WEBVTT 00:02.970 --> 00:04.470 - Well, good morning everyone. 00:05.600 --> 00:07.264 Let me welcome all of you 00:07.264 --> 00:09.870 to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 00:09.870 --> 00:10.940 I'm Ashley Tellis. 00:10.940 --> 00:13.730 I'm a senior fellow here in the endowment. 00:13.730 --> 00:17.210 And it's a great opportunity for us today 00:17.210 --> 00:19.120 that we have Randy Shriver, 00:19.120 --> 00:20.570 the Assistant Secretary of Defense 00:20.570 --> 00:24.523 for Asian and Pacific Affairs, joining us this morning. 00:26.000 --> 00:29.090 The topic as we have advertised 00:29.090 --> 00:33.150 is a conversation about the two-plus-two dialogue 00:33.150 --> 00:36.683 that's going to happen within about a week in Delhi. 00:38.060 --> 00:39.670 It's an event that is very important 00:39.670 --> 00:43.580 in the political calendar because the relationship 00:43.580 --> 00:48.580 has really come a long way since we first began 00:49.040 --> 00:52.440 working on the transformation about 20 years ago. 00:52.440 --> 00:56.020 And I'm particularly delighted that we could snag Randy 00:56.020 --> 01:01.020 to speak about it, because he has the action 01:01.270 --> 01:03.183 on this issue in the Pentagon. 01:04.270 --> 01:07.550 Randy, as all of you know, has had a long career 01:07.550 --> 01:11.593 in government, and public policy, analysis and in business. 01:12.560 --> 01:14.940 Prior to his current position, 01:14.940 --> 01:18.200 he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 01:18.200 --> 01:21.010 for East Asia, and the Chief of Staff 01:21.010 --> 01:22.347 and the Senior Policy Advisor 01:22.347 --> 01:26.097 to the Deputy Secretary of State under Bush 01:27.066 --> 01:29.840 (mumbles) right about there. 01:29.840 --> 01:33.130 He also served as the CEO and the President 01:33.130 --> 01:35.833 of the Project 2049 Institute, 01:36.960 --> 01:38.800 whose website, if you haven't seen, 01:38.800 --> 01:41.090 I would strongly command to your attention 01:41.090 --> 01:45.463 because it does superb work on East Asian security affairs. 01:46.460 --> 01:49.050 And Randy ran that for a long time 01:49.050 --> 01:51.470 before he came into government. 01:51.470 --> 01:54.370 He also was a founding partner of Armitage International. 01:54.370 --> 01:56.080 So he's covered all the basics, 01:56.080 --> 01:59.150 everything from business to public policy to government. 01:59.150 --> 02:02.930 And he's, without fear of contradiction, 02:02.930 --> 02:05.200 one of the nation's premier analysts 02:05.200 --> 02:07.030 of Asian security issues. 02:07.030 --> 02:08.590 So welcome, Randy. 02:08.590 --> 02:10.500 It's wonderful to have you. 02:10.500 --> 02:12.760 - Thank you very much for the invitation 02:12.760 --> 02:14.130 and I look forward to the discussion. 02:14.130 --> 02:16.100 - I look forward to that, too. 02:16.100 --> 02:18.750 I wanna start by just saying a few words 02:18.750 --> 02:21.153 of tribute to Senator McCain. 02:22.810 --> 02:27.510 Because he actually graced this very room at Carnegie 02:27.510 --> 02:31.520 twice in the last decade, if I remember, 02:31.520 --> 02:34.640 speaking on the very subject that we are about 02:34.640 --> 02:36.003 to have a conversation on. 02:37.830 --> 02:40.530 Without doubt, he was a towering figure 02:40.530 --> 02:44.630 in America's public life and he certainly left the country 02:44.630 --> 02:49.410 stronger by his presence and by his contributions 02:49.410 --> 02:51.943 as a soldier and as a public servant. 02:52.830 --> 02:54.960 They're very strong convictions about the issues 02:54.960 --> 02:57.038 that we care about. 02:57.038 --> 02:59.400 He reminded us that our values 02:59.400 --> 03:02.650 are really the most important part 03:02.650 --> 03:06.337 of who we are as people and as a country. 03:06.337 --> 03:09.870 And that our strength is essential 03:09.870 --> 03:14.077 if our vision and our values are to be protected. 03:14.077 --> 03:16.780 And on the two occasions that he actually spoke 03:16.780 --> 03:21.720 at Carnegie, he made a very strong plea 03:22.610 --> 03:26.490 for a strengthened US-India bilateral relationship 03:26.490 --> 03:30.240 as the foundation for the success of the liberal order. 03:30.240 --> 03:34.780 And so it is a particularly important thing, I think, 03:34.780 --> 03:37.170 that we recognize his spirit in this room 03:38.130 --> 03:40.470 as we have this conversation. 03:40.470 --> 03:44.590 I want to start this conversation with Randy with a quote 03:45.780 --> 03:50.780 from Senator McCain's 2010 speech which was remarkable 03:50.890 --> 03:52.800 as I was just going through it last night 03:52.800 --> 03:55.360 so please hear it, and the vision. 03:55.360 --> 04:00.360 And he said in 2010, if the United States and India 04:00.760 --> 04:03.343 are to forge a truly strategic partnership, 04:04.380 --> 04:06.370 our seniors leaders in government 04:06.370 --> 04:09.563 must prioritize two areas of cooperation above all, 04:10.550 --> 04:11.653 security and values. 04:12.940 --> 04:17.550 In short, the creation of geopolitical conditions 04:17.550 --> 04:21.220 that secure and expand the community of countries 04:21.220 --> 04:23.573 that value political and economic freedom. 04:24.920 --> 04:27.087 I think if there is lead motif 04:28.654 --> 04:29.853 for the conversation this morning, 04:29.853 --> 04:31.347 I think this is a great lead motif. 04:31.347 --> 04:34.200 And I wanna start on that note, Randy, 04:34.200 --> 04:37.350 by asking you to talk about the broader chapeau 04:38.440 --> 04:40.950 under which we are thinking of the bilateral relationship 04:40.950 --> 04:43.297 which is the free and open Indo-Pacific. 04:44.610 --> 04:48.700 The President surprised many because of the fears raised 04:48.700 --> 04:50.780 during the campaign of isolationism 04:50.780 --> 04:52.810 and America's engagement in the world 04:52.810 --> 04:54.410 when he came out and embraced 04:54.410 --> 04:56.347 the free and open Indo-Pacific. 04:57.280 --> 04:58.900 And yet this has been a subject 04:58.900 --> 05:01.103 that has been clouded by some uncertainty. 05:01.103 --> 05:03.080 So I was wondering if you could spend a few minutes 05:03.080 --> 05:06.360 just laying out what the administration's vision is 05:06.360 --> 05:08.750 and then sort of helping us think 05:08.750 --> 05:11.459 how you see India fitting into that rubric. 05:11.459 --> 05:12.820 - Sure. 05:12.820 --> 05:13.900 Well, thank you, can I just start 05:13.900 --> 05:15.070 by thanking you-- - Of course. 