WEBVTT 00:00.270 --> 00:02.193 - The sub committee will come to order. 00:03.370 --> 00:05.210 We're pleased to welcome today 00:05.210 --> 00:07.120 our distinguished panel to review 00:07.400 --> 00:10.740 the fiscal year 2019 budget request 00:10.970 --> 00:12.733 for the Department of Defense. 00:13.170 --> 00:14.600 Today the committee will hear 00:14.600 --> 00:18.010 from the Honorable James Mattis, Secretary of Defense 00:18.010 --> 00:19.543 and General Joseph Dunford, 00:19.620 --> 00:21.520 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 00:23.180 --> 00:26.040 We know that you got a lot of ground 00:26.040 --> 00:27.210 to cover Mr. Secretary. 00:27.210 --> 00:28.950 I'd like for my opening statement 00:28.950 --> 00:31.330 to be part of the record where you could 00:31.330 --> 00:34.180 get to your statement, and we could get to our questions. 00:34.410 --> 00:35.323 Senator Durbin. 00:36.040 --> 00:38.590 - I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement 00:38.590 --> 00:41.770 also be included in the record and defer to our witnesses. 00:41.770 --> 00:42.720 - Without objection 00:43.037 --> 00:45.787 (audio cuts out) 00:48.240 --> 00:50.360 statement will be made part of the record 00:50.360 --> 00:52.723 in its entirety, you proceed as you wish. 00:55.129 --> 00:58.170 - Thank you Chairman Shelby, ranking member Durbin 00:58.210 --> 01:00.110 and distinguished members of the committee. 01:00.110 --> 01:03.210 I appreciate the opportunity to testify 01:03.210 --> 01:04.800 in support of the President's budget 01:04.800 --> 01:07.563 request for fiscal year 2019. 01:07.577 --> 01:09.690 Joined by the Chairman Joe Dunford, 01:09.690 --> 01:11.710 but also the department's comptroller, 01:11.710 --> 01:14.453 Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist. 01:14.620 --> 01:16.260 And thank you for accepting my written 01:16.260 --> 01:17.270 statement for the record. 01:17.270 --> 01:20.840 I'm now in my second year as Secretary of Defense 01:20.840 --> 01:22.340 and with this committee's help 01:22.520 --> 01:25.863 we have made steady progress during the past 15 months. 01:26.130 --> 01:28.530 I must also note that this is my first time 01:28.530 --> 01:31.860 to testify before you as Chairman, Chairman Shelby. 01:31.860 --> 01:35.043 And congratulations on that leadership position, 01:35.120 --> 01:38.070 and the Pentagon had sent a note of confidence 01:38.070 --> 01:40.220 through our ranks, thank you. 01:40.220 --> 01:42.300 Yesterday President Trump announced 01:42.300 --> 01:44.720 the administration's decision to withdraw 01:44.720 --> 01:46.970 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 01:47.240 --> 01:49.230 terminating US participation, 01:49.230 --> 01:52.173 and reimposing sanctions on the Iranian regime. 01:52.560 --> 01:54.840 We will continue to work alongside our allies 01:54.840 --> 01:56.724 and partners to ensure that Iran 01:56.724 --> 01:58.419 can never acquire a nuclear weapon. 01:58.419 --> 02:01.050 And we'll work with others to address 02:01.050 --> 02:03.713 the range of Iran's maligned influence. 02:03.713 --> 02:05.756 This administration remains committed 02:05.756 --> 02:07.467 to putting the safety, interests, 02:07.467 --> 02:10.433 and well being of our citizens first. 02:10.540 --> 02:12.583 In January the department published 02:12.583 --> 02:15.770 a 2018 National Defense Strategy. 02:15.770 --> 02:17.163 The first in a decade. 02:17.600 --> 02:21.443 Framed within President Trump's National Security Strategy, 02:21.870 --> 02:23.930 the 2018 National Defense Strategy 02:23.930 --> 02:26.630 provides clear direction for America's military 02:26.630 --> 02:28.628 to restore its competitive edge 02:28.628 --> 02:31.700 in an era of re-emerging, long term, 02:31.700 --> 02:33.313 great power competition. 02:33.411 --> 02:36.280 The department next released the 2018 02:36.280 --> 02:38.550 Nuclear Posture Review which calls 02:38.550 --> 02:40.950 for America's military to provide a safe, 02:40.950 --> 02:43.547 secure, and effective nuclear deterrent 02:43.547 --> 02:46.963 that is modern, robust, flexible, 02:47.170 --> 02:49.840 resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored 02:49.840 --> 02:51.918 to deter 21st century threats, 02:51.918 --> 02:54.643 and to reassure our allies. 02:55.770 --> 02:57.883 In South Asia and Afghanistan, 02:57.990 --> 03:00.330 uncertainty in the region has been replaced 03:00.330 --> 03:01.833 by the certainty of the administration's 03:01.833 --> 03:03.703 South Asia Strategy. 03:04.030 --> 03:05.380 Concurrently in the Middle East 03:05.380 --> 03:08.570 we have dramatically reduced ISIS physical caliphate 03:08.880 --> 03:11.280 using a coordinated whole of government approach 03:11.280 --> 03:15.010 that worked by, with, and through our allies and partners 03:15.370 --> 03:17.947 to crush ISIS claim of invincibility, 03:17.947 --> 03:20.990 and to deny them a geographic haven 03:21.090 --> 03:22.623 from which to plot murder. 03:23.100 --> 03:26.410 Two months ago, thanks to the bipartisan support 03:26.410 --> 03:28.187 and the political courage of Congress 03:28.187 --> 03:30.834 and the dedication of this committee, 03:30.834 --> 03:33.900 President Trump signed the omnibus spending bill 03:33.900 --> 03:34.860 that funds the government 03:34.860 --> 03:36.650 for the remainder of the fiscal year. 03:36.650 --> 03:39.410 This law, along with the two year budget 03:39.410 --> 03:41.660 agreement passed as part of February's 03:41.660 --> 03:43.100 budget bipartisan act 03:43.776 --> 03:46.473 finally freed us from the inefficient, 03:46.530 --> 03:50.210 and damaging continuing resolution funding process 03:50.570 --> 03:52.450 and is now providing the predictable, 03:52.450 --> 03:55.080 and sufficient funding needed to continue 03:55.080 --> 03:58.313 implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 03:59.020 --> 04:01.980 Our fiscal year 2019 budget requests 04:02.290 --> 04:04.580 the three sources necessary to fulfill 04:04.580 --> 04:06.430 the departments enduring mission 04:06.430 --> 04:10.080 to provide the combat credible military forces needed 04:10.370 --> 04:13.410 to deter war, and if deterrents fail, 04:13.410 --> 04:15.303 to win in any conflict. 04:15.720 --> 04:18.632 These forces reinforce America's traditional 04:18.632 --> 04:21.790 tools of diplomacy, ensuring that the President 04:21.790 --> 04:26.263 and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. 04:27.770 --> 04:31.000 To restore our nation's competitive military advantage 04:31.400 --> 04:34.680 the FY19 budget funds our National Defense Strategy's 04:34.680 --> 04:36.883 three overarching lines of effort. 04:36.883 --> 04:39.091 To build a more lethal force. 04:39.091 --> 04:41.900 Second to strengthen our traditional alliances 04:41.900 --> 04:43.490 while building new partnerships. 04:43.490 --> 04:46.010 And third to reform the department's 04:46.010 --> 04:49.703 business practices for performance and affordability. 04:50.270 --> 04:52.180 In regard to our first line of effort, 04:52.180 --> 04:53.660 to build a more lethal force, 04:53.660 --> 04:55.630 all our department's policies, 04:55.630 --> 04:58.212 expenditures in training must contribute 04:58.212 --> 05:00.683 to the lethality of our military. 05:00.950 --> 05:04.350 We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts 05:04.350 --> 05:06.945 with yesterday's thinking, yesterday's weapons, 05:06.945 --> 05:08.683 or yesterday's equipment. 05:08.685 --> 05:11.670 As President Washington said during his first 05:11.670 --> 05:15.017 State of the Union address, "to be prepared for war 05:15.017 --> 05:17.027 "is one of the most effectual means 05:17.027 --> 05:19.496 "of preserving peace." So today, 05:19.496 --> 05:23.550 members of the committee, our lethal military arm 05:23.550 --> 05:27.762 is designed to enhance our diplomat's persuasiveness. 05:27.762 --> 05:30.658 The paradox of war is that an adversary 05:30.658 --> 05:34.213 will always move against any perceived weakness. 05:34.350 --> 05:38.232 So we cannot adopt a single preclusive form of warfare. 05:38.232 --> 05:40.450 We must be able to fight across 05:40.450 --> 05:42.626 the entire spectrum of combat. 05:42.626 --> 05:44.930 The nation must field sufficient 05:44.930 --> 05:47.960 capable forces to deter conflict. 05:47.960 --> 05:50.593 If deterrents fail we must win. 05:50.850 --> 05:53.070 Following this logic we must maintain 05:53.070 --> 05:55.860 a credible nuclear deterrent so these weapons 05:55.860 --> 05:58.842 are never used, and a decisive conventional force 05:58.842 --> 06:02.863 that includes irregular warfare capability. 06:03.780 --> 06:05.320 Preserving the full range of our nation's 06:05.320 --> 06:08.680 deterrent options requires the recapitalization 06:08.680 --> 06:11.730 of our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces 06:12.120 --> 06:15.393 as initiated by the previous administration. 06:16.030 --> 06:19.220 Modernizing the nation's nuclear delivery systems 06:19.220 --> 06:21.150 and our Nuclear Command and Control 06:21.410 --> 06:23.501 is our department's top priority. 06:23.501 --> 06:27.833 And these programs are fully funded in the 2019 budget. 06:28.670 --> 06:31.060 That budget funds enhancements to the US 06:31.060 --> 06:33.659 missile defense capability to defend the homeland, 06:33.659 --> 06:37.000 defend our deployed forces, allies, and partners 06:37.000 --> 06:40.563 against an increasingly complex missile threat. 06:41.110 --> 06:43.040 In accordance with the soon to be released 06:43.040 --> 06:46.860 2018 Missile Defense Review this budget request 06:46.860 --> 06:51.130 continued robust support for missile defense capability 06:51.520 --> 06:54.090 and the capability that will keep pace 06:54.090 --> 06:55.823 with advancing threats. 06:56.470 --> 06:58.500 The proposed budget will modestly 06:58.500 --> 07:00.380 increase the end strength of the Army, 07:00.380 --> 07:03.263 Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp to restore readiness, 07:03.770 --> 07:08.703 adding a total of 25,900 to the active and reserve force. 07:08.887 --> 07:11.045 The budget will also continue to invest 07:11.045 --> 07:15.583 in the military's most important asset, it's war fighters. 07:15.790 --> 07:19.113 With a 2.6% military pay increase. 07:19.400 --> 07:22.920 And the 2019 budget continues increased procurement 07:23.200 --> 07:25.843 of preferred and advanced munitions. 07:26.200 --> 07:29.000 A necessity due to the ongoing operations 07:29.410 --> 07:32.933 in the Middle East, and due to the need for war reserves. 07:33.660 --> 07:36.700 10 combat ships and eight support ships are funded 07:36.700 --> 07:38.780 arresting the downward trajectory 07:39.020 --> 07:41.313 of our Navy's size and lethality. 07:41.670 --> 07:45.017 We will continue production of 77 F35s 07:45.017 --> 07:48.023 and 24 F18 aircraft. 07:48.370 --> 07:50.790 Evaluating the performance of both 07:50.790 --> 07:53.863 to determine the most appropriate mix moving forward. 07:54.258 --> 07:57.718 The budget request fund systems to enhance communications 07:57.718 --> 08:01.330 and resiliency in space addressing 08:01.330 --> 08:03.660 overhead persistent infrared capabilities 08:05.323 --> 08:08.063 and also positioning navigation and timing. 08:08.840 --> 08:10.790 Our 2018 National Defense Strategy 08:10.790 --> 08:13.795 also prioritizes investing in technological 08:13.795 --> 08:16.643 innovation to increase lethality. 08:16.665 --> 08:20.653 Specifically cyber advanced computing, 08:20.790 --> 08:23.803 big data analytics, artificial intelligence, 08:24.010 --> 08:27.883 autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, 08:28.020 --> 08:31.273 additive manufacturing, directed energy, 08:31.460 --> 08:33.920 and hypersonics are the very technology 08:33.920 --> 08:37.543 that we need to fight and win wars of the future. 08:39.010 --> 08:41.470 Every investment in the strategy driven 08:41.570 --> 08:44.900 FY 2019 budget is designed to contribute 08:44.900 --> 08:46.760 to the lethality of our military 08:46.760 --> 08:49.550 ensuring that subsequent Secretaries of Defense 08:49.850 --> 08:53.223 inherit a military force that is fit for its time. 08:53.750 --> 08:55.840 Those seeking to threaten America's 08:55.840 --> 08:57.973 experiment in democracy should know 08:57.973 --> 09:01.510 that if you challenge us it will be 09:01.510 --> 09:03.603 your longest and worst day. 09:04.600 --> 09:06.720 Our 2018 National Defense Strategy 09:06.720 --> 09:09.400 second line of effort remains to strengthen 09:09.400 --> 09:12.513 traditional alliances to our building new partnerships. 09:13.080 --> 09:14.660 In the past I had the privilege 09:14.660 --> 09:17.773 of fighting many times in defense of the United States. 09:17.990 --> 09:21.543 But I never fought in a solely American formation. 09:21.970 --> 09:24.823 It was always alongside foreign troops. 09:25.370 --> 09:27.602 Easier said than done, Winston Churchill noted 09:27.602 --> 09:29.197 "the only thing harder than fighting 09:29.197 --> 09:31.447 "with allies is fighting without them." 09:31.770 --> 09:33.750 But history proves that we are stronger 09:33.750 --> 09:35.593 when we stand united with others. 09:35.920 --> 09:38.760 Accordingly our military will be designed, 09:38.760 --> 09:41.963 trained, and ready to fight alongside allies. 09:42.960 --> 09:45.210 Working by, with, and through allies and partners 09:45.210 --> 09:48.360 who carry their fair share remains a source 09:48.360 --> 09:50.063 of strength for the United States. 09:50.670 --> 09:52.655 Since the costly victory in World War II, 09:52.655 --> 09:55.800 Americans have carried a disproportionate 09:55.800 --> 09:59.253 share of the global defense burden while others recover. 09:59.542 --> 10:01.870 Today the growing economic strength 10:01.870 --> 10:05.260 of allies and partners has enabled them to step up 10:05.690 --> 10:08.210 as demonstrated by the 74 nations 10:08.210 --> 10:11.230 and international organizations participating 10:11.230 --> 10:13.363 in a defeat ISIS campaign. 10:13.680 --> 10:15.689 And again in the 41 nations now standing 10:15.689 --> 10:18.730 shoulder to shoulder in NATO's Resolute 10:18.730 --> 10:20.943 Support Mission in Afghanistan. 10:20.983 --> 10:24.907 This year, every NATO ally has increased defense spending. 10:24.907 --> 10:28.860 And 15 NATO allies are increasing their defense budgets 10:29.130 --> 10:31.543 as a share of gross domestic product, 10:31.800 --> 10:33.340 giving credence to the value 10:33.340 --> 10:35.195 of democracies standing together. 10:35.195 --> 10:38.110 Further, our Pacific partners are also 10:38.110 --> 10:39.803 strengthening their defenses. 10:40.940 --> 10:43.089 Our third line of effort is the urgent reform 10:43.089 --> 10:45.460 of the department's business practices 10:45.460 --> 10:48.638 to provide both solvency and security to the nation. 10:48.638 --> 10:50.844 We will continue to establish a culture 10:50.844 --> 10:53.839 of performance where results and accountability 10:53.839 --> 10:58.150 matter on every expenditure to gain full strength 10:58.150 --> 11:01.293 from every single taxpayer dollar spent on defense. 11:01.432 --> 11:04.110 We are committed to exercising the utmost 11:04.110 --> 11:06.400 degree of financial stewardship and budget 11:06.400 --> 11:08.133 discipline within the department. 11:08.259 --> 11:10.840 In this regard, this year we will deliver 11:10.840 --> 11:15.086 our department's first full financial audit in our history. 11:15.086 --> 11:16.711 We will find problems, 11:16.711 --> 11:20.124 and then take swift action to correct our deficiencies 11:20.124 --> 11:22.587 thereby earning the trust of Congress, 11:22.587 --> 11:24.142 and the American people. 11:24.142 --> 11:26.588 I am confident we have the right leaders in place 11:26.588 --> 11:30.023 to make meaningful reform a reality. 11:30.360 --> 11:32.913 Pat Shanahan, a Deputy Secretary of Defense, 11:33.040 --> 11:35.403 Jay Gibson as the Chief Management Officer, 11:35.403 --> 11:38.420 Ellen Lord as Under Secretary of Defense 11:38.420 --> 11:40.512 for Acquisitions and Sustainment, 11:40.512 --> 11:42.510 Michael Griffin as Under Secretary 11:42.510 --> 11:44.600 of Defense for Research and Engineering, 11:44.600 --> 11:46.920 Bob Daigle as Director of Cost, 11:46.920 --> 11:49.423 Assessment, and Program Evaluation, 11:49.780 --> 11:51.773 and David Norquist who joins us here today 11:51.773 --> 11:54.513 as the departments Chief Financial Officer. 11:54.513 --> 11:57.240 Each brings the intellect, energy, 11:57.240 --> 11:58.693 and experience required to implement 11:58.693 --> 12:01.758 and sustain meaningful reform 12:01.758 --> 12:03.770 ensuring the department provides 12:03.770 --> 12:07.193 performance and affordability for the American taxpayer. 12:07.920 --> 12:09.490 The department is transitioning 12:09.490 --> 12:11.719 to a culture of performance and affordability 12:11.719 --> 12:14.547 that operates at the speed of relevance. 12:14.547 --> 12:17.817 We will prioritize speed of delivery, 12:17.817 --> 12:22.623 continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. 12:22.870 --> 12:24.870 With your continued critical support 12:24.870 --> 12:27.105 we will shed outdated management 12:27.105 --> 12:30.038 and acquisition processes while adopting 12:30.038 --> 12:32.633 American industry's best practices. 12:32.930 --> 12:34.925 Our management structure and processes 12:34.925 --> 12:37.203 are not engraved in stone. 12:37.410 --> 12:39.053 They are a means to an end. 12:39.240 --> 12:42.391 If current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality 12:42.391 --> 12:44.249 I have directed Service Secretaries 12:44.249 --> 12:47.993 and agency heads to consolidate, eliminate, 12:48.060 --> 12:50.503 or restructure to achieve their mission. 12:51.610 --> 12:54.190 The 2018 National Defense Strategy's 12:54.190 --> 12:55.640 three primary lines of effort 12:55.640 --> 12:58.933 are more lethal force, strengthening our alliances, 12:59.260 --> 13:02.390 and reforming the department's business practices 13:02.550 --> 13:05.510 will restore our competitive military advantage 13:05.790 --> 13:07.430 ensuring we are prepared to fight 13:07.430 --> 13:09.520 across the full spectrum of combat 13:09.730 --> 13:11.313 both now and in the future. 13:11.610 --> 13:13.860 I wanna thank this committee for your strong spirit 13:13.860 --> 13:16.303 of bipartisan collaboration. 13:16.406 --> 13:19.580 While our trajectory is going in the right direction, 13:19.580 --> 13:21.203 our work has just begun. 13:21.400 --> 13:22.960 This is a year of opportunity, 13:22.960 --> 13:24.970 and a chance to continue to work together 13:24.970 --> 13:26.663 building on a strong start, 13:26.900 --> 13:30.633 as we turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action. 13:31.070 --> 13:33.073 The point I need to emphasize in today's hearing 13:33.073 --> 13:35.209 are that the budget, which is designed 13:35.209 --> 13:39.540 to execute this strategy of building a more lethal force, 13:39.540 --> 13:41.177 restoring current and future readiness, 13:41.177 --> 13:43.940 and modernizing our nuclear deterrent forces 13:44.490 --> 13:46.300 also must build for the future 13:46.300 --> 13:48.166 by improving our military's technological 13:48.166 --> 13:52.160 competitive edge and reforming the department's 13:52.160 --> 13:54.680 business processes to establish that 13:54.680 --> 13:56.966 culture of performance and affordability 13:56.966 --> 13:59.973 that will ensure security and solvency. 14:00.460 --> 14:03.440 The strategy is the guidepost for all our actions 14:03.440 --> 14:06.602 including this year's strategy driven budget request. 14:06.602 --> 14:08.739 Driving meaningful reform to establish 14:08.739 --> 14:11.200 an enduring culture of performance, 14:11.200 --> 14:13.850 affordability, and agility. 14:13.850 --> 14:17.005 I cannot appear before you Mr. Chairman 14:17.005 --> 14:20.153 without expressing my gratitude to the men and women 14:20.153 --> 14:22.170 of the Department of Defense. 14:22.170 --> 14:23.860 They are the ones who must ultimately 14:23.860 --> 14:26.623 turn the National Defense Strategy into action. 14:26.990 --> 14:28.859 Every day more than two million service members, 14:28.859 --> 14:32.121 and nearly one million civilians do their duty 14:32.121 --> 14:34.690 honoring previous generations of veterans 14:34.690 --> 14:38.073 and civil servants who have sacrificed for their country. 14:38.360 --> 14:40.593 It is a privilege to serve alongside them. 14:40.690 --> 14:43.230 And I thank them for their tireless efforts, 14:43.230 --> 14:46.313 and unyielding standards in defense of our nation. 14:46.590 --> 14:48.610 General Dunford is prepared to discuss 14:48.610 --> 14:51.683 the military dimensions of this budget request. 14:52.700 --> 14:54.343 - Secretary General Dunford. 14:55.270 --> 14:56.834 - Chairman Shelby, Vice Chairman Durbin, 14:56.834 --> 14:58.360 distinguished members of the committee, 14:58.360 --> 14:59.850 thank you for the opportunity to join 14:59.850 --> 15:02.293 Secretary Mattis, and Under Secretary Norquist. 15:02.353 --> 15:05.203 It's an honor to represent your men and women in uniform. 15:05.470 --> 15:06.895 Well we're here for a candid discussion 15:06.895 --> 15:08.590 of the challenges we face. 15:08.590 --> 15:11.370 I wanna begin by assuring you that the US military 15:11.510 --> 15:13.300 has a competitive advantage over any 15:13.300 --> 15:14.886 potential adversary today. 15:14.886 --> 15:17.646 I'm confident we can deter a nuclear attack, 15:17.646 --> 15:20.613 defend the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, 15:20.613 --> 15:22.429 and prevail in any conflict. 15:22.429 --> 15:24.990 But as we have previously discussed, 15:24.990 --> 15:27.693 after years of sustained operational commitments, 15:27.950 --> 15:30.789 budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries, 15:30.789 --> 15:32.660 our competitive advantage has eroded 15:32.660 --> 15:34.618 and our readiness has degraded. 15:34.618 --> 15:37.350 Driven by the National Defense Strategy 15:37.350 --> 15:39.786 and building on the FY17 and 18 appropriations 15:39.786 --> 15:42.700 the 19 budget submission supports 15:42.700 --> 15:46.163 rebuilding a lethal and ready force that the nation needs. 15:46.790 --> 15:49.422 The Secretary has addressed our Defense Strategy 15:49.422 --> 15:52.600 that recognizes Russia and China as the priority 15:52.820 --> 15:54.356 while also meeting the immediate challenges 15:54.356 --> 15:58.653 posed by rogue regimes, and violent extremist organizations. 