --> 32:51.173
those things or aircraft,

32:51.815 --> 32:55.110
the rest of the country also will have means to do that,

32:55.110 --> 32:57.418
but there are some particular programs that have

32:57.418 --> 33:00.710
been underway for some time to provide

33:00.710 --> 33:02.390
some phased improvements in

33:02.390 --> 33:04.983
our capability for the air threats,

33:05.220 --> 33:07.300
I'm happy to provide you a fuller briefing

33:07.300 --> 33:09.650
and more information on that if you'd like Sir?

33:10.900 --> 33:13.253
- We'll talk about it in classified session,

33:13.310 --> 33:14.410
thank you Mr Chairman.

33:16.438 --> 33:17.530
- The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado,

33:17.530 --> 33:18.363
Mr Lambourne.

33:18.760 --> 33:19.810
- Thank you chairman,

33:20.307 --> 33:21.140
thank you all for being here,

33:21.140 --> 33:23.223
General Robinson I wish you the best in the future,

33:23.230 --> 33:24.330
and thank you for your service,

33:24.330 --> 33:27.123
but thank you all for the great work that you are doing.

33:27.470 --> 33:28.510
And the first question,

33:28.510 --> 33:30.400
actually this is not missile defense but

33:30.400 --> 33:31.693
it has to do with space,

33:31.890 --> 33:33.588
yesterday I was at the space symposium

33:33.588 --> 33:35.810
and Vice President Pence,

33:35.810 --> 33:38.053
who's also chairman of the Space Council,

33:38.390 --> 33:42.190
talked about a new directive from

33:42.190 --> 33:45.863
the council on space management,

33:46.123 --> 33:51.063
watching and tracking debris and similar things,

33:51.300 --> 33:53.670
taking that responsibility and giving it

33:53.670 --> 33:56.483
to the Department of Commerce,

33:56.680 --> 33:59.930
Mr Ruud will that help the military focus better

33:59.930 --> 34:01.153
on its core mission?

34:01.260 --> 34:02.963
To give that responsibility away?

34:03.670 --> 34:04.653
- Yes it well,

34:05.080 --> 34:08.763
as described at the Space Symposium and elsewhere,

34:09.270 --> 34:12.547
the number of objects in space continues to increase,

34:12.547 --> 34:14.550
and a number of objects not only satellites,

34:14.550 --> 34:16.833
but some of the debris and other matters,

34:17.060 --> 34:19.840
the Defense Department has had the responsibility

34:19.840 --> 34:22.160
to catalog those objects and to engage in

34:22.160 --> 34:26.593
a discussion with commercial operators in space,

34:27.090 --> 34:31.070
with the aim of providing safe use of that space

34:31.070 --> 34:34.680
for their communications satellites or other items,

34:34.680 --> 34:37.270
as that has grown the Commerce Department

34:37.270 --> 34:40.683
we think is an more appropriate player to do that,

34:40.840 --> 34:42.490
and our colleagues at the Commerce Department

34:42.490 --> 34:44.783
have stepped forward to take on that mission,

34:44.890 --> 34:46.990
the Defense Department will still maintain

34:47.311 --> 34:48.610
its responsibilities in the defense base,

34:48.610 --> 34:50.893
we will partner with the Commerce Department,

34:51.030 --> 34:52.530
but it's an area the Commerce Department

34:52.530 --> 34:54.240
will more appropriately take the lead.

34:54.240 --> 34:55.940
- Fantastic, that's great to hear,

34:55.950 --> 34:57.490
okay back to missile defense,

34:57.490 --> 34:59.400
General Greaves I'd like to ask you a question,

34:59.400 --> 35:02.710
you've touched on some very important

35:03.060 --> 35:05.540
cutting-edge technologies developing

35:05.590 --> 35:07.883
multi-object kill vehicle,

35:08.240 --> 35:09.663
directed energy,

35:09.986 --> 35:11.273
tracking,

35:12.271 --> 35:13.271
hypersonics,

35:14.200 --> 35:17.730
are we devoting enough resources in this budget

35:17.730 --> 35:21.700
that we are discussing to advance those technologies,

35:21.700 --> 35:25.063
or should we be doing more R&D in those areas?

35:27.170 --> 35:28.003
- Congressmen,

35:28.003 --> 35:31.853
we are beginning the work on hypersonics,

35:32.160 --> 35:34.453
beginning the work on directed energy,

35:34.690 --> 35:37.950
and continuing the work at a lower level on

35:37.950 --> 35:39.723
the multiple object kill vehicle,

35:40.120 --> 35:42.330
I have significant hope from what

35:42.330 --> 35:44.110
I've seen already from within the department,

35:44.110 --> 35:47.010
that was Doctor Griffin's focus on

35:47.010 --> 35:49.410
the priorities he's laid out for the department,

35:50.490 --> 35:52.860
the discussion will become a lot more robust,

35:52.860 --> 35:56.150
and my hope is that we will see increased

35:56.150 --> 35:59.863
resources dedicated to those areas in the next budget.

36:00.440 --> 36:02.890
- Well this is a really important issue,

36:02.890 --> 36:05.460
and I think as we discuss the NDAA,

36:05.460 --> 36:07.090
we're gonna want to make sure that

36:07.090 --> 36:11.103
the R&D resources are really there,

36:11.378 --> 36:12.543
are any of them,

36:13.320 --> 36:15.460
are you saying it's kind of lacking right now

36:15.460 --> 36:17.773
and we need more resources?

36:18.282 --> 36:21.787
- Congressmen I'm saying the threat has demonstrated

36:21.787 --> 36:24.650
the capability within the last 18 months

36:24.650 --> 36:27.913
that was somewhat theoretical before that time,

36:28.860 --> 36:30.720
we've seen the rapid progress,

36:30.720 --> 36:34.090
and time is the enemy which is driving the department

36:34.090 --> 36:37.290
under Doctor Griffin's leadership to focus on those areas

36:37.290 --> 36:40.770
and apply the resources I believe that we will need

36:40.770 --> 36:44.393
to provide capabilities to stay in advance of the threat,

36:44.540 --> 36:46.940
so my hope is to see additional resources

36:46.940 --> 36:49.623
in that area in the next PB.

36:49.900 --> 36:50.810
- Alright thank you so much,

36:50.810 --> 36:55.231
and lastly the chairman already talked with you about this,

36:55.231 --> 36:58.353
that is space-based sensors,

36:58.910 --> 37:00.153
whether it's infrared,

37:03.059 --> 37:03.892
or electrical,

37:04.140 --> 37:05.103
optical,

37:07.510 --> 37:08.900
radar detectable,

37:08.900 --> 37:09.733
optical,

37:10.220 --> 37:11.243
so on and so forth,

37:11.440 --> 37:15.163
are we doing enough in those areas for space-based sensors?

37:15.920 --> 37:16.753
- Let's see,

37:17.309 --> 37:18.142
again I'll start with the threat,

37:18.142 --> 37:20.140
and the threat I see is the hypersonic

37:20.646 --> 37:22.093
thread is the greatest threat,

37:22.720 --> 37:26.383
we are executing the planning,

37:26.680 --> 37:29.250
and I expect to see a significant increase in

37:29.250 --> 37:30.730
the amount and time and resources that

37:30.730 --> 37:32.463
we will spend in that area,

37:32.740 --> 37:35.950
it is the top priority I believe for me within

37:35.950 --> 37:38.800
the agency to enhance our sensor architecture

37:39.130 --> 37:41.575
and to include leading that sensor architecture

37:41.575 --> 37:44.513
to space in concert with what we have on the ground.

37:45.440 --> 37:46.280
- Alright, thank you so much,

37:46.280 --> 37:47.540
Mr Chairman I yield back.

37:48.150 --> 37:48.983
- Thank you,

37:49.659 --> 37:50.960
I recognized the gentle lady from Hawaii,

37:50.960 --> 37:52.760
Miss Hannah Busaka for five minutes.

37:53.490 --> 37:54.690
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

37:56.210 --> 37:59.513
General Robinson thank you very much for your service,

37:59.860 --> 38:03.963
I have some questions for you about NORTHCOM and NORAD,

38:04.160 --> 38:06.960
so what is the interface between the two,

38:06.960 --> 38:09.773
they both seem to be your commands but separate?