05:15.070 --> 05:17.470 - For the invitation and giving me this opportunity 05:17.470 --> 05:19.437 to talk about this relationship 05:19.437 --> 05:21.380 and the upcoming two-plus-two. 05:21.380 --> 05:23.860 And thank you so much for opening 05:23.860 --> 05:25.790 by paying tribute to Senator McCain, 05:25.790 --> 05:28.620 somebody who is a great American hero 05:28.620 --> 05:32.440 and meant so much to so many, but particularly 05:32.440 --> 05:35.600 for those of us who work in the Indo-Pacific. 05:35.600 --> 05:39.120 His leadership was just tremendous and counted on 05:39.120 --> 05:43.650 and now there's a real hole there that, I don't know, 05:43.650 --> 05:47.180 that can be filled but we certainly valued 05:47.180 --> 05:50.853 his voice for so long so thank you for that as well. 05:51.800 --> 05:53.820 I gotta also say, it's a little, 05:53.820 --> 05:55.890 it's a little strange for me to be sitting here 05:55.890 --> 05:59.034 being asked questions by Ashley Tellis about India. 05:59.034 --> 06:00.530 (audience laughing) 06:00.530 --> 06:03.050 Ashley Tellis is the person that we all go to 06:03.050 --> 06:06.730 to ask questions about India and have for a long time 06:06.730 --> 06:08.250 so I'll play along. 06:08.250 --> 06:09.258 - That's very kind. 06:09.258 --> 06:10.658 That's very kind, Randy. 06:10.658 --> 06:12.430 But you're not going to, please. 06:12.430 --> 06:15.740 - But we still, in the Department of Defense 06:15.740 --> 06:18.070 and across the government, count on Ashley's expertise. 06:18.070 --> 06:21.463 So, but I'll play along today and do my best here. 06:22.500 --> 06:25.360 So we've begun to publicly articulate 06:25.360 --> 06:27.650 the aspects of the Indo-Pacific, 06:27.650 --> 06:29.360 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. 06:29.360 --> 06:32.360 Secretary Mattis did that primarily 06:32.360 --> 06:35.670 with his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue recently 06:35.670 --> 06:38.260 at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum. 06:38.260 --> 06:42.240 Secretary Pompeo, Secretary of Energy Perry, 06:42.240 --> 06:45.810 Secretary Ross, OPIC President Washburne 06:45.810 --> 06:49.780 all started to articulate the economic and energy 06:49.780 --> 06:51.550 and development aspects of that 06:52.680 --> 06:54.040 so I don't need to repeat all that. 06:54.040 --> 06:56.870 But I think that the core is our belief 06:56.870 --> 07:01.500 that we're promoting a positive, 07:01.500 --> 07:03.560 affirmative vision for the region. 07:03.560 --> 07:07.470 It's not necessarily anti anybody, counter anybody; 07:07.470 --> 07:10.940 it's really affirming and promoting the principles 07:10.940 --> 07:12.580 of a free and open Indo-Pacific. 07:12.580 --> 07:16.740 So by free, at the core of that is 07:16.740 --> 07:19.030 we believe countries should have complete 07:19.030 --> 07:20.930 sovereign control of their countries 07:20.930 --> 07:22.990 to make decisions from capital, 07:22.990 --> 07:26.320 free from coercion, free from undue pressure. 07:26.320 --> 07:29.130 We also mean free open transparent 07:29.130 --> 07:31.163 and reciprocal trade relationships. 07:32.060 --> 07:35.510 By open, we're talking about open 07:37.100 --> 07:39.773 areas for commerce, for freedom of navigation, 07:40.630 --> 07:43.260 for broad participation 07:43.260 --> 07:46.913 in the life of the region commercially, economically. 07:47.859 --> 07:50.703 So we think this is something that is, 07:51.550 --> 07:54.770 US vision and strategy, but one that countries 07:54.770 --> 07:58.983 can readily sign up for in a variety of ways, 08:00.104 --> 08:04.150 but particularly this aspect of promoting sovereignty. 08:04.150 --> 08:07.030 Because we know that there are threats to that, 08:07.030 --> 08:10.270 we know that one of the principal challenges we're facing 08:10.270 --> 08:12.720 is the potential erosion of sovereignty 08:12.720 --> 08:14.450 coming through predatory economics, 08:14.450 --> 08:18.260 coming through intimidation and coercion 08:18.260 --> 08:19.870 through military means. 08:19.870 --> 08:22.030 So at a minimum sort of baseline, 08:22.030 --> 08:24.640 we really wanna promote that idea and be a partner. 08:24.640 --> 08:28.470 We don't seek influence or control of anybody's territory. 08:28.470 --> 08:31.980 We feel we're better off if countries have their own 08:31.980 --> 08:35.170 sovereign control and the ability to protect that. 08:35.170 --> 08:36.823 So how does India fit in? 08:38.310 --> 08:41.410 That's a subject of continuing discussion 08:41.410 --> 08:44.280 and will certainly be featured at the two-plus-two, 08:44.280 --> 08:46.760 but I would suggest just lay side-by-side 08:46.760 --> 08:48.790 Secretary Mattis' speech at Shangri-La 08:48.790 --> 08:52.183 and Prime Minister Modi's speech at Shangri-La 08:52.183 --> 08:53.833 who, of course, gave the keynote. 08:54.670 --> 08:58.590 This is not a situation where we're really searching 08:58.590 --> 09:01.580 for common ground and convergence. 09:01.580 --> 09:05.280 This is where a situation where 09:05.280 --> 09:07.300 as our leadership articulates the vision 09:07.300 --> 09:10.460 we see a lot of convergence and belief 09:10.460 --> 09:13.320 that these are principles we both share and wanna promote. 09:13.320 --> 09:16.090 So our goal is really to operationalize that 09:16.090 --> 09:17.680 with India as a partner. 09:17.680 --> 09:22.680 And the specifics I think will take form 09:23.667 --> 09:25.590 and some of that will be in the defense area, 09:25.590 --> 09:28.873 some of that may be in the development assistance area, 09:29.840 --> 09:30.990 but that's what we're working on. 09:30.990 --> 09:33.100 But again I think at the foundation, 09:33.100 --> 09:37.730 we can see our leadership roughly has the same vision 09:37.730 --> 09:42.140 as articulated by Prime Minister Modi and Secretary Mattis, 09:42.140 --> 09:45.870 and now it's our job to really operationalize that. 09:45.870 --> 09:49.610 - I actually found Prime Minister Modi's speech 09:49.610 --> 09:51.730 at Shangri-La quite remarkable, 09:51.730 --> 09:56.730 because he emphasized the same teams that we have. 09:58.586 --> 10:01.260 Though, he seemed to draw the distinction 10:01.260 --> 10:04.320 between the vision and strategy, 10:04.320 --> 10:07.940 and I'm not quite sure what was intended 10:07.940 --> 10:10.510 by the emphasis of that distinction. 10:10.510 --> 10:12.260 But clearly on the headlines, 10:12.260 --> 10:14.900 he emphasized a complete comfort 10:14.900 --> 10:17.010 with what the United States was trying to achieve 10:17.010 --> 10:19.130 because I think he sees that 10:19.130 --> 10:21.460 as being in India's interest as well. 10:21.460 --> 10:23.910 Is that the sense that you get as you prepare 10:23.910 --> 10:27.020 for the discussions going up to the two-plus-two? 10:27.020 --> 10:30.150 - Yes, again, we see, at least on the vision, 10:30.150 --> 10:34.970 a convergence and a lot of common ground. 