15:58.716 --> 16:00.860 China and Russia continue to invest 16:00.860 --> 16:03.950 across a full range nuclear, cyber, space, 16:03.950 --> 16:05.577 and conventional capabilities. 16:05.577 --> 16:08.420 Both states are focused on limiting our ability 16:08.420 --> 16:10.470 to project power and undermining 16:10.470 --> 16:12.653 the credibility of our alliances. 16:12.920 --> 16:14.410 They are also increasingly adept 16:14.410 --> 16:15.680 at advancing their interests through 16:15.680 --> 16:17.640 coercive, competitive activity 16:17.930 --> 16:19.963 below threshold of armed conflict. 16:20.630 --> 16:22.458 North Korea has been on a relentless pursuit 16:22.458 --> 16:24.653 of nuclear and missile capability. 16:24.750 --> 16:26.312 And have been clear that these capabilities 16:26.312 --> 16:28.167 have been intended to threaten the United States 16:28.167 --> 16:29.713 and our allies in the region. 16:29.978 --> 16:32.570 Iran continues to spread, malign influence 16:32.590 --> 16:34.890 and create instability across the Middle East. 16:35.060 --> 16:36.940 And while we have made a great deal of progress, 16:36.940 --> 16:38.828 and the Secretary outlined that in his remarks, 16:38.828 --> 16:40.471 we're still grappling with the challenges 16:40.471 --> 16:44.073 of violent extremism including ISIS, Al Qaeda, 16:44.230 --> 16:45.653 and associated movements. 16:46.130 --> 16:48.130 Defending our homeland and our allies, 16:48.130 --> 16:50.110 and advancing our interests in the context 16:50.110 --> 16:51.551 of these and other challenges 16:51.551 --> 16:54.480 requires us to maintain a balanced force 16:54.490 --> 16:56.579 of ready, lethal, and flexible forces 16:56.579 --> 16:58.560 that are relevant across the range 16:58.560 --> 17:00.023 of military operations. 17:00.167 --> 17:03.110 Fortunately with your support we've begun 17:03.110 --> 17:05.310 to arrest the erosion of our competitive advantage 17:05.310 --> 17:06.830 and we're on a path towards developing 17:06.830 --> 17:08.853 a force that the nation needs. 17:09.150 --> 17:11.700 This year's budget again builds on the readiness recovery 17:11.700 --> 17:13.804 that we started in fiscal year 17, 17:13.804 --> 17:15.930 and accelerates our efforts to develop 17:15.930 --> 17:18.580 the capabilities we need for both today and tomorrow. 17:18.655 --> 17:21.251 In requesting your support for this year's budget 17:21.251 --> 17:23.450 I along with all the uniformed leaders 17:23.450 --> 17:24.940 in the department commit to you 17:24.940 --> 17:26.790 that we will make every dollar count. 17:26.810 --> 17:28.240 We fully support the auditing initiative 17:28.240 --> 17:30.469 led by Secretary Norquist, and will maintain 17:30.469 --> 17:32.497 an ongoing dialogue with you 17:32.497 --> 17:34.563 about the return on your investment. 17:36.192 --> 17:38.410 To restore our competitive advantage 17:38.410 --> 17:40.160 and ensure our men and women ever find 17:40.160 --> 17:41.543 themselves in a fair fight, 17:41.700 --> 17:44.123 the US military requires sustained, 17:44.270 --> 17:46.733 sufficient, and predictable funding. 17:47.120 --> 17:49.080 The funding in this budget is sufficient 17:49.080 --> 17:50.750 and I look forward to working with the Congress 17:50.750 --> 17:52.110 to make sure that it's sustained 17:52.110 --> 17:53.883 and predictable in the future. 17:54.080 --> 17:55.310 Thank you again for your support 17:55.310 --> 17:57.160 and the opportunity to be here today. 17:58.230 --> 18:01.460 - Mr. Secretary, first of all I have a number of questions. 18:01.460 --> 18:03.070 But I'd like to submit them for the record 18:03.070 --> 18:04.509 where we can move on. 18:04.509 --> 18:07.228 But I'd like for you to discuss 18:07.228 --> 18:09.530 what you can in this setting. 18:09.530 --> 18:10.713 It's a public setting. 18:11.030 --> 18:14.443 Dealing with Iran and also North Korea. 18:14.587 --> 18:17.273 As you, what you can do. 18:18.340 --> 18:19.173 - Yes sir. 18:19.259 --> 18:22.770 In regards to Iran, they continue 18:22.770 --> 18:25.343 their malign activities across the region. 18:26.000 --> 18:28.040 Assad is still in power today. 18:28.040 --> 18:30.633 Still murdering his own people. 18:31.209 --> 18:34.010 And still creating refugee flows 18:34.010 --> 18:35.533 that we've not seen before, 18:35.670 --> 18:38.180 based on the support out of Iran. 18:38.180 --> 18:39.595 Without it he would have fallen 18:39.595 --> 18:42.660 to his own people's revolt against him. 18:42.660 --> 18:47.080 At the same time, we see Iran's activities 18:47.080 --> 18:50.543 from Yemen to Bahrain, Saudia Arabia, 18:50.648 --> 18:55.648 obviously up into Lebanon, and it continues a pace. 18:56.330 --> 18:58.263 There, we have not seen any draw down 18:58.263 --> 19:01.770 or reduction in Iran's malicious activities 19:01.770 --> 19:04.401 and malign activities across the region. 19:04.401 --> 19:09.401 At the same time we have walked away from the JCPOA 19:09.630 --> 19:11.910 because we found it was inadequate 19:12.550 --> 19:14.146 for the long term effort. 19:14.146 --> 19:17.650 And this was something probably noted by the Senate 19:18.099 --> 19:20.060 several years ago when the Senate 19:20.060 --> 19:23.323 did not endorse it as a treaty. 19:24.030 --> 19:25.756 So we will work with our allies, 19:25.756 --> 19:30.756 and try to bring Iran back into more responsible 19:31.060 --> 19:33.890 behavior at the same time addressing 19:33.890 --> 19:37.686 all five of the threats that Iran constitutes. 19:37.686 --> 19:41.360 The nuclear issue which is foremost. 19:41.360 --> 19:45.111 Certainly the terrorism issue that I just sited. 19:45.111 --> 19:48.640 The ballistic missile efforts they have. 19:48.640 --> 19:50.963 Cyber attacks they've been conducting. 19:51.210 --> 19:55.361 And then the threats to international commerce, 19:55.361 --> 19:57.340 whether it be out of the Red Sea, 19:57.340 --> 19:58.868 where we have seen it most recently, 19:58.868 --> 20:00.870 or back up in the Persian Gulf 20:00.870 --> 20:03.420 where it has relented over the last several months. 20:03.869 --> 20:07.793 So that's basically where we're at visa vie Iran. 20:10.806 --> 20:14.438 - What's the upside of breaking out 20:14.438 --> 20:17.090 of the agreement with Iran, and what's 20:17.090 --> 20:19.733 the downside as you see it? 20:19.767 --> 20:20.600 - Yes sir. 20:20.820 --> 20:23.070 I believe what's happened is the President 20:23.070 --> 20:26.737 could not affirm as required that this agreement 20:26.737 --> 20:29.588 was being lived up to and in the best interest 20:29.588 --> 20:34.300 in all aspects of what was supposed to be happening 20:34.318 --> 20:36.263 under the JCPOA. 20:36.321 --> 20:39.540 In that regard it was a bonafide, 20:39.540 --> 20:41.630 as you know it was not a hasty decision. 20:41.630 --> 20:44.470 We've been, the administration's been in place 20:44.600 --> 20:46.468 for over a year, and for over a year 20:46.468 --> 20:48.860 we have attempted to work with allies 20:49.060 --> 20:51.310 to address the shortcomings on it. 20:51.310 --> 20:52.949 So I think we now have the opportunity 20:52.949 --> 20:56.230 to move forward to address those shortcomings 20:56.570 --> 20:58.090 and make it more compelling. 20:58.090 --> 21:00.527 So that effort is underway already 21:00.527 --> 21:03.843 with Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, 21:03.843 --> 21:05.893 and others working the issue. 21:07.651 --> 21:09.513 - You will get into North Korea? 21:10.353 --> 21:12.693 - With North Korea sir, certainly, 21:13.000 --> 21:15.551 their capability concerns us on the military side. 21:15.551 --> 21:19.810 However, we see there is some reason for optimism. 21:19.810 --> 21:23.633 We said all along this was a diplomatically led effort, 21:24.370 --> 21:26.302 backed up by military force. 21:26.302 --> 21:29.446 But for right now, Secretary Pompeo 21:29.446 --> 21:31.470 is air born bringing home the three 21:31.470 --> 21:34.673 released American citizens as we speak. 21:34.820 --> 21:36.470 They've launched out of Pyongyang 21:36.634 --> 21:38.734 on their way back to the United States. 21:38.734 --> 21:41.673 And I think there is reason for some optimism 21:41.673 --> 21:44.573 that these talks could be fruitful. 21:46.810 --> 21:47.823 - Senator Durbin. 21:49.890 --> 21:52.227 - First, thanks to you Secretary Mattis 21:52.227 --> 21:54.070 and General Dunford, and all of those 21:54.070 --> 21:55.180 who have gathered with you today 21:55.180 --> 21:56.410 for your service to our country. 21:56.410 --> 21:57.610 We're lucky to have you. 21:57.710 --> 21:59.591 And thank you for all the sacrifices 21:59.591 --> 22:02.240 you're making personally to make certain 22:02.553 --> 22:03.853 that we are a safe nation. 22:04.070 --> 22:07.000 Let me say at the outset, that President Trump's 22:07.000 --> 22:11.850 decision yesterday to basically exit 22:12.070 --> 22:15.123 the United States from this Iran nuclear agreement, 22:15.440 --> 22:18.513 I believe is not only wrong but reckless. 22:18.570 --> 22:21.240 We are in a situation where we have had 22:21.240 --> 22:24.510 under this agreement, inspectors on the ground 22:24.670 --> 22:27.330 who have reported to us directly and personally 22:27.330 --> 22:29.670 in the United States Senate the success 22:29.670 --> 22:32.300 of their inspection regime to make certain 22:32.300 --> 22:34.933 that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. 22:34.986 --> 22:38.210 By walking away from this agreement 22:38.300 --> 22:42.140 we are forsaking the opportunity 22:42.140 --> 22:45.000 to continue to monitor in detail 22:45.000 --> 22:47.890 the work done by Iran to make certain 22:47.890 --> 22:49.513 that they live up to its terms. 22:49.940 --> 22:51.705 Equally important, and you've acknowledged it, 22:51.705 --> 22:54.623 our allies are important to us around the world. 22:54.660 --> 22:57.689 Our allies joined us in sticking their necks out, 22:57.689 --> 23:00.843 France, Germany, UK, the European Union, 23:01.510 --> 23:04.450 China and Russia joining us to make certain 23:04.450 --> 23:06.650 that this agreement had a kind of universal 23:06.650 --> 23:09.190 support beyond Iran and now the United States 23:09.190 --> 23:11.203 is walking away from it. 23:11.510 --> 23:13.820 That I cannot believe will inspire 23:13.820 --> 23:15.680 any confidence among our allies 23:16.387 --> 23:18.400 about our word and our reliability in the future 23:18.400 --> 23:20.173 when it comes to these agreements. 23:20.810 --> 23:23.313 And I know you've commented on this already. 23:23.450 --> 23:26.000 I won't call on you to do it again unless you wish. 23:26.170 --> 23:27.530 The second point I'd like to make 23:27.530 --> 23:30.290 is you're about to make history this year, 23:30.290 --> 23:31.483 and again next year. 23:31.910 --> 23:33.470 It'll be, you'll have the largest 23:33.470 --> 23:34.902 budget of any department ever, 23:34.902 --> 23:37.383 in the history of the United States of America. 23:37.800 --> 23:38.653 The largest. 23:38.950 --> 23:40.710 And you'll see an increase this year, 23:40.710 --> 23:43.633 and another next year that is virtually unprecedented. 23:44.170 --> 23:46.720 That gives you a great opportunity to do great things. 23:46.720 --> 23:48.509 But as you have noted in your testimony 23:48.509 --> 23:53.509 it also invites some unwelcome consequences. 23:53.611 --> 23:55.570 Whether we're talking about waste 23:55.570 --> 23:59.209 of taxpayers dollars, fraud, or misuse of those dollars, 23:59.209 --> 24:01.717 which could damage the reputation of your mission, 24:01.717 --> 24:04.017 and the men and women who are dedicated to it. 24:04.370 --> 24:06.567 I know you are personally committed to avoid that. 24:06.567 --> 24:09.500 And are talking about things like procurement 24:09.500 --> 24:12.130 reform as part of it, but I think 24:12.130 --> 24:13.593 you have a special burden. 24:13.810 --> 24:15.970 There was a burden when you had too few dollars. 24:15.970 --> 24:17.570 There'll be an additional burden 24:17.770 --> 24:20.383 when you have so many dollars coming in so quickly. 24:21.000 --> 24:23.110 The third point I'd like to ask a question about 24:23.110 --> 24:24.911 is one that we've talked about last year, 24:24.911 --> 24:26.853 and I wanted to revisit. 24:28.040 --> 24:30.560 You referred in your testimony to the certainty 24:30.560 --> 24:33.223 of the administration's South Asian strategy. 24:33.440 --> 24:34.990 And I would like to focus in 24:35.070 --> 24:37.223 on what is happening in Afghanistan. 24:37.610 --> 24:39.590 The President's new South Asian Strategy 24:39.590 --> 24:43.096 increases US military personnel to 15,000. 24:43.096 --> 24:45.395 Takes a tougher line with Pakistan. 24:45.395 --> 24:47.853 And increases our outreach to India. 24:48.390 --> 24:52.221 Meanwhile, suicide bombs continue to savage Kabul, 24:52.221 --> 24:54.450 and the new Special Inspector General 24:54.450 --> 24:57.350 for Afghanistan reconstruction issues 24:57.350 --> 24:59.830 a report that paints a very bleak picture 25:00.070 --> 25:03.080 about the future of our involvement 25:03.080 --> 25:04.459 in what has become the longest war 25:04.459 --> 25:07.033 in the history of the United States of America. 25:07.580 --> 25:08.823 A few statistics. 25:09.090 --> 25:13.240 After 126 billion dollars US relief and reconstruction 25:13.240 --> 25:15.093 investment over the last 20 years, 25:15.093 --> 25:19.946 Afghanistan ranks 183rd among nations in the world 25:19.946 --> 25:22.250 where one would want to do business. 25:22.250 --> 25:25.720 Less than a third of the people of Afghanistan 25:25.720 --> 25:27.363 are connected to the power grid. 25:27.750 --> 25:29.830 The number of bombs dropped by the western 25:29.830 --> 25:32.690 coalition in Afghanistan in early 2018 25:32.930 --> 25:36.183 was the highest number since the year 2013. 25:36.610 --> 25:38.610 And the number of direct Taliban attacks 25:38.610 --> 25:40.113 declined over the winter. 25:40.171 --> 25:43.840 However, only 65% of the population 25:43.840 --> 25:47.053 presently lives under Afghan government control. 25:47.410 --> 25:50.090 After direct US expenditures to Afghan 25:50.090 --> 25:53.170 Security Forces of 78 billion dollars 25:53.960 --> 25:56.130 this report that I refer to projects 25:56.130 --> 25:59.343 that the overall trend for the insurgency is rising. 25:59.840 --> 26:04.163 Suicide attacks in Afghanistan up 50% in 2017. 26:04.480 --> 26:06.200 Casualties from complex attacks 26:06.200 --> 26:08.413 and suicide bombings steadily rising. 26:08.670 --> 26:12.313 Sectarian attacks tripled in 2017. 26:12.690 --> 26:15.930 Recent media reports indicate the First Security Forces 26:15.930 --> 26:18.631 Assistance Brigade deployed to Afghanistan in March 26:18.631 --> 26:21.952 is facing serious delays due to problems vetting 26:21.952 --> 26:25.793 Afghan National Army personnel. 26:25.960 --> 26:27.890 Despite all of our efforts at training, 26:27.890 --> 26:30.783 and despite the massive investment by the United States. 26:31.160 --> 26:33.320 Last year I asked you for an assessment 26:33.320 --> 26:37.193 of the civilian and military situation in this Afghan war, 26:37.370 --> 26:39.947 and today by the Inspector General's report 26:39.947 --> 26:43.733 all of the indicators that he gives are negative. 26:43.940 --> 26:47.240 When is it reasonable for the United States of America 26:47.240 --> 26:49.896 to expect that the administration's certainty, 26:49.896 --> 26:53.200 as you call it, in their South Asian Strategy 26:53.200 --> 26:55.363 will actually show success? 26:56.758 --> 26:59.810 - Senator Durbin, first on the amount of money 26:59.810 --> 27:01.611 we've been given, it's sobering 27:01.611 --> 27:06.100 as we look at the sacrifice of money that could be used 27:06.100 --> 27:07.693 elsewhere in our society. 27:08.690 --> 27:11.640 It's sobering to realize this much sacrifice 27:11.640 --> 27:14.313 is providing us the budget certainty. 27:14.498 --> 27:17.640 But that also means it's solvency and security 27:17.640 --> 27:20.453 have got to go hand in hand, 27:20.500 --> 27:22.530 and I would just tell you that the audit, 27:22.530 --> 27:25.033 the financial audit that we have going on, 27:25.190 --> 27:26.770 and it's going to happen this year. 27:26.770 --> 27:28.407 First time in 70 years. 27:28.407 --> 27:30.610 We are going to find the problems. 27:30.610 --> 27:32.170 I'm gonna celebrate every one of 'em. 27:32.170 --> 27:33.173 We're gonna fix 'em. 27:33.620 --> 27:35.473 And when we get done we're going to show you 27:35.473 --> 27:37.780 that we can spend this money wisely. 27:37.780 --> 27:40.197 I'm not out for perfection. 27:40.197 --> 27:43.192 But in this regard sir, I'm going to be 27:43.192 --> 27:48.180 both impatient and intolerant of any misbehavior 27:48.550 --> 27:50.690 with the public money, and I'll work with you. 27:50.690 --> 27:52.318 We'll be open with what we find. 27:52.318 --> 27:54.910 And I know you'll be forthcoming to me 27:54.910 --> 27:57.493 when you find problems, and we'll work on it. 27:57.640 --> 28:00.940 On Afghanistan, this goes to the very heart 28:01.030 --> 28:02.823 of the world we live in today. 28:03.750 --> 28:07.930 The certainty was one where we were realigning our forces 28:07.930 --> 28:12.210 to purely advisory duties with the exception 28:12.220 --> 28:14.090 of a few counter terrorism strike forces 28:14.090 --> 28:15.793 which continue their missions. 28:15.793 --> 28:20.793 And ensuring that we also had more allies coming with us. 28:22.120 --> 28:25.336 We've gone from 50 allies, down to 39. 28:25.336 --> 28:27.770 We've restored two, and both of those 28:27.770 --> 28:30.023 are Muslim nations by the way. 28:30.100 --> 28:31.433 We're up to 41. 28:32.500 --> 28:35.290 The realignment and the reinforcement, 28:35.290 --> 28:37.083 US and other nations. 28:37.190 --> 28:39.233 The Germans are bringing in, 28:39.620 --> 28:43.460 basically raising their numbers by 35% at the same time. 28:43.460 --> 28:45.388 It's not going to all be carried by us. 28:45.388 --> 28:50.050 Going through India on my way into Afghanistan 28:50.050 --> 28:53.320 on one of my first trips, Prime Minister Modi 28:54.100 --> 28:56.753 basically committed to a very high level 28:56.753 --> 28:58.813 of development funding. 28:58.930 --> 29:01.560 My point here is we're also regionalizing 29:01.560 --> 29:03.810 this effort so that it's not all carried 29:03.810 --> 29:06.103 by our tax payers, by our soldiers. 29:07.216 --> 29:10.160 Probably the most difficult aspect of this, 29:10.160 --> 29:12.640 and I would contest a few of the figures 29:12.640 --> 29:14.713 you gave me Senator, but not all of them. 29:14.911 --> 29:17.853 I think the theme is what you're driving at. 29:19.010 --> 29:23.253 Progress and violence coexist in Afghanistan. 29:23.363 --> 29:26.450 And in that regard the Taliban recognizes 29:26.450 --> 29:29.920 that they cannot win at the ballot box. 29:29.920 --> 29:31.300 So they went to bombs. 29:31.300 --> 29:32.440 We anticipated it. 29:32.440 --> 29:35.484 We've stopped a large number of these attacks. 29:35.484 --> 29:37.880 But you'll notice the attacks right now 29:38.100 --> 29:40.570 are addressed to soft targets, 29:40.570 --> 29:42.220 is what we call 'em, by in large. 29:42.640 --> 29:44.434 The reason is, they are bein' rebuffed 29:44.434 --> 29:47.693 by the Afghan Forces and the Coalition Forces. 29:47.930 --> 29:52.250 And furthermore they are trying to set a condition 29:52.610 --> 29:55.130 that would wear our patience thin. 29:55.130 --> 29:57.730 That's why they're going after the balloting, 29:57.730 --> 29:59.683 and the election, 30:02.910 --> 30:04.693 where you sign up for elections. 30:05.010 --> 30:08.290 The registration sites. 30:08.290 --> 30:11.783 That's why they're going after high visibility efforts here. 30:11.846 --> 30:16.846 So our point right now is, that as we find more ability, 30:17.303 --> 30:18.890 and we're going to find it. 30:18.890 --> 30:21.850 We're going to vet the troops that we are working with. 30:21.850 --> 30:23.259 We're not just going to send our troops out 30:23.259 --> 30:25.755 to work with people who have not been vetted. 30:25.755 --> 30:28.200 But as we find those units, 30:28.200 --> 30:30.820 and we start having more NATO advisors with them, 30:30.820 --> 30:33.849 mostly American, but other NATO countries as well, 30:33.849 --> 30:37.630 then we will end up with more capable units in the field. 30:37.630 --> 30:41.359 The American advised units, commandos and special forces, 30:41.359 --> 30:44.950 over the last several years have not been defeated 30:44.950 --> 30:47.623 in combat with the Taliban. 30:47.645 --> 30:50.830 Those that were not mentored by our units 30:50.880 --> 30:53.690 were being defeated, so that's why 30:53.690 --> 30:55.873 we realigned to this approach. 30:56.040 --> 30:57.566 It's going to take a fighting season. 30:57.566 --> 31:00.253 This fighting season is underway. 31:00.540 --> 31:03.300 The number of enemy initiated attacks 31:03.300 --> 31:07.646 where they had the initiative is down by 17% over last year. 31:07.646 --> 31:10.128 So who's initiating the attack 31:10.128 --> 31:13.073 is as important as the number of attacks. 31:13.120 --> 31:14.823 Where we're ambushing them. 31:14.940 --> 31:16.620 Where we're starting the fight. 31:16.620 --> 31:18.403 That means we have the initiative. 31:18.680 --> 31:20.368 It's going to take time Senator. 31:20.368 --> 31:23.733 And I don't refute that this has been a long fight. 31:23.960 --> 31:26.240 I first landed there in October, 31:26.240 --> 31:28.700 excuse me November of 2001. 31:28.700 --> 31:30.516 I recognize how long it's been. 31:30.516 --> 31:34.220 But I think too, if you look at what we stand 31:34.220 --> 31:37.670 for in this world, the idea that attacks 31:37.670 --> 31:41.429 on registration places for elections, 31:41.429 --> 31:43.350 that's not something that should 31:43.350 --> 31:44.963 drive us out of this fight sir. 31:47.270 --> 31:48.493 - Senator Alexander. 31:49.970 --> 31:51.313 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 31:51.884 --> 31:55.253 Welcome Mr. Secretary, General, Mr. Norquist. 