38:10.480 --> 38:12.453
- Yes ma'am that's a true statement,

38:13.189 --> 38:16.273
under my North American Aerospace Defense Command hat,

38:16.770 --> 38:18.740
I'm responsible for defending Canada

38:18.740 --> 38:20.740
and the United States in the air domain,

38:21.233 --> 38:25.713
so that can be whether it's Russian long-range aviation,

38:25.830 --> 38:28.173
or submarines shooting missiles,

38:28.621 --> 38:30.690
so I'm responsible for that,

38:30.690 --> 38:32.010
in my NORTHCOM hat,

38:32.010 --> 38:33.660
as commander of Northern Command,

38:33.730 --> 38:37.640
I am responsible for defending the United States from

38:37.640 --> 38:40.363
a ballistic missile defense threat,

38:40.670 --> 38:43.410
I also work defense to civil authorities as well

38:43.410 --> 38:46.883
as theater of the security operation with Canada,

38:47.034 --> 38:49.653
Mexico and the Bahamas.

38:50.680 --> 38:52.883
- So General, as you know,

38:52.910 --> 38:57.053
Hawaii had the infamous false missile alert,

38:57.710 --> 39:00.740
so I'm trying to figure out who is it

39:00.740 --> 39:03.810
that would have or should have detected if

39:03.810 --> 39:07.903
a missile was fired from North Korea,

39:09.274 --> 39:10.310
and whether it was headed for Guam,

39:10.310 --> 39:12.183
the United States continent,

39:12.320 --> 39:13.233
or Hawaii,

39:13.300 --> 39:17.540
who would have been the agency or the entity

39:17.540 --> 39:21.023
that should be the one frontline detecting it?

39:21.540 --> 39:24.450
- So we look at that that STRATCOM does

39:24.450 --> 39:25.823
the initial sensing,

39:26.370 --> 39:29.680
and then we work our way through on as the missile,

39:29.680 --> 39:33.603
and I can be much more clear in the closed session,

39:34.230 --> 39:36.330
but as we work through the missile launch,

39:36.330 --> 39:38.270
and as it goes through flight,

39:38.270 --> 39:40.343
then there's different roles and responsibilities

39:40.343 --> 39:42.223
that we have,

39:42.650 --> 39:44.720
and at the end of the day when it comes

39:44.720 --> 39:46.870
time to defend the United States against

39:46.870 --> 39:47.780
a ballistic missile,

39:47.780 --> 39:49.963
it's me as the commander of NORTHCOM.

39:50.990 --> 39:52.613
- So just so that I'm clear,

39:53.920 --> 39:56.403
when we are talking about Hawaii or Guam,

39:56.690 --> 40:00.800
is it different or is that considered to be as it reaches

40:00.800 --> 40:02.810
a certain, it seems like trajectory

40:02.810 --> 40:05.910
it will become your responsibility?

40:05.910 --> 40:07.573
- Ma'am I would really rather talk about

40:07.573 --> 40:09.113
that in a closed session,

40:09.530 --> 40:11.800
so I can give you the detail you're looking for.

40:11.800 --> 40:13.050
- And as you can imagine,

40:13.610 --> 40:16.500
that's a question that's plaguing us in Hawaii right now,

40:16.500 --> 40:20.623
we are trying to figure out who is the one who should know,

40:21.500 --> 40:23.810
the one thing that the congressional delegation

40:23.810 --> 40:28.050
is uniformed on in Hawaii, our four members,

40:28.050 --> 40:33.050
is that we believe that we should split apart

40:34.210 --> 40:36.860
the emergency alert system between

40:36.860 --> 40:40.140
that which is potentially militarily,

40:40.140 --> 40:42.333
ballistic missile in particular,

40:42.480 --> 40:43.640
and that which would be,

40:43.640 --> 40:46.880
like we just had major flooding and hurricanes

40:46.880 --> 40:47.943
and tsunamis,

40:48.060 --> 40:50.890
that should be something that the state should handle,

40:50.890 --> 40:53.650
but we are not sure that the state should be delving

40:53.650 --> 40:57.503
in this area of missiles and missile alert.

40:58.010 --> 41:01.090
In the testimony,

41:01.090 --> 41:06.053
let me get to I believe General Dickinson,

41:06.420 --> 41:11.420
when we talk about the whole spectrum of missile defense,

41:11.930 --> 41:15.255
and how we break it up in terms of from

41:15.255 --> 41:17.900
the I guess when it shot up

41:17.960 --> 41:19.980
and it goes up in the trajectory,

41:19.980 --> 41:22.880
and then it goes straight and then it starts to come down,

41:23.210 --> 41:27.130
do you have any specific role in that scenario,

41:27.130 --> 41:29.083
or is that General Greaves?

41:32.430 --> 41:35.080
- So I'll start off with the operational perspective,

41:35.607 --> 41:36.440
and I'll turn it over to General Greaves for

41:36.440 --> 41:37.690
the technical piece of that,

41:37.690 --> 41:42.050
but what you're describing is our ability to look at

41:42.050 --> 41:45.823
the total trajectory of the ballistic missile flight,

41:46.010 --> 41:49.415
and able to influence or have capabilities

41:49.415 --> 41:51.140
in each stage of that flight,

41:51.140 --> 41:52.730
whether it's prelaunch,

41:52.730 --> 41:54.993
whether it's during the mid towards terminal,

41:55.200 --> 41:56.663
or even the boost phase,

41:56.750 --> 41:58.880
our ability to do operational planning

41:58.880 --> 42:00.720
and then have capabilities that are able

42:00.720 --> 42:03.000
to influence each one of those steps in

42:03.000 --> 42:05.250
the flight of that missile is very important,

42:05.320 --> 42:09.690
so when you look at operational design around the world,

42:09.690 --> 42:11.790
and each of the different COCOMS for our regional

42:11.790 --> 42:15.343
missile defenses as well as our national defenses,

42:15.440 --> 42:18.090
we look at that very carefully to see how we do that,

42:18.194 --> 42:19.750
and then the capabilities that come along with that

42:19.750 --> 42:21.958
are critical to our ability to influence

42:21.958 --> 42:24.443
each one of those sections of flight.

42:25.390 --> 42:28.313
- General I don't mean to be insulting in any way,

42:28.500 --> 42:31.180
but if it takes this long to detect it

42:31.180 --> 42:33.163
as you just gave the explanation,

42:33.240 --> 42:35.753
there are a lot of people who are going to be very anti.

42:36.010 --> 42:37.810
General do you have anything to add?

42:38.100 --> 42:39.540
- Just one clarification ma'am is

42:39.540 --> 42:42.353
that my role is the acquirer,

42:42.870 --> 42:45.190
our folks they essentially work with industry

42:45.190 --> 42:46.573
to deliver the capability,

42:46.770 --> 42:48.930
the operational use of those systems rests

42:48.930 --> 42:50.330
with the command commanders.

42:50.830 --> 42:51.930
- Thank you very much,

42:52.124 --> 42:54.213
and with that I yield back.

42:54.213 --> 42:55.387
- I think the gentle lady,

42:55.387 --> 42:56.820
and I recognize the gentleman from California,

42:56.820 --> 42:58.170
Mr Hunter for five minutes.