10:34.970 --> 10:38.030 In terms of the strategy, well, I think that's something 10:38.030 --> 10:40.300 that we need to build out. 10:40.300 --> 10:42.960 And we've been putting this together 10:42.960 --> 10:45.553 but it's taken us a while to articulate this. 10:46.603 --> 10:49.300 Secretary Mattis' speechs at Shangri-La 10:49.300 --> 10:51.060 was a year and a half into the administration 10:51.060 --> 10:53.860 and now we have our other agencies 10:53.860 --> 10:56.210 articulating that at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum. 10:56.210 --> 10:59.550 So these things take a little time to build out. 10:59.550 --> 11:02.170 As we do that side-by-side in parallel with India, 11:02.170 --> 11:04.780 I think that, again I'll use the same phrase, 11:04.780 --> 11:06.590 operationalizing this strategy, 11:06.590 --> 11:09.320 we need to figure out what the division of labor might be, 11:09.320 --> 11:10.680 where the partnership might be, 11:10.680 --> 11:13.640 where the minilateral, multilateral opportunities 11:13.640 --> 11:15.840 that include both the United States and India may be, 11:15.840 --> 11:18.550 and that's basically what we're discussing. 11:18.550 --> 11:21.480 - Let me come back to this question in a different way. 11:21.480 --> 11:25.940 Shyam Saran, who was the former Indian Foreign Secretary 11:25.940 --> 11:28.460 and was deeply engaged in the negotiations 11:28.460 --> 11:33.460 on the Civil Nuclear Agreement, wrote a piece two weeks ago, 11:33.560 --> 11:36.010 I think it was published in one of the Indian newspapers, 11:36.010 --> 11:40.130 where he made the argument that although the US and India 11:40.130 --> 11:45.030 share very strong convergence on the Indo-Pacific vision, 11:45.030 --> 11:48.260 let's not kid ourselves, at the end of the day 11:48.260 --> 11:50.730 there is a common challenge, 11:50.730 --> 11:52.503 and that common challenge is China. 11:53.470 --> 11:57.450 If we did not have a challenge of the kind posed by China 11:57.450 --> 12:00.310 in the area of economics, in the area of sovereignty, 12:00.310 --> 12:02.560 in the area of its own military capabilities, 12:03.610 --> 12:07.593 the Indo-Pacific concept would sort of be less salient. 12:08.920 --> 12:10.320 How do we think of China? 12:10.320 --> 12:13.210 Because it's almost like Banquo's ghost 12:13.210 --> 12:15.078 when we talk about the Indo-Pacific. 12:15.078 --> 12:18.260 It's the one country that has tremendous prominence 12:18.260 --> 12:22.370 in the region that has a gravitational field 12:22.370 --> 12:24.490 that is attractive in some areas 12:24.490 --> 12:27.390 but also repelling because of some of its behaviors. 12:27.390 --> 12:31.170 So you mentioned that this is not against anyone, 12:31.170 --> 12:33.690 but there is a view both in India 12:33.690 --> 12:34.940 and even in the United States 12:34.940 --> 12:39.280 that we cannot sort of have rosy tinted glasses 12:39.280 --> 12:40.470 when we think about China. 12:40.470 --> 12:44.790 So how does China fit into our common vision 12:44.790 --> 12:46.440 for a free and open Indo-Pacific? 12:47.340 --> 12:49.580 - Well, I'm rarely accused of rose tinted glasses 12:49.580 --> 12:50.983 when it comes to China, but, 12:52.990 --> 12:56.250 look, I don't think we wanna lose the idea 12:56.250 --> 12:58.290 that this is an inclusive strategy, 12:58.290 --> 13:03.290 and we would prefer China embracing the same vision. 13:04.030 --> 13:06.860 I think if you're against free and or open 13:07.957 --> 13:09.910 there's a notice there to explain 13:09.910 --> 13:11.660 exactly what it is you don't like about it 13:11.660 --> 13:13.730 because then you're getting right to the heart 13:13.730 --> 13:16.330 of threatening a country's sovereignty 13:16.330 --> 13:20.140 and ability to have free flow of commerce, 13:20.140 --> 13:22.380 freedom of navigation, et cetera. 13:22.380 --> 13:27.040 So I think it's not so much, again countering 13:27.040 --> 13:30.483 any particular country but China's behavior, 13:31.410 --> 13:35.580 things they've articulated, sometimes we call China opaque 13:35.580 --> 13:39.050 or difficult, but in other ways they're very clear, right, 13:39.050 --> 13:41.170 and they're clear in public statements, 13:41.170 --> 13:43.330 they're clear in their actions and their behavior 13:43.330 --> 13:44.920 and they're demonstrating that they have 13:44.920 --> 13:47.830 a different aspiration for the Indo-Pacific region 13:47.830 --> 13:51.140 and it's manifested in their economic strategy, 13:51.140 --> 13:54.030 Belt and Road Initiative, their militarization 13:54.030 --> 13:58.020 of the South China Sea, a lot of the coercive approaches 13:58.020 --> 14:00.783 to the internal politics of others. 14:02.430 --> 14:04.990 So maybe there's a counterfactual 14:04.990 --> 14:06.450 where China isn't doing these things 14:06.450 --> 14:07.940 and we have trouble getting countries 14:07.940 --> 14:11.310 to align on an Indo-Pacific vision and strategy, 14:11.310 --> 14:15.040 but the world we live in it is in fact helping 14:15.040 --> 14:16.500 countries coalesce around this. 14:16.500 --> 14:20.440 So I suppose that's a residual sort of benefit 14:20.440 --> 14:21.620 of China's behavior. 14:21.620 --> 14:24.450 Again our preference would be an inclusive strategy 14:24.450 --> 14:27.360 that includes China as a constructive participant 14:27.360 --> 14:30.630 in regional affairs but that's I think largely demonstrated 14:30.630 --> 14:32.460 by their behavior, not the world we live in. 14:32.460 --> 14:36.418 So we wanna be a partner with India and other countries 14:36.418 --> 14:39.343 at looking how to have alternatives. 14:40.520 --> 14:44.390 You don't necessarily thwart or counter something 14:44.390 --> 14:46.240 like Belt and Road Initiative; 14:46.240 --> 14:47.673 you shine a light on the downsides of it, 14:47.673 --> 14:50.070 but you also have to have an alternative. 14:50.070 --> 14:52.260 And we've talked to India about 14:52.260 --> 14:53.750 coordinating development assistance 14:53.750 --> 14:55.380 and looking at how we can be partners 14:55.380 --> 14:57.633 in providing that alternative. 14:58.470 --> 15:01.130 Same would do in the military and security areas. 15:01.130 --> 15:04.530 How do we prove ourselves a preferred partner 15:04.530 --> 15:06.690 and a more trusted and reliable partner 15:06.690 --> 15:08.660 to countries in the Indo-Pacific region, 15:08.660 --> 15:10.260 rather than saying you shouldn't have a relationship 15:10.260 --> 15:12.710 with China and you shouldn't do these activities with China, 15:12.710 --> 15:17.540 that's just unrealistic given China's size, 15:17.540 --> 15:19.440 influence and geography. 