31:56.616 --> 31:58.430 Mr. Secretary you and the General 31:58.430 --> 32:01.260 have spent most of your life in the service 32:01.260 --> 32:02.690 of your country and I wanna thank you 32:02.690 --> 32:05.230 for continuing to do so. 32:05.230 --> 32:07.030 I notice that when you come to Capitol Hill, 32:07.030 --> 32:09.633 you're invited to speak to the democratic caucus, 32:09.960 --> 32:11.730 as well as to the republican caucus 32:11.730 --> 32:13.428 so we have a lot of confidence in you 32:13.428 --> 32:18.428 as a source of stability and good advice for us. 32:19.150 --> 32:21.522 And I think that is one major reason 32:21.522 --> 32:24.197 why the funding levels for this year 32:24.197 --> 32:27.244 and for next year so much higher. 32:27.244 --> 32:30.683 I wanna talk to you about the nuclear posture review. 32:33.429 --> 32:37.497 The Department of Defense is the lead author for that. 32:38.300 --> 32:43.300 I voted for the new start treaty in 2010 with Russia 32:45.570 --> 32:50.040 which in general reduced the number 32:50.040 --> 32:51.490 of nuclear weapons in the world. 32:51.490 --> 32:52.883 I thought we had enough, 32:54.030 --> 32:59.030 if we made sure that the ones we continue to have work. 33:00.010 --> 33:02.600 And I'm Chairman of the sub committee 33:02.600 --> 33:05.260 Energy and Water along with Senator Feinstein 33:06.030 --> 33:09.100 that provides the money for modernization 33:09.100 --> 33:11.600 of our nuclear weapons, and over that period of time 33:11.600 --> 33:14.523 we've kept our commitments to do that. 33:14.920 --> 33:17.240 I notice that the Nuclear Posture Review 33:18.100 --> 33:22.530 calls for the development two low yield 33:22.530 --> 33:25.973 nuclear weapons to be deployed on submarines. 33:26.308 --> 33:28.360 And I wanna ask you about that. 33:28.360 --> 33:32.080 The idea would be to use 65 million 33:32.080 --> 33:33.780 to modify the remaining portion 33:33.780 --> 33:37.283 of the W76 warhead life extension program. 33:38.590 --> 33:42.973 My questions are, is this a new nuclear weapon? 33:43.173 --> 33:45.630 Is that consistent with the direction 33:45.630 --> 33:47.530 we've been going over the last several years 33:47.530 --> 33:49.853 of reducing the number of nuclear weapons? 33:50.190 --> 33:52.390 Do you believe Russia's increased the role 33:52.390 --> 33:54.337 of its nuclear weapons over the last decade 33:54.337 --> 33:56.283 in its doctrine and planning? 33:56.404 --> 33:59.630 Do you believe that our investing 33:59.630 --> 34:03.540 in our own low yield nuclear weapons 34:03.540 --> 34:05.800 would help deter Russia from using 34:05.820 --> 34:08.900 nuclear weapons in certain instances? 34:08.900 --> 34:11.241 So basically what's the justification 34:11.241 --> 34:16.241 for developing two new low yield nuclear weapons? 34:17.610 --> 34:20.603 - Senator Alexander thank you for your mention 34:20.603 --> 34:23.120 of the bipartisan nature of the support 34:23.120 --> 34:25.070 we are getting in the Department of Defense. 34:25.070 --> 34:26.933 We recognize it. 34:27.240 --> 34:28.990 And we recognize the responsibility 34:29.090 --> 34:30.780 to maintain open communications 34:30.780 --> 34:32.883 across the House and the Senate. 34:33.470 --> 34:34.530 No reservations whosoever, 34:34.530 --> 34:37.103 and we wouldn't be where we're at without, 34:37.434 --> 34:40.043 I would even call it, political courage, 34:40.270 --> 34:41.953 in order to pass the omnibus. 34:46.260 --> 34:47.883 even their reelection. 34:48.160 --> 34:51.440 In terms of the number of strategic weapons, 34:51.440 --> 34:52.963 there is no increase. 34:53.510 --> 34:55.980 The reason we want to reduce the yield 34:55.980 --> 34:58.355 of several of those weapons on the submarines 34:58.355 --> 35:02.604 is frankly, the bellicose statements 35:02.604 --> 35:06.273 and caviler statements coming out of Moscow 35:06.273 --> 35:08.870 even to the point of talking about 35:08.870 --> 35:11.793 escalation to deescalate, in other words, 35:12.070 --> 35:15.230 a conventional fight that they would initiate, 35:15.230 --> 35:18.350 wouldn't be going well so they would escalate 35:18.350 --> 35:20.165 to a low yield nuclear weapon 35:20.165 --> 35:22.707 knowing that our choice would be 35:22.707 --> 35:25.693 to either respond with a high yield or surrender. 35:25.920 --> 35:29.423 In other words, frankly suicide or surrender. 35:29.470 --> 35:32.310 Because a nuclear exchange between 35:32.630 --> 35:36.510 Russia and the United States would be a disaster 35:36.643 --> 35:39.723 for this planet, and certainly for our countries. 35:40.010 --> 35:41.910 So there's no increase in the numbers. 35:42.070 --> 35:44.321 We need to make certain that we can checkmate 35:44.321 --> 35:48.000 any thought that they could escalate to deescalate 35:48.000 --> 35:50.203 so these weapons are never used. 35:50.434 --> 35:55.434 And I think that we have seen, and heard 35:55.500 --> 35:59.350 Russian talk about offensive actions 36:00.330 --> 36:03.820 to include the video, the pre election video 36:03.820 --> 36:07.870 by Mr. Putin that would show a degree 36:07.870 --> 36:11.970 of cavalier discussion about nuclear weapons 36:11.970 --> 36:14.623 that we would never have seen in his predecessors. 36:14.686 --> 36:17.530 And as such we are responding to make certain 36:17.530 --> 36:20.143 our deterrent is fit for its time. 36:20.149 --> 36:23.900 Not creating a war fighting capability. 36:23.900 --> 36:27.128 To me it's gotta be able to be used 36:27.128 --> 36:29.713 so it's never used is our point. 36:29.890 --> 36:30.723 - Okay. 36:30.940 --> 36:32.870 - And I didn't see anything he said 36:32.870 --> 36:34.463 in that video, by the way, 36:34.540 --> 36:36.663 that changed my strategic calculus, 36:36.663 --> 36:39.210 that would have me coming back a month from now 36:39.480 --> 36:42.713 asking to raise the number of strategic weapons. 36:43.050 --> 36:44.460 - Thank you Mr. Secretary. 36:44.460 --> 36:45.870 Mr. Secretary I'm gonna submit 36:45.870 --> 36:47.210 a question for the record 36:48.120 --> 36:50.880 involving a small defense contractor 36:50.880 --> 36:51.966 in Tennessee that's suddenly found 36:51.966 --> 36:53.921 in violation of the Berry Amendment 36:53.921 --> 36:57.500 because they sourced parts for the zippers 36:57.500 --> 36:59.214 they make in Tennessee from overseas. 36:59.214 --> 37:02.372 We thought it was an incidental matter for 16 years. 37:02.372 --> 37:05.560 It hasn't been a problem, suddenly it's a problem 37:05.560 --> 37:07.580 and threatens to put a bunch of people out of work. 37:07.580 --> 37:09.180 So I'll submit a letter on that. 37:09.710 --> 37:12.171 My last question is this, and goes to something, 37:12.171 --> 37:15.310 we have here the Chairman, 37:15.310 --> 37:18.140 we have the democratic Whip, we have the Vice Chairman 37:18.140 --> 37:20.930 of the committee, I've talked to Senator Schumer, 37:20.930 --> 37:22.598 Senator McConnell, they're all, 37:22.598 --> 37:24.560 everybody says that we're gonna have 37:24.560 --> 37:26.430 an appropriations process this year. 37:26.430 --> 37:27.636 We're pledging to do it. 37:27.636 --> 37:30.352 We may have to train senators as to how to do that 37:30.352 --> 37:33.464 because it requires agreeing to allow 37:33.464 --> 37:35.350 Durbin to bring his amendment up, 37:35.350 --> 37:37.050 and not block the Alexander amendment, 37:37.050 --> 37:38.523 and that sort of thing. 37:38.549 --> 37:43.410 So we've done, we've done one step 37:43.410 --> 37:46.113 which is a two year budget agreement. 37:46.142 --> 37:48.870 But the second, but we still could be faced 37:48.870 --> 37:50.570 with continuing resolutions, 37:50.570 --> 37:53.250 and I wonder if you'd wanna use this occasion 37:53.600 --> 37:56.337 to remind the committee, so we can remind our colleagues 37:56.337 --> 38:00.492 of how damaging a continuing resolution would be 38:00.492 --> 38:04.080 this year if we didn't do the Defense Appropriation Bill 38:04.450 --> 38:06.313 on time for the entire year. 38:06.820 --> 38:10.230 - Senator as you know, we over many years 38:10.230 --> 38:12.610 of combat, and of reduced funding, 38:12.610 --> 38:15.656 and continuing resolutions nine of the last 10 years, 38:15.656 --> 38:18.050 we got ourselves into a position where 38:18.050 --> 38:21.350 we are losing, or eroding our competitive edge. 38:21.350 --> 38:24.050 We still have the edge in land combat, 38:24.050 --> 38:28.709 in maritime combat, in air combat, and elsewhere. 38:28.709 --> 38:32.080 But we are losing that edge. 38:32.080 --> 38:34.650 And it's largely due to the uncertainty 38:34.650 --> 38:36.450 in the budget unpredictability 38:36.850 --> 38:40.418 and the inability to reprogram large amounts of money 38:40.418 --> 38:43.363 to a dynamic security situation. 38:43.650 --> 38:47.400 We are not going to get out of the hole we were in 38:47.400 --> 38:51.070 in a matter of a year, or 18 months, or two years. 38:51.070 --> 38:54.080 So we're going to have to get back to regular order 38:54.080 --> 38:56.510 with predictability so that we're spending 38:56.510 --> 38:58.840 the money wisely, we're not spending it on things 38:58.840 --> 39:01.670 we don't need, but prohibited from new starts 39:01.670 --> 39:03.103 of things that we do need. 39:03.360 --> 39:05.333 The research and engineering is underway. 39:05.333 --> 39:08.352 If we actually produce what looks like 39:08.352 --> 39:10.320 is going to work for us, 39:10.320 --> 39:11.900 the last thing we wanna do is say, 39:11.900 --> 39:13.570 we can't make the change right now 39:13.570 --> 39:16.683 because we're back under a continuing resolution. 39:16.870 --> 39:17.980 So this would be, 39:17.980 --> 39:21.023 this would be financially a disaster. 39:21.120 --> 39:23.770 It would reduce my ability to ensure 39:23.770 --> 39:26.223 that I spend all the money wisely, 39:26.227 --> 39:30.450 which is my obligation to you who fund us. 39:30.450 --> 39:33.580 So to me this would be puttin' us right back 39:33.580 --> 39:35.800 to where we were in the hole before. 39:35.800 --> 39:38.325 And it was exactly what you had to dig us out of 39:38.325 --> 39:40.910 with this bill this time around. 39:40.910 --> 39:43.294 So I think we need to get back to regular order. 39:43.294 --> 39:46.010 And I think that the continuing resolution 39:46.010 --> 39:49.793 also puts the Congress into a spectator seat. 39:50.860 --> 39:52.713 They're watching what's happening. 39:53.380 --> 39:55.577 From our point of view we want Congress 39:55.577 --> 39:57.963 in the driver's seat on the budget. 39:58.050 --> 40:00.270 And if I can't convince you to fund something 40:00.270 --> 40:01.510 then we shouldn't get it. 40:01.510 --> 40:03.243 But our intent is to make certain 40:03.243 --> 40:05.980 that if we satisfy you, you tell us 40:05.980 --> 40:08.371 that you'll give us the money. 40:08.371 --> 40:11.183 Under the CR of course, that doesn't happen. 40:11.720 --> 40:12.840 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 40:12.840 --> 40:13.993 - [Chairman] Senator Leahy. 40:14.969 --> 40:19.140 - Well thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Durbin 40:19.140 --> 40:20.493 for holding this hearing. 40:21.607 --> 40:24.740 I appreciate it when Secretary Mattis 40:24.950 --> 40:29.633 and General Dunford, and those with them are here. 40:31.052 --> 40:33.380 I might just say personally I appreciate 40:33.380 --> 40:36.680 the fact that the Secretary and the General, 40:36.680 --> 40:40.180 every time I've had a question for them, 40:40.180 --> 40:43.615 or reach out for on a response, they've been there. 40:43.615 --> 40:45.163 And they've responded. 40:45.870 --> 40:48.463 And that makes it a lot easier. 40:49.390 --> 40:53.000 Now Senator Durbin had talked about the budget 40:53.000 --> 40:55.392 financial expense account that's more than half 40:55.392 --> 40:59.410 of our nation's discretionary spending. 40:59.410 --> 41:04.397 It's larger than any other country by far. 41:06.570 --> 41:09.420 And I sit with this sub committee and I voted for it. 41:09.420 --> 41:12.340 I said when this sub committee met with you last year, 41:12.340 --> 41:14.507 I'm grateful you understand the importance 41:14.747 --> 41:16.860 of both adequately funding our troops, 41:16.860 --> 41:18.260 our National Defense Program, 41:18.260 --> 41:21.020 and the domestic and foreign assistance 41:21.840 --> 41:23.690 programs that support families 41:23.690 --> 41:26.043 and improve educational opportunities, 41:26.320 --> 41:30.384 promote diplomacy, and democracy abroad, 41:30.384 --> 41:33.383 and fulfill our promise to our veterans. 41:34.720 --> 41:37.373 Now Secretary Mattis a consolidated appropriations 41:37.373 --> 41:40.630 act which we passed by bipartisan majorities 41:40.630 --> 41:42.033 in the Senate and the House, 41:42.249 --> 41:44.180 signed into law by the President 41:45.570 --> 41:48.523 included 654 billion for defense, 41:49.830 --> 41:52.520 plus another 11 billion for military construction, 41:52.520 --> 41:55.170 a massive increase over even what 41:55.170 --> 41:56.803 the President had requested. 41:58.520 --> 42:03.440 You talked about rebuilding and improving readiness, 42:03.440 --> 42:07.113 and I could not agree more about that. 42:07.164 --> 42:11.330 But I think, and again to follow up 42:11.330 --> 42:13.683 on what Senator Durbin has said, 42:14.918 --> 42:17.300 wanna ensure the funding isn't only spent 42:17.300 --> 42:21.357 but spent responsibly in these remaining six years. 42:28.965 --> 42:31.500 You've granted that audit that you've talked about 42:31.500 --> 42:33.373 in November Mr. Secretary, 42:34.738 --> 42:35.890 I think you've answered this, 42:35.890 --> 42:37.833 but I wanna make absolutely sure. 42:40.220 --> 42:42.163 It's easy to tell us the good news. 42:42.322 --> 42:44.740 Will you commit to tell us the bad news, 42:44.740 --> 42:46.563 if there is bad news in that audit? 42:48.010 --> 42:50.603 - Senator Leahy I think we have an obligation 42:50.603 --> 42:54.070 to be even more forthcoming with the bad news 42:54.070 --> 42:55.530 because you expect the good news. 42:55.530 --> 42:57.173 You expect us to do it right. 42:57.410 --> 42:59.560 And we're going to have to bring the bad news 42:59.560 --> 43:01.354 when the audit uncovers things, 43:01.354 --> 43:05.440 when our criminal investigators uncover things, 43:05.440 --> 43:07.462 we're going to have to bring that to you 43:07.462 --> 43:10.180 and not even wait on your questions. 43:10.180 --> 43:13.460 That's been my direction to the department, 43:13.460 --> 43:15.917 to the Service Secretaries, the Comptroller, 43:15.917 --> 43:17.693 the Chief Financial Officer. 43:17.890 --> 43:19.990 But we are going to be forthcoming with it 43:20.150 --> 43:21.353 to the point that you can trust us 43:21.353 --> 43:24.193 that we're not sweeping something under the rug. 43:25.411 --> 43:27.583 We will not enjoy it I'm sure. 43:28.040 --> 43:29.693 But that's our obligation. 43:30.280 --> 43:34.933 - And I think Mr. Norquist is very much in tune with that. 43:35.301 --> 43:36.801 And I know General Dunford is. 43:37.510 --> 43:39.750 The President's ordered additional National Guard 43:39.750 --> 43:42.543 personnel to the southwest border for security. 43:44.420 --> 43:45.960 He's raised the possibility of using 43:45.960 --> 43:48.870 Defense Department funds to pay for his border wall. 43:48.870 --> 43:52.112 Has he instructed you to use Defense Department 43:52.112 --> 43:55.623 funds to construct a wall on the southern border? 43:56.050 --> 43:57.253 - No sir, he has not. 44:00.290 --> 44:02.680 - We didn't provide defense dollars in, 44:02.680 --> 44:05.651 on the omnibus to build this wall. 44:05.651 --> 44:08.663 - Senator Leahy if I could correct myself here. 44:08.750 --> 44:11.810 There is a portion of a bombing range 44:11.810 --> 44:14.563 that is immediately adjacent to the border. 44:14.636 --> 44:17.150 And for years we've tried to maintain 44:17.150 --> 44:19.360 the fencing or wall off of that 44:19.360 --> 44:22.230 so that no migrant, illegal, or whatever 44:22.490 --> 44:24.237 can get into an impact range. 44:24.237 --> 44:29.237 And so for that one area, Barry Goldwater range 44:30.120 --> 44:31.620 and down along the-- 44:31.620 --> 44:32.910 - [Senator Leahy] I know the range. 44:32.910 --> 44:36.230 - We do protect that range so that no one 44:36.230 --> 44:38.325 is inadvertently killed or wounded-- 44:38.325 --> 44:39.488 - That's a different thing. 44:39.488 --> 44:41.943 That's a military instillation. 44:41.943 --> 44:42.843 - [Secretary Mattis] That's the only place. 44:44.676 --> 44:47.834 - You have a cost estimate of 18 to 20 billion dollars 44:47.834 --> 44:50.428 if you were asked to build the wall, 44:50.428 --> 44:52.720 there's a lot of things you'd have to cut out, 44:52.720 --> 44:53.973 is that correct? 44:54.490 --> 44:57.800 - I don't have the authority to provide that money sir. 44:57.800 --> 44:58.633 - Good. 45:00.330 --> 45:03.360 Now General Lengyel last month testified 45:03.410 --> 45:06.180 the National Guard would not have any direct contact 45:07.010 --> 45:10.230 with migrants unless they were explicitly authorized 45:12.470 --> 45:15.963 by the Department of Defense. 45:17.256 --> 45:19.283 I'm reluctant to see the National Guard 45:19.283 --> 45:21.160 in a law enforcement role. 45:21.160 --> 45:22.582 Are you planning to change 45:22.582 --> 45:27.533 the Guard's traditional role of supplanting, 45:28.150 --> 45:29.980 or of supporting civil authorities 45:29.980 --> 45:32.823 into a role, a law enforcement role? 45:33.590 --> 45:37.570 - Sir, right now, we are not having any contact 45:37.570 --> 45:40.610 with migrants, I'm in constant contact 45:40.610 --> 45:43.735 with Secretary Nielsen, and she is not asked 45:43.735 --> 45:46.128 for that support, and I have no plans 45:46.128 --> 45:49.880 to provide that support for any contact 45:49.880 --> 45:53.483 between the National Guard and migrants. 45:54.230 --> 45:57.450 - I watch with pride a lot of our 45:57.450 --> 45:59.300 National Guard units around the country. 45:59.300 --> 46:01.790 But they're not law enforcement units. 46:01.790 --> 46:06.193 And they're not trained for that and should not be. 46:06.660 --> 46:10.830 General Dunford, you've heard me brag 46:10.830 --> 46:13.173 a lot about the Vermont's National Guard, 46:13.434 --> 46:16.413 source of pride for the green mountain state. 46:17.562 --> 46:20.893 It's soon gonna be the base for the Air Force's F35-A. 46:21.978 --> 46:25.933 The Air Force was in charge of the basing selection. 46:25.972 --> 46:29.160 But can you explain the overall strategic value 46:29.160 --> 46:33.200 to national defense of basing this new jet 46:33.260 --> 46:35.350 in the northeast, especially that's an area 46:35.350 --> 46:39.653 seeing a decline in basing in the past two years? 46:41.090 --> 46:43.991 - Senator that platform, one will be useful 46:43.991 --> 46:46.210 both when we make forward deployments 46:46.210 --> 46:48.013 as well as for homeland security. 46:48.630 --> 46:50.420 Incredible fifth generation fighter, 46:50.420 --> 46:54.650 low observable and a very significant improvement 46:54.650 --> 46:56.910 in our ability to share knowledge on the battlefield. 46:56.910 --> 46:58.713 So the F35 is very significant. 46:58.910 --> 47:00.802 With regards to its importance in the northeast, 47:00.802 --> 47:02.240 it'll contribute the F35, 47:02.240 --> 47:04.980 and the Guard will contribute to homeland security 47:05.260 --> 47:07.281 by flying what we call combat air patrols 47:07.281 --> 47:10.258 over the United States to preclude a threat 47:10.258 --> 47:13.470 in any kind of circumstance. 47:13.470 --> 47:15.023 So it is very important. 47:15.180 --> 47:16.013 - Thanks. 47:16.310 --> 47:18.660 And then would you provide us for the record 47:18.660 --> 47:21.375 a summary of the value of the Army and Marine Corp 47:21.375 --> 47:25.960 mountain warfare training that we've been doing 47:25.960 --> 47:29.363 at the Army Mountain Warfare School in Vermont, 47:29.479 --> 47:32.453 the value that has to the joint force? 47:33.543 --> 47:34.850 - Senator I'll do that. 47:34.850 --> 47:36.857 I personally trained there two or three times 47:36.857 --> 47:39.000 and be happy to provide that for the record. 47:39.000 --> 47:41.800 - Obviously it may sound somewhat parochial 47:41.800 --> 47:43.295 but I'm awfully proud of the men 47:43.295 --> 47:45.338 and women who train there. 47:45.338 --> 47:46.443 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 47:46.930 --> 47:47.930 - Senator Murkowski. 47:48.560 --> 47:50.113 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 47:50.170 --> 47:52.160 Gentlemen thank you for your service, 47:52.160 --> 47:55.303 and for appearing before the committee today. 47:55.568 --> 48:00.210 Secretary Mattis, you have appropriately noted 48:00.210 --> 48:02.040 that Russia, as well as China, 48:02.040 --> 48:05.203 but Russia is a strategic competitor, 48:05.380 --> 48:06.843 is the word that you used, 48:06.950 --> 48:09.120 seeking to create a world consistent 48:09.120 --> 48:10.620 with their authoritarian models 48:10.620 --> 48:12.790 and pursue veto power over other nation's 48:12.790 --> 48:15.743 economic, diplomatic, and security decision. 48:15.863 --> 48:20.230 I think, we see that very, very, very clearly 48:20.330 --> 48:24.163 up in the arctic region in the past 10 years. 48:24.300 --> 48:28.113 We have seen the Russians move dramatically, 48:29.000 --> 48:32.773 and actually in the past year even more so. 48:33.210 --> 48:36.925 And yet, our US arctic strategy 48:36.925 --> 48:41.290 has yet to evolve to this changing dynamic. 48:41.290 --> 48:43.870 And the concern that I have is that 48:43.870 --> 48:46.320 rather than the arctic being this place 48:46.320 --> 48:49.880 for commerce, a stable area with freedom of maneuver, 48:49.880 --> 48:52.690 that Russia is positioning themselves 48:52.840 --> 48:54.130 to control the arctic, 48:54.130 --> 48:55.740 control its resources, 48:55.740 --> 48:57.400 control the sea lanes. 48:57.400 --> 49:00.250 And if the Northern Sea route becomes 49:00.250 --> 49:04.060 a major shipping lane, Russia is poised 49:04.060 --> 49:07.250 to be that sole power that could effectively 49:07.250 --> 49:12.250 sanction or threaten to coerce, project power. 49:14.270 --> 49:16.240 We have had many conversations about this. 49:16.240 --> 49:19.110 Last May the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 49:19.110 --> 49:20.838 Bob Works, spoke about the arctic 49:20.838 --> 49:24.030 not being a central concern in the 2014 49:24.100 --> 49:25.693 National Defense Strategy. 