42:58.670 --> 43:00.010
- Thank you Mr Chairman thank you lady

43:00.010 --> 43:01.260
and gentlemen for being here,

43:01.260 --> 43:02.130
and for your service,

43:02.130 --> 43:04.853
I guess General Dickinson,

43:05.182 --> 43:07.860
let's talk about if we could,

43:07.860 --> 43:09.990
the way that the pendulum swings from high-tech

43:09.990 --> 43:11.610
to low-tech based on what we're doing

43:11.610 --> 43:13.990
at whatever point in time we exist right now,

43:13.990 --> 43:16.080
which is looking at North Korea,

43:16.080 --> 43:17.693
looking at Russia and China,

43:17.910 --> 43:19.633
talking a lot about space,

43:20.000 --> 43:21.933
very complex giant systems,

43:22.200 --> 43:26.773
when 10 years ago the focus was the SeaRAM,

43:26.920 --> 43:28.997
our counter battery radars acquiring rockets

43:28.997 --> 43:31.836
and other just mortars and content

43:31.836 --> 43:34.480
that guys were shooting at our forward

43:34.480 --> 43:36.480
operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan,

43:36.800 --> 43:37.950
so that's switched now,

43:38.010 --> 43:40.450
so now are focusing more on space stuff,

43:40.450 --> 43:42.390
I guess my general question is to begin,

43:42.390 --> 43:45.099
do you think the pendulum is staying where it needs to be,

43:45.099 --> 43:47.570
we get back in that fight again where we we're getting

43:47.570 --> 43:48.470
shot at all the time,

43:48.470 --> 43:51.240
and we realize we lost that

43:52.575 --> 43:55.083
sharpness that we had in that fight,

43:55.230 --> 43:57.580
and give it up to the more high-tech big fight,

43:57.920 --> 44:00.018
and realizing that there is only a few countries,

44:00.018 --> 44:03.070
that takes satellites and interceptors and other things

44:03.070 --> 44:04.130
to stop their ICBMs,

44:04.130 --> 44:06.100
there's lots of countries that can do a lot

44:06.100 --> 44:08.420
of bad things to forward operating bases in Africa to

44:08.420 --> 44:11.020
the Middle East to the Philippines and other places,

44:11.420 --> 44:13.953
that's the pendulum question,

44:14.480 --> 44:15.313
where are we?

44:15.700 --> 44:18.270
- So I think with regards to your question,

44:18.270 --> 44:19.920
so we have identified that,

44:19.920 --> 44:21.693
your mention of the SeaRAM system,

44:22.100 --> 44:25.650
the army as a whole is identified that as an area

44:25.650 --> 44:28.540
that we are continuing development in terms

44:28.540 --> 44:31.530
of building back short range defense capability

44:31.530 --> 44:33.530
that will bring back into the army formations

44:33.530 --> 44:35.080
here in the next several years,

44:35.380 --> 44:37.440
we're currently looking at what we call maneuver

44:37.440 --> 44:38.963
short ed capabilities,

44:39.090 --> 44:41.304
whether that's a gun missile mix or potentially

44:41.304 --> 44:43.340
in the future to directed energy,

44:43.340 --> 44:45.890
in my particular command we are looking

44:45.890 --> 44:46.960
into directed energy,

44:46.960 --> 44:50.240
and have good success in demonstrating

44:50.240 --> 44:54.930
a five KW laser mounted on a Stryker combat vehicle,

44:54.930 --> 44:58.270
and we've had very good success over the last year

44:58.270 --> 45:01.090
and a half or so with four different tests where

45:01.090 --> 45:03.810
we actually had soldiers on the Stryker combat

45:03.810 --> 45:07.050
vehicle engaging small UAS quad copter

45:07.050 --> 45:09.203
type targets very successfully,

45:09.320 --> 45:14.313
so as we mature that technology beyond five KW on to 50 KW,

45:14.640 --> 45:18.373
with the ultimate objective for the army at a hundred KW,

45:18.570 --> 45:19.700
we are looking at that,

45:19.700 --> 45:22.523
that will be integrated into what we call an if pick,

45:22.560 --> 45:24.483
which is the follow on to the SeaRAM,

45:24.670 --> 45:27.670
that will have the ability to use directed energy,

45:27.670 --> 45:30.083
as well as potentially a gun missile mix,

45:30.490 --> 45:32.720
we're also looking to see whether or not we

45:32.720 --> 45:35.080
can employ electronic warfare and some

45:35.080 --> 45:36.653
of those capabilities as well,

45:36.680 --> 45:38.860
so overall the army has identified the fact

45:38.860 --> 45:42.540
that we need to bring back that capability into

45:42.540 --> 45:44.483
the maneuver forces for the army,

45:44.670 --> 45:45.900
and so to your question,

45:45.900 --> 45:48.913
I would say that pendulum is probably about right,

45:49.030 --> 45:50.220
we're looking at what we need to do

45:50.220 --> 45:51.670
to address what you describe,

45:52.060 --> 45:53.180
the counter UAS,

45:53.180 --> 45:55.190
counter cruise missile capability,

45:55.190 --> 45:58.340
and we're looking to the near peer adversaries

45:58.340 --> 46:01.723
that have the more sophisticated missile technology.

46:02.290 --> 46:03.820
- Look at what the Ukrainians went through with

46:03.820 --> 46:05.986
the Russians bombarding them with artillery fire,

46:05.986 --> 46:09.103
and I'd like the members of this committee to know,

46:09.212 --> 46:11.730
this committee before I was in Congress put

46:11.730 --> 46:15.203
the SeaRAM in Iraq in the first place,

46:15.260 --> 46:16.093
it was a Navy,

46:16.093 --> 46:17.450
it shoots uranium,

46:17.450 --> 46:18.563
missiles coming in,

46:19.210 --> 46:20.510
the military didn't want to do it,

46:20.510 --> 46:23.023
this committee later went up in California,

46:23.270 --> 46:24.103
sent it out there,

46:24.103 --> 46:25.660
and they could then shoot rockets and mortars coming

46:25.660 --> 46:27.810
in with the spent uranium and it saved a lot of lives,

46:27.810 --> 46:29.590
but it was one of the things that this committee did

46:29.590 --> 46:32.223
was outside the box that the military didn't want to do.

46:34.420 --> 46:35.790
I guess lastly are you looking at what

46:35.790 --> 46:38.380
the Ukrainians have done with our counter-battery

46:38.380 --> 46:41.490
radars that we gave them with restrictions,

46:41.490 --> 46:43.020
we couldn't give them any offensive weaponry

46:43.020 --> 46:44.850
for the last eight years,

46:44.850 --> 46:46.340
but we've given them counter-battery radars,

46:46.340 --> 46:48.550
and they've really rigged those up

46:48.550 --> 46:49.810
to do some amazing things,

46:49.810 --> 46:51.010
have you guys look at that?

46:51.010 --> 46:52.370
- We continue to look at that,

46:52.370 --> 46:54.500
and other operational scenarios we've had in

46:54.500 --> 46:57.170
the theater with our own weapon system as we build to

46:57.170 --> 46:58.823
the future with that capability.

46:58.940 --> 47:01.130
- And I guess tying in with that you have the new integrated

47:01.130 --> 47:03.290
air and missile defense battle command system,

47:03.290 --> 47:04.683
the IBCS,

47:05.400 --> 47:07.250
can you just talk about that briefly?

47:07.520 --> 47:09.150
- So that the future system--

47:09.150 --> 47:10.550
- In terms of the budgeting,

47:10.630 --> 47:13.053
and its milestones being on track on time.

47:13.500 --> 47:18.500
- So the program overall is on track to deliver in 2022,

47:20.420 --> 47:22.923
we'll do a limited user test in 2020,

47:23.200 --> 47:24.163
that system,

47:24.970 --> 47:26.880
that capability brings online the fact that

47:26.880 --> 47:29.040
we'll be able to bring in multiple sensors,

47:29.040 --> 47:32.413
multiple shooters onto an integrated fire control network,

47:32.520 --> 47:34.920
so that will greatly enhance our capability

47:34.920 --> 47:37.210
to essentially have the best shooter and

47:37.210 --> 47:40.060
the best sensor coupled together to prosecute the target.

47:40.164 --> 47:42.370
- And that would plug-in to whatever the distributed

47:42.370 --> 47:45.313
common ground system is in the future I would guess?

47:45.360 --> 47:46.640
- We're looking at that, yes.

47:46.640 --> 47:48.456
- Okay, alright thank you very much,

47:48.456 --> 47:49.911
thank you Mr Chairman.

47:49.911 --> 47:50.744
- Thank you gentlemen,

47:50.744 --> 47:51.610
the chair now recognizes the gentleman

47:51.610 --> 47:53.070
from New Jersey, Mr Norcross,

47:53.070 --> 47:53.903
five minutes,

47:54.700 --> 47:55.533
or not.

47:57.750 --> 47:59.133
Alright the chair now recognizes the gentleman

47:59.133 --> 48:01.040
from the great state of Alabama,

48:01.040 --> 48:02.463
Mr Byrne for five minutes.

48:02.780 --> 48:03.980
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

48:04.240 --> 48:06.770
I think General Greaves this is directed to you,

48:06.770 --> 48:08.133
but if I'm wrong tell me,

48:08.998 --> 48:09.980
I want to talk about hypersonic,

48:09.980 --> 48:11.753
are you the right person for that?