15:19.440 --> 15:22.360 So this is the conversation we're going to have 15:22.360 --> 15:25.050 in Delhi, or I should say continue to have in Delhi, 15:25.050 --> 15:27.260 and I think China will be a factor 15:27.260 --> 15:29.703 in most of what we do going forward. 15:29.703 --> 15:32.810 - And I think the government of India 15:32.810 --> 15:35.220 certainly does not want to have a relationship 15:35.220 --> 15:38.960 that is one of complete alienation with China anyway, 15:38.960 --> 15:41.440 because China exists on its borders, 15:41.440 --> 15:44.460 it has a civilization relationship 15:44.460 --> 15:47.560 going back centuries so on and so forth. 15:47.560 --> 15:51.270 But I think there is a common effort being made 15:52.750 --> 15:55.545 with respect to an effective response 15:55.545 --> 15:58.090 and the effective response will take a different form 15:58.090 --> 16:01.917 in the strategic area, different form and the economic area. 16:01.917 --> 16:05.510 Do you have the sense that our relationship now 16:05.510 --> 16:10.510 is mature enough that we could begin to think of things 16:10.700 --> 16:13.890 that we do, not only for the other 16:13.890 --> 16:18.890 but also for third parties that might be implicated 16:19.730 --> 16:22.440 in both the strategic and economic realm? 16:22.440 --> 16:26.650 So for example, are we ready to sort of work together 16:26.650 --> 16:30.140 in a place like Africa or in Southeast Asia 16:30.140 --> 16:31.240 in the economic realm? 16:32.075 --> 16:34.220 In the strategic realm, what do you imagine 16:34.220 --> 16:36.420 the two countries actually being able to do? 16:37.560 --> 16:41.170 - It's a great question, and I do think our relationship 16:41.170 --> 16:42.610 has matured to that point, 16:42.610 --> 16:45.350 and these are items on our agenda. 16:45.350 --> 16:48.280 So we'll talk about, as I said, 16:48.280 --> 16:50.130 the coordination of development assistance, 16:50.130 --> 16:53.834 and I think we'll try to find some key areas 16:53.834 --> 16:57.460 where individual countries or regions 16:57.460 --> 16:59.160 are facing particular challenges 16:59.160 --> 17:02.010 in how we can find 17:04.075 --> 17:07.120 a common effort that, or where synergies exist 17:07.120 --> 17:12.120 if India and the US are involved in development assistance 17:12.210 --> 17:15.200 or economic activities trade. 17:15.200 --> 17:17.980 So I think that is where our relationship is 17:17.980 --> 17:21.167 and I think we can both promote our respective interests 17:21.167 --> 17:23.260 and our shared interests by doing that. 17:23.260 --> 17:25.580 I think that'll be true in the security area as well. 17:25.580 --> 17:27.973 We've seen exercises, 17:28.830 --> 17:30.940 not just bilateral US-India exercises, 17:30.940 --> 17:32.763 but multilateral exercises. 17:33.780 --> 17:35.920 Well, obviously you exercise for a reason, right? 17:35.920 --> 17:37.726 You exercise to improve readiness 17:37.726 --> 17:40.160 and training of your own forces, 17:40.160 --> 17:41.520 but you think about contingencies, 17:41.520 --> 17:46.060 you think about real-world possibilities, 17:46.060 --> 17:50.900 and so multilateralizing those opportunities 17:50.900 --> 17:52.100 is part of that as well. 17:52.980 --> 17:55.770 - Let me ask you a specific question about the two-plus-two, 17:55.770 --> 17:59.280 because it's in this context that the two-plus-two 17:59.280 --> 18:02.453 has received incredible attention in India, 18:03.510 --> 18:06.282 partly because it's the APEX meeting 18:06.282 --> 18:08.570 between leaders and the two sides 18:08.570 --> 18:12.250 and will set an agenda for some time to come 18:12.250 --> 18:15.130 in terms of activities, in terms of programmatic 18:15.130 --> 18:17.263 developments and so on and so forth. 18:17.263 --> 18:20.820 Can you tell us something about how this two-plus-two 18:20.820 --> 18:23.900 will be structured, what's on the agenda for conversation 18:23.900 --> 18:25.163 and just sort of walk our audience 18:25.163 --> 18:27.920 through what's likely to happen in Delhi 18:27.920 --> 18:29.520 a week or so from now? 18:29.520 --> 18:30.353 - Sure. 18:30.353 --> 18:32.040 Well, first of all, it's a historic meeting, 18:32.040 --> 18:35.041 it's the first ever two-plus-two between our countries 18:35.041 --> 18:37.580 that's significant in and of itself. 18:37.580 --> 18:40.170 But I think beyond that, we have an opportunity 18:40.170 --> 18:44.330 to really advance the relationship in in significant ways. 18:44.330 --> 18:47.790 You were kind enough to go through some of my bio 18:47.790 --> 18:51.270 and my background, I've seen a lot of high-level exchanges. 18:51.270 --> 18:53.913 Sometimes you meet, you talk, you go away 18:53.913 --> 18:56.630 and don't have a lot to show for it. 18:56.630 --> 18:59.730 In this case, I think we're meeting at this high level, 18:59.730 --> 19:04.130 we'll talk about regional issues and strategic issues, 19:04.130 --> 19:07.690 but we're also gonna have a set of actual concrete outcomes. 19:07.690 --> 19:09.340 So it's a very good combination 19:09.340 --> 19:11.720 of strategic high-level dialogue 19:11.720 --> 19:14.520 and concrete outcomes that will serve as enablers 19:14.520 --> 19:18.960 for advancing the relationship well beyond the meeting 19:18.960 --> 19:21.530 in Delhi on September 6th and 7th. 19:21.530 --> 19:26.140 So the conversation on strategic issues, 19:26.140 --> 19:30.280 regional security issues, certainly our shared interest 19:30.280 --> 19:32.523 in understanding China and how to respond to that 19:32.523 --> 19:34.860 will be front and center. 19:34.860 --> 19:37.350 Other aspects of promoting the free and open Indo-Pacific, 19:37.350 --> 19:39.580 how we approach Southeast Asia, 19:39.580 --> 19:41.167 I think we'll talk about Afghanistan, 19:41.167 --> 19:43.910 our shared interest there and driving that 19:43.910 --> 19:46.603 to a political settlement. 19:47.937 --> 19:49.382 But some of the concrete areas, 19:49.382 --> 19:53.240 and maybe I'll just stick to the defense areas, 19:53.240 --> 19:55.600 we're working on a set of enabling agreements, 19:55.600 --> 19:58.630 it's a bit of an alphabet soup of agreements. 19:58.630 --> 20:01.760 But collectively what that'll allow us to do 20:01.760 --> 20:03.340 is have secure communications, 20:03.340 --> 20:06.800 protect technology, protect information, 20:06.800 --> 20:08.810 getting those enabling agreements in place 20:08.810 --> 20:13.390 will allow security assistance cooperation to go forward, 20:13.390 --> 20:16.060 will allow us to exercise and training 20:16.060 --> 20:18.050 in more meaningful ways. 20:18.050 --> 20:21.950 So again those are really key concrete outcomes 20:21.950 --> 20:24.530 that will set us on a good course for the future. 