49:25.890 --> 49:28.267 Now we've got the newly published 2018 49:28.267 --> 49:32.090 strategy summary and it also does not specifically 49:32.090 --> 49:33.823 highlight the arctic region, 49:33.930 --> 49:37.890 nor address how longstanding gaps in arctic 49:37.890 --> 49:39.840 infrastructure will be addressed. 49:39.840 --> 49:42.400 So I'm getting to this place, 49:42.400 --> 49:44.210 we have discussions about it, 49:44.210 --> 49:46.463 I raise the issue of the arctic, 49:47.141 --> 49:49.010 and what we're seeing up north, 49:49.010 --> 49:52.193 and again, this very dynamic area. 49:52.370 --> 49:55.100 But I am reluctantly coming to the impression 49:55.100 --> 49:56.800 that the Department of Defense 49:56.960 --> 50:00.028 does not have a coherent vision 50:00.028 --> 50:03.680 for addressing America's defense interests 50:03.680 --> 50:06.593 in the changing arctic at this point in time. 50:06.692 --> 50:10.070 And that the view is, is that's it's going 50:10.070 --> 50:11.650 to be a problem someday, 50:11.650 --> 50:13.330 but that right now, it's not a problem 50:13.330 --> 50:15.433 and so we don't need to address it. 50:15.670 --> 50:18.046 So I'd like to know if you think I'm wrong 50:18.046 --> 50:21.460 in that impression, and if you can share with me 50:21.460 --> 50:23.950 what you believe the vision is, 50:23.950 --> 50:26.300 and how we intend to resource it. 50:26.300 --> 50:29.370 Because things are changing quickly 50:30.240 --> 50:31.783 in a dramatic way up there. 50:31.890 --> 50:33.490 - Well I appreciate the strategic 50:33.490 --> 50:35.730 nature of your question Senator. 50:35.730 --> 50:37.200 The first point I would make is yes, 50:37.200 --> 50:39.851 there is a prioritization that goes on 50:39.851 --> 50:41.520 as we look at the strategy. 50:41.520 --> 50:43.420 What are the near and present threats, 50:43.890 --> 50:44.723 this sort of thing. 50:45.020 --> 50:47.350 But I would also point out that the entire 50:47.350 --> 50:52.180 strategy is drawn with a by, with, and through approach. 50:52.180 --> 50:53.250 And why do I bring that up? 50:53.250 --> 50:56.570 The Arctic Council as you no doubt are aware, 50:56.570 --> 51:01.510 Denmark, Norway, Canada, the United States, and Russia, 51:01.510 --> 51:03.970 and there are other observer nations, 51:03.970 --> 51:06.970 China is one by the way, that's helping to fund Russia 51:07.364 --> 51:09.423 in their activities in the north. 51:09.502 --> 51:12.081 But my point is that you can see 51:12.081 --> 51:15.293 that four of those five nations are democracies. 51:15.470 --> 51:18.040 So if we look at our line of effort number two, 51:18.040 --> 51:20.960 about strengthening alliances and partnerships. 51:20.960 --> 51:25.010 And again the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, 51:25.010 --> 51:28.510 all NATO allies, you can see that our approach 51:28.510 --> 51:32.100 is heavily involved with those allies 51:32.100 --> 51:33.993 when you look at the Arctic Council makeup. 51:33.993 --> 51:38.123 So the more that we work by, with, and through allies, 51:38.590 --> 51:41.990 including several, Denmark and Norway, 51:41.990 --> 51:44.693 that keep a very close eye on the north. 51:44.880 --> 51:49.210 We are in effect working in a coalition 51:49.210 --> 51:53.050 of sorts, right now, now it's not a military coalition-- 51:53.050 --> 51:55.442 - And that is what I was going to interject 51:55.442 --> 51:58.460 is that the Arctic Council specifically 51:58.460 --> 52:02.040 says that defense, and defense strategies 52:02.070 --> 52:04.823 are not part of what they deal with. 52:04.823 --> 52:07.830 - That's correct, but at the same time, 52:07.830 --> 52:10.193 Russia has to confront the claims. 52:10.263 --> 52:14.070 For example, Denmark and Norway, 52:14.070 --> 52:16.070 where they contradict Russian claims. 52:16.070 --> 52:17.764 So I think there's still an advantage 52:17.764 --> 52:21.370 in the diplomatic realm of this competition 52:21.370 --> 52:23.063 that Russia's chosen. 52:23.180 --> 52:26.760 But at same time you will see new ice breakers 52:26.760 --> 52:28.461 coming into the Coast Guard inventory. 52:28.461 --> 52:30.767 Those are being funded-- 52:31.078 --> 52:32.440 - We have one funded. 52:32.440 --> 52:35.100 But we need to have a plan for the additional five. 52:35.100 --> 52:36.657 And I would like to work with you 52:36.657 --> 52:37.753 all on that. - I couldn't agree more. 52:38.097 --> 52:39.523 - I agree 100% with you. 52:39.730 --> 52:42.860 Senator, again there's an effort to make certain 52:42.860 --> 52:45.100 that what we're doing is with others 52:45.100 --> 52:47.510 so that we're not carrying the full financial, 52:47.510 --> 52:52.408 or military costs, but it is an area of increased concern 52:52.408 --> 52:56.523 because as the ice sheet melts backward, 52:56.920 --> 52:58.590 we've got waterway open that we 52:58.590 --> 53:01.053 didn't have to confront year around in the past. 53:01.420 --> 53:02.919 So I think right now, 53:02.919 --> 53:05.311 I have your concern loud and clear. 53:05.311 --> 53:07.660 I think we're doing the right thing. 53:07.660 --> 53:09.700 But I cannot articulate either 53:09.960 --> 53:12.260 that full strategy you're lookin' for. 53:12.260 --> 53:13.880 And we are putting it together 53:13.907 --> 53:17.170 with other parts of the government. 53:17.170 --> 53:18.460 Anything else, Chairman? 53:18.460 --> 53:20.463 - Senator, the only thing I'd add 53:20.730 --> 53:22.950 speaking at it from the military perspective. 53:22.950 --> 53:25.466 You know in the 1990's we actually developed 53:25.466 --> 53:27.840 regional strategy so they'd be focused 53:27.840 --> 53:29.933 on the arctic, the pacific, the atlantic. 53:30.250 --> 53:32.360 The global campaign plans that we've developed 53:32.360 --> 53:34.343 right now, which are classified, 53:34.790 --> 53:36.310 take a problem set approach. 53:36.310 --> 53:38.755 So we have a global campaign plan for Russia 53:38.755 --> 53:41.180 which accounts for the military capabilities 53:41.180 --> 53:42.770 that they have postured in the arctic. 53:42.770 --> 53:46.750 So our plans not longer focus specifically geographically. 53:46.750 --> 53:49.450 For example in the 1990s we might have had a plan 53:49.450 --> 53:51.883 specifically focused on defending the Baltics. 53:52.120 --> 53:53.840 We now take a much broader approach 53:53.840 --> 53:56.230 to the full range of challenges that Russia provides. 53:56.230 --> 53:59.183 And I would argue at least at the military level, 53:59.320 --> 54:01.070 the arctic is fully included in our 54:01.070 --> 54:02.833 global campaign plan for Russia. 54:03.523 --> 54:04.800 Specifically the military capabilities 54:04.800 --> 54:05.913 that they have postured in the arctic, 54:05.913 --> 54:07.733 and the threat that they pose. 54:08.400 --> 54:10.450 - Well know that you will find me 54:10.450 --> 54:13.120 aggressively pushing on this to make sure 54:13.120 --> 54:15.123 that we do have that broader view. 54:15.270 --> 54:18.856 Let me ask one additional short question, 54:18.856 --> 54:21.180 and I'll submit the rest for the record. 54:21.180 --> 54:23.370 This will be to you General Dunford. 54:23.370 --> 54:25.930 And this is regarding how we have 54:25.930 --> 54:28.420 integrated women in combat. 54:28.420 --> 54:31.573 That formal process began in January of 13. 54:31.710 --> 54:35.283 We've seen the integration of women into the front lines. 54:36.254 --> 54:40.193 Equipment requirements for women are lagging. 54:40.300 --> 54:44.380 Currently only the Army has women specific body armor, 54:44.380 --> 54:47.060 but quantities are so low that I understand 54:47.060 --> 54:49.480 its only issued to women who are deploying 54:49.630 --> 54:52.647 and not during any initial entry or unit training. 54:52.647 --> 54:55.451 We had a conversation just yesterday 54:55.451 --> 54:59.730 with some of our women veterans, 54:59.730 --> 55:02.930 and this was an issue that they had raised to my attention. 55:02.930 --> 55:06.530 Can you tell me what actions are being taken 55:06.530 --> 55:08.510 to ensure that women are properly 55:08.510 --> 55:10.233 equipped for the combat roles? 55:10.300 --> 55:11.970 - I can Senator, and to be honest, 55:11.970 --> 55:16.970 in 2016 when I submitted my recommendation for integration 55:17.436 --> 55:20.200 one of the areas that I identified 55:20.200 --> 55:21.680 was what we call tariff sizes. 55:21.680 --> 55:25.620 So we knew in 2016 that the standard equipment, 55:25.620 --> 55:27.816 particularly as women began to occupy 55:27.816 --> 55:30.073 fields where they hadn't historically been, 55:30.190 --> 55:32.520 and they were wearing combat armor, packs, 55:32.520 --> 55:33.525 those kinds of things-- 55:33.525 --> 55:34.358 - [Senator Murkowski] Rucksacks, yeah. 55:34.358 --> 55:36.170 - Had been built for the average male 55:37.121 --> 55:37.954 and not the average female, 55:37.954 --> 55:39.527 and we would have to adjust that. 55:39.527 --> 55:41.220 And we knew it would take some time. 55:41.220 --> 55:43.547 And so I know that each of the services now 55:43.547 --> 55:46.880 has an initiative to change the tariff sizes 55:46.880 --> 55:49.720 to accommodate the different body types of women. 55:49.720 --> 55:51.050 But it taking some time. 55:51.050 --> 55:53.650 But I can assure you they are all attentive to it, 55:53.650 --> 55:55.150 and in fielding equipment. 55:55.150 --> 55:58.363 And I know you said only the Army has done it. 55:58.499 --> 56:01.360 I'm fairly certain, and I'll get back to you personally. 56:01.360 --> 56:03.100 I'm fairly certain that the other services 56:03.100 --> 56:05.320 have also been informed by integration 56:05.320 --> 56:07.070 of women into occupational fields, 56:07.070 --> 56:08.473 where they hadn't historically served, 56:08.473 --> 56:10.957 in the needs to adjust equipment accordingly. 56:10.957 --> 56:12.990 - Well certainly would hope that we would 56:12.990 --> 56:15.260 have it during training as well as deployment. 56:15.260 --> 56:16.093 So thank you for that. 56:16.093 --> 56:16.940 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 56:16.940 --> 56:18.073 - Senator Schatz. 56:18.330 --> 56:19.163 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 56:19.163 --> 56:20.290 Thank you all for being here. 56:20.290 --> 56:22.980 Secretary Mattis, the unclassified summary 56:22.980 --> 56:25.300 of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 56:25.300 --> 56:28.130 noted that the department's principle priorities 56:28.130 --> 56:30.160 over the long term are managing strategic 56:30.160 --> 56:31.982 competition with China and Russia. 56:31.982 --> 56:34.629 Can you walk us through how vital Hawaii 56:34.629 --> 56:37.430 and the forces in the state are to DOD's 56:37.430 --> 56:40.341 long term efforts to countering China and Russia, 56:40.341 --> 56:43.091 and to our defense posture in the pacific specifically? 56:47.520 --> 56:50.690 - You know, Senator, it's probably the key 56:50.690 --> 56:53.905 outpost anywhere west of the west coast. 56:53.905 --> 56:58.905 It is the fundamental anchor point for the fleet. 57:00.060 --> 57:03.560 It is the significant command and control effort. 57:03.560 --> 57:06.626 I mean we obviously have redundancies built in elsewhere. 57:06.626 --> 57:09.720 But this is our, I would just call it 57:09.720 --> 57:12.159 the home port for all things in the pacific. 57:12.159 --> 57:15.670 And augmented of course by the other 57:15.670 --> 57:18.763 location from the west coast to Alaska, Guam. 57:19.095 --> 57:21.710 - Thank you, and I'd like you to take us on 57:21.710 --> 57:25.140 a tour of the Pacific AOR excluding 57:25.140 --> 57:27.520 the countries and the alliances, 57:27.520 --> 57:29.250 and the adversaries that we normally have. 57:29.250 --> 57:31.030 I'm particularly interested in our emerging 57:31.030 --> 57:34.460 relationship with India, and the status 57:34.460 --> 57:36.880 of the enhanced defense cooperation 57:36.880 --> 57:38.723 agreement with the Philippines. 57:40.390 --> 57:41.223 - Right. 57:41.353 --> 57:45.783 If we start, let's start as far west with India. 57:46.060 --> 57:49.133 India, the world's most populous democracy. 57:49.330 --> 57:54.330 They've been very open, inviting for a stronger 57:54.485 --> 57:56.350 mil to mil relationship. 57:56.350 --> 57:58.154 They see it in their best interest. 57:58.154 --> 58:02.963 These two democracies have every reason to work together, 58:03.110 --> 58:05.593 because we want the same thing. 58:05.870 --> 58:07.627 We don't have to search for common ground. 58:07.627 --> 58:10.710 We have common ground on respect 58:10.710 --> 58:13.543 for international law, territorial integrity, 58:13.670 --> 58:15.638 sovereignty, freedom of navigation. 58:15.638 --> 58:18.663 All these efforts are aligned. 58:18.800 --> 58:20.810 When we walk in we can just go through 58:20.810 --> 58:22.280 our talking points and check 'em off. 58:22.280 --> 58:23.810 Okay we all agree, now let's work 58:23.810 --> 58:25.560 about what we're gonna do about it. 58:25.730 --> 58:29.463 As you work further to the east, 58:29.640 --> 58:32.813 what you have is Australia, 58:33.430 --> 58:35.693 anchor point in the south pacific. 58:36.023 --> 58:40.480 A steadfast ally through good times and bad. 58:40.480 --> 58:41.879 Goes back 100 years. 58:41.879 --> 58:45.170 100 years of mate ship is what they call it. 58:45.170 --> 58:46.820 We're celebrating that this year. 58:46.882 --> 58:49.715 And further they have been, 58:49.715 --> 58:52.990 I would just say they have launched 58:52.990 --> 58:55.270 many initiatives to maintain stability 58:55.270 --> 58:57.530 in the southern pacific with the island 58:57.530 --> 58:59.699 nations there that need a hand. 58:59.699 --> 59:02.760 New Zealand as you know, one of the five I's. 59:02.760 --> 59:06.380 Moving further up we have got with Indonesia 59:06.380 --> 59:09.495 which is a fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific ocean. 59:09.495 --> 59:12.235 Fulcrum in the IndoPac area. 59:12.235 --> 59:14.340 We see a country that is trying 59:14.340 --> 59:16.060 to carve its own way forward. 59:16.060 --> 59:18.299 And that means to break out of its reliance 59:18.299 --> 59:21.364 on past purchases for example, 59:21.364 --> 59:24.173 of Russian weapons, that sort of thing. 59:24.173 --> 59:26.720 Clearly when you go over to Singapore, 59:26.720 --> 59:28.370 which has gone out of its way to help us, 59:28.370 --> 59:32.132 in terms of home porting US Navy units, 59:32.132 --> 59:34.848 support to our folks out there. 59:34.848 --> 59:37.588 And they also as you know, train in Idaho. 59:37.588 --> 59:39.353 And I can keep going like this. 59:39.353 --> 59:41.640 From the Philippines, we're maintaining 59:41.640 --> 59:44.527 a long term view to maintain that relationship. 59:44.527 --> 59:47.170 And it goes right up to Japan, 59:47.170 --> 59:50.717 and the strength they provide in the northern pacific-- 59:50.900 --> 59:52.301 - And I'll ask one question for the record 59:52.301 --> 59:54.580 about the compact of free association, 59:54.580 --> 59:57.170 the Palau compact of free association 59:57.170 --> 59:59.370 kind of languishing, and the one for the marshals 59:59.370 --> 01:00:03.145 in FSM expiring in 2023, and I'd like for the committee's 01:00:03.145 --> 01:00:06.370 understanding, and for the whole Senate's understanding 01:00:06.370 --> 01:00:11.370 to reinforce how essential that is for our defense strategy. 01:00:11.909 --> 01:00:14.620 I'd like to change topics to the DOD's 01:00:14.620 --> 01:00:17.727 post don't ask don't tell discharge review policy. 01:00:17.727 --> 01:00:20.110 I just wanna confirm that the DOD policy 01:00:20.110 --> 01:00:23.240 established in 2011 to review discharges 01:00:23.240 --> 01:00:25.923 due to sexual orientation is the same. 01:00:27.550 --> 01:00:29.280 - I'm not aware of any change. 01:00:29.280 --> 01:00:30.113 I've-- 01:00:31.743 --> 01:00:33.143 - It's not a trick question. 01:00:34.870 --> 01:00:39.210 So since 1970 roughly 43,000 service members 01:00:39.210 --> 01:00:41.204 were discharged due to sexual orientation. 01:00:41.204 --> 01:00:43.210 These are those who were discharged 01:00:43.210 --> 01:00:46.340 solely for what they call homosexual behavior, 01:00:46.340 --> 01:00:49.302 not any combination of so-called offenses. 01:00:49.302 --> 01:00:52.736 But so far only around 1,000 01:00:52.736 --> 01:00:54.671 applications have been reviewed. 01:00:54.671 --> 01:00:57.078 I get that this may be a resource question, 01:00:57.078 --> 01:00:59.340 but more people need to know that this review 01:00:59.340 --> 01:01:01.955 is available to them, and it's highly technical, 01:01:01.955 --> 01:01:04.660 so it's not good enough to have good policy. 01:01:04.660 --> 01:01:06.840 You have to allow people to seek 01:01:06.840 --> 01:01:08.620 the kind of justice that they deserve. 01:01:08.620 --> 01:01:10.913 And not everybody knows how to do it. 01:01:10.920 --> 01:01:13.523 So will you work with me, and others 01:01:13.523 --> 01:01:16.280 interested in the Senate to make sure 01:01:16.280 --> 01:01:19.140 that individuals separated under don't ask don't tell, 01:01:19.140 --> 01:01:21.720 or similar policy know that they have 01:01:21.720 --> 01:01:23.967 a way for their records to be reviewed, 01:01:23.967 --> 01:01:26.170 potentially upgraded and removed 01:01:26.170 --> 01:01:27.873 of any derogatory comments? 01:01:28.880 --> 01:01:29.713 - I will Senator. 01:01:29.713 --> 01:01:31.270 First I need to determine the problem. 01:01:31.270 --> 01:01:35.290 You know, what is the hold up here 01:01:35.391 --> 01:01:38.887 before I tell you exactly what I'm gonna do. 01:01:38.887 --> 01:01:41.080 But I have no problem workin' with you at all Senator. 01:01:41.080 --> 01:01:41.913 Absolutely. 01:01:41.913 --> 01:01:43.007 - Sure and one of the problems is, 01:01:43.007 --> 01:01:46.746 before 1970 individuals separated sometimes, 01:01:46.746 --> 01:01:50.410 under ambiguous codes, they were euphemisms 01:01:50.410 --> 01:01:52.840 to sort of allow the service member to save face 01:01:52.840 --> 01:01:55.140 so they were discharged for what would have otherwise, 01:01:55.140 --> 01:01:58.240 post 1970 be considered homosexual behavior, 01:01:58.240 --> 01:02:01.553 but they for instance, convenience to the government, 01:02:01.680 --> 01:02:05.280 unsuitability, these are really tough ones to get 01:02:05.280 --> 01:02:07.644 to because you don't necessarily know 01:02:07.644 --> 01:02:12.644 what unsuitability means or, convenience to the government. 01:02:12.938 --> 01:02:16.423 But this conceals the real reason for discharge 01:02:16.423 --> 01:02:18.998 in some instance, and it's extremely difficult 01:02:18.998 --> 01:02:21.200 for these individuals who have no other 01:02:21.200 --> 01:02:23.740 aggravating circumstances to have their records reviewed. 01:02:23.740 --> 01:02:25.825 So can we work together on, 01:02:25.825 --> 01:02:28.833 especially the pre 1970 issue, 01:02:28.890 --> 01:02:31.467 but more generally making sure that the mechanics 01:02:31.467 --> 01:02:35.717 of this review process are clear and robust. 01:02:35.717 --> 01:02:38.108 And that former service members 01:02:38.108 --> 01:02:43.090 who were discharged under either don't ask don't tell, 01:02:43.090 --> 01:02:46.560 or it's, or what came before it, 01:02:46.560 --> 01:02:49.390 know that this is available to them. 01:02:49.390 --> 01:02:50.943 This is not an easy one. 01:02:50.995 --> 01:02:54.090 But this is a commitment that we've all made 01:02:54.090 --> 01:02:56.593 in the Congress, and the department has made it, 01:02:56.720 --> 01:02:58.120 and now we've gotta execute. 01:02:58.970 --> 01:03:00.930 - No reservations on it sir. 01:03:00.930 --> 01:03:03.520 I need to just make sure I don't run afoul 01:03:03.520 --> 01:03:05.601 of privacy concerns frankly, 01:03:05.601 --> 01:03:10.454 by people who may not want to make that appeal. 01:03:10.454 --> 01:03:14.300 That we're certainly willing to look at it. 01:03:14.300 --> 01:03:16.350 I mean the law is the law, 01:03:16.350 --> 01:03:18.140 and no reservations on that. 01:03:18.140 --> 01:03:21.350 But we have to find our way through that. 01:03:21.350 --> 01:03:23.180 That's why I mean, need to look at what 01:03:23.180 --> 01:03:25.628 the real problem is, and if they're shy 01:03:25.628 --> 01:03:27.428 about bringing it forward, 01:03:27.428 --> 01:03:30.929 I'm not sure how we would legally do it. 01:03:30.929 --> 01:03:33.080 And I'm not even real sure how we would do 01:03:33.080 --> 01:03:34.880 the review ourselves internally 01:03:34.880 --> 01:03:39.120 if it was done in a way to look out for, at that time, 01:03:39.120 --> 01:03:41.680 the dignity that the person requested. 01:03:41.680 --> 01:03:44.280 So let me look at it, and we'll work with you on it. 01:03:44.320 --> 01:03:45.153 - [Senator Schatz] Thank you. 01:03:45.153 --> 01:03:45.986 - Yes sir. 01:03:46.010 --> 01:03:47.310 - [Chairman] Senator Hoeven. 01:03:47.310 --> 01:03:48.143 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:03:48.143 --> 01:03:49.640 Gentlemen thank you for being here, 01:03:49.640 --> 01:03:51.940 and thank you for your service to our country. 01:03:52.480 --> 01:03:54.610 Secretary Mattis, in your prepared remarks 01:03:54.610 --> 01:03:56.980 you said the modernization of our nuclear triad 01:03:56.980 --> 01:03:59.763 is the department "the department's top priority" 01:04:00.970 --> 01:04:02.538 which I completely agree with, 01:04:02.538 --> 01:04:04.840 and would note you're able to fund 01:04:04.840 --> 01:04:07.110 this top priority for about four percent 01:04:07.110 --> 01:04:11.290 of your total request in FY19. 01:04:11.290 --> 01:04:14.830 Yet there's still critics that complain about the cost. 01:04:14.830 --> 01:04:17.095 So would you agree that spending four percent 01:04:17.095 --> 01:04:19.730 of the defense budget for nuclear modernization 01:04:19.730 --> 01:04:21.701 is both cost effective and affordable. 01:04:21.701 --> 01:04:24.874 Can you also address how our nuclear deterrent 01:04:24.874 --> 01:04:29.050 helps form the foundation for the rest of our defense, 01:04:29.050 --> 01:04:30.493 and then one more piece. 01:04:30.493 --> 01:04:33.303 Also how is it important for our allies 01:04:33.303 --> 01:04:37.690 in Europe, and east Asia particularly 01:04:37.690 --> 01:04:40.050 in terms of them being confident 01:04:40.650 --> 01:04:44.453 that our nuclear forces are credible and effective? 01:04:45.260 --> 01:04:46.093 - Right. 01:04:46.093 --> 01:04:50.111 Senator first, the nuclear deterrent is the basis. 