48:12.820 --> 48:14.133
- [General Greaves] One of several.

48:14.610 --> 48:17.010
- Well if somebody else can answer this jump in,

48:17.720 --> 48:19.820
I know that you spent a little over a year

48:20.735 --> 48:22.873
now and your analysis of alternatives,

48:23.820 --> 48:27.260
and I've been reading recently China has made some

48:27.260 --> 48:30.993
pretty shocking advances in the realm of hypersonic weapons,

48:31.048 --> 48:33.260
aside from the flight testing they've done there

48:33.260 --> 48:35.420
are reports that there are heavily investing

48:35.788 --> 48:37.220
in their ground testing infrastructure,

48:37.220 --> 48:39.520
and have planned to have a wind tunnel operational

48:39.520 --> 48:42.820
by 2020 that can simulate hypersonic speeds,

48:42.820 --> 48:44.864
which will allow them to better test their weapons,

48:44.864 --> 48:47.290
there are no indications that they are slowing down

48:47.290 --> 48:48.720
the development of their capabilities,

48:48.720 --> 48:49.823
and earlier this year,

48:49.990 --> 48:52.723
Admiral Harris, with PAYCOM,

48:52.724 --> 48:53.740
testified this committee,

48:53.740 --> 48:55.730
that Chinese hypersonic weapons are one of

48:55.730 --> 48:57.120
the biggest threats in his region.

48:57.120 --> 48:58.677
So can you tell us,

48:58.677 --> 49:02.003
as you coming to the close of the analysis of alternatives,

49:02.340 --> 49:04.520
what you've learned so far and how far

49:04.520 --> 49:06.253
that you see it moving forward?

49:07.140 --> 49:09.130
- Yes sir, you are correct,

49:09.130 --> 49:11.267
we are coming to closure on the AOA,

49:12.551 --> 49:13.384
the announcements of alternatives,

49:13.384 --> 49:14.940
I should be able to get a quick look within

49:14.940 --> 49:16.143
the next 30 days,

49:16.810 --> 49:19.440
and before the end of the year that should be completed.

49:19.440 --> 49:22.970
What we are determining is that the architecture

49:22.970 --> 49:26.770
that we need to defend against that hypersonic

49:26.770 --> 49:30.663
threat will be air, ground and space based,

49:31.190 --> 49:32.473
the most important one,

49:33.080 --> 49:35.430
initially is to deploy that sensing layer

49:35.430 --> 49:36.863
I referenced before,

49:37.170 --> 49:39.967
but also we need to look at the systems engineering part

49:39.967 --> 49:41.770
for that to roll out and develop

49:41.770 --> 49:43.420
the architecture that's required,

49:43.650 --> 49:47.080
as well as a potential new interceptor that

49:47.080 --> 49:49.000
we may need to mitigate that threat,

49:49.000 --> 49:51.710
so it's a complete architectural look

49:51.910 --> 49:54.023
at what will be needed,

49:54.120 --> 49:55.420
and the threat,

49:55.420 --> 49:57.683
the enemy is time again,

49:57.930 --> 50:01.520
so we look to Doctor Griffin and Mrs Lawrence's

50:01.520 --> 50:05.040
leadership within the Department to strongly advocate

50:05.040 --> 50:07.623
for what will roll out of the AOA,

50:07.830 --> 50:09.879
and to ensure that activity is resourced

50:09.879 --> 50:11.840
and funded in next year's budget,

50:11.840 --> 50:14.102
and we can continue on to deploy

50:14.102 --> 50:16.963
those capabilities to meet the threat,

50:17.140 --> 50:19.100
and I'll turn it it over to either Secretary Ruud

50:19.100 --> 50:21.873
or General Robinson to see if they have anything to add.

50:23.222 --> 50:24.940
- I think General Greaves largely covered it,

50:24.940 --> 50:26.870
except to say I concur with you fully

50:26.870 --> 50:28.180
about the growth of the threat,

50:28.180 --> 50:29.730
I think we're very concerned about

50:29.730 --> 50:32.743
the rate of progression that we've seen,

50:32.910 --> 50:35.433
not only in China but elsewhere like Russia,

50:35.640 --> 50:36.990
and so it's an area that we are looking

50:36.990 --> 50:38.610
very seriously at in the department,

50:38.610 --> 50:41.150
and the analysis of alternatives being led

50:41.150 --> 50:43.453
by General Greaves and Doctor Griffin.

50:44.920 --> 50:46.833
- Let me pose a hypothetical to you,

50:47.210 --> 50:49.163
a very disturbing hypothetical.

50:50.010 --> 50:52.193
There is a breakdown in Congress,

50:52.670 --> 50:55.290
and we decide to go back to the funding levels

50:55.290 --> 50:57.030
that were established in the budget control

50:57.030 --> 50:59.283
act for the out years,

50:59.750 --> 51:02.600
what does that do to what you're responsible for Mr Ruud?

51:03.950 --> 51:06.450
- Certainly the Congress in its recent actions

51:06.450 --> 51:08.630
has shown great confidence in

51:08.630 --> 51:11.750
the Defense Department leadership to come forward with

51:11.810 --> 51:15.533
the kind of programs and capabilities to defend the nation.

51:15.870 --> 51:17.120
- It was a two-year deal,

51:17.200 --> 51:18.350
and it could break now,

51:18.840 --> 51:21.320
what happens to what you're responsible for,

51:21.320 --> 51:22.470
if there's a breakdown,

51:23.224 --> 51:24.370
and we go back to those spending levels

51:24.370 --> 51:25.820
under the budget control act?

51:26.310 --> 51:28.860
- It would obviously cause a substantial concern,

51:28.860 --> 51:32.700
because the levels envisioned in the budget control act

51:32.700 --> 51:35.723
are significantly below that which we are operating now,

51:35.800 --> 51:37.760
as the national defense strategy makes clear,

51:37.760 --> 51:39.382
we've entered a period of competition

51:39.382 --> 51:41.373
amongst the great powers,

51:41.570 --> 51:44.630
with China and Russia being our principal concerns,

51:44.630 --> 51:47.550
but certainly states like North Korea and Iran

51:47.550 --> 51:49.610
and the fight that we are in with violent

51:49.610 --> 51:52.210
extremism posing a substantial threat,

51:52.210 --> 51:55.530
so certainly a substantially smaller defense budget

51:55.530 --> 51:58.260
is envisioned under those PBA caps will

51:58.260 --> 52:00.543
be a significant concern for us.

52:00.640 --> 52:02.622
- Would endanger your ability to defend America

52:02.622 --> 52:04.223
against a missile attack?

52:06.230 --> 52:08.730
- Well we would obviously continue to mount

52:08.730 --> 52:11.350
an effective defense with the capabilities we had,

52:11.350 --> 52:14.290
but certainly a smaller topline budget and how

52:14.290 --> 52:16.240
that got translated down to missile defense

52:16.240 --> 52:20.023
would impose some significant constraints.

52:21.120 --> 52:22.970
- Thank you I yield back Mr Chairman.

52:23.550 --> 52:24.383
- I thank the gentlemen,

52:24.383 --> 52:25.740
the chair now recognizes the gentle lady

52:25.927 --> 52:27.553
from California, Miss Davies for five minutes.

52:27.900 --> 52:28.733
- Thank you, thank you Mr Chairman,

52:28.733 --> 52:30.763
thank you all very much for being here,

52:31.310 --> 52:32.143
this morning,

52:32.143 --> 52:34.200
and you might have seen or heard,

52:34.200 --> 52:39.173
we had a session on promoting DOD's culture of innovation,

52:40.801 --> 52:42.410
and the question really is whether or not

52:42.410 --> 52:44.847
we are able to keep pace with the scope

52:44.847 --> 52:48.383
of innovation in the defense technology sector,

52:48.620 --> 52:53.620
given a host of issues including culture,

52:54.800 --> 52:57.950
but some of that the restrictions we have

52:57.950 --> 52:59.430
in terms of our own laws,

52:59.430 --> 53:04.067
in terms of our own need to create multiple layers

53:07.281 --> 53:09.820
of authority and little different from DARPA

53:10.070 --> 53:11.143
as you well know,

53:11.420 --> 53:14.143
how do you see that?