20:24.530 --> 20:25.970 I think we're gonna expand the scope 20:25.970 --> 20:28.461 of some of our exercises. 20:28.461 --> 20:32.000 Increase the complexity and the elements 20:32.000 --> 20:34.770 that will participate in these exercises. 20:34.770 --> 20:36.490 That's a very good outcome. 20:36.490 --> 20:39.860 We're gonna talk about augmenting the two-plus-two 20:39.860 --> 20:43.970 to include perhaps at my level a two-plus-two 20:43.970 --> 20:46.280 and my counterpart at State Department 20:46.280 --> 20:49.760 so that as valuable as those exchanges are 20:49.760 --> 20:52.440 they tend to be once a year at best 20:52.440 --> 20:56.290 so we can augment that with other senior-level dialogue. 20:56.290 --> 20:58.970 So that's a very good outcome. 20:58.970 --> 21:02.600 The elevation of India to Strategic Trade Authority 21:02.600 --> 21:07.070 Tier One status is a very important outcome 21:07.070 --> 21:11.174 because again that's an enabler for trade 21:11.174 --> 21:15.250 and technology cooperation 'cause it lifts 21:15.250 --> 21:19.613 some of the restrictions on our ability to do that. 21:20.740 --> 21:23.170 So there's just a number of things that again 21:23.170 --> 21:26.100 will really set us on a great course as we go forward. 21:26.100 --> 21:27.340 - Well, the augmentation idea 21:27.340 --> 21:28.760 is actually particularly important, 21:28.760 --> 21:32.803 because it's hard to imagine the Secretary of Defense 21:32.803 --> 21:34.810 and his counterpart in India being able to meet 21:34.810 --> 21:36.410 as frequently as we would like 21:36.410 --> 21:39.660 simply because of troubles of the calendar. 21:39.660 --> 21:41.800 But if we can, at the working level, 21:41.800 --> 21:44.990 have a continuous dialogue I think that would be 21:44.990 --> 21:48.750 extremely productive and so kudos for doing that. 21:48.750 --> 21:52.370 Let me come back to the strategic aspect at two levels. 21:52.370 --> 21:53.823 One is the region itself. 21:54.860 --> 21:57.790 India lives in a sort of troubled neighborhood 21:57.790 --> 22:00.330 and we suddenly have a common project 22:00.330 --> 22:03.313 with respect to success in Afghanistan. 22:03.313 --> 22:06.710 There have been, the last few weeks in Afghanistan 22:06.710 --> 22:10.010 had been particularly troubled with Taliban activity, 22:10.010 --> 22:12.243 the attack on Ghazni and so on and so forth. 22:13.380 --> 22:18.380 Where do you see the President's decision 22:18.850 --> 22:20.950 to sort of stay the course in Afghanistan? 22:21.960 --> 22:26.960 How do you see the future of US-India cooperation 22:27.370 --> 22:29.050 in light of that decision? 22:29.050 --> 22:31.500 What are the expectations of India at this point? 22:33.200 --> 22:36.410 - Well, I'll leave the strategic policy decisions 22:36.410 --> 22:39.760 to the President and Secretary Pompeo, Ambassador Bolton 22:39.760 --> 22:42.180 about the future of our approach there. 22:42.180 --> 22:45.070 But I think what Secretary Mattis said yesterday 22:45.070 --> 22:47.860 and General Nicholson, our outgoing commander there, 22:47.860 --> 22:52.670 have said is, looking through all this recent activity 22:52.670 --> 22:56.000 we, nonetheless, see signs that there may be 22:56.000 --> 22:59.113 opportunities to move the political process forward. 23:00.340 --> 23:05.010 President Ghani's initial ceasefire was very revealing 23:05.010 --> 23:07.180 in a lot of ways, first of all, that they pulled it off. 23:07.180 --> 23:09.470 And some wanna say, well, it was only three days 23:09.470 --> 23:13.150 but in fact there were sort of localized ceasefires 23:13.150 --> 23:14.640 that extended beyond that. 23:14.640 --> 23:17.800 And again it was very revealing that there was 23:17.800 --> 23:19.810 a growing interest even on the Taliban side 23:19.810 --> 23:22.763 maybe for accelerated reconciliation. 23:23.900 --> 23:26.230 So we're seeing some signs 23:26.230 --> 23:30.070 that a political process is moving. 23:30.070 --> 23:33.000 President Ghani is pursuing another ceasefire 23:33.000 --> 23:36.613 and we'll see if the Taliban are willing to step up to that. 23:37.490 --> 23:41.010 So I think where we can be good partners with India, 23:41.010 --> 23:45.500 first of all, I think our goals are shared and common here, 23:45.500 --> 23:48.540 we do wanna drive this to a political settlement. 23:48.540 --> 23:51.410 India has a lot of experience in being a multi-ethnic, 23:51.410 --> 23:54.920 multi-religious democracy and manages 23:54.920 --> 23:56.480 all those complexities very well. 23:56.480 --> 23:59.830 There's things that Afghanistan can surely learn from that. 23:59.830 --> 24:01.250 But then there's the more concrete, 24:01.250 --> 24:03.523 the economic, and development assistance, 24:04.990 --> 24:08.150 election training and potentially monitoring 24:09.190 --> 24:12.920 some logistic support that may get into the security area, 24:12.920 --> 24:16.333 although I think our Indian friends are, 24:17.970 --> 24:21.110 have some limitations that they wanna honor and respect 24:21.110 --> 24:23.770 for regional security interests there. 24:23.770 --> 24:26.930 So I do see that this is an area where we can cooperate 24:26.930 --> 24:29.960 and that will be an agenda item at the two-plus-two. 24:29.960 --> 24:31.130 - And what about Pakistan? 24:31.130 --> 24:34.120 Because a great deal of the prospects 24:34.120 --> 24:36.590 for success in Afghanistan are determined 24:36.590 --> 24:38.360 by the choices that Pakistan makes 24:38.360 --> 24:40.410 which is one-dimensional to the issue. 24:40.410 --> 24:42.350 But the other dimension is Pakistan 24:42.350 --> 24:44.840 as a factor in US-India relations 24:44.840 --> 24:47.950 where India has viewed itself as being a victim 24:47.950 --> 24:50.720 of Pakistani supported terrorism over the years. 24:50.720 --> 24:52.520 And the Trump administration has really 24:52.520 --> 24:56.060 come out quite forthrightly in terms of holding Pakistan 24:56.060 --> 24:59.910 to account for these misdemeanors. 24:59.910 --> 25:02.573 How do you see the triangular relationship 25:02.573 --> 25:05.870 between the US and India and Pakistan at this point? 25:05.870 --> 25:08.040 - Well, I probably don't want to say a lot on that 25:08.040 --> 25:10.300 because we wanna give the new prime minister, 25:10.300 --> 25:12.230 the new government in Pakistan space 25:12.230 --> 25:15.600 to explore where there may be opportunities 25:15.600 --> 25:17.883 to improve relations with India. 