01:04:50.111 --> 01:04:53.010 They have, must deter the use of those weapons. 01:04:53.010 --> 01:04:54.473 We don't ever wanna see them used. 01:04:54.473 --> 01:04:57.800 I believe that the cost of four percent 01:04:57.800 --> 01:05:00.210 is absolutely affordable. 01:05:00.210 --> 01:05:03.323 Secondly, even though it grows in the out years, 01:05:03.450 --> 01:05:07.366 there is a rise, just to be fully candid here. 01:05:07.366 --> 01:05:11.460 Because we've delayed this over some time. 01:05:11.460 --> 01:05:13.680 It was started by the last administration, 01:05:13.680 --> 01:05:15.133 the modernization program. 01:05:15.180 --> 01:05:16.933 It will rise up into the six, 01:05:17.030 --> 01:05:19.513 I think 6.3% at its height. 01:05:19.798 --> 01:05:22.310 But I believe it is absolutely affordable 01:05:22.510 --> 01:05:24.720 as the basis for the defense of the country. 01:05:24.720 --> 01:05:28.787 Our allies sir, I took the nuclear posture 01:05:28.787 --> 01:05:32.790 of you in its draft form, early forms to Brussels. 01:05:32.790 --> 01:05:36.363 I briefed our allies, our NATO allies who were critical. 01:05:36.850 --> 01:05:40.060 I've discussed this issue with the Republic of Korea, 01:05:40.060 --> 01:05:44.720 and Japan for example, and it has been welcomed by them. 01:05:44.720 --> 01:05:46.850 I was surprised when I actually rolled it out 01:05:46.850 --> 01:05:49.083 and went to Brussels in its final form. 01:05:49.340 --> 01:05:51.493 But I think because we had included them, 01:05:51.690 --> 01:05:54.642 they were 100% aligned with us. 01:05:54.642 --> 01:05:56.941 That this was the deterrent that was necessary. 01:05:56.941 --> 01:06:00.254 I've been asked both in Seoul and Tokyo, 01:06:00.254 --> 01:06:04.300 doesn't that nuclear umbrella protect them. 01:06:04.300 --> 01:06:05.850 And we've assured them it does. 01:06:05.910 --> 01:06:09.253 What we're doin' in effect is a non proliferation effort. 01:06:09.420 --> 01:06:12.060 Because they trust us that we don't see 01:06:12.060 --> 01:06:14.310 more nuclear armed countries in the world. 01:06:14.310 --> 01:06:16.144 And that is critical if we're to try to keep 01:06:16.144 --> 01:06:20.483 on a track towards reducing these weapons overall. 01:06:20.672 --> 01:06:23.150 - I think that's an incredibly important point, 01:06:23.150 --> 01:06:24.263 that last point. 01:06:25.510 --> 01:06:27.800 Senator Murkowski brought up the arctic region. 01:06:27.800 --> 01:06:29.610 My question in regard to the arctic region, 01:06:29.610 --> 01:06:31.678 do we have sufficient intelligence, 01:06:31.678 --> 01:06:34.325 surveillance, and reconsecrate capabilities 01:06:34.325 --> 01:06:36.600 in the arctic to ensure that we know 01:06:36.600 --> 01:06:37.750 what's going on in the arctic. 01:06:37.750 --> 01:06:41.571 And I would ask for General Dunford to follow up as well. 01:06:41.571 --> 01:06:45.330 Are we making adequate use of unmanned assets 01:06:45.330 --> 01:06:47.523 like Global Hawk to do that? 01:06:49.188 --> 01:06:51.703 - Well Senator let me let General Dunford 01:06:51.703 --> 01:06:53.440 get in some of the military aspects. 01:06:53.440 --> 01:06:55.017 I would just tell you sir, 01:06:55.295 --> 01:06:59.280 we've had to make priorities on these scarce assets, 01:06:59.280 --> 01:07:01.703 what we call high demand assets, 01:07:01.703 --> 01:07:05.973 and we engaged in the active operations we have going on. 01:07:06.067 --> 01:07:08.500 In certain areas we have prioritized that 01:07:08.500 --> 01:07:10.323 where we have troops in harms way. 01:07:10.430 --> 01:07:12.860 So I don't believe we're doing everything 01:07:12.860 --> 01:07:15.470 we could be doing, or even should be 01:07:15.470 --> 01:07:17.823 if we had unlimited assets in the arctic. 01:07:18.090 --> 01:07:21.300 But right now I think we're making the prudent steps 01:07:21.300 --> 01:07:24.141 to grow our ISR forces that will allow us 01:07:24.141 --> 01:07:26.283 in the future to a better job. 01:07:26.630 --> 01:07:27.463 General. 01:07:27.463 --> 01:07:29.612 - Senator I know that you're aware 01:07:29.612 --> 01:07:30.980 that for many years we took eye off the ball 01:07:30.980 --> 01:07:32.280 with regard to Russia. 01:07:32.280 --> 01:07:33.713 And about two years ago, 01:07:33.930 --> 01:07:36.200 it isn't just the intelligence, surveillance, 01:07:36.200 --> 01:07:38.412 reconnaissance platforms we have fielded every day. 01:07:38.412 --> 01:07:41.895 But it's the analytic effort as well to look at Russia. 01:07:41.895 --> 01:07:43.915 And two years ago we significantly 01:07:43.915 --> 01:07:45.910 increased our analytic effort toward Russia. 01:07:45.910 --> 01:07:48.710 And really dedicated a large portion 01:07:48.710 --> 01:07:50.240 of our Defense Intelligence Agency 01:07:50.240 --> 01:07:52.390 now to look specifically at Russia. 01:07:52.390 --> 01:07:54.913 Just to put it in perspective, 01:07:55.690 --> 01:07:58.799 we're meeting overall somewhere between 30 and 40% 01:07:58.799 --> 01:08:01.390 of each of the Combatant Commanders demands. 01:08:01.390 --> 01:08:02.937 So if you would talk to General Scaparrotti 01:08:02.937 --> 01:08:05.210 and you would ask the question you just asked. 01:08:05.210 --> 01:08:07.158 He would say no, I don't have adequate resources 01:08:07.158 --> 01:08:09.483 to keep an eye on Russia. 01:08:09.640 --> 01:08:10.720 And as the Secretary said, 01:08:10.720 --> 01:08:13.860 that's a result of us balancing the global demand 01:08:14.050 --> 01:08:15.530 which we have significantly shifted 01:08:15.530 --> 01:08:17.193 toward North Korea of late. 01:08:17.350 --> 01:08:19.570 And then with regard to unmanned resources, 01:08:19.570 --> 01:08:21.940 we are absolutely leveraging unmanned resources, 01:08:21.940 --> 01:08:24.760 and keepin' our eye on Russia, and specifically the arctic. 01:08:24.760 --> 01:08:26.780 - Well in a broader context that relates, 01:08:26.780 --> 01:08:28.660 again both to the pilot shortage, 01:08:28.660 --> 01:08:31.193 and I would ask again, starting with Secretary, 01:08:31.320 --> 01:08:34.763 do you see the pilot shortage as a critical issue? 01:08:34.792 --> 01:08:36.793 How are we addressing that? 01:08:36.840 --> 01:08:40.853 And then the other aspect is counter UAS, counter drone. 01:08:40.943 --> 01:08:43.410 For example in my statement in Grand Forks, 01:08:43.410 --> 01:08:46.492 North Dakota we have 900 miles of border responsibility. 01:08:46.492 --> 01:08:49.103 We have military instillation in Grand Forks, 01:08:49.230 --> 01:08:50.700 combined with the technology part, 01:08:50.700 --> 01:08:52.330 combined with customs and border protection, 01:08:52.330 --> 01:08:54.980 combined with our Guard that's all working 01:08:54.980 --> 01:08:59.450 with aviation assets like UAS to try to cover this border. 01:08:59.450 --> 01:09:01.170 So both again, pilot shortage, 01:09:01.170 --> 01:09:02.480 which is getting more acute, 01:09:02.480 --> 01:09:04.178 and then this counter drone impact. 01:09:04.178 --> 01:09:06.440 What are you doing there and how 01:09:06.440 --> 01:09:08.340 are we getting on top of those issues? 01:09:10.072 --> 01:09:12.250 - Senator, I'll touch the pilot shortage. 01:09:12.250 --> 01:09:13.777 And I know the Secretary's given us all 01:09:13.777 --> 01:09:16.670 some very specific counter UAS direction, 01:09:16.670 --> 01:09:18.223 so I'll let him speak to that. 01:09:18.810 --> 01:09:20.880 I think you know, we do have a significant pilot 01:09:20.880 --> 01:09:22.410 shortage across all the services. 01:09:22.410 --> 01:09:25.403 2,000 short in the Air Force alone. 01:09:26.040 --> 01:09:29.003 This obviously has the attention of all the service chiefs. 01:09:29.090 --> 01:09:33.095 General Goldfein, Admiral Richardson, 01:09:33.095 --> 01:09:34.976 General Neller in particular have all 01:09:34.976 --> 01:09:38.100 done some detail research to try to figure out 01:09:38.100 --> 01:09:41.230 what will it take to incentivize people to stay, 01:09:41.230 --> 01:09:42.783 and to recruit more pilots. 01:09:43.110 --> 01:09:44.660 This budget does address in part 01:09:44.660 --> 01:09:46.170 the shortage of pilots, to increase 01:09:46.170 --> 01:09:48.170 the numbers of pilots in Thruput, 01:09:48.300 --> 01:09:49.955 and part of it has been Thruput, 01:09:49.955 --> 01:09:52.930 numbers of people we can train at a single time. 01:09:52.930 --> 01:09:54.343 So we're increasing that. 01:09:54.610 --> 01:09:57.569 And General Goldfein's also met with industry 01:09:57.569 --> 01:09:59.100 to include commercial pilots, 01:09:59.100 --> 01:10:01.040 'cause as you know the shortfall is not 01:10:01.040 --> 01:10:03.010 just in the US military, it's in 01:10:03.010 --> 01:10:04.396 commercial aviation as well. 01:10:04.396 --> 01:10:06.140 - [Senator Hoeven] Manned and unmanned. 01:10:06.140 --> 01:10:07.370 - Manned and unmanned. 01:10:07.370 --> 01:10:09.682 In almost every aspect of what we fly. 01:10:09.682 --> 01:10:11.856 - [Secretary Mattis] And maintenance as well Senator. 01:10:11.856 --> 01:10:12.689 - Right. 01:10:12.880 --> 01:10:14.700 - We're workin' the issue hard sir. 01:10:14.700 --> 01:10:16.290 We're workin' in each of the services 01:10:16.290 --> 01:10:18.960 but we also have a departmental overview 01:10:18.960 --> 01:10:20.820 of this to make certain that we're not 01:10:20.820 --> 01:10:23.480 solving one problem and creating another. 01:10:23.480 --> 01:10:25.080 On the counter UAS, 01:10:25.080 --> 01:10:27.700 this is becoming an increasing problem. 01:10:27.700 --> 01:10:31.173 We now track every overflight of our bases, 01:10:31.400 --> 01:10:35.907 ships, air fields, and I was surprised to see 01:10:37.050 --> 01:10:38.878 just how much of this is being dealt with. 01:10:38.878 --> 01:10:42.750 We are probably going to have to come in to the FAA 01:10:42.750 --> 01:10:44.590 and perhaps even to Congress and ask 01:10:44.590 --> 01:10:45.963 for additional authorities. 01:10:46.230 --> 01:10:47.740 We have the authority as you know, 01:10:47.740 --> 01:10:49.633 over certain sensitive sites. 01:10:50.050 --> 01:10:52.063 You know of some of them well. 01:10:52.700 --> 01:10:55.310 But we do not have the authority to take these down 01:10:55.310 --> 01:10:59.303 over many other sites, the normal military base. 01:10:59.358 --> 01:11:01.670 The problem is, it's only a matter of time 01:11:01.670 --> 01:11:05.203 before the threat manifests in a violent way. 01:11:05.430 --> 01:11:07.060 So we're going to have to come in 01:11:07.060 --> 01:11:09.410 with a very clear statement, what we need 01:11:09.410 --> 01:11:11.283 from the Congress or the FAA. 01:11:11.630 --> 01:11:13.010 And then get that authority out. 01:11:13.010 --> 01:11:15.113 Get the systems out to take 'em down. 01:11:16.169 --> 01:11:17.920 And make sure we're not running afoul of any, 01:11:17.920 --> 01:11:19.312 and we gotta be careful again, 01:11:19.312 --> 01:11:23.600 that some of the things we would take a UAV down with, 01:11:23.600 --> 01:11:26.413 we don't wanna take down a passenger jet for example. 01:11:26.780 --> 01:11:28.920 There's a reason it's gotta be integrated. 01:11:28.920 --> 01:11:30.950 We're working this, and we're tracking 01:11:30.950 --> 01:11:33.853 every incursion now, every single one sir. 01:11:34.320 --> 01:11:35.620 - Thank you appreciate it. 01:11:36.560 --> 01:11:37.960 - [Chairman] Senator Murray. 01:11:39.310 --> 01:11:40.440 - Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. 01:11:40.440 --> 01:11:42.700 Thank you all for your service. 01:11:42.700 --> 01:11:45.283 Secretary Mattis I want to ask you, 01:11:45.520 --> 01:11:49.050 because I was deeply disturbed by a March 2018 01:11:49.050 --> 01:11:50.900 Associated Press investigation 01:11:51.210 --> 01:11:53.237 that revealed a massive failure 01:11:53.237 --> 01:11:56.310 of DOD officials to protect children 01:11:56.362 --> 01:11:59.863 who are sexually assaulted on our military bases. 01:12:00.000 --> 01:12:03.920 The AP documented nearly 600 sexual assault cases 01:12:03.920 --> 01:12:06.953 that have occurred on bases since 2007, 01:12:07.080 --> 01:12:08.782 including actually more than 30 reports 01:12:08.782 --> 01:12:10.918 in my own state of Washington. 01:12:10.918 --> 01:12:13.055 And just recently the Army released 01:12:13.055 --> 01:12:16.630 information on 86 additional cases, 01:12:16.630 --> 01:12:19.370 even more shocking, it appears that 01:12:19.370 --> 01:12:21.576 these children and their families have no recourse. 01:12:21.576 --> 01:12:24.460 So almost two months ago I wrote to you 01:12:24.460 --> 01:12:27.977 about this issue asking for some straightforward questions 01:12:27.977 --> 01:12:30.207 about the scope of the problem 01:12:30.207 --> 01:12:31.747 and the department's response. 01:12:31.747 --> 01:12:35.500 The DOD Education Activity had an initial 01:12:35.500 --> 01:12:37.313 conversation with my staff, 01:12:37.390 --> 01:12:40.005 but I am still waiting for answers to those questions, 01:12:40.005 --> 01:12:42.193 and many that I have. 01:12:42.350 --> 01:12:44.010 So I am concerned that the department 01:12:44.010 --> 01:12:46.069 is not taking this seriously. 01:12:46.069 --> 01:12:49.780 And wanted to as you if you can tell me today 01:12:49.780 --> 01:12:52.360 with certainty how many juveniles 01:12:52.360 --> 01:12:54.297 have experienced sexual violence or harassment 01:12:54.297 --> 01:12:57.173 on a military base in the last 10 years? 01:12:59.150 --> 01:13:02.217 - Senator first of all you'll have an answer within a week. 01:13:02.217 --> 01:13:06.913 I was unaware of that, but thank you for bringin' it up. 01:13:06.913 --> 01:13:09.510 You know Senator, I accept that we're gonna 01:13:09.650 --> 01:13:11.560 have casualties on battlefields. 01:13:11.560 --> 01:13:13.301 It's part of the military's role. 01:13:13.301 --> 01:13:16.159 We're not a life insurance corporation. 01:13:16.159 --> 01:13:18.094 Our young troops sign up, 01:13:18.094 --> 01:13:22.280 and they sign a blank check to carry out 01:13:22.280 --> 01:13:23.830 their mission on a battlefield. 01:13:24.290 --> 01:13:26.500 I do not accept a single casualty 01:13:26.500 --> 01:13:29.193 in the Department of Defense out of sexual assault. 01:13:29.500 --> 01:13:30.818 That is intolerable. 01:13:30.818 --> 01:13:34.700 That to me is something that must be rooted out. 01:13:34.700 --> 01:13:37.350 It's important to stand up and say what we stand for. 01:13:37.530 --> 01:13:38.953 On this one it's even more important 01:13:38.953 --> 01:13:41.303 that we say what we will not tolerate. 01:13:41.760 --> 01:13:45.842 So I don't know how different this is 01:13:45.842 --> 01:13:48.350 from the civilian society. 01:13:48.350 --> 01:13:51.103 So I don't know if it's a unique problem to us. 01:13:51.350 --> 01:13:53.086 But obviously we've got to look at it 01:13:53.086 --> 01:13:55.950 and see if it's because of what we're bringing 01:13:55.950 --> 01:13:59.570 into our ranks and how do we stop it is the bottom line. 01:13:59.570 --> 01:14:02.908 More importantly do we have the federal authority-- 01:14:02.908 --> 01:14:04.790 - Well that's, I wanted to ask you 01:14:04.790 --> 01:14:07.730 who has legal jurisdiction over military children 01:14:07.730 --> 01:14:10.313 on the military installations both here and abroad. 01:14:14.920 --> 01:14:17.010 - Let me get back to you specifically, 01:14:17.010 --> 01:14:18.419 because I think it's also different 01:14:18.419 --> 01:14:21.430 depending on where it's located. 01:14:21.430 --> 01:14:23.040 I may have to break this out. 01:14:23.040 --> 01:14:26.198 But we will get back to you with full answer. 01:14:26.198 --> 01:14:28.148 Is all of it in your letter? 01:14:28.148 --> 01:14:29.330 That what you need to know? 01:14:29.330 --> 01:14:31.410 - Yes, and we'll make sure, 01:14:31.410 --> 01:14:33.560 if you can get us the answers back to that. 01:14:33.800 --> 01:14:36.707 And what specific steps the Army and other-- 01:14:36.840 --> 01:14:38.440 - Lemme get back to you Senators. 01:14:38.440 --> 01:14:40.140 Seven days from now you'll have an answer. 01:14:40.140 --> 01:14:41.826 - I appreciate that very much, thank you. 01:14:41.826 --> 01:14:44.550 Lemme go back to the Iran deal. 01:14:44.550 --> 01:14:46.080 And you know President Trump announced 01:14:46.080 --> 01:14:47.949 he's gonna begin steps to pull us out. 01:14:47.949 --> 01:14:50.410 That deal wasn't perfect. 01:14:50.410 --> 01:14:52.690 And Iran's other aggression in the area, 01:14:52.690 --> 01:14:54.263 region has to be addressed, 01:14:54.380 --> 01:14:56.133 but based on everything I've heard, 01:14:56.560 --> 01:14:59.500 according to the IAE and our Intelligence Committee 01:14:59.500 --> 01:15:02.513 the deal was holding, Iran was meeting its commitments. 01:15:02.550 --> 01:15:04.230 And I haven't seen any evidence 01:15:04.230 --> 01:15:06.070 from President Trump to the contrary. 01:15:06.070 --> 01:15:09.201 So I'm concerned this is gonna be a destabilizing move 01:15:09.201 --> 01:15:12.870 that undermines, in addition undermines our credibility. 01:15:12.870 --> 01:15:16.350 And I'm concerned it dramatically raises 01:15:16.350 --> 01:15:18.768 the risk of a military confrontation. 01:15:18.768 --> 01:15:21.159 Now in his remarks yesterday, the President 01:15:21.159 --> 01:15:24.248 made several veiled threats toward Iran. 01:15:24.248 --> 01:15:26.083 And I wanted to ask you, 01:15:26.350 --> 01:15:29.300 has the department been asked to develop 01:15:29.300 --> 01:15:31.253 military options against Iran? 01:15:32.171 --> 01:15:35.270 - Ma'am we maintain, Senator we maintain 01:15:35.810 --> 01:15:39.410 military options because of Iran's bellicose statements 01:15:39.410 --> 01:15:42.683 and threats, death to America, 01:15:42.970 --> 01:15:44.563 we have maintained those. 01:15:44.590 --> 01:15:47.607 As you I had some experience in Central Command 01:15:47.607 --> 01:15:52.607 in my past life and those plans remain operant. 01:15:55.094 --> 01:15:58.443 - Okay so I understood from his statement yesterday, 01:15:58.443 --> 01:16:01.005 that he was going to ask you to develop plans. 01:16:01.005 --> 01:16:03.048 You just have plans in place. 01:16:03.048 --> 01:16:06.094 Nothing new is gonna be developed as a result of this? 01:16:06.094 --> 01:16:10.323 - Senator we are always updating those plans. 01:16:10.323 --> 01:16:13.451 It's a constant, I don't wanna tell ya it's frozen in time. 01:16:13.451 --> 01:16:18.072 The plans are updated as rapidly as needed. 01:16:18.072 --> 01:16:22.180 And if not, if a need is not seen, 01:16:22.180 --> 01:16:24.132 they're actually on a required update 01:16:24.132 --> 01:16:26.413 so that they can't languish. 01:16:26.470 --> 01:16:27.810 - Well okay, I would just ask that you 01:16:27.810 --> 01:16:30.760 regularly update this committee on any new 01:16:30.760 --> 01:16:33.733 plans you are developing in response to this. 01:16:34.531 --> 01:16:36.193 Lemme ask a different question. 01:16:36.200 --> 01:16:37.948 The department's Nuclear Posture Review, 01:16:37.948 --> 01:16:41.510 calls for developing two new capabilities 01:16:41.510 --> 01:16:43.915 for delivering low yield nuclear weapons. 01:16:43.915 --> 01:16:45.889 The department claims these systems 01:16:45.889 --> 01:16:49.302 will make the use of nuclear weapons less likely. 01:16:49.302 --> 01:16:51.490 But that can only be true if we 01:16:51.490 --> 01:16:53.374 are more willing to use those weapons. 01:16:53.374 --> 01:16:55.880 The administration has yet to convince me 01:16:55.880 --> 01:16:58.590 why this is a good use of our defense dollars 01:16:58.590 --> 01:17:00.710 instead of investing in critically needed 01:17:00.890 --> 01:17:03.044 conventional systems or training our personnel. 01:17:03.044 --> 01:17:07.020 Why is the combination of our current nuclear 01:17:07.020 --> 01:17:08.923 deterrent and significant conventional 01:17:08.923 --> 01:17:11.933 weapons capabilities insufficient. 01:17:12.358 --> 01:17:15.193 - Senator what we have found is, we listened 01:17:15.193 --> 01:17:20.193 to the President of Russia is an increased 01:17:20.240 --> 01:17:23.000 willingness out of Moscow to discuss 01:17:23.000 --> 01:17:24.791 the use of nuclear weapons. 01:17:24.791 --> 01:17:28.580 Specifically escalate to deescalate. 01:17:28.580 --> 01:17:31.130 Which means they're in a conventional fight, 01:17:31.130 --> 01:17:33.490 it's not going well, so they escalate. 01:17:33.490 --> 01:17:36.903 The deescalation is based on their success. 01:17:36.903 --> 01:17:39.440 What we need to do, and make it very clear, 01:17:39.440 --> 01:17:41.530 you cannot escalate to a low yield 01:17:41.530 --> 01:17:44.060 nuclear weapon and confront us. 01:17:44.060 --> 01:17:45.720 We only have two choices. 01:17:45.720 --> 01:17:48.492 Use high yield weapons which means 01:17:48.492 --> 01:17:51.346 we would now be escalating the fight, 01:17:51.346 --> 01:17:54.763 or do nothing which would mean surrender. 01:17:54.980 --> 01:17:56.530 Basically from our perspective, 01:17:56.530 --> 01:18:00.063 we would characterize it as suicide or surrender. 01:18:00.290 --> 01:18:02.860 So by having the low yield we are attempting 01:18:02.860 --> 01:18:05.835 to checkmate their thinking that they could employ, 01:18:05.835 --> 01:18:10.268 deter them from deploying even a low yield nuclear weapon. 01:18:10.268 --> 01:18:13.777 It is the adaptation of the nuclear deterrent 01:18:13.777 --> 01:18:17.363 to the dynamic threat, the changing threat, 01:18:17.530 --> 01:18:20.185 so it's not frozen in a Cold War mentality, 01:18:20.185 --> 01:18:23.510 where we were willing to go high yield immediately 01:18:23.770 --> 01:18:25.274 against a high yield attack. 01:18:25.274 --> 01:18:27.323 Once they start talkin' about low yield 01:18:27.323 --> 01:18:30.730 as a way to escalate a conventional fight, 01:18:30.730 --> 01:18:32.562 we need to adapt our deterrent. 01:18:32.562 --> 01:18:35.230 - Okay, and I am out of time, 01:18:35.230 --> 01:18:37.130 but I did wanna bring to your attention 01:18:37.130 --> 01:18:40.223 the issue of spouse employment for our military. 01:18:40.420 --> 01:18:43.290 I've talked to a number of spouses recently 01:18:43.500 --> 01:18:47.051 who can't get a job around their base where they live. 01:18:47.051 --> 01:18:50.190 I've actually heard from military spouses 01:18:50.190 --> 01:18:54.240 in our home state who face this challenge. 01:18:54.240 --> 01:18:55.900 And actually told me that they hide 01:18:55.900 --> 01:18:58.800 their military affiliation, these are the spouses, 01:18:58.800 --> 01:19:00.798 because employers don't call them back 01:19:00.798 --> 01:19:02.880 if they know that they're gonna leave again, 01:19:02.880 --> 01:19:05.230 or don't have long term commitments. 