53:14.610 --> 53:15.760
Could you comment on that,

53:15.760 --> 53:19.930
because I think a lot of us know and understand some

53:19.930 --> 53:21.573
of the difficulties we have,

53:22.200 --> 53:26.190
that it takes a long time to bring many

53:26.190 --> 53:28.170
of those technologies to bear,

53:28.170 --> 53:31.363
and by the time we are ready for them it's late,

53:32.863 --> 53:33.696
what do you see,

53:33.696 --> 53:37.680
what holds you up in being able to get what you need to

53:37.855 --> 53:40.363
the war fighter in a timely fashion?

53:41.550 --> 53:43.770
- Ma'am I'll start with what Doctor Griffin

53:43.770 --> 53:44.793
said this morning,

53:45.720 --> 53:48.370
the three impediments that he discussed this morning,

53:48.620 --> 53:51.723
the first being excessive processes,

53:51.940 --> 53:52.923
bureaucracy,

53:53.270 --> 53:56.110
the second being risk aversion,

53:56.110 --> 53:57.350
risk aversion nature,

53:57.350 --> 53:59.823
and the third being a fear to fail,

54:00.181 --> 54:02.970
those are things which are the biggest impediments,

54:02.970 --> 54:04.583
I totally concur with him,

54:04.790 --> 54:09.354
that leads to, if not indecision,

54:09.354 --> 54:12.860
the length of time it takes to make a decision,

54:12.860 --> 54:15.000
I think speed of decision-making within

54:15.000 --> 54:17.190
the Department is what we need,

54:17.190 --> 54:19.810
and with those three impediments

54:19.810 --> 54:21.190
that Doctor Griffin laid out,

54:21.190 --> 54:26.190
and his intent to reduce or attempt to eliminate those

54:26.370 --> 54:29.410
I think would go a long way in ensuring that

54:29.410 --> 54:32.260
we can make decisions in a time relevant manner as

54:32.460 --> 54:34.140
the secretary of defense and talks about

54:34.140 --> 54:35.840
to deliver the capability we need,

54:36.070 --> 54:36.903
thank you.

54:38.600 --> 54:40.490
- The only thing I would add Congresswoman,

54:40.490 --> 54:42.513
is that for Secretary Maddis,

54:43.110 --> 54:45.532
improving the department's capabilities to both

54:45.532 --> 54:48.420
be good storage to the taxpayers dollars as well as

54:48.420 --> 54:50.613
to improve the speed at which we can

54:50.613 --> 54:52.720
field capabilities to war fighters,

54:52.720 --> 54:55.833
is one of his three top lines of effort,

54:55.960 --> 54:59.330
he works that through his leadership team,

54:59.330 --> 55:01.500
the deputy secretary of defense in particular

55:01.500 --> 55:03.233
very focused in this area,

55:03.440 --> 55:06.150
and I think the legislation that Congress passed

55:06.330 --> 55:09.040
creating the separation with an undersecretary

55:09.040 --> 55:10.160
for research engineering,

55:10.160 --> 55:12.530
and an undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment,

55:12.530 --> 55:14.750
is certainly something we fully embrace

55:14.750 --> 55:16.683
and are starting to move forward with,

55:16.910 --> 55:18.780
so the problem and the challenge certainly

55:18.780 --> 55:20.520
is very well understood by the senior

55:20.520 --> 55:21.970
leadership of the Department,

55:21.990 --> 55:24.156
we've got to make the changes necessary

55:24.156 --> 55:27.253
to support the kind of innovation you just discussed.

55:28.017 --> 55:30.550
- And I think that Congress is ready and willing to try

55:30.550 --> 55:33.140
and work through a number of those requirements

55:33.140 --> 55:38.140
so they don't basically take us down a complicated path

55:39.310 --> 55:42.763
that perhaps we are going to be able to avoid in the future,

55:43.500 --> 55:45.070
recognizing of course we still have

55:45.070 --> 55:47.683
many requirements that are going to be out there,

55:47.877 --> 55:48.710
thank you,

55:48.710 --> 55:49.543
I appreciate that.

55:49.934 --> 55:51.210
I think the other issue that we have

55:51.210 --> 55:54.453
all worked with and talked about,

55:54.710 --> 55:57.480
is whether or not it's possible through

55:57.480 --> 56:02.123
the use of multiple satellites to in fact,

56:03.449 --> 56:06.963
have less expensive technology,

56:07.410 --> 56:08.253
more of it,

56:08.350 --> 56:13.350
that may in fact help us to mitigate some of

56:14.040 --> 56:17.913
the high costs and even the issues around missile defense,

56:18.522 --> 56:22.230
is that something that you feel that

56:22.300 --> 56:24.493
we can be exploring further,

56:24.770 --> 56:26.520
and we should be exploring further?

56:27.150 --> 56:28.160
- Ma'am I totally agree,

56:28.160 --> 56:29.470
we are exploring it today,

56:29.470 --> 56:31.395
we have taken action in certain areas today

56:31.395 --> 56:33.260
and within the recent past,

56:33.260 --> 56:35.560
and it's something we must do into the future,

56:35.600 --> 56:38.642
whether or not it's dis-aggregating missions

56:38.642 --> 56:42.983
or payloads from what I call our Battle Star Galacticas,

56:43.210 --> 56:46.160
or we're hosting payloads are using commercial capability,

56:46.160 --> 56:49.308
those are all things that I know the Department

56:49.308 --> 56:50.700
has been looking at,

56:50.700 --> 56:51.533
is looking at,

56:51.533 --> 56:53.803
and will be looking out into the future.

56:54.340 --> 56:55.173
- Thank you,

56:55.512 --> 56:59.227
and just quickly the agency's top line

57:00.700 --> 57:04.483
of 11.5 billion for this fiscal year,

57:04.537 --> 57:07.700
is gonna be cut down in the administration's

57:07.700 --> 57:09.253
budget to 9.9,

57:09.650 --> 57:11.493
is that a concern to you,

57:12.270 --> 57:13.913
that you will be able to,

57:16.380 --> 57:18.900
mitigate again the impacts of what's

57:18.900 --> 57:21.723
being proposed as a funding reduction?

57:23.790 --> 57:26.850
- Ma'am I think that the answer is yes,

57:26.850 --> 57:27.890
it concerns me,

57:27.890 --> 57:29.960
but I do believe that we've got

57:30.183 --> 57:32.920
the management structure in place,

57:32.920 --> 57:34.413
the attention in place,

57:34.910 --> 57:36.443
the threat has voted,

57:36.730 --> 57:39.333
the fact that North Korea has done what it's done,

57:39.440 --> 57:42.190
it's visible to the entire nation and the entire world,

57:42.200 --> 57:44.460
so it's reality we're dealing with,

57:44.460 --> 57:46.660
and those discussions will be very robust within

57:46.660 --> 57:49.100
the Department to ensure that we deploy

57:49.100 --> 57:51.580
a missile defense system that is capable

57:51.740 --> 57:52.940
of defending the nation.

57:53.884 --> 57:54.717
- Thank you,

57:54.717 --> 57:55.733
thank you Mr Chairman.

57:57.070 --> 57:57.945
- Thank the gentle lady,

57:57.945 --> 57:59.210
the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia,

57:59.210 --> 58:00.460
Mr Haas for five minutes.

58:01.320 --> 58:02.583
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

58:03.458 --> 58:06.803
General Greaves let me begin with you with this,

58:07.570 --> 58:11.023
for directed energy boost phase missile defense application,

58:11.260 --> 58:13.560
can you explain the similarities and differences

58:13.560 --> 58:16.713
between what MDA requires versus the services?

58:18.980 --> 58:19.813
- Yes sir,

58:20.946 --> 58:22.863
the short answer is power level,

58:23.821 --> 58:25.013
as you heard,

58:25.160 --> 58:27.810
General Dickinson discussed his requirements

58:27.810 --> 58:31.295
to go from five kilowatts to 50 to a hundred,

58:31.295 --> 58:32.570
the missile defense requirements begin

58:32.570 --> 58:34.673
at 500 kilowatts to a megawatt,

58:35.030 --> 58:37.520
and we can discuss more of that in the closed session,

58:37.520 --> 58:42.490
but power level as well as delivery capability for

58:42.490 --> 58:44.363
the boost phase intercept mission,

58:44.460 --> 58:47.420
if you may recall that the airborne laser program,

58:47.420 --> 58:48.970
a chemical laser which essentially

58:48.970 --> 58:51.053
operated within the atmosphere,

58:51.730 --> 58:55.470
where we are looking at deployment

58:55.910 --> 58:57.310
capability is much higher,

58:57.310 --> 58:59.603
60,000 feet plus,

59:00.050 --> 59:03.890
and all of the beam steering, beam quality requirements

59:03.890 --> 59:04.810
that go along with that,

59:04.810 --> 59:06.743
so the bottom line is power level.