25:18.740 --> 25:21.300 Many new governments come in to power in Islamabad 25:21.300 --> 25:25.290 and wanna do that and then run smack-dab into reality 25:25.290 --> 25:27.720 and all the difficulties. 25:27.720 --> 25:32.010 But in terms of separating what was said during a campaign 25:32.010 --> 25:34.493 and what he said since the election, 25:35.350 --> 25:38.470 we wanna give him space to find the opportunities 25:38.470 --> 25:40.340 to improve things with India. 25:40.340 --> 25:44.560 I think on the questions about how that all relates 25:44.560 --> 25:47.103 to Afghanistan and shared interests, 25:48.970 --> 25:51.760 there's no question we need Pakistan's help 25:51.760 --> 25:55.060 in encouraging, persuading, pressuring the Taliban 25:55.060 --> 25:56.790 to come to the negotiating table, 25:56.790 --> 25:59.500 deal with the national unity government 25:59.500 --> 26:03.160 under President Ghani and talk about a future 26:03.160 --> 26:06.720 where they're included, but not through force 26:06.720 --> 26:08.713 but through a political process. 26:10.190 --> 26:12.800 We have made decisions on curbing assistance 26:12.800 --> 26:17.360 and putting constraints on our relationship with Pakistan 26:17.360 --> 26:21.630 as a means to try to persuade them to adopt that course 26:21.630 --> 26:23.853 and use their influence on the Taliban. 26:24.970 --> 26:29.000 We're still evaluating as to the impact of that. 26:29.000 --> 26:31.740 It's certainly not where we want it to be, 26:31.740 --> 26:34.790 but it's something that I think we'll stick with. 26:34.790 --> 26:38.930 And certainly the end state should be one 26:38.930 --> 26:40.293 that we can all agree on. 26:41.520 --> 26:44.360 So I think it's a matter of dealing with suspicions 26:44.360 --> 26:47.090 and distrust in the mix of all this. 26:47.090 --> 26:48.680 And I think the best thing, 26:48.680 --> 26:50.680 if we can get some momentum behind this 26:51.680 --> 26:54.990 initial ceasefire, sorry, the second ceasefire offer, 26:54.990 --> 26:57.970 and have that lead to some political dialogue, 26:57.970 --> 27:00.420 I think that would go a long way in reducing 27:00.420 --> 27:03.730 suspicions among all these other actors and players. 27:03.730 --> 27:05.830 - Absolutely, and that, by definition, 27:05.830 --> 27:07.060 will be a long-term process, right? 27:07.060 --> 27:11.797 It's not likely to come to any happy conclusion, so be it. 27:11.797 --> 27:13.180 - It may be. 27:13.180 --> 27:16.250 I mean we've moved our Afghanistan approach 27:16.250 --> 27:18.720 to a conditions-based approach, not a timeline, 27:18.720 --> 27:21.370 but if Secretary Mattis were sitting here 27:21.370 --> 27:22.730 I can assure you he would say 27:22.730 --> 27:26.660 17 years is long enough to be involved in a war. 27:26.660 --> 27:27.493 We need this to end. 27:27.493 --> 27:28.900 We want this to end. 27:28.900 --> 27:31.840 So we're not on a timeline; it's conditions-based. 27:31.840 --> 27:35.850 But we do see, through President Ghani's initiatives, 27:35.850 --> 27:37.750 some of the reaction from the Taliban 27:37.750 --> 27:39.410 to the initial ceasefire. 27:39.410 --> 27:42.200 We do see an opportunity there that we really wanna seize. 27:42.200 --> 27:45.240 So it may be long term, ultimately, to get Afghanistan 27:45.240 --> 27:47.130 to a place where we all want it to be, 27:47.130 --> 27:49.500 but this is a potential inflection point 27:49.500 --> 27:50.543 that we wanna seize. 27:51.500 --> 27:54.460 - Can I move the aperture and make it 27:54.460 --> 27:56.960 a little broader for a second 'cause I wanna talk about 27:56.960 --> 28:00.840 a country to Pakistan's west to India's west, 28:00.840 --> 28:04.081 which is of concern to India, and this is Iran, 28:04.081 --> 28:06.320 and that concern is obviously anchored 28:06.320 --> 28:10.093 in the change of course that the administration is pursuing. 28:10.930 --> 28:12.230 I suspect this as an issue 28:12.230 --> 28:14.273 that will come up in the two-plus-two. 28:15.200 --> 28:20.200 The Indian concern about Iran, of course, 28:20.670 --> 28:25.050 has to do with changes in US policy and the implications 28:25.050 --> 28:27.490 for India's own relationship with Iran. 28:27.490 --> 28:29.520 What are we asking of India and Iran? 28:29.520 --> 28:32.323 What is the administration trying to get done here? 28:33.280 --> 28:37.760 - Well, I am, on most days of the week, 28:37.760 --> 28:39.920 happy to leave Iran to my colleague, 28:39.920 --> 28:41.440 Robert Karem, my counterpart 28:41.440 --> 28:43.060 as an assistant secretary of defense. 28:43.060 --> 28:45.600 But you're right, it does very much bleed over 28:45.600 --> 28:49.180 into my area of responsibility and it will be 28:49.180 --> 28:52.973 a topic of discussion, I believe, at the two-plus-two. 28:53.860 --> 28:55.560 Without going into a lot of detail, 28:55.560 --> 28:57.670 because I think we need to hear from the Indians, 28:57.670 --> 29:00.230 this is still a relatively new development 29:00.230 --> 29:04.500 pulling out of JCPOA and what that may ultimately mean 29:04.500 --> 29:08.543 for a variety of things, potential sanctions, et cetera. 29:09.420 --> 29:13.050 I think we'll go to the table and look forward 29:13.050 --> 29:15.910 to hearing from the Indians about their relationship there 29:15.910 --> 29:19.681 and what they see as key priorities 29:19.681 --> 29:22.820 to try to preserve, if they can. 29:22.820 --> 29:25.610 But obviously the President made the decision he did on Iran 29:25.610 --> 29:27.550 because of concerns about the agreement 29:27.550 --> 29:31.030 and about having, in our view, 29:31.030 --> 29:33.830 a need for something much stronger 29:33.830 --> 29:37.530 and dealing with Iran's, not only nuclear program 29:37.530 --> 29:40.900 but their behavior so I think we need to sit 29:40.900 --> 29:43.820 and have that very open candid, sober dialogue 29:43.820 --> 29:45.580 and see where we come out the other side. 29:45.580 --> 29:48.780 But we understand that India will raise these issues 29:48.780 --> 29:51.280 and we welcome that and we'll have the discussion. 29:52.350 --> 29:54.250 - There is a parallel discussion around 29:54.250 --> 29:57.573 that's also on Indian minds, and that is Russia. 29:58.770 --> 30:03.210 The administration is struggling to come to terms 30:03.210 --> 30:05.690 with the whole problem of Russian interference 30:05.690 --> 30:08.350 in US domestic politics, while the President, 30:08.350 --> 30:10.790 at the same time, has made various overtures 30:10.790 --> 30:11.933 of outreach to Russia. 30:12.785 --> 30:14.770 The specific concern to India at the moment 30:14.770 --> 30:16.477 is of course the threat of sanctions 30:16.477 --> 30:19.553 particularly on Russian and Indian defense trade. 