01:19:05.230 --> 01:19:07.670 So this is a huge question, and I'd love, 01:19:07.670 --> 01:19:09.880 I wanted to bring it to your attention, 01:19:09.880 --> 01:19:11.780 but love to talk to you more about it 01:19:11.780 --> 01:19:13.450 some other time about how we can make 01:19:13.450 --> 01:19:16.160 sure that we remove the obstacles. 01:19:16.160 --> 01:19:18.580 Because this is a challenge for recruitment. 01:19:18.580 --> 01:19:20.090 This is a challenge for retention. 01:19:20.090 --> 01:19:22.170 This is a challenge for these families economically. 01:19:22.170 --> 01:19:24.420 And I really believe we need to take 01:19:24.420 --> 01:19:25.670 some steps to address it. 01:19:27.130 --> 01:19:28.080 - [Chairman] Senator Moran. 01:19:28.080 --> 01:19:29.900 - Mr. Chairman thank you very much. 01:19:29.900 --> 01:19:34.393 Secretary Mattis let me begin a discussion of cyber space. 01:19:36.060 --> 01:19:39.700 You requested 8.6 billion dollars in FY19 01:19:39.700 --> 01:19:42.770 to build cyber capabilities and perform missions 01:19:42.770 --> 01:19:45.430 to defend the department networks, 01:19:45.430 --> 01:19:47.123 weapon systems and information. 01:19:47.399 --> 01:19:50.440 I think when we think of cyber security 01:19:50.440 --> 01:19:52.845 we often think of our defensive capabilities 01:19:52.845 --> 01:19:56.518 as part of the 133 Cyber Mission Force 01:19:56.518 --> 01:19:58.150 teams you're developing. 01:19:58.150 --> 01:20:01.440 I wanna draw your attention to cyber teams 01:20:01.440 --> 01:20:05.203 that specialize in threat analysis or emulation. 01:20:06.036 --> 01:20:09.170 I'm referring to the work of the NSA Certified 01:20:09.170 --> 01:20:12.430 Cyber Red Teams which are only Cyber Red Teams, 01:20:12.430 --> 01:20:13.740 which are the only Cyber Red Teams 01:20:13.740 --> 01:20:15.635 authorized to operate DOD networks, 01:20:15.635 --> 01:20:19.670 and capable of simulating cyber attacks 01:20:19.670 --> 01:20:22.293 on DOD systems, or major weapons systems. 01:20:23.120 --> 01:20:25.870 They're there to determine if there are vulnerabilities 01:20:27.550 --> 01:20:29.183 that compromise our system or our weapons 01:20:29.183 --> 01:20:30.593 that are being tested. 01:20:30.750 --> 01:20:32.353 The 2006 Defense Authorization Act 01:20:32.353 --> 01:20:34.990 mandated that Cyber Red Team testing 01:20:34.990 --> 01:20:37.340 on each major weapons system and to develop 01:20:37.340 --> 01:20:40.790 strategies to mitigate the risks of cyber vulnerabilities 01:20:40.790 --> 01:20:42.543 identified in those evaluations. 01:20:43.800 --> 01:20:46.343 It's referred to as adversarial assessments. 01:20:46.720 --> 01:20:48.450 And they're primarily managed by the Director 01:20:48.450 --> 01:20:51.733 of Operation Tests and Evaluations, DOT&E. 01:20:53.182 --> 01:20:55.750 Mr. Secretary there's only a handful 01:20:55.750 --> 01:20:59.520 of NSA Certified Red Teams authorized 01:20:59.520 --> 01:21:01.243 to conduct those assessments. 01:21:01.830 --> 01:21:04.025 And I'm concerned that DOD is not addressing 01:21:04.025 --> 01:21:07.670 what DOT&E has described as a chronic Red Team 01:21:07.670 --> 01:21:10.853 shortfall to meet the demands of cyber threat testing. 01:21:11.177 --> 01:21:15.933 Cyber funding has increased roughly 36% since 2016. 01:21:16.490 --> 01:21:20.350 And that lends me to these kinds of questions. 01:21:20.350 --> 01:21:22.620 Will the department allocate cyber funds 01:21:22.620 --> 01:21:26.723 towards increasing NSA Certified Red Teams? 01:21:27.956 --> 01:21:31.495 Are any of the 133 total Cyber Mission Force Teams 01:21:31.495 --> 01:21:36.040 you are developing are there planned to be 01:21:36.040 --> 01:21:38.066 NSA Certified Red Teams that can conduct 01:21:38.066 --> 01:21:40.513 those adversarial assessments? 01:21:43.320 --> 01:21:46.690 The point here is that I wanna understand 01:21:46.690 --> 01:21:49.583 how the department is approaching Cyber Red Teams 01:21:49.583 --> 01:21:52.170 and when we do the assessments then, 01:21:52.170 --> 01:21:55.033 what's the result of those assessments in ending, 01:21:55.161 --> 01:21:58.080 or reducing the vulnerabilities 01:21:58.080 --> 01:22:01.343 that those Red Teams have determined exist? 01:22:03.200 --> 01:22:05.460 Maybe the shortcut of that is that I'm worried 01:22:05.460 --> 01:22:07.346 that we're under emphasizing the value 01:22:07.346 --> 01:22:11.580 of those Red Teams in assessing the challenge 01:22:11.982 --> 01:22:14.283 and determining the vulnerabilities. 01:22:15.350 --> 01:22:17.313 So we need more Red Teams. 01:22:17.690 --> 01:22:20.070 And then secondly, once the Red Team 01:22:20.070 --> 01:22:21.580 determines the vulnerability 01:22:22.110 --> 01:22:24.180 what is the department's reaction 01:22:24.180 --> 01:22:26.673 and response to end those vulnerabilities. 01:22:28.700 --> 01:22:31.147 - As you know, Senator, right now we're in the midst 01:22:31.147 --> 01:22:35.640 of coming up with our Cyber Posture Review. 01:22:35.640 --> 01:22:38.883 You've heard talk earlier about the Nuclear Posture Review. 01:22:39.130 --> 01:22:42.623 We're doing a similar effort with a Cyber Posture Review. 01:22:43.000 --> 01:22:45.430 I'm a strong believer in Red Teams. 01:22:45.430 --> 01:22:49.010 I use CIA's Red Team all the time on policies, 01:22:49.010 --> 01:22:52.333 on the what if, you know this sort of thing, 01:22:52.530 --> 01:22:53.773 on everything we do. 01:22:54.550 --> 01:22:56.030 As far as what we have to do, 01:22:56.030 --> 01:22:59.312 you know I think about 3.4 billion 01:22:59.312 --> 01:23:01.704 is going into test, evaluation, 01:23:01.704 --> 01:23:05.070 that's part of the budget of the cyber effort. 01:23:05.070 --> 01:23:08.050 And in there will be Cyber Red Team, 01:23:08.050 --> 01:23:11.293 not just creating a robust capability. 01:23:11.550 --> 01:23:13.877 But also how do we follow up and track it 01:23:13.877 --> 01:23:16.683 to make certain we've corrected the deficiency. 01:23:17.020 --> 01:23:18.320 But it had been a problem. 01:23:18.320 --> 01:23:21.673 I will tell ya, I found a number of IT reports, 01:23:21.910 --> 01:23:24.040 some of which, not many, but some of which 01:23:24.040 --> 01:23:25.853 dealt with cyber vulnerabilities. 01:23:25.923 --> 01:23:29.250 And the number of 'em that had not been, 01:23:29.250 --> 01:23:30.570 and this goes back 10 years, 01:23:30.570 --> 01:23:31.971 that had not been corrected, 01:23:31.971 --> 01:23:35.163 the vulnerabilities shown, struck me. 01:23:35.330 --> 01:23:39.083 So this is an effort by Deputy Secretary Shanahan right now. 01:23:39.170 --> 01:23:41.090 It's such a priority that we've raised 01:23:41.090 --> 01:23:44.030 it up to my number two because it cuts across 01:23:44.030 --> 01:23:46.893 all the services, it cuts across all parts of DOD, 01:23:47.530 --> 01:23:49.323 from nuclear to conventional. 01:23:49.470 --> 01:23:52.220 So this is an area where after I get done 01:23:52.220 --> 01:23:54.675 the Cyber Posture Review, which I expect within, 01:23:54.675 --> 01:23:56.490 we've got a new Lieutenant General 01:23:56.490 --> 01:23:58.230 just promoted to General, took over, 01:23:58.230 --> 01:24:00.860 General Nakasone out at Cyber Command, 01:24:00.860 --> 01:24:04.373 and I expect to have this within months right now. 01:24:04.500 --> 01:24:06.223 But we will work this forward. 01:24:06.670 --> 01:24:08.926 You don't have to sell me on Red Teams sir. 01:24:08.926 --> 01:24:10.423 I'm a believer. 01:24:10.670 --> 01:24:12.630 And we will find a way to get them 01:24:12.630 --> 01:24:14.406 built up to whatever level is needed. 01:24:14.406 --> 01:24:17.487 Better we find our problems than our enemy finds 'em. 01:24:17.620 --> 01:24:19.173 - I appreciate your response. 01:24:19.260 --> 01:24:21.587 Perhaps the Deputy Secretary would be willing 01:24:21.587 --> 01:24:24.715 to have a conversation with us about this topic. 01:24:24.715 --> 01:24:25.548 - [Secretary Mattis] Absolutely. 01:24:25.548 --> 01:24:26.450 - I appreciate that. 01:24:26.821 --> 01:24:30.870 It seems to me that it's important 01:24:30.870 --> 01:24:32.492 that we not miss this opportunity. 01:24:32.492 --> 01:24:35.320 And that Red Teams have, as you indicated, 01:24:35.320 --> 01:24:36.800 great value, and I wanted to make sure 01:24:36.800 --> 01:24:39.950 that you had an awareness of this, 01:24:39.950 --> 01:24:41.527 and the department was taking this aspect 01:24:41.527 --> 01:24:44.853 of cyber security seriously. 01:24:45.281 --> 01:24:49.464 While I started my questions by talking about cyber security 01:24:49.464 --> 01:24:52.780 I'll say this, I'll say it in passing, 01:24:52.780 --> 01:24:54.414 and I don't know that there's a question here. 01:24:54.414 --> 01:24:59.414 But I also have concern that in the focus 01:24:59.434 --> 01:25:02.410 on cyber security, the focus on Russia, 01:25:02.410 --> 01:25:03.603 the focus on China, 01:25:04.398 --> 01:25:06.697 we need to make certain we don't forget 01:25:06.697 --> 01:25:08.833 the men and women who are serving in Afghanistan. 01:25:08.833 --> 01:25:11.150 I know that you responded to a question 01:25:11.150 --> 01:25:13.501 from Senator Durbin in regard to Afghanistan. 01:25:13.501 --> 01:25:16.440 But I would not want to not take 01:25:16.440 --> 01:25:18.033 this opportunity to highlight. 01:25:18.450 --> 01:25:21.070 I've visited Afghanistan a few months back, 01:25:21.070 --> 01:25:25.463 with then, Acting Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy. 01:25:26.620 --> 01:25:29.733 I saw things that were impressive to me. 01:25:30.446 --> 01:25:33.240 But we have so many challenges in the world 01:25:33.430 --> 01:25:36.540 that I don't want us to forget the young men and women, 01:25:36.540 --> 01:25:38.703 and their circumstances in Afghanistan. 01:25:38.787 --> 01:25:41.260 I know I don't have to tell you or General Dunford 01:25:41.260 --> 01:25:43.840 these things, but, I wanna make certain 01:25:43.840 --> 01:25:45.350 that I don't miss the opportunity 01:25:45.350 --> 01:25:47.657 of highlighting in this setting 01:25:47.657 --> 01:25:50.460 the value of our continued support 01:25:50.460 --> 01:25:51.656 for our military men and women. 01:25:51.656 --> 01:25:53.403 - I'm grateful you brought 'em up. 01:25:53.403 --> 01:25:55.590 They're never out of our minds sir. 01:25:55.590 --> 01:25:56.423 But thank you. 01:25:56.423 --> 01:25:57.830 - I have no doubt about that sir. 01:25:57.864 --> 01:26:00.916 My, I don't know that I can ask this question 01:26:00.916 --> 01:26:04.330 in 31 seconds so, Mr. Chairman 01:26:04.360 --> 01:26:05.838 thank you for the opportunity to question 01:26:05.838 --> 01:26:08.843 the Secretary, and the Chief, 01:26:09.050 --> 01:26:11.600 and I will submit a couple of questions in writing. 01:26:12.840 --> 01:26:13.853 - Senator Tester. 01:26:14.128 --> 01:26:15.520 - Yeah, thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:26:15.520 --> 01:26:18.210 And I wanna echo the comments of so many people 01:26:18.210 --> 01:26:20.850 on this panel of, in fact everybody on this panel 01:26:21.000 --> 01:26:23.880 in appreciation for you Secretary Mattis, 01:26:23.880 --> 01:26:26.483 and you General Dunford in the work that you do. 01:26:26.990 --> 01:26:28.283 I can't thank you enough. 01:26:29.058 --> 01:26:30.883 And the people that serve under you. 01:26:31.700 --> 01:26:32.533 Thank you. 01:26:32.850 --> 01:26:34.210 It's a complicated world. 01:26:34.210 --> 01:26:36.143 And I don't need to tell you that. 01:26:36.421 --> 01:26:39.220 And Afghanistan is incredibly complicated. 01:26:39.220 --> 01:26:43.060 This goes off of what Durbin mentioned earlier, 01:26:43.060 --> 01:26:46.303 and Moran had referenced, 01:26:46.303 --> 01:26:50.083 a year ago we had about 8400 troops in Afghanistan. 01:26:50.370 --> 01:26:53.853 Last fall, the last report we got, there was about 15,000. 01:26:53.904 --> 01:26:57.250 The Wall Street Journal, and correct me 01:26:57.250 --> 01:26:58.991 if they're wrong, 'cause they could be, 01:26:58.991 --> 01:27:01.235 but they're reporting that the number 01:27:01.235 --> 01:27:03.500 of Afghan army and police personnel 01:27:03.500 --> 01:27:07.323 decreased by about 36,000 people last year. 01:27:08.470 --> 01:27:11.829 It looks to me that our presence 01:27:11.829 --> 01:27:14.211 is going up while their presence, 01:27:14.211 --> 01:27:15.810 the people within the country, 01:27:15.810 --> 01:27:18.401 which I think is critically important, is going down. 01:27:18.401 --> 01:27:21.670 You've requested about 5.2 billion dollars 01:27:21.670 --> 01:27:26.342 for Afghan security forces in this budget. 01:27:26.342 --> 01:27:31.342 Number one, we put about 78 billion into it already. 01:27:33.890 --> 01:27:34.990 Are we makin' headway. 01:27:35.170 --> 01:27:37.890 Look, I mean I don't, I'm not indicatin' 01:27:37.890 --> 01:27:40.240 that I think that this isn't a valiant effort. 01:27:40.240 --> 01:27:41.073 It is. 01:27:41.073 --> 01:27:42.390 But Afghanistan's been around, 01:27:42.390 --> 01:27:45.545 and we've seen a lot of turmoil for decades, 01:27:45.545 --> 01:27:48.100 and decades, and decades around that country. 01:27:48.100 --> 01:27:51.683 Can you give me any sort of assurance that there's an end? 01:27:53.850 --> 01:27:56.550 - Senator Tester, since the Russian invasion 01:27:56.550 --> 01:28:00.119 in 1979 that society's been turned upside down. 01:28:00.119 --> 01:28:03.783 And since 2001 we've been there. 01:28:03.889 --> 01:28:08.310 I think the most difficult point to convey today. 01:28:08.310 --> 01:28:12.085 And we just heard from, a Senator just visited there 01:28:12.085 --> 01:28:14.454 in the last few months, 01:28:14.454 --> 01:28:19.074 progress and violence coexist in Afghanistan. 01:28:19.074 --> 01:28:22.640 The Taliban are turning to blowing up 01:28:22.640 --> 01:28:24.423 the registration stations, 01:28:24.438 --> 01:28:27.800 and they're doing that because they recognize 01:28:27.800 --> 01:28:29.490 they can't win at the ballot box, 01:28:29.490 --> 01:28:31.290 so they're tryin' to win with bombs. 01:28:31.470 --> 01:28:33.450 They've turned away from attacking 01:28:33.450 --> 01:28:36.806 many of the Afghan forces because we're now mentoring more. 01:28:36.806 --> 01:28:40.427 And in that regard, I would just point out that 01:28:40.427 --> 01:28:42.710 we are going with more attention 01:28:42.710 --> 01:28:45.643 on the quality of those Afghan forces. 01:28:46.277 --> 01:28:47.927 So in some cases what we've done, 01:28:47.950 --> 01:28:49.353 is due to better accounting, 01:28:49.353 --> 01:28:52.010 we've made certain there's no ghost soldiers. 01:28:52.010 --> 01:28:53.580 In other words we're payin' for a soldier 01:28:53.580 --> 01:28:54.780 that's not really there. 01:28:54.840 --> 01:28:59.050 There's a stricter accountability for who's getting paid, 01:28:59.050 --> 01:29:00.520 to make certain they exist. 01:29:00.520 --> 01:29:03.830 And we're going to expand the size of the elite forces. 01:29:03.830 --> 01:29:05.790 And there will be a reduction 01:29:05.790 --> 01:29:07.760 overall in the number of forces. 01:29:07.760 --> 01:29:10.076 Because we know the mentored, 01:29:10.076 --> 01:29:12.468 mentored by the NATO Forces, 01:29:12.468 --> 01:29:14.453 supported by NATO. 01:29:14.610 --> 01:29:17.150 Those forces always win against the enemy. 01:29:17.150 --> 01:29:18.623 It's the ones that were not, 01:29:18.700 --> 01:29:20.940 are some of those that have been reduced in size. 01:29:20.940 --> 01:29:22.704 - So they're reporting that the Wall Street Journal 01:29:22.704 --> 01:29:26.720 talked about, you believe is more of an accounting 01:29:26.720 --> 01:29:28.653 issue than it is a real body issue? 01:29:29.010 --> 01:29:32.251 - It may be real bodies in the sense Senator, 01:29:32.251 --> 01:29:36.180 that where we, for example, if a Kandak, 01:29:36.180 --> 01:29:39.681 a battalion of regular Army is not going to be mentored, 01:29:39.681 --> 01:29:42.980 and we're building up a Commando battalion, 01:29:42.980 --> 01:29:46.290 a Commando Kandak, that may be a smaller Kandak, 01:29:46.290 --> 01:29:48.090 but it's going to be more effective. 01:29:49.184 --> 01:29:52.240 So more quality, not quantity on that. 01:29:52.240 --> 01:29:55.303 Chairman can you give any background on this? 01:29:55.303 --> 01:29:56.655 - Okay Senator, part of it is also 01:29:56.655 --> 01:29:59.400 casualties of the Afghans. 01:29:59.400 --> 01:30:02.590 And if I could just address the idea that 01:30:02.770 --> 01:30:04.750 we've been doin' the same thing over and again 01:30:04.750 --> 01:30:07.068 for 17 years, and just maybe put in context 01:30:07.068 --> 01:30:09.659 our current strategy to what we've been doin'. 01:30:09.659 --> 01:30:13.411 In my judgment from 2001 to 2013 01:30:13.411 --> 01:30:16.130 we did the fighting in Afghanistan. 01:30:16.130 --> 01:30:18.820 And we somewhat pejoratively talked about 01:30:18.820 --> 01:30:23.820 an Afghan face on coalition capability from 2001 to 2013. 01:30:23.983 --> 01:30:27.990 In June of 2013 we actually said to the Afghans, 01:30:27.990 --> 01:30:30.556 okay you have now responsibility for your country. 01:30:30.556 --> 01:30:33.230 And when we said that we had over 100,000 01:30:33.230 --> 01:30:35.283 coalition forces in Afghanistan. 01:30:35.660 --> 01:30:38.797 From 2013 to 2017 we drew down 01:30:38.797 --> 01:30:41.121 the the 8,000 plus that you spoke about. 01:30:41.121 --> 01:30:44.983 I think there's really three phases in Afghanistan. 01:30:45.060 --> 01:30:46.760 There's the phase where we fought. 01:30:46.860 --> 01:30:48.470 There's the phase where we drew down. 01:30:48.470 --> 01:30:52.060 That was our primary mission between 2013 and 2017. 01:30:52.060 --> 01:30:54.840 You can't come from a high of 140,000 01:30:54.840 --> 01:30:57.620 down to 8,000 without singularly focusing 01:30:57.620 --> 01:31:00.913 on logistics and the challenges associated with draw down. 01:31:00.928 --> 01:31:03.134 I really do believe that this year, 01:31:03.134 --> 01:31:05.525 in conjunction with the South Asia strategy, 01:31:05.525 --> 01:31:07.920 this is the first time we are providing 01:31:07.920 --> 01:31:10.303 the Afghans with the capabilities they need, 01:31:10.430 --> 01:31:12.080 and the advisory effort they need 01:31:12.170 --> 01:31:14.490 to actually fight the counter insurgency themselves. 01:31:14.490 --> 01:31:16.114 Are there challenges, absolutely. 01:31:16.114 --> 01:31:19.793 With the numbers question you asked specifically Senator, 01:31:19.920 --> 01:31:22.640 what we expect to see, one of the things we expect to see 01:31:22.640 --> 01:31:24.530 because of the strategy we've implemented 01:31:24.530 --> 01:31:27.203 is a reduction in Afghan casualties, 01:31:27.240 --> 01:31:29.480 and a conventional increase in the numbers of Afghans 01:31:29.480 --> 01:31:30.560 that might be willing to serve. 01:31:30.560 --> 01:31:32.043 It is a volunteer service. 01:31:32.070 --> 01:31:32.943 - Okay thank you. 01:31:33.005 --> 01:31:35.280 I wanna talk, I'm gonna approach this 01:31:35.280 --> 01:31:37.490 a little different way than what Senator Murray 01:31:37.708 --> 01:31:39.055 did on the JCPOA, when you drafted this budget, 01:31:39.055 --> 01:31:43.676 Secretary Mattis, did you have in mind 01:31:43.676 --> 01:31:46.907 that the President may be pullin' out of the JCPOA? 01:31:46.907 --> 01:31:49.700 And the reason I ask that is that, 01:31:49.700 --> 01:31:51.876 are there any budgetary impacts 01:31:51.876 --> 01:31:56.200 with the pullout of the JCPOA, in other words, 01:31:56.200 --> 01:31:58.088 are you anticipating you're gonna have to invest 01:31:58.088 --> 01:32:01.760 more dollars militarily than you are now, 01:32:01.760 --> 01:32:03.900 because of that withdraw of the JCPOA? 01:32:03.900 --> 01:32:08.430 - I do not anticipate asking for more dollars. 01:32:08.430 --> 01:32:11.400 Now should mean, should Iran do something-- 01:32:11.400 --> 01:32:12.710 - [Senator Tester] Yeah, yeah, that's a different-- 01:32:12.710 --> 01:32:13.710 - That's a different issue. 01:32:13.710 --> 01:32:16.842 But, no I'm not coming to you with an additional 01:32:16.842 --> 01:32:19.723 supplemental funding request. 01:32:19.900 --> 01:32:21.123 - So you're confident the budget 01:32:21.123 --> 01:32:26.123 will reflect realities even with our removal from the JCPOA. 01:32:26.230 --> 01:32:27.360 - I am confident Senator. 01:32:27.360 --> 01:32:28.193 - Thank you. 01:32:28.193 --> 01:32:29.817 I just wanna talk about mental health for a second. 01:32:29.817 --> 01:32:31.430 And I only got 45 seconds. 01:32:31.430 --> 01:32:32.930 You guys know all the figures. 01:32:33.280 --> 01:32:35.210 But we've got, we've got a problem 01:32:35.210 --> 01:32:37.280 in our active components. 01:32:37.280 --> 01:32:39.980 We've got a worse problem in our Reserves 01:32:39.980 --> 01:32:41.393 and our National Guard. 01:32:43.600 --> 01:32:45.850 Can you tell me, within this budget 01:32:45.850 --> 01:32:48.692 if there's any prioritization of resources 01:32:48.692 --> 01:32:51.525 to deal with the Guard and Reserve components 01:32:51.525 --> 01:32:56.525 ability to address this suicide problem, 01:32:56.910 --> 01:32:58.933 epidemic, whatever you wanna call it? 01:33:00.919 --> 01:33:02.940 - I'm gonna have to get back to you. 01:33:02.940 --> 01:33:04.063 David do you know this one? 01:33:04.063 --> 01:33:05.440 - [David Norquist] No I do not. 01:33:05.440 --> 01:33:07.128 - We're gonna have to take that one for the record. 01:33:07.128 --> 01:33:09.543 We'll get you an answer very quickly. 01:33:09.660 --> 01:33:12.580 - And once again thank you gentlemen for the job you do. 01:33:12.580 --> 01:33:13.413 I appreciate it. 01:33:13.607 --> 01:33:15.139 - [Secretary Mattis] Thank you. 01:33:15.139 --> 01:33:16.283 - Senator blunt. 01:33:17.780 --> 01:33:18.738 - Thank you Chairman. 01:33:18.738 --> 01:33:23.738 Let me start by thanking you for three 01:33:24.110 --> 01:33:26.960 specific things that particularly General Dunford, 01:33:26.960 --> 01:33:29.290 and Secretary Mattis you worked on. 01:33:29.290 --> 01:33:33.140 One is supporting the National Geospacial Transfer 01:33:33.153 --> 01:33:35.750 from Saint Louis, for the facility they've been 01:33:35.750 --> 01:33:39.381 in for 70 years to a new facility. 