59:07.330 --> 59:09.230
- General Dickinson anything that you would

59:09.230 --> 59:10.743
like to add to that?

59:11.700 --> 59:13.250
- I'd agree with what General Greaves said,

59:13.250 --> 59:16.610
what we are developing now is intended for more of

59:16.610 --> 59:18.310
a close fight if you will and support

59:18.310 --> 59:19.763
of the maneuver forces,

59:20.060 --> 59:21.603
whether army, marine,

59:21.810 --> 59:24.220
and are the power levels we are talking about

59:24.220 --> 59:26.000
are appropriate for countering

59:26.480 --> 59:27.810
UASes and potentially

59:27.810 --> 59:30.663
cruise missiles in the short term.

59:32.583 --> 59:33.640
- General Greaves,

59:33.640 --> 59:36.130
are there areas that are not being addressed by

59:36.130 --> 59:38.510
the Department high energy laser advanced

59:38.510 --> 59:40.830
development program that are specific to

59:40.830 --> 59:45.670
what MDA had intended to use for those funds in FY 19

59:45.670 --> 59:49.603
that would somehow delay the missile defense capability?

59:53.300 --> 59:54.133
- No sir,

59:54.133 --> 59:57.390
what I would say is that the discussion is

59:57.390 --> 01:00:00.660
a department level discussion right now,

01:00:00.660 --> 01:00:03.477
so we are looking at the requirements that on

01:00:03.477 --> 01:00:05.770
the lower end as General Dickinson

01:00:05.770 --> 01:00:07.480
mentioned as well as mine,

01:00:07.480 --> 01:00:11.210
we are working with Doctor Griffin's staff,

01:00:11.210 --> 01:00:13.100
and Doctor Griffin in particular,

01:00:13.100 --> 01:00:15.890
to ensure that the funds that were allocated

01:00:15.890 --> 01:00:17.293
for directed energy,

01:00:18.150 --> 01:00:21.293
and the funds that we requested make it down to our level.

01:00:22.000 --> 01:00:23.800
- Okay, the last question I have for you,

01:00:23.800 --> 01:00:24.920
in your written statement,

01:00:24.920 --> 01:00:26.550
I wanted to shift gears a little bit here,

01:00:26.550 --> 01:00:28.310
but in your written statement you discussed

01:00:28.310 --> 01:00:31.150
the need to develop technology and capabilities

01:00:31.150 --> 01:00:35.773
that would take out ICBMs in their boost phase of flight,

01:00:37.280 --> 01:00:41.773
can you explain how in the FY 19 budget,

01:00:42.288 --> 01:00:43.121
that's being requested,

01:00:43.121 --> 01:00:46.693
how that would help those technologies?

01:00:47.140 --> 01:00:47.973
- Yes sir,

01:00:48.344 --> 01:00:50.890
basically it's the amount we've got allocated

01:00:50.890 --> 01:00:53.193
to do what we call laser scaling,

01:00:53.600 --> 01:00:57.483
we've been able to demonstrate 30 kilowatts in the lab,

01:00:58.030 --> 01:01:00.690
we need to continue the work to upgrade

01:01:00.690 --> 01:01:03.790
that power level demonstration capability

01:01:03.790 --> 01:01:06.490
to 100 kilowatts in a stepwise fashion and get

01:01:06.490 --> 01:01:09.513
to the 500, one megawatt level,

01:01:09.530 --> 01:01:12.750
so the technology work is absolutely essential so

01:01:12.750 --> 01:01:16.100
that we can demonstrate the Capability on the ground

01:01:16.450 --> 01:01:18.393
and in the air as part of the plan,

01:01:18.620 --> 01:01:20.809
before we leap off into a full system

01:01:20.809 --> 01:01:25.210
that has promises which we haven't delivered

01:01:25.210 --> 01:01:27.900
the high technology readiness level capabilities

01:01:27.900 --> 01:01:31.543
that we need to develop and deploy the system.

01:01:31.960 --> 01:01:33.980
- Okay so you feel comfortable that

01:01:37.447 --> 01:01:41.560
the PB 19 budget request would be sufficient?

01:01:42.745 --> 01:01:45.610
- I will be advocating for additional funding

01:01:45.610 --> 01:01:48.610
to be quite honest with you-
- That's what I wanted to know

01:01:48.960 --> 01:01:50.860
- There were hard decisions that had

01:01:50.860 --> 01:01:52.390
to be made within the department,

01:01:52.390 --> 01:01:56.072
and the PB represents the product of those decisions.

01:01:56.072 --> 01:01:56.993
- Okay,

01:01:57.520 --> 01:01:58.370
thank you very much,

01:01:58.370 --> 01:01:59.763
Mr Chairman I yield back.

01:02:00.697 --> 01:02:01.613
- The gentleman yields back,

01:02:01.620 --> 01:02:02.453
the chair now recognizes the gentleman

01:02:02.698 --> 01:02:03.803
from Alabama, Mr Brooks for five minutes.

01:02:05.820 --> 01:02:07.020
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

01:02:07.650 --> 01:02:08.793
General Greaves,

01:02:09.070 --> 01:02:11.310
it has been brought to my attention that requirement for

01:02:11.310 --> 01:02:14.763
a THAAD follow-on development program has been eliminated,

01:02:14.960 --> 01:02:17.570
either though other missile defense systems have

01:02:17.580 --> 01:02:19.690
an ongoing follow-on development

01:02:19.690 --> 01:02:21.313
after their initial fielding,

01:02:21.780 --> 01:02:24.133
given the pace of threat evolution globally,

01:02:24.180 --> 01:02:27.143
and given that that is a successful and in-demand system,

01:02:27.430 --> 01:02:30.730
can you share your plans if any for an ongoing

01:02:30.730 --> 01:02:34.123
THAAD follow-on that would build upon current capabilities?

01:02:36.680 --> 01:02:37.563
- Congressmen,

01:02:38.090 --> 01:02:39.193
to be quite honest,

01:02:41.108 --> 01:02:44.110
we across all of our systems look at what

01:02:44.110 --> 01:02:47.070
the next generation can produce and can feel,

01:02:47.070 --> 01:02:48.800
THAAD currently meet the requirements

01:02:48.800 --> 01:02:50.720
that have been delivered to us,

01:02:50.720 --> 01:02:55.010
and I will not say that it's not being done,

01:02:55.010 --> 01:02:56.710
I'd say that the systems that

01:02:57.497 --> 01:02:58.330
we delivered meets requirements,

01:02:58.330 --> 01:03:00.580
and were looking to see what capability

01:03:00.580 --> 01:03:03.453
will enhance its capability for the future.

01:03:04.720 --> 01:03:06.113
- As a follow-up,

01:03:06.250 --> 01:03:11.250
currently THAAD was operationalized in Hawaii in 2009,

01:03:12.730 --> 01:03:15.030
to provide additional homeland missile defense

01:03:15.200 --> 01:03:17.713
against longer range threats from North Korea,

01:03:18.360 --> 01:03:21.900
perhaps THAAD could provide another layer

01:03:21.900 --> 01:03:25.073
of coverage against ICBMs for homeland defense,

01:03:25.400 --> 01:03:27.620
what if any are your plans to test

01:03:27.620 --> 01:03:29.833
that against ICBM targets?

01:03:30.660 --> 01:03:33.047
- Congressmen I request that we cover that

01:03:33.047 --> 01:03:35.130
in the closed session,

01:03:35.130 --> 01:03:36.840
I have a quick answer for you,

01:03:36.840 --> 01:03:40.743
but I would not want to say too much in the open session.