30:20.490 --> 30:22.330 I imagine this is one of those issues 30:22.330 --> 30:24.830 that will also have to be discussed at some point. 30:25.680 --> 30:30.220 How does one work with India 30:30.220 --> 30:33.000 to achieve a common goal which is to sort of 30:33.000 --> 30:36.650 strengthen India's capacity in the Indo-Pacific 30:36.650 --> 30:39.270 without letting India's relations with Russia 30:39.270 --> 30:41.270 become a problem in US-Indian relations? 30:42.661 --> 30:45.010 - It's a complex issue so let me, 30:45.010 --> 30:46.940 let me just say a few things. 30:46.940 --> 30:50.667 We understand the historical nature of that relationship 30:50.667 --> 30:54.250 and the legacy of that relationship as it applies 30:54.250 --> 30:57.150 to the defense ministry and the military, 30:57.150 --> 31:00.393 so a lot of legacy platforms and the need to support those. 31:02.372 --> 31:06.137 I think what we wanna do is have a conversation 31:06.137 --> 31:09.250 with India that's not about the past and their legacy, 31:09.250 --> 31:12.483 but about the future and look at the nature of this regime. 31:13.360 --> 31:15.480 Look at Crimea, Ukraine, I called it 31:15.480 --> 31:17.270 the laundry list when I was in Manila, 31:17.270 --> 31:20.633 the chemical attack in the UK. 31:22.879 --> 31:26.810 And look at Russia's own future, their demographics. 31:26.810 --> 31:31.810 This is I think not a country that you really wanna have 31:32.010 --> 31:36.290 a strategic partnership well into the future. 31:36.290 --> 31:38.290 We can be a more reliable, better partner. 31:38.290 --> 31:41.050 So that's sort of at the macro level. 31:41.050 --> 31:46.050 To deal with issues like CATSA and potential sanctions 31:47.430 --> 31:49.593 I think we need to be very careful here. 31:50.530 --> 31:53.210 Secretary Mattis did in fact go to Capitol Hill 31:53.210 --> 31:56.530 and often use India as sort of a flagship example 31:56.530 --> 32:01.530 as to why we wanted a waiver for the Secretary of State. 32:01.940 --> 32:04.340 And so I think that created a certain impression 32:05.327 --> 32:07.910 that we're gonna completely protect the India relationship, 32:07.910 --> 32:12.910 insulate India from any fallout from this legislation 32:13.540 --> 32:14.510 no matter what they do. 32:14.510 --> 32:17.943 I would say that's a bit misleading. 32:20.890 --> 32:23.960 We would still have very significant concerns 32:23.960 --> 32:27.930 if India pursued major new platforms and systems. 32:27.930 --> 32:31.820 I can't sit here and tell you that they would be exempt, 32:31.820 --> 32:34.080 that we would use that waiver. 32:34.080 --> 32:35.810 That'll be the decision of the President. 32:35.810 --> 32:39.010 If he's faced with a major new platform 32:39.010 --> 32:41.660 and capability that India has acquired from Russia 32:41.660 --> 32:43.080 that'll be the President's decision. 32:43.080 --> 32:44.950 But all I know is I can't sit here and tell you 32:44.950 --> 32:47.050 that the waiver will be used in that case. 32:48.810 --> 32:52.320 So that's a specific thing that we'll have to navigate. 32:52.320 --> 32:56.180 I think overall one of the reasons Secretary Mattis 32:56.180 --> 33:00.010 use India as that flagship example is he knows 33:00.010 --> 33:02.240 where he wants the relationship to go with India. 33:02.240 --> 33:03.570 He wants it to go forward. 33:03.570 --> 33:05.300 He wants it to improve, strengthen, 33:05.300 --> 33:08.170 be more capable as a partnership 33:08.170 --> 33:10.230 and he doesn't want these impediments. 33:10.230 --> 33:14.580 And so whether it's finding ways 33:14.580 --> 33:17.510 to persuade India to go a different course, 33:17.510 --> 33:19.790 rely on us as a trusted partner 33:19.790 --> 33:21.640 and supplier of defense equipment, 33:21.640 --> 33:24.490 whether it's giving consideration to a waiver 33:24.490 --> 33:25.830 we know the direction we wanna go 33:25.830 --> 33:28.470 and we don't want these to be impediments. 33:28.470 --> 33:30.840 - I hope we get the opportunity of the two-plus-two 33:30.840 --> 33:33.163 to actually have the strategic conversation. 33:34.190 --> 33:37.260 Because the strategic conversation is truly fundamental. 33:37.260 --> 33:39.650 If India understands Russia's own evolution 33:40.810 --> 33:45.810 and recognizes its limits for India's own self-interests 33:45.950 --> 33:48.040 that would be a productive opportunity 33:48.040 --> 33:51.030 for us to see how we can break through 33:51.030 --> 33:52.930 some of the logjams and other issues. 33:52.930 --> 33:55.280 - Well said, I think we'll endeavor to do that. 33:56.830 --> 33:59.270 - I will have two last questions 33:59.270 --> 34:01.650 before I open it to the floor. 34:01.650 --> 34:04.700 One has to do with the change that has occurred 34:04.700 --> 34:08.730 in the Trump administration with respect to economic policy, 34:08.730 --> 34:10.600 not only towards India but towards 34:10.600 --> 34:12.400 a range of other countries. 34:12.400 --> 34:15.000 But the specific question to India is the following. 34:16.360 --> 34:17.790 The Department of Defense in particular 34:17.790 --> 34:19.640 has gone out of its way to emphasize 34:19.640 --> 34:21.870 the importance of the strategic partnership 34:21.870 --> 34:25.190 as has the administration and the National Security Strategy 34:25.190 --> 34:28.120 and the National Defense Strategy documents. 34:28.120 --> 34:32.510 But how can we sort of work with India 34:32.510 --> 34:35.430 when in the economic arena we still have 34:35.430 --> 34:39.820 a series of irritants and difficulties 34:39.820 --> 34:44.630 while we appear to be making much greater progress 34:45.560 --> 34:46.873 in the defense space? 34:48.780 --> 34:50.930 Because the Trump administration has made economic 34:50.930 --> 34:55.610 so important and central to its engagement with the world, 34:55.610 --> 34:59.020 how do we sort of keep both these elements 34:59.020 --> 35:02.950 in the relationship in sync as we move forward? 35:02.950 --> 35:04.020 - Well, it can be a challenge. 35:04.020 --> 35:08.330 And I would just say in support of my colleagues 35:08.330 --> 35:10.343 who do the trade and economic issues, 35:11.600 --> 35:15.070 we need that channel at that ongoing dialogue 35:15.070 --> 35:18.570 to be successful because these are long-standing irritants. 35:18.570 --> 35:20.900 I would say this is not just the Trump administration 35:20.900 --> 35:24.140 or maybe the Trump administration is taking this 35:24.140 --> 35:27.230 more head on and applying different tools, 35:27.230 --> 35:29.290 but you know better than I, 35:29.290 --> 35:32.310 some of the long-standing irritants in this relationship. 