01:33:39.381 --> 01:33:42.028 Also, I think this is the first time I recall 01:33:42.028 --> 01:33:44.610 that the Super Hornets, which this committee's 01:33:44.610 --> 01:33:47.810 always been very supportive of made the regular budget 01:33:47.810 --> 01:33:50.553 as opposed to the unrequest, 01:33:51.396 --> 01:33:52.770 the budget you'd like to have, 01:33:52.770 --> 01:33:55.473 and always in the Super Hornet category got 01:33:55.473 --> 01:33:58.520 with a multi year procurement request there, 01:33:58.520 --> 01:33:59.861 helps keep that line open. 01:33:59.861 --> 01:34:03.580 And then we've all talked about this before, 01:34:03.580 --> 01:34:06.440 but your willingness to both work for, 01:34:06.440 --> 01:34:10.030 and now implement the Military Family Stability Act 01:34:10.030 --> 01:34:12.868 that was in the Defense Authorization Act that time. 01:34:12.868 --> 01:34:15.480 That would not have happened if both of you 01:34:15.480 --> 01:34:19.576 hadn't understood the importance of it happening. 01:34:19.576 --> 01:34:23.067 And we wanna continue to work on those things. 01:34:23.067 --> 01:34:28.067 B21 basing decision, looking first at current bases 01:34:29.060 --> 01:34:31.200 is the logical way to do this. 01:34:31.200 --> 01:34:32.990 And the way you have approached it. 01:34:32.990 --> 01:34:35.945 But to the degree you can discuss it, 01:34:35.945 --> 01:34:40.945 the B21 issues, whatever you can discuss here, 01:34:41.090 --> 01:34:43.510 can you elaborate on the efficiencies 01:34:43.510 --> 01:34:46.906 and savings generated by using existing bases. 01:34:46.906 --> 01:34:50.560 And then your view of what kind of commitment 01:34:50.560 --> 01:34:53.197 we're gonna need to make moving forward 01:34:53.197 --> 01:34:57.207 to facilities to deal with the Addition 01:34:57.207 --> 01:35:00.093 of the B21 to the force? 01:35:01.750 --> 01:35:04.296 - Senator, every new type model aircraft 01:35:04.296 --> 01:35:07.617 brings with it a certain logistical requirement. 01:35:07.617 --> 01:35:11.290 So we'll have to address the maturation 01:35:11.290 --> 01:35:12.725 of the basing locations. 01:35:12.725 --> 01:35:15.540 And while we would always be looking 01:35:15.540 --> 01:35:19.800 at existing bases, and of course dispersal points 01:35:20.030 --> 01:35:22.850 for them we also have to look at the changing 01:35:22.850 --> 01:35:24.620 world situation and and make certain 01:35:24.620 --> 01:35:28.470 those existing bases, where we have strategic aircraft 01:35:28.470 --> 01:35:31.092 now are the right locations for them in the future. 01:35:31.092 --> 01:35:34.496 And any modification to those bases. 01:35:34.496 --> 01:35:37.490 So I don't wanna say absolutely they're going 01:35:37.490 --> 01:35:40.287 to the same base, I can't tell you that right now. 01:35:40.287 --> 01:35:42.772 Clearly they would have a leg up 01:35:42.772 --> 01:35:47.363 unless there's a strategic reason to ship them elsewhere. 01:35:49.400 --> 01:35:52.510 - Well, and I think, what we'll need to look at there too, 01:35:52.510 --> 01:35:54.890 and as soon as we do have a sense of where 01:35:54.890 --> 01:35:56.425 they're gonna go as what the military 01:35:56.425 --> 01:35:59.820 construction needs might be, what we ought to be 01:35:59.820 --> 01:36:01.690 thinking about, is we think about adding 01:36:01.690 --> 01:36:05.520 that to our future Defense Posture. 01:36:05.520 --> 01:36:07.503 I wanna talk a little bit about Korea. 01:36:08.270 --> 01:36:10.570 I was on some news program the other day 01:36:10.570 --> 01:36:13.400 and asked in Korea what would you see 01:36:13.400 --> 01:36:16.998 as the line that would be non negotiable. 01:36:16.998 --> 01:36:20.057 Now my view, which, if anybody could persuade 01:36:20.057 --> 01:36:21.758 me that my view was wrong, 01:36:21.758 --> 01:36:24.410 the two of you at the table might be able to do that. 01:36:24.410 --> 01:36:26.983 But my view was that for the foreseeable future, 01:36:26.983 --> 01:36:31.832 our presence in Korea, not a negotiable issue. 01:36:31.832 --> 01:36:34.910 The South Koreans have really stepped up 01:36:35.110 --> 01:36:37.803 with the money they've invested in the new basing 01:36:37.803 --> 01:36:40.560 for us as well the other assistance 01:36:40.870 --> 01:36:42.772 that we get from them to be there. 01:36:42.772 --> 01:36:45.489 I know this is an ongoing discussion. 01:36:45.489 --> 01:36:48.993 I know General Mattis, you have discussed it recently. 01:36:49.490 --> 01:36:53.180 What do you see as the importance of our presence. 01:36:53.180 --> 01:36:55.363 Not only in the Korean peninsula, 01:36:55.470 --> 01:36:57.860 but also our regional presence, 01:36:57.860 --> 01:36:59.908 and the advantages we would have 01:36:59.908 --> 01:37:03.820 with the new base there, and the South Korean 01:37:03.820 --> 01:37:06.870 support that we gain, or that we get 01:37:06.870 --> 01:37:09.160 for our regional presence there. 01:37:09.160 --> 01:37:13.623 And what king of negotiating item that may or may not be. 01:37:14.407 --> 01:37:19.407 - Senator, Korea, the red line I would say 01:37:19.480 --> 01:37:21.950 is the verifiable, irreversible, 01:37:21.950 --> 01:37:24.440 nuclear free Korean peninsula. 01:37:24.440 --> 01:37:26.860 This is a policy of the United States, 01:37:26.860 --> 01:37:31.373 of South Korea, of Japan, China, Russia. 01:37:31.390 --> 01:37:33.483 It's the same policy for all. 01:37:33.630 --> 01:37:35.142 I think it's why you've seen three 01:37:35.142 --> 01:37:38.450 unanimous UN Security Council resolutions 01:37:38.450 --> 01:37:40.893 in the last, little over a year, 01:37:41.017 --> 01:37:44.563 imposing sanction on Korea, 01:37:44.960 --> 01:37:46.566 on DPRK, North Korea. 01:37:46.566 --> 01:37:50.010 And I think that that stands as the goal, 01:37:50.010 --> 01:37:52.810 the negotiation that we're entering into, 01:37:52.810 --> 01:37:55.280 that's underway actually right now, 01:37:55.280 --> 01:37:58.362 with Secretary Pompeo having just left there, 01:37:58.362 --> 01:38:01.163 having done more of the preparation work. 01:38:01.440 --> 01:38:02.867 The presence of our forces there, 01:38:02.867 --> 01:38:04.210 and as you're aware sir, 01:38:04.210 --> 01:38:06.373 that 90% of cost of that new base 01:38:06.373 --> 01:38:09.583 is born by Republic of Korea. 01:38:09.879 --> 01:38:14.037 The presence of our forces there is a stabilizing presence. 01:38:14.037 --> 01:38:16.613 When, if we had no one there, 01:38:16.613 --> 01:38:19.573 and we moved in that many troops, 01:38:19.720 --> 01:38:22.070 that could actually have a destabilizing effect. 01:38:22.070 --> 01:38:24.070 In other words the fact that they're there. 01:38:24.070 --> 01:38:25.010 Everything's stable. 01:38:25.010 --> 01:38:26.523 The American's are committed. 01:38:26.800 --> 01:38:31.800 And this, and I would say resonates among allies. 01:38:32.200 --> 01:38:34.430 And not just in Japan and Korea 01:38:34.430 --> 01:38:37.000 because those forces are in the Northwest Pacific. 01:38:37.000 --> 01:38:39.420 But also around the world when they see 01:38:39.420 --> 01:38:42.130 that when trouble looms, we don't walk away. 01:38:42.130 --> 01:38:44.431 Now if during the negotiation, 01:38:44.431 --> 01:38:48.620 this issue was to come up between our allies and us, 01:38:48.620 --> 01:38:51.002 that would be one thing between two allies. 01:38:51.002 --> 01:38:56.002 Not a matter of the negotiation with DPRK for example. 01:38:56.520 --> 01:38:58.837 That is a sovereign decision between 01:38:59.616 --> 01:39:00.593 the people and the government of ROK, 01:39:01.000 --> 01:39:03.060 and the people and the government of the United States. 01:39:03.060 --> 01:39:05.810 That's not something that would be on the table 01:39:05.839 --> 01:39:08.063 in the initial negotiation. 01:39:09.030 --> 01:39:10.880 - And the move to the new base. 01:39:10.880 --> 01:39:13.260 When do you anticipate that will happen? 01:39:13.260 --> 01:39:14.530 And when would it be completed? 01:39:14.530 --> 01:39:15.793 General Dunford is it? 01:39:17.031 --> 01:39:19.090 - Senator I was there probably three or four months ago. 01:39:19.090 --> 01:39:20.983 And it's actually ongoing. 01:39:21.110 --> 01:39:22.410 - [Senator Blunt] Right and when do you think 01:39:22.410 --> 01:39:24.780 that move will be completed? 01:39:24.780 --> 01:39:26.730 - I'll get back to you to confirm it. 01:39:26.730 --> 01:39:28.386 But my understanding was it'll be complete 01:39:28.386 --> 01:39:30.793 in this calendar year. 01:39:31.453 --> 01:39:32.286 - Thank you. 01:39:32.286 --> 01:39:33.236 thank you Chairman. 01:39:35.120 --> 01:39:39.113 - Thank you Chairman Shelby, 01:39:39.300 --> 01:39:41.380 and thank you all for your service. 01:39:41.380 --> 01:39:43.653 And we're really lucky I think to have you. 01:39:44.147 --> 01:39:48.530 I agree with Senator Durbin's earlier comments 01:39:48.530 --> 01:39:52.349 on Iran and withdrawing from the Iran agreement. 01:39:52.349 --> 01:39:54.410 This is a big mistake. 01:39:54.410 --> 01:39:55.855 It splits us from our allies. 01:39:55.855 --> 01:39:58.893 It puts us on a path to war with Iran. 01:39:59.106 --> 01:40:02.100 And Mr. Secretary I really appreciate 01:40:02.100 --> 01:40:06.188 your advocacy and outspokenness on this issue. 01:40:06.188 --> 01:40:09.416 We understand the President has made his decision, 01:40:09.416 --> 01:40:12.813 and is going to withdraw and reimpose sanctions. 01:40:12.813 --> 01:40:16.410 If Iran were to restart its nuclear weapons program 01:40:16.410 --> 01:40:18.210 do you believe the President can order 01:40:18.210 --> 01:40:21.118 a unilateral attack to stop that program. 01:40:21.118 --> 01:40:23.563 And if so under what authority? 01:40:26.960 --> 01:40:28.872 - Senator I'd prefer not to talk 01:40:28.872 --> 01:40:31.358 about a hypothetical case like that. 01:40:31.358 --> 01:40:35.840 I think that this is an issue that we've seen 01:40:36.210 --> 01:40:37.837 discussed here on the Hill. 01:40:37.837 --> 01:40:41.030 Certainly we've looked at the AUMF Authority, 01:40:41.030 --> 01:40:44.610 and another venue, we've looked at the War Powers Act, 01:40:44.610 --> 01:40:47.473 was a previous, a generation ago effort 01:40:47.473 --> 01:40:50.051 to come to grips with this issue. 01:40:50.051 --> 01:40:51.746 But I would say right now, 01:40:51.746 --> 01:40:53.626 everything that we are doing, 01:40:53.626 --> 01:40:56.181 and you can see it with Korea. 01:40:56.181 --> 01:40:58.740 You can see it with how long it took 01:40:59.160 --> 01:41:01.548 for us to make the decision on this issue. 01:41:01.548 --> 01:41:03.890 We're diplomatically led on this. 01:41:03.890 --> 01:41:06.350 We're not talking about any default to war 01:41:06.350 --> 01:41:08.620 as the binary choice. 01:41:08.620 --> 01:41:11.330 We're going back into working with allies, 01:41:11.330 --> 01:41:13.530 working with the international community, 01:41:13.530 --> 01:41:15.801 United Nations, with Ambassador Haley. 01:41:15.801 --> 01:41:18.813 And working this issue forward. 01:41:19.120 --> 01:41:23.393 - Yeah, well I'm very pleased to hear that, 01:41:23.910 --> 01:41:25.870 considering the diplomatic options. 01:41:25.870 --> 01:41:27.900 But I think it's pretty clear. 01:41:27.900 --> 01:41:29.940 And I won't get you into the hypothetical, 01:41:29.940 --> 01:41:32.193 but unless there's an imminent threat. 01:41:32.195 --> 01:41:34.810 I don't think the President can order that. 01:41:34.810 --> 01:41:38.083 I think he has to come to the Congress. 01:41:38.083 --> 01:41:39.897 The President's National Security, 01:41:39.897 --> 01:41:41.500 and this is what concerns me, 01:41:41.500 --> 01:41:43.108 as I'm gonna talk a little bit about 01:41:43.108 --> 01:41:45.943 some of the people that surround him. 01:41:46.110 --> 01:41:47.860 President's National Security Advisor, 01:41:47.860 --> 01:41:50.460 John Bolton, published and op ed in the New York Times 01:41:50.460 --> 01:41:52.164 just over three years ago, titled, 01:41:52.164 --> 01:41:55.053 To Stop Iran's Bomb, Bomb Iran. 01:41:55.600 --> 01:41:58.040 If the US were to use force to stop 01:41:58.040 --> 01:41:59.736 an Iranian nuclear weapons program, 01:41:59.736 --> 01:42:02.052 we must consider the most likely 01:42:02.052 --> 01:42:04.683 second and third order impacts. 01:42:04.780 --> 01:42:07.001 How Iran and other Nations would respond 01:42:07.001 --> 01:42:10.330 to such escalation, or how such attack 01:42:10.330 --> 01:42:13.317 could lead to other actions in the region. 01:42:13.317 --> 01:42:15.530 Following the experience in Iraq 01:42:15.530 --> 01:42:18.060 can the Department of Defense be confident 01:42:18.350 --> 01:42:20.910 that such an action would be limited to air strikes, 01:42:20.910 --> 01:42:23.420 and avoid another ground war involving 01:42:23.420 --> 01:42:25.133 US troops in the middle east? 01:42:28.730 --> 01:42:31.754 - Senator I have had numerous conversations 01:42:31.754 --> 01:42:35.633 in the last two or three weeks with Mr. Bolton. 01:42:35.678 --> 01:42:40.678 This issue as characterized by his article 01:42:40.879 --> 01:42:44.987 that you quoted there has not even arisen. 01:42:44.987 --> 01:42:47.183 There is, as we all recognize, 01:42:47.183 --> 01:42:50.446 a sobering aspect of being in the positions 01:42:50.446 --> 01:42:52.983 that he and I occupy. 01:42:53.790 --> 01:42:54.623 - Thank you. 01:42:54.623 --> 01:42:58.760 The National Security Advisor Bolton's 2015 op ed 01:42:58.760 --> 01:43:03.760 also advocated a US policy of regime change for Iran. 01:43:04.958 --> 01:43:08.060 Rudolph Giuliani is now the President's attorney. 01:43:08.060 --> 01:43:10.440 And recently made public remarks 01:43:10.440 --> 01:43:12.913 in support of regime change for Iran. 01:43:13.120 --> 01:43:15.170 Does the United States have a policy 01:43:15.170 --> 01:43:16.870 of regime change for Iran, 01:43:16.870 --> 01:43:19.550 and if so, what actions does the President 01:43:19.550 --> 01:43:21.763 intend to take to implement that policy? 01:43:21.932 --> 01:43:26.932 - Senator, as you know, our problem with Iran 01:43:28.790 --> 01:43:30.423 is not with the Iranian people. 01:43:30.500 --> 01:43:35.237 It is with the regime that holds them captive basically 01:43:35.237 --> 01:43:37.923 to the activities they've conducted. 01:43:38.180 --> 01:43:39.858 But I would let Mr. Bolton, 01:43:39.858 --> 01:43:43.680 and Mr. Giuliani speak for themselves sir. 01:43:43.680 --> 01:43:46.113 I'd prefer not to comment on that, 01:43:46.113 --> 01:43:47.810 and let them speak for themselves. 01:43:47.810 --> 01:43:48.643 - Thank you. 01:43:48.720 --> 01:43:50.460 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 01:43:50.460 --> 01:43:52.745 may meet this month to debate and update 01:43:52.745 --> 01:43:57.745 the AUMF to replace the 911 AUMF and the Iraq war AUMF. 01:43:59.290 --> 01:44:01.880 I hope that your team has compared 01:44:01.880 --> 01:44:04.240 the new Senate language which Chairman Corker 01:44:04.240 --> 01:44:07.327 released last month with the existing authorities. 01:44:07.327 --> 01:44:10.926 My reading of the new AUMF is that it authorizes 01:44:10.926 --> 01:44:14.090 force against Al-Qaeda and ISIL, 01:44:14.360 --> 01:44:16.544 and some named associate forces, 01:44:16.544 --> 01:44:18.960 but it does not authorize force 01:44:18.960 --> 01:44:20.623 against the Syrian government, 01:44:20.720 --> 01:44:22.420 or against the Iranian government. 01:44:22.640 --> 01:44:24.010 Do you agree with that reading? 01:44:24.010 --> 01:44:27.123 Would you commit to providing the Department of Defense, 01:44:27.123 --> 01:44:30.100 a Department of Defense analysis 01:44:30.360 --> 01:44:33.080 of the proposed, updated AUMF prior 01:44:33.080 --> 01:44:36.220 to the committee markup which may occur in two weeks. 01:44:36.220 --> 01:44:39.840 We really appreciate having your input into this, 01:44:39.840 --> 01:44:42.033 seeing how important it is. 01:44:43.632 --> 01:44:47.684 - Senator, I've worked with the two Senators 01:44:47.684 --> 01:44:49.637 who were involved with this. 01:44:49.637 --> 01:44:52.623 And the White House is working with them. 01:44:52.653 --> 01:44:57.423 We have been, I think, heard well. 01:44:57.668 --> 01:45:02.070 But let me get back to the White House 01:45:02.070 --> 01:45:04.153 and see where the inner agency is on this. 01:45:04.153 --> 01:45:06.561 State Department's important, obviously, 01:45:06.561 --> 01:45:09.789 in an event like this, or in an issue like this. 01:45:09.789 --> 01:45:12.773 Because we try to keep the US Military, 01:45:12.773 --> 01:45:16.670 and the Defense Department in a reinforcing role 01:45:16.670 --> 01:45:20.215 to State Department's lead on foreign policy, 01:45:20.215 --> 01:45:23.935 where we belong, and where I think we're strongest. 01:45:23.935 --> 01:45:27.803 But we'll get back to you Senator, on this. 01:45:27.808 --> 01:45:29.829 - The important thing, 01:45:29.829 --> 01:45:33.938 and I think we have emphasized this with Chairman Corker, 01:45:33.938 --> 01:45:36.584 is that if he's going to go forward 01:45:36.584 --> 01:45:40.270 with a markup of the proposal that's out there, 01:45:40.270 --> 01:45:44.860 before we do that, that we actually have a hearing 01:45:44.860 --> 01:45:47.420 where we can hear from all the individuals 01:45:47.420 --> 01:45:51.260 you talked about, and in addition have another panel, 01:45:51.260 --> 01:45:53.480 which would be outside experts 01:45:53.480 --> 01:45:54.840 to talk about what this means. 01:45:54.840 --> 01:45:58.397 It seems that if we're going to really head down the road 01:45:58.397 --> 01:46:00.750 for a new and updated AUMF, 01:46:00.750 --> 01:46:03.880 that the administration needs to take a strong position 01:46:03.880 --> 01:46:05.667 where they are on it in addition, 01:46:05.667 --> 01:46:08.803 outside experts take a look at it. 01:46:08.837 --> 01:46:13.837 And I notice, and I'll put this one in for the record, 01:46:14.020 --> 01:46:16.180 but the administration as you know, 01:46:16.180 --> 01:46:17.780 the last administration when it was going 01:46:17.780 --> 01:46:20.192 to bomb in Syria, asked for Congress's 01:46:20.192 --> 01:46:23.001 permission to do so, and it didn't get it. 01:46:23.001 --> 01:46:25.068 And does this administration consider 01:46:25.068 --> 01:46:27.810 the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world 01:46:27.810 --> 01:46:30.850 as a legal basis for US military force 01:46:30.850 --> 01:46:32.130 without the vote in Congress. 01:46:32.130 --> 01:46:34.101 It seems to me, this is a big issue. 01:46:34.101 --> 01:46:36.683 The difference in administrations. 01:46:36.730 --> 01:46:38.020 So I'll put it for the record. 01:46:38.020 --> 01:46:40.603 I know, Secretary Mattis, how thoughtful you are. 01:46:40.603 --> 01:46:42.530 And you really think these things out. 01:46:42.530 --> 01:46:45.560 And so I'd appreciate a good, thoughtful answer on that one. 01:46:45.560 --> 01:46:46.639 Thank you very much. 01:46:46.639 --> 01:46:48.195 - Senator Daines. 01:46:48.195 --> 01:46:50.032 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:46:50.032 --> 01:46:52.880 And I'm honored to be here with you 01:46:52.880 --> 01:46:54.581 Secretary Mattis, General Dunford. 01:46:54.581 --> 01:46:59.130 I'm very pleased to see that President Trump's 01:46:59.130 --> 01:47:01.064 budget submissions are strategy based. 01:47:01.064 --> 01:47:04.220 They establish a foundation of rebuilding 01:47:04.220 --> 01:47:07.270 the US Military into more capable, 01:47:07.270 --> 01:47:10.380 a more lethal, and a ready Joint Force. 01:47:10.380 --> 01:47:13.670 It's very clear to me that our Department of Defense 01:47:13.670 --> 01:47:15.827 is focused on what matters most. 01:47:15.827 --> 01:47:18.160 And that's keeping Americans safe. 01:47:18.160 --> 01:47:20.517 And I wanna thank you for your leadership in that regard. 01:47:20.517 --> 01:47:23.900 And having spent a fair amount of time 01:47:23.900 --> 01:47:26.830 over in Asia, worked over there in a previous life, 01:47:26.830 --> 01:47:28.448 and just in the last 30 days, 01:47:28.448 --> 01:47:30.928 some meeting there with some allies. 01:47:30.928 --> 01:47:35.130 The Peace Through Strength Doctrine, 01:47:35.130 --> 01:47:36.330 that I really, you think you've brought 01:47:36.330 --> 01:47:39.718 back here from the days of President Reagan is working. 01:47:39.718 --> 01:47:42.420 And by keeping all options on the table 01:47:42.420 --> 01:47:44.852 as you have regarding North Korea. 01:47:44.852 --> 01:47:47.380 We have a window of opportunity now 01:47:47.380 --> 01:47:50.370 that we've not seen arguably in a generation. 01:47:50.370 --> 01:47:52.096 And I wanna thank you for your leadership. 01:47:52.096 --> 01:47:54.960 It's remarkable to hear the news this morning 01:47:54.960 --> 01:47:57.863 that three American detainees are on their way home. 01:47:57.901 --> 01:47:59.689 That's not by accident. 01:47:59.689 --> 01:48:03.780 And you ought to be commended for the important 01:48:03.780 --> 01:48:05.630 work the US Military has done 01:48:05.630 --> 01:48:07.380 by keeping all options on the table 01:48:07.700 --> 01:48:10.920 to drive Kim Jung Un here to a reasonable outcome 01:48:10.920 --> 01:48:12.820 in this dilemma here which is a denuclearization 01:48:12.820 --> 01:48:15.203 of the Korean peninsula. 01:48:15.382 --> 01:48:17.960 Earlier this year the Department of Defense 01:48:17.960 --> 01:48:20.000 released its updated National Defense Strategy 01:48:20.000 --> 01:48:21.610 which acknowledges the emergence 01:48:21.610 --> 01:48:23.072 of a long term strategic competition. 01:48:23.072 --> 01:48:27.280 After years of focused conflicts abroad 01:48:27.780 --> 01:48:30.130 this strategy is distinct in that it 01:48:30.130 --> 01:48:32.573 prioritizes defense of the homeland. 01:48:32.708 --> 01:48:35.450 Secretary Mattis, defense of the homeland 01:48:35.450 --> 01:48:38.343 is a core competency for our National Guard. 01:48:39.170 --> 01:48:41.160 What measures is the department taking 01:48:41.160 --> 01:48:44.620 to address some critical readiness shortfalls 01:48:44.620 --> 01:48:45.943 that we see in our Guard, 01:48:45.943 --> 01:48:50.943 such as the UH60 Blackhawk, and the AH64 Apache. 01:49:02.283 --> 01:49:05.020 - Senator I think I'm going to have to take that 01:49:05.020 --> 01:49:07.590 for the record, I know that we are upgrading 01:49:07.590 --> 01:49:10.853 and we're shifting air frames in certain places. 01:49:11.201 --> 01:49:12.593 But I'd better, 01:49:13.170 --> 01:49:14.670 do you have it with you David? 01:49:15.210 --> 01:49:16.110 - [David Norquist] I don't have a specific-- 01:49:16.110 --> 01:49:17.920 - Alright yeah, let us take that for the record 01:49:17.920 --> 01:49:19.560 so we can be specific. 