01:03:40.860 --> 01:03:41.693
- If you would,

01:03:41.693 --> 01:03:43.797
I'm not sure if I'll be here during the closed session,

01:03:43.797 --> 01:03:46.170
but if you'll answer that question for

01:03:46.170 --> 01:03:47.893
the record I would appreciate it,

01:03:48.610 --> 01:03:50.540
we are about to have votes called in five

01:03:50.540 --> 01:03:52.720
or 10 minutes is what I've been notified,

01:03:52.720 --> 01:03:56.610
and I do have other meetings that are conflicting.

01:03:56.610 --> 01:03:58.760
- The short answer sir, we have studied it,

01:03:58.760 --> 01:03:59.593
and we've got the answer.

01:03:59.593 --> 01:04:00.490
- Alright thank you,

01:04:00.980 --> 01:04:02.923
General Greaves and General Dickinson,

01:04:03.040 --> 01:04:05.260
are you concerned that current THAAD battery

01:04:05.260 --> 01:04:07.590
and interceptor availability will be challenged

01:04:07.590 --> 01:04:10.503
given current and future operational requirements?

01:04:15.927 --> 01:04:18.910
- As of today we've got six going

01:04:18.910 --> 01:04:20.993
to seven operational THAAD batteries,

01:04:21.180 --> 01:04:23.530
and congressmen I know you're well aware we have one

01:04:23.530 --> 01:04:27.843
that's in Guam and one recently deployed to Korea,

01:04:27.961 --> 01:04:31.823
and as you look at the capacity that we have,

01:04:31.890 --> 01:04:33.340
we've got five ready,

01:04:33.340 --> 01:04:34.390
or soon to be five,

01:04:34.390 --> 01:04:35.223
four right now,

01:04:35.223 --> 01:04:36.663
five here this fall,

01:04:36.870 --> 01:04:38.503
that will be fully operational,

01:04:38.640 --> 01:04:41.860
I think the THAAD weapon system and the way it's developed

01:04:41.860 --> 01:04:43.190
and designed right now gives us

01:04:43.190 --> 01:04:45.340
some flexibility and capacity,

01:04:45.340 --> 01:04:47.880
operational flexibility in the sense that

01:04:47.980 --> 01:04:50.930
we can move additional launchers from one battery to

01:04:50.930 --> 01:04:53.453
the other to increase capacity if needed,

01:04:53.900 --> 01:04:55.650
but at this particular time I think

01:04:55.680 --> 01:04:58.450
the seven batteries which I believe are the program

01:04:59.151 --> 01:05:02.093
of record by MDA is satisfactory.

01:05:02.181 --> 01:05:04.459
- Do you have a plan to provide additional

01:05:04.459 --> 01:05:06.190
THAAD batteries to the army,

01:05:06.190 --> 01:05:08.610
or to add launchers to the existing batteries

01:05:08.610 --> 01:05:10.573
to increase defensive capabilities?

01:05:11.980 --> 01:05:12.813
- Congressmen,

01:05:12.990 --> 01:05:14.770
General Dickinson mentioned the permanent record,

01:05:14.770 --> 01:05:17.170
so as of today the answer is no,

01:05:17.170 --> 01:05:18.513
permanent record is seven,

01:05:18.560 --> 01:05:20.840
however there is discussion within the Department

01:05:20.840 --> 01:05:23.280
on what the THAAD battery requirement is,

01:05:23.280 --> 01:05:27.050
so if that changes we will request resources

01:05:27.050 --> 01:05:29.423
to develop and deploy that capability.

01:05:29.670 --> 01:05:31.313
- And then finally General Greaves,

01:05:31.450 --> 01:05:33.540
can you talk a little bit about the status of

01:05:33.540 --> 01:05:36.750
the joint emergent operational need for US Forces Korea,

01:05:36.750 --> 01:05:37.930
what work has begun,

01:05:37.930 --> 01:05:39.823
and what work needs to be done,

01:05:40.130 --> 01:05:42.340
I'm aware of your unfunded requirement

01:05:42.350 --> 01:05:45.233
of 284 million for the JEON,

01:05:45.890 --> 01:05:47.560
joint emergent operational need,

01:05:47.560 --> 01:05:49.910
and I'm concerned that key integration work for

01:05:49.924 --> 01:05:51.984
the THAAD and the PAK-3 MSE missile,

01:05:51.984 --> 01:05:54.870
and for launch through remote capability

01:05:54.870 --> 01:05:55.923
has not been funded.

01:05:57.720 --> 01:05:58.620
- Yes congressmen,

01:05:58.820 --> 01:06:01.320
that is one of the top priorities

01:06:01.320 --> 01:06:02.750
for General Brooks in Korea,

01:06:02.750 --> 01:06:05.593
who discussed that requirement with me directly,

01:06:06.330 --> 01:06:10.853
we have laid out a plan which if resourced properly

01:06:10.853 --> 01:06:15.700
provides that capability to improve

01:06:15.700 --> 01:06:18.383
the interoperability between those two systems,

01:06:19.204 --> 01:06:20.330
and we will continue to advocate for

01:06:20.330 --> 01:06:22.490
the funding required to complete that project,

01:06:22.490 --> 01:06:25.250
and pending department decision we'll see where we go next.

01:06:25.250 --> 01:06:26.083
- Alright,

01:06:26.083 --> 01:06:28.583
Mr Chairman that concludes my questions,

01:06:28.790 --> 01:06:30.727
gentleman and lady thank you for your service

01:06:30.727 --> 01:06:32.827
and I yield the remainder of my time back.

01:06:33.482 --> 01:06:34.315
- I thank the gentleman,

01:06:34.315 --> 01:06:35.148
the chair now recognizes the gentleman

01:06:35.148 --> 01:06:37.530
from Colorado, Mr Kaufman for five minutes.

01:06:38.360 --> 01:06:39.560
- Thank you Mr Chairman,

01:06:39.933 --> 01:06:42.313
to all the witnesses,

01:06:43.290 --> 01:06:48.290
how is the rapid advance of North Korean missile technology,

01:06:49.020 --> 01:06:53.663
obviously they still have to weaponize that launch system,

01:06:54.500 --> 01:06:58.770
but how is that affected your decisions

01:06:59.200 --> 01:07:01.323
the US missile defense posture?

01:07:03.790 --> 01:07:05.850
- I'll start and invite my colleagues

01:07:05.850 --> 01:07:07.343
to add to that sir,

01:07:08.110 --> 01:07:10.760
certainly the rapid pace that the North Koreans

01:07:10.760 --> 01:07:12.540
are improving their capabilities,

01:07:12.540 --> 01:07:15.380
And the demonstrable way they've gone about that with

01:07:15.380 --> 01:07:18.810
some two dozen ballistic missile tests in recent years,

01:07:18.810 --> 01:07:23.080
accompanied with nuclear testing has really punctuated

01:07:23.080 --> 01:07:24.900
the concern that we've had for quite some

01:07:24.900 --> 01:07:26.548
time about North Korea,

01:07:26.548 --> 01:07:29.173
punctuated it with an exclamation point,

01:07:29.670 --> 01:07:31.690
so that has gotten our attention,

01:07:31.690 --> 01:07:35.290
as mentioned in our statements last

01:07:35.290 --> 01:07:37.400
year we requested supplemental funding

01:07:37.520 --> 01:07:40.560
which the Congress was supportive of,

01:07:40.560 --> 01:07:41.883
and thank you for that,

01:07:42.130 --> 01:07:44.420
to increase the pace at which we're doing that,

01:07:44.420 --> 01:07:47.140
but the size, scale and sophistication of

01:07:47.140 --> 01:07:48.470
the threat it's growing,

01:07:48.470 --> 01:07:51.460
and the size and scale and sophistication of our defense

01:07:51.700 --> 01:07:54.713
is supposed to grow in the President's budget request,

01:07:54.860 --> 01:07:57.120
and we are presently examining capabilities

01:07:57.120 --> 01:07:59.543
to take that to a substantially higher level,

01:07:59.920 --> 01:08:02.170
not just for the United States as discussed,

01:08:02.170 --> 01:08:04.253
we have deployed THAAD to South Korea,

01:08:04.480 --> 01:08:07.241
we are in conversations with our Japanese allies

01:08:07.241 --> 01:08:09.910
and other partners about how we can improve

01:08:09.910 --> 01:08:12.520
our collective capabilities to be able

01:08:12.520 --> 01:08:14.093
to respond to that threat sir.