01:49:19.560 --> 01:49:22.612 If it's those two helicopters you're concerned with, 01:49:22.612 --> 01:49:24.430 we can probably get you an answer, 01:49:24.430 --> 01:49:25.620 I'd say within the week. 01:49:25.620 --> 01:49:28.102 - Okay thank you, appreciate that. 01:49:28.102 --> 01:49:30.500 I just recently returned from leading 01:49:30.500 --> 01:49:31.923 a kodel to China. 01:49:32.186 --> 01:49:34.290 In fact I brought four US Senators 01:49:34.290 --> 01:49:36.590 with me the last 30 days where we 01:49:36.590 --> 01:49:39.520 were assessing the threats as well as the opportunities 01:49:39.750 --> 01:49:41.040 of our engagement with China. 01:49:41.040 --> 01:49:42.779 It was readily apparent to the delegation 01:49:42.779 --> 01:49:44.922 that after spending a week there. 01:49:44.922 --> 01:49:47.670 This leads me to believe that the very real 01:49:47.670 --> 01:49:50.540 threats that China poses to our national security, 01:49:50.540 --> 01:49:52.743 and that they need to be addressed directly. 01:49:53.200 --> 01:49:55.593 Whether it's their military investments, 01:49:55.809 --> 01:49:59.597 the economic development via forced technology transfers, 01:49:59.597 --> 01:50:04.060 outright theft, or China's rapidly developing 01:50:04.060 --> 01:50:06.093 and innovative tech sector, 01:50:06.480 --> 01:50:09.653 the time has passed where the US can be complacent. 01:50:10.510 --> 01:50:14.150 Secretary Mattis, how can we best impose 01:50:14.272 --> 01:50:18.510 effective export controls, and other means 01:50:18.510 --> 01:50:22.040 to protect US interests, and our innovation 01:50:23.010 --> 01:50:27.229 while not unduly impeding foreign direct investment 01:50:27.229 --> 01:50:29.743 for both our friends and our allies? 01:50:29.806 --> 01:50:32.320 - And that's the rub right there. 01:50:32.320 --> 01:50:33.780 That last phrase sir. 01:50:33.780 --> 01:50:36.910 I think right now, what Senator Cornym is leading 01:50:36.910 --> 01:50:41.068 in terms of the CIFIUS, and the how do we protect 01:50:41.068 --> 01:50:43.960 certain industries here in the country 01:50:44.080 --> 01:50:45.843 for research and development, 01:50:46.800 --> 01:50:50.325 that truly are critical to what we need 01:50:50.325 --> 01:50:53.210 for national defense, that is part of it. 01:50:53.210 --> 01:50:54.884 But we don't wanna do this in a way 01:50:54.884 --> 01:50:57.960 that basically takes a sledge hammer 01:50:57.960 --> 01:51:00.085 to handle something that's gotta be delicately 01:51:00.085 --> 01:51:04.223 addressed more directly fine tuned. 01:51:04.530 --> 01:51:06.020 So we're going to have to work 01:51:06.020 --> 01:51:08.650 closely with you because there are some areas 01:51:08.650 --> 01:51:10.940 that I see democracies from Australia 01:51:10.940 --> 01:51:14.384 to Europe, Canada, all working to protect. 01:51:14.384 --> 01:51:16.390 And it's interesting that the nations 01:51:16.390 --> 01:51:18.340 taking the most active role in this, 01:51:18.340 --> 01:51:21.935 are some of the most populous democracies right now. 01:51:21.935 --> 01:51:25.440 And so we all recognize that intellectual 01:51:25.440 --> 01:51:28.220 property theft is an issue that China 01:51:28.220 --> 01:51:29.630 is going to have to address if they 01:51:29.630 --> 01:51:31.827 want to be treated as an equal 01:51:31.827 --> 01:51:34.822 in terms of foreign investment in other firms. 01:51:34.822 --> 01:51:38.640 I think one of the reasons why we're looking 01:51:39.200 --> 01:51:41.460 at certain sanctions right now, 01:51:41.460 --> 01:51:45.016 certain tariffs and all, are as a result 01:51:45.016 --> 01:51:46.757 of this very issue. 01:51:46.757 --> 01:51:50.500 So we're looking at it with a host 01:51:50.500 --> 01:51:51.943 of different initiatives. 01:51:52.160 --> 01:51:55.270 But they've gotta be done with a fair degree of fidelity 01:51:55.270 --> 01:51:57.000 or we're going to actually run afoul 01:51:57.000 --> 01:51:59.644 of that lats point where we're penalizing 01:51:59.644 --> 01:52:02.598 ourselves rather than protecting ourselves. 01:52:02.598 --> 01:52:03.640 - Yeah absolutely. 01:52:03.640 --> 01:52:05.124 I think you look at virtually every 01:52:05.124 --> 01:52:08.354 Fortune 100 company, or Fortune 500 company 01:52:08.354 --> 01:52:11.077 has the growth in China, 01:52:11.077 --> 01:52:13.900 and our ability to supply those opportunities 01:52:13.900 --> 01:52:15.620 an important part of our overall growth 01:52:15.620 --> 01:52:17.630 for our American businesses. 01:52:17.630 --> 01:52:20.660 At the same time, it's become more and more clear to me 01:52:20.660 --> 01:52:23.010 that China is fierce competitor 01:52:23.010 --> 01:52:25.380 in the development of artificial intelligence, 01:52:25.380 --> 01:52:27.933 quantum computing, biotechnology, 01:52:29.440 --> 01:52:33.280 and that's the, of course the walk of wisdom 01:52:33.280 --> 01:52:35.623 it's gonna take here as we sort that out. 01:52:37.000 --> 01:52:38.933 Despite this, I tell ya, I'm confident 01:52:38.933 --> 01:52:42.100 the department recognizes those challenges. 01:52:42.100 --> 01:52:43.333 I hear it from you. 01:52:43.810 --> 01:52:45.818 And it's a very thoughtful response. 01:52:45.818 --> 01:52:48.170 And that you're moving aggressively 01:52:48.170 --> 01:52:51.113 to maintain our competitive edge as well. 01:52:51.330 --> 01:52:53.223 Both from a commercial viewpoint, 01:52:53.440 --> 01:52:55.651 and importantly from a military viewpoint. 01:52:55.651 --> 01:52:58.716 Nonetheless, one area the Chinese are outpacing us 01:52:58.716 --> 01:53:02.733 is actually in the mining of critical materials, 01:53:02.733 --> 01:53:05.313 and critical minerals. 01:53:05.620 --> 01:53:08.040 I understand these minerals are the building blocks 01:53:08.040 --> 01:53:09.560 for most of our military equipment, 01:53:09.560 --> 01:53:11.832 and without access to them, 01:53:11.832 --> 01:53:13.840 our most advanced weapons systems 01:53:13.840 --> 01:53:15.826 would be rendered useless. 01:53:15.826 --> 01:53:18.821 Additionally Defense News recently published 01:53:18.821 --> 01:53:22.398 that our dependence on China as a sole provider 01:53:22.398 --> 01:53:25.044 for at least 20 of these minerals 01:53:25.044 --> 01:53:28.295 makes this a strategic vulnerability, 01:53:28.295 --> 01:53:31.240 that poses a significant risk to our 01:53:31.240 --> 01:53:33.713 country's national security. 01:53:35.122 --> 01:53:38.870 Secretary Mattis, do you share any thoughts, 01:53:38.870 --> 01:53:40.970 or could you elaborate on what the Department 01:53:40.970 --> 01:53:43.743 of Defense is doing to mitigate 01:53:43.743 --> 01:53:47.060 this strategic vulnerability caused 01:53:47.060 --> 01:53:50.080 by our dependence on China for critical minerals 01:53:50.168 --> 01:53:55.003 which are used in our most advanced weapon systems. 01:53:55.270 --> 01:53:56.103 - Yes sir. 01:53:56.103 --> 01:53:58.410 Senator what we've got going on right now, 01:53:58.410 --> 01:54:02.283 it's an inner agency effort with Department of Defense 01:54:02.283 --> 01:54:05.685 at the main table there, Under Secretary Ellen Lord, 01:54:05.685 --> 01:54:08.640 and one of her key subordinates, 01:54:08.640 --> 01:54:10.994 who focuses on nothing but this issue, 01:54:10.994 --> 01:54:13.930 working with the Department of Commerce, 01:54:13.930 --> 01:54:16.186 Department of Treasury, Department of State 01:54:16.186 --> 01:54:19.840 as we look at how do we solve the problem. 01:54:19.840 --> 01:54:22.093 In other words, identify the problem, solve it. 01:54:22.093 --> 01:54:24.833 There's a number of different efforts underway. 01:54:24.833 --> 01:54:27.623 We're looking at putting together a program, 01:54:29.517 --> 01:54:30.350 a strategy basically that addresses 01:54:30.350 --> 01:54:31.550 all these vulnerabilities. 01:54:31.550 --> 01:54:34.125 In some cases technology can lessen 01:54:34.125 --> 01:54:36.790 our dependence on certain key elements. 01:54:36.790 --> 01:54:39.830 In other cases, there are other locations 01:54:39.830 --> 01:54:43.170 which are perhaps more costly for extraction. 01:54:43.170 --> 01:54:45.905 But they would work as a reserve. 01:54:45.905 --> 01:54:48.660 Certainly we could look at a strategic stockpile 01:54:48.660 --> 01:54:50.694 as well for certain things. 01:54:50.694 --> 01:54:54.970 So the process is underway, I can tell you that. 01:54:54.970 --> 01:54:57.076 I can't give you the output right now. 01:54:57.076 --> 01:54:58.798 And I don't think even if I had 01:54:58.798 --> 01:55:01.686 the work that they've done I could give you full answers. 01:55:01.686 --> 01:55:04.763 But I will assure you that this is getting full attention. 01:55:04.960 --> 01:55:07.205 - I'm out of time Mr. Secretary. 01:55:07.205 --> 01:55:08.900 But I just wanna let you know, 01:55:08.900 --> 01:55:11.030 please let this committee know 01:55:11.390 --> 01:55:14.120 how Congress might assist you in that effort 01:55:14.150 --> 01:55:16.723 to develop the strategy and next steps. 01:55:16.920 --> 01:55:18.870 This is playing the long game here. 01:55:18.870 --> 01:55:20.940 But it's an important strategy 01:55:21.053 --> 01:55:22.510 we need to lay out here when it relates 01:55:22.510 --> 01:55:24.660 to ensuring that we keep the homeland safe. 01:55:24.710 --> 01:55:25.543 Thank you. 01:55:25.663 --> 01:55:27.990 - There's 1800 reports here that I'm required 01:55:27.990 --> 01:55:29.518 to submit, I may just add one to it sir, 01:55:29.518 --> 01:55:32.760 on my own and report this back to you 01:55:32.760 --> 01:55:35.023 about where we're at on this issue. 01:55:35.120 --> 01:55:35.996 - [Senator Daines] Thank you. 01:55:35.996 --> 01:55:36.829 - Yes sir. 01:55:37.351 --> 01:55:38.184 - [Chairman] Senator Baldwin. 01:55:38.184 --> 01:55:39.393 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 01:55:39.430 --> 01:55:42.390 And thank you Mr. Secretary, and General 01:55:42.390 --> 01:55:44.193 for your service and for your being here 01:55:44.193 --> 01:55:47.260 as we have this year's hearing 01:55:47.260 --> 01:55:48.963 on the Defense Department budget. 01:55:48.963 --> 01:55:52.710 General Dunford as part of last year's hearing 01:55:52.720 --> 01:55:54.429 on the Defense Department Budget, 01:55:54.429 --> 01:55:58.930 I asked you for the record whether it 01:55:58.930 --> 01:56:01.515 was in the US interest to continue implementing 01:56:01.515 --> 01:56:03.833 the Iran Nuclear agreement, 01:56:04.000 --> 01:56:05.950 and what were the risks to the US 01:56:05.950 --> 01:56:10.119 and our national security, and our allies security 01:56:10.119 --> 01:56:12.074 if the agreement were scrapped. 01:56:12.074 --> 01:56:17.074 You responded in July of 2017 saying, 01:56:17.560 --> 01:56:22.273 and here I will quote, "I believe it is in the nation's 01:56:23.777 --> 01:56:25.747 "interest to continue implementing 01:56:25.747 --> 01:56:27.453 "the Iran nuclear agreement. 01:56:28.892 --> 01:56:32.017 "Militarily the JCPOA remains the most durable 01:56:32.017 --> 01:56:34.177 "means of preventing Iran from acquiring 01:56:34.177 --> 01:56:36.933 "a nuclear weapons capability. 01:56:37.018 --> 01:56:39.317 "If the United States scraps the deal 01:56:39.317 --> 01:56:42.757 "Iran could respond by restarting 01:56:42.757 --> 01:56:44.963 "its quest for nuclear weapons. 01:56:45.327 --> 01:56:48.157 "A nuclear armed Iran would further destabilize 01:56:48.157 --> 01:56:50.834 "the entire middle east, and could precipitate 01:56:50.834 --> 01:56:55.197 "a regional nuclear arms race, or regional war." 01:56:55.269 --> 01:56:58.750 Your response was, and remains consistent 01:56:58.750 --> 01:57:01.236 with the positions of other US military, 01:57:01.236 --> 01:57:03.107 and intelligence leaders including 01:57:03.107 --> 01:57:08.107 the consensus that Iran is in compliance with the agreement. 01:57:09.323 --> 01:57:12.260 For example, last month, you told the House 01:57:12.260 --> 01:57:13.840 Armed Services Committee that you 01:57:13.840 --> 01:57:15.893 were not aware of any violations. 01:57:15.893 --> 01:57:20.627 General Dunford, is your response from July 2017 01:57:20.627 --> 01:57:24.163 still your professional military judgment. 01:57:24.353 --> 01:57:26.060 - Senator I think you probably, 01:57:26.060 --> 01:57:30.270 as you understand my job really is to support the policy. 01:57:30.270 --> 01:57:32.467 So the President has changed the policy. 01:57:32.467 --> 01:57:35.280 Iran has a nuclear challenge. 01:57:35.280 --> 01:57:37.263 And as the Secretary outlined earlier, 01:57:37.340 --> 01:57:39.131 a maritime challenge, a cyber challenge, 01:57:39.131 --> 01:57:43.773 the support of proxies in the region as well. 01:57:43.890 --> 01:57:47.073 And so my job now is to adjust to that reality 01:57:47.073 --> 01:57:50.300 and make sure that I'm supporting the President's policy 01:57:50.300 --> 01:57:52.622 in the development or potential development 01:57:52.622 --> 01:57:54.123 of nuclear weapons by Iran. 01:57:56.092 --> 01:57:58.543 - But I think it's also true that your job 01:57:59.040 --> 01:58:01.748 involves giving us your best, 01:58:01.748 --> 01:58:04.137 and the President your best professional 01:58:04.137 --> 01:58:07.840 military judgment, has your judgment changed 01:58:07.840 --> 01:58:10.073 since you wrote that response? 01:58:10.390 --> 01:58:12.870 - Senator if I could, in this civilian 01:58:12.870 --> 01:58:15.895 can call the military point here, 01:58:15.895 --> 01:58:18.882 this took us over a year as we dealt 01:58:18.882 --> 01:58:22.760 with the inner agency, you saw it was not a hasty 01:58:22.760 --> 01:58:25.455 decision immediately after inauguration. 01:58:25.455 --> 01:58:28.868 And I can assure you that the Chairman and I 01:58:28.868 --> 01:58:33.430 were given full hearing, it was a rigorous debate. 01:58:33.430 --> 01:58:35.184 It went over many, many months. 01:58:35.184 --> 01:58:37.640 And you've seen it in the news 01:58:37.820 --> 01:58:40.939 as certain affirmations had to be made 01:58:40.939 --> 01:58:43.619 to the Congress by the President. 01:58:43.619 --> 01:58:46.787 And he got to a point to where he just did not see 01:58:46.787 --> 01:58:50.170 that this was in our best interest to continue. 01:58:50.170 --> 01:58:52.070 It had to do with all the other things 01:58:52.150 --> 01:58:56.105 that Iran is certainly doing from supporting Assad 01:58:56.105 --> 01:59:00.889 to supporting proxies, attacking in Saudia Arabia, 01:59:00.889 --> 01:59:04.558 and fomenting the problem down in Yemen. 01:59:04.558 --> 01:59:07.600 So all of this had to be mixed together 01:59:07.600 --> 01:59:09.970 and separate out what the Chairman's 01:59:09.970 --> 01:59:12.500 or my advice was on our area. 01:59:12.500 --> 01:59:15.410 It had to be leavened with foreign policy 01:59:15.410 --> 01:59:19.410 concerns out of state intel assessments 01:59:19.410 --> 01:59:21.860 of where they are at today, and where they're going. 01:59:21.860 --> 01:59:25.523 So I just wanna be completely candid with you on that. 01:59:26.320 --> 01:59:27.320 - I understand. 01:59:27.320 --> 01:59:29.635 And you know there's, 01:59:29.635 --> 01:59:34.480 whether you base it on violations, 01:59:34.480 --> 01:59:36.683 which I don't think any of our, 01:59:38.410 --> 01:59:40.870 our leaders identified, 01:59:40.870 --> 01:59:45.803 or the interests of the nation. 01:59:47.400 --> 01:59:51.030 I want to understand whether professional 01:59:51.030 --> 01:59:53.603 military judgment has changed since last year. 01:59:53.691 --> 01:59:57.393 But let me move on to a different topic. 01:59:59.218 --> 02:00:02.253 Secretary Mattis, and General Dunford, 02:00:02.329 --> 02:00:06.400 to meet the strategic challenge posed by China 02:00:06.416 --> 02:00:10.340 we need to ensure that our national security policies 02:00:10.340 --> 02:00:13.983 also strengthen our economic security. 02:00:14.357 --> 02:00:17.259 In the DOD context this means strengthening 02:00:17.259 --> 02:00:19.953 our defense industrial base. 02:00:20.163 --> 02:00:23.400 Like President Trump, I believe it is best 02:00:23.400 --> 02:00:27.313 accomplished through robust buy America policies. 02:00:27.313 --> 02:00:29.600 For example, earlier this month 02:00:29.600 --> 02:00:32.900 I introduced the Made in America Ship Building Act 02:00:33.080 --> 02:00:34.642 which requires that all ships 02:00:34.642 --> 02:00:36.663 purchased by the federal government, 02:00:36.780 --> 02:00:39.283 regardless of the agency or class, 02:00:39.420 --> 02:00:42.685 be made in America with US materials 02:00:42.685 --> 02:00:45.223 and US shipboard components. 02:00:45.223 --> 02:00:48.313 This bill will strengthen the industrial base, 02:00:48.440 --> 02:00:50.530 level the playing field for suppliers, 02:00:50.530 --> 02:00:54.458 and grow a skilled manufacturing jobs. 02:00:54.458 --> 02:00:57.858 But it will also help secure defense supply chains 02:00:57.858 --> 02:01:02.858 at a time of increased global insecurity and instability. 02:01:03.260 --> 02:01:06.040 By eliminating US reliance on foreign 02:01:06.040 --> 02:01:07.903 corporations and components. 02:01:07.903 --> 02:01:10.640 Can both of you provide your views 02:01:10.640 --> 02:01:12.870 on the importance of buy America policies 02:01:12.870 --> 02:01:14.682 to our defense industrial base, 02:01:14.682 --> 02:01:17.560 the national security implications 02:01:17.560 --> 02:01:20.998 of not having reliable access to critical supplies, 02:01:20.998 --> 02:01:24.970 and after market support, and the dangers 02:01:24.970 --> 02:01:26.640 posed by counterfeit parts, 02:01:26.640 --> 02:01:30.440 and adversarial nations using DOD supply chains 02:01:30.440 --> 02:01:34.983 for industrial espionage and technology transfer. 02:01:38.030 --> 02:01:40.712 - Yes Senator, the defense industrial base 02:01:40.712 --> 02:01:44.180 has shrunk over the years since the Cold War. 02:01:44.180 --> 02:01:45.443 We all recognize it. 02:01:45.580 --> 02:01:47.650 But there comes a point where preservation 02:01:47.650 --> 02:01:49.211 of it is critical. 02:01:49.211 --> 02:01:51.207 You cannot barter it away. 02:01:51.207 --> 02:01:54.760 You cannot, there is no more room to reduce 02:01:54.760 --> 02:01:56.826 it at a certain point. 02:01:56.826 --> 02:02:00.040 And I think the made in America effort 02:02:00.050 --> 02:02:03.160 is a very valid national security concern. 02:02:03.160 --> 02:02:06.220 Now at the same time, if there's allies 02:02:06.220 --> 02:02:09.460 that are as committed to defense of democracy, 02:02:09.460 --> 02:02:10.770 and we're in alliances with them. 02:02:10.770 --> 02:02:13.710 There may be some room for back and forth. 02:02:13.710 --> 02:02:14.873 We've done that before. 02:02:15.593 --> 02:02:17.190 As you know the Marine Harrier jet 02:02:17.250 --> 02:02:19.515 came out of England when it was first started. 02:02:19.515 --> 02:02:22.600 But I think too, that critical supplies, 02:02:22.600 --> 02:02:26.873 and certainly having faulty or counterfeit parts, 02:02:26.873 --> 02:02:30.379 these two actually go hand in hand, these two issues. 02:02:30.379 --> 02:02:33.518 And this is why I think the earlier question 02:02:33.518 --> 02:02:36.973 about how do we protect intellectual property, 02:02:37.060 --> 02:02:38.901 how do we look at what other nations 02:02:38.901 --> 02:02:41.593 should be allowed to invest in. 02:02:41.680 --> 02:02:43.173 I think it's an appropriate issue 02:02:43.173 --> 02:02:45.890 for the Congress to take in hand, 02:02:45.890 --> 02:02:47.190 and I think it's appropriate for you 02:02:47.190 --> 02:02:51.184 to ask us at what point do we see problems, 02:02:51.184 --> 02:02:52.903 strategic vulnerabilities. 02:02:52.903 --> 02:02:55.810 And we can provide that information to you. 02:02:55.810 --> 02:02:58.590 Again Under Secretary Ellen Lord 02:02:58.750 --> 02:03:00.423 is leading this effort. 02:03:00.500 --> 02:03:02.410 But we've got a lot of other people helping. 02:03:02.410 --> 02:03:03.909 And she has some members of her staff 02:03:03.909 --> 02:03:06.220 who do nothing but this issue. 02:03:06.220 --> 02:03:08.739 So we can give any kind of further detain, 02:03:08.739 --> 02:03:11.360 but I would just say I'm completely 02:03:11.360 --> 02:03:13.540 aligned with the themes as you outlined them. 02:03:13.540 --> 02:03:14.523 - [Senator Baldwin] Thank you. 02:03:14.776 --> 02:03:15.609 General Dunford. 02:03:15.609 --> 02:03:17.130 - Senator, in my opening remarks 02:03:17.130 --> 02:03:18.767 I spoke about competitive advantage. 02:03:18.767 --> 02:03:20.870 And I said that I have confidence today 02:03:20.870 --> 02:03:22.747 that we have a competitive advantage over potential, 02:03:22.747 --> 02:03:24.476 over any potential adversary. 02:03:24.476 --> 02:03:26.363 And I don't think you can understate 02:03:26.363 --> 02:03:28.811 the importance of the industrial base 02:03:28.811 --> 02:03:32.380 in the United States to that competitive advantage. 02:03:32.380 --> 02:03:33.890 So I think what you're alluding to, 02:03:33.890 --> 02:03:36.870 are both the qualitative implications 02:03:36.870 --> 02:03:39.010 of leveraging the US industrial base. 02:03:39.010 --> 02:03:41.570 We are always in front of everybody else. 02:03:41.570 --> 02:03:43.117 In part because of our educational system, 02:03:43.117 --> 02:03:45.217 and the quality of our workers. 02:03:45.217 --> 02:03:46.960 And then the other important point 02:03:46.960 --> 02:03:48.520 you pointed out was security. 02:03:48.520 --> 02:03:50.814 Obviously, our relationships with nations 02:03:50.814 --> 02:03:53.199 fall under laws within the United States 02:03:53.199 --> 02:03:54.946 makes it much easier for us to protect 02:03:54.946 --> 02:03:59.170 intellectual property and make sure that we do 02:03:59.170 --> 02:04:00.811 maintain that competitive advantage. 02:04:00.811 --> 02:04:02.311 - [Senator Baldwin] Thank you. 02:04:03.422 --> 02:04:05.423 - Mr. Secretary, General Dunford 02:04:05.423 --> 02:04:08.855 we appreciate your appearance before the committee today. 02:04:08.855 --> 02:04:12.779 Other Senators may submit additional written 02:04:12.779 --> 02:04:15.500 questions to you and if they do, 02:04:15.500 --> 02:04:17.390 I hope you will be able to respond the them 02:04:17.390 --> 02:04:21.138 within 30 days, and subject to all that 02:04:21.138 --> 02:04:24.500 the Defense Sub Committee will reconvene 02:04:24.500 --> 02:04:27.120 next Tuesday, May the 15th at 10 am 02:04:27.120 --> 02:04:30.143 to receive testimony from the United States Army. 02:04:30.230 --> 02:04:31.230 Thank you gentlemen.