01:08:15.840 --> 01:08:18.460
- Sir the only thing I would add to that as

01:08:18.460 --> 01:08:22.682
the commander of NORTHCOM is we watched very quickly

01:08:22.682 --> 01:08:25.347
the rapidity with which he did testing and

01:08:25.347 --> 01:08:27.603
the speed with which he made capability,

01:08:27.710 --> 01:08:30.640
so with the ATR that was given to us last year

01:08:30.640 --> 01:08:33.890
to be able to add capacity while still working on

01:08:33.890 --> 01:08:37.530
the redesigned kill vehicle will also add to the capability

01:08:37.530 --> 01:08:39.740
and still working on discrimination radar,

01:08:39.740 --> 01:08:42.410
so all of this is good news to help us,

01:08:42.410 --> 01:08:43.910
but we watch him very closely.

01:08:46.482 --> 01:08:49.190
- Congressman I support entirely what Secretary Ruud

01:08:49.190 --> 01:08:51.203
and General Robinson just articulated,

01:08:51.520 --> 01:08:55.703
it has caused us and helped us to focus our efforts on,

01:08:55.940 --> 01:08:58.470
and make the articulation of the threat

01:08:58.470 --> 01:09:00.560
a whole lot easier because it's been demonstrated,

01:09:00.560 --> 01:09:02.723
and the timeline has been compressed,

01:09:03.210 --> 01:09:05.933
due to the demonstrated capability that we've seen.

01:09:08.780 --> 01:09:11.370
- And in my role as a force provider

01:09:11.370 --> 01:09:13.620
for General Robinson for the soldiers

01:09:13.620 --> 01:09:15.970
that actually operate the GM system,

01:09:15.970 --> 01:09:17.730
I can tell you I'm absolutely confident

01:09:17.730 --> 01:09:21.060
in their abilities to operate that system 24 hours

01:09:21.060 --> 01:09:23.380
a day on behalf of the nation,

01:09:23.380 --> 01:09:26.810
and completely confident given the capabilities

01:09:26.810 --> 01:09:28.770
that we have seen demonstrated in the weapon

01:09:28.770 --> 01:09:29.810
system that we have,

01:09:29.810 --> 01:09:32.690
I am in complete agreement on where we are going on

01:09:33.499 --> 01:09:35.249
the path to improve the reliability

01:09:35.500 --> 01:09:37.323
and performance of the system.

01:09:38.370 --> 01:09:40.973
- One for all witnesses again,

01:09:41.410 --> 01:09:42.503
across the board,

01:09:43.940 --> 01:09:48.130
there's been a consensus on the need to get to space

01:09:48.130 --> 01:09:51.463
for missile defense tracking and discrimination,

01:09:51.820 --> 01:09:56.163
again without the benefit of having the MDR,

01:09:56.310 --> 01:10:00.040
can you lay out the department's position

01:10:00.040 --> 01:10:04.120
on how space is being looked at in regards to

01:10:05.230 --> 01:10:07.330
a war fighting domain for missile defense,

01:10:07.610 --> 01:10:10.387
are you still looking at what space-based

01:10:10.387 --> 01:10:14.223
intercept constellation could provide,

01:10:14.300 --> 01:10:17.328
is the ultimate goal for directed energy

01:10:17.328 --> 01:10:19.523
to be used in space?

01:10:21.040 --> 01:10:22.240
- I'll just start briefly,

01:10:22.240 --> 01:10:24.720
and again reiterate that we are concerned about

01:10:24.720 --> 01:10:27.230
the progression of space capabilities,

01:10:27.230 --> 01:10:29.860
and the contested nature of space as a domain

01:10:29.860 --> 01:10:31.233
just as a general matter,

01:10:31.420 --> 01:10:34.080
and the area of missile defense of course,

01:10:34.080 --> 01:10:36.367
the offensive missiles that could be fired against

01:10:36.367 --> 01:10:39.033
the states will transit space and re-enter,

01:10:40.300 --> 01:10:42.540
we've had in our architecture for some

01:10:42.540 --> 01:10:44.600
time space-based capabilities to track

01:10:44.600 --> 01:10:46.693
and detect the launch of those missiles,

01:10:46.890 --> 01:10:49.660
and there have been efforts over the years to have

01:10:49.660 --> 01:10:52.060
a space-based testbed and other activities

01:10:52.060 --> 01:10:54.453
to evaluate competing capabilities,

01:10:54.760 --> 01:10:56.900
certainly the Missile defense agency and General Greaves

01:10:56.900 --> 01:10:58.323
can articulate that further,

01:10:58.360 --> 01:11:01.100
have put forward concepts for space-based

01:11:01.100 --> 01:11:03.990
tracking capabilities which the Department

01:11:04.020 --> 01:11:06.453
has funded for demonstration this year,

01:11:06.660 --> 01:11:09.670
and we are looking at additional capabilities

01:11:09.670 --> 01:11:10.503
in that regard,

01:11:10.503 --> 01:11:13.007
both in the space-based tracking area and evaluating

01:11:13.007 --> 01:11:16.360
the capabilities that could potentially be fielded

01:11:16.360 --> 01:11:19.280
in space for the kill mechanism whether

01:11:19.280 --> 01:11:21.833
that be through directed energy or other means,

01:11:22.320 --> 01:11:24.170
those are things that were just simply evaluating

01:11:24.170 --> 01:11:25.003
at this stage,

01:11:25.003 --> 01:11:27.160
but General Greaves may want to articulate more.

01:11:27.650 --> 01:11:28.483
- Congressmen,

01:11:29.231 --> 01:11:30.490
it begins with the threat,

01:11:30.490 --> 01:11:33.510
today's ballistic missile threat is fairly predictable,

01:11:33.510 --> 01:11:36.850
you throw a baseball from where I am in that direction,

01:11:36.850 --> 01:11:38.300
it will go in that direction,

01:11:38.530 --> 01:11:41.820
the concern again is what we've seen Russia,

01:11:41.820 --> 01:11:46.820
China and other nations do in the area of hypersonics

01:11:47.520 --> 01:11:50.933
where it's lower flying, maneuverable,

01:11:51.090 --> 01:11:54.860
and the need as they deploy more complex countermeasures,

01:11:54.860 --> 01:11:58.203
things to aim at defeating our missile defense capabilities,

01:11:58.860 --> 01:11:59.693
the need,

01:11:59.693 --> 01:12:03.090
the absolute essential need to track and maintain

01:12:03.090 --> 01:12:06.683
custody of that threat from beginning to end,

01:12:06.840 --> 01:12:09.100
and that draws you up into space,

01:12:09.100 --> 01:12:10.940
we don't have enough radars to populate

01:12:10.940 --> 01:12:14.330
the global to maintain that same level of custody,

01:12:14.330 --> 01:12:16.580
so from a space sensing layer,

01:12:16.580 --> 01:12:17.430
absolutely essential,

01:12:17.430 --> 01:12:20.130
first thing we need to do is increase that capability,

01:12:20.310 --> 01:12:23.280
and then as a nation decide what the next

01:12:23.280 --> 01:12:26.410
step is with deploying an interceptor,

01:12:26.410 --> 01:12:27.280
if it's space-based,

01:12:27.280 --> 01:12:28.150
whether or not to do it,

01:12:28.150 --> 01:12:29.603
how to use directed energy,

01:12:30.760 --> 01:12:32.800
spending resources on the technology

01:12:32.800 --> 01:12:37.553
and initial development work to essentially determine

01:12:37.810 --> 01:12:39.760
if that capability is real or not,

01:12:39.760 --> 01:12:42.340
so it's really critical that we pursue

01:12:42.340 --> 01:12:43.700
the space-based capability.

01:12:43.700 --> 01:12:45.200
- Appreciate it, I yield back.

01:12:45.843 --> 01:12:49.833
- It looks like if we walk briskly down to the skiff,

01:12:50.100 --> 01:12:51.670
we will be able to get the classified session

01:12:51.670 --> 01:12:52.733
done before votes,

01:12:52.770 --> 01:12:53.930
so we will reconvene,

01:12:53.930 --> 01:12:55.590
we will stand in recess for five minutes

01:12:55.590 --> 01:12:56.990
while we moved to the skiff.