35:32.310 --> 35:34.350 I would say from a defense perspective 35:36.343 --> 35:38.320 that the economic and trade relationship 35:38.320 --> 35:42.230 can be supportive, additive, complementary 35:42.230 --> 35:44.620 to what we do on the defense and security side 35:44.620 --> 35:47.300 and that's the optimal environment. 35:47.300 --> 35:50.920 But we certainly have history and are able 35:50.920 --> 35:54.174 to walk and chew gum at the same time. 35:54.174 --> 35:57.840 I'm old enough to remember the difficulties we had 35:57.840 --> 36:01.970 with Japan in the 1980s when we had members of Congress 36:01.970 --> 36:05.470 smashing Toshiba products on the steps of the Capitol 36:05.470 --> 36:09.880 and incredible trade irritants and disputes with Japan, 36:09.880 --> 36:13.040 all the while our alliance and our security relationship 36:13.040 --> 36:15.780 was evolving at a very good pace 36:15.780 --> 36:17.980 driven by our security interest. 36:17.980 --> 36:22.770 So we are able to compartmentalize, if we have to. 36:22.770 --> 36:24.880 I think the realities of the security environment 36:24.880 --> 36:27.110 will create a natural convergence 36:27.110 --> 36:29.380 and give us these opportunities 36:29.380 --> 36:32.510 irrespective of what's happening on the trade side. 36:32.510 --> 36:34.570 So I'm not saying that's what we want, 36:34.570 --> 36:39.000 but I think our interests are very compelling 36:39.000 --> 36:41.310 and persuasive on the defense and security side 36:41.310 --> 36:44.190 that I think we'll be able to continue momentum 36:44.190 --> 36:45.920 even in that environment. 36:45.920 --> 36:47.850 - That is actually a consoling image 36:47.850 --> 36:48.800 because you're absolutely right. 36:48.800 --> 36:53.800 Japan offers a useful example of the United States 36:53.930 --> 36:56.840 having faced the situation before and having come out, 36:56.840 --> 36:58.625 both the United States and Japan having come out 36:58.625 --> 36:59.720 the better for it. 36:59.720 --> 37:01.269 So I hope we can actually end up 37:01.269 --> 37:02.730 in the same place with India. 37:02.730 --> 37:05.070 The last question I have before I open it to the floor 37:05.070 --> 37:09.240 is going into the two-plus-two, how would you judge 37:09.240 --> 37:13.110 the health of the US in their strategic relationship net-net 37:13.110 --> 37:16.630 taking into account all these difficulties in some cases, 37:16.630 --> 37:18.700 opportunities and others? 37:18.700 --> 37:20.690 Where do you see us today? 37:20.690 --> 37:23.540 Do we have the foundations in place 37:23.540 --> 37:27.390 for building something that is truly substantial 37:28.550 --> 37:30.790 for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific 37:30.790 --> 37:32.370 over the next decade? 37:32.370 --> 37:35.570 - Yeah, we're quite bullish as a US government 37:35.570 --> 37:38.340 and at the Department of Defense in particular. 37:38.340 --> 37:40.890 And it's really, and I should've said this earlier, 37:42.120 --> 37:46.003 we're really the beneficiaries of decades of great work. 37:46.880 --> 37:49.823 The Bush administration, your contributions, Ashley, 37:51.360 --> 37:54.430 working through the civil nuclear deal, 37:54.430 --> 37:57.650 the Obama administration particularly on the defense side, 37:57.650 --> 37:59.340 we used to sometimes refer to Ash Carter 37:59.340 --> 38:02.481 as the India desk officer when he was Secretary of Defense. 38:02.481 --> 38:04.415 - He almost was. 38:04.415 --> 38:07.120 - But the creation of the major defense partner concept 38:07.120 --> 38:09.250 coming in the Obama administration. 38:09.250 --> 38:14.250 And so this is sort of evolutionary in its nature. 38:14.480 --> 38:17.100 But I think all that good work, what it amounts to 38:17.100 --> 38:19.000 is the creation of that foundation 38:19.000 --> 38:21.243 you're talking about and asking about, 38:22.660 --> 38:26.690 I think would benefit from leadership on both sides 38:26.690 --> 38:29.023 that are willing to take some risks, 38:31.480 --> 38:32.870 having articulated a vision, 38:32.870 --> 38:36.680 talk about how to operationalize a strategy. 38:36.680 --> 38:39.903 So we're quite bullish, as I said. 38:41.190 --> 38:43.630 We'll be able to navigate some of these challenges, 38:43.630 --> 38:46.200 I believe, and come out the other side 38:46.200 --> 38:48.500 with being able to say our administration 38:48.500 --> 38:51.200 continued the momentum that the previous ones started. 38:52.563 --> 38:54.207 So I'm pretty optimistic. 38:54.207 --> 38:56.020 - Well, I wish you and your colleagues all the best 38:56.020 --> 38:58.496 for the next couple of weeks 38:58.496 --> 38:59.673 as you'll have these conversations 38:59.673 --> 39:01.323 and for whatever comes after. 39:02.410 --> 39:05.890 I'm gonna open the floor to our guests. 39:05.890 --> 39:09.630 And if you could identify yourself 39:09.630 --> 39:12.470 and make the question or the comment 39:12.470 --> 39:14.402 sort of pointed and brief so I can give 39:14.402 --> 39:16.860 as many people a chance that would be helpful. 39:16.860 --> 39:17.817 Yes, ma'am. 39:25.580 --> 39:27.970 - [Woman] How India is getting caught up 39:27.970 --> 39:30.150 in the sanctions against Russia, 39:30.150 --> 39:32.720 but you didn't talk as much about the sanctions 39:32.720 --> 39:34.670 against Iran so I'm hoping you can give us 39:34.670 --> 39:37.480 a little bit more detail and how you plan 39:37.480 --> 39:39.130 to navigate those sanctions 39:39.130 --> 39:41.740 particularly with regards to oil. 39:41.740 --> 39:46.360 And I also wanted just to press you in terms of CATSA 39:46.360 --> 39:49.465 on the purchase of the S-400. 39:49.465 --> 39:53.950 And does the US plan to seek a waiver 39:53.950 --> 39:57.541 for CATSA for the S-400 for India? 39:57.541 --> 40:01.913 And if yes or no, what is the precedent that that sets? 40:03.573 --> 40:05.040 - Nice to see you face to face. 40:05.040 --> 40:06.453 We've had communication. 40:07.710 --> 40:10.040 I'm gonna to resist the urge to talk more about Iran. 40:10.040 --> 40:13.387 As I said, I think we need the opportunity to sit down 40:13.387 --> 40:18.040 with our Indian friends at this high level 40:18.040 --> 40:21.210 and have a good exchange on where 40:21.210 --> 40:23.200 India thinks its interests are 40:23.200 --> 40:26.200 and the aspects of the relationship with Iran 40:26.200 --> 40:29.430 that they feel they need to protect or insulate 40:29.430 --> 40:32.650 and we'll be able to explain our point of view on that. 40:32.650 --> 40:36.140 But again it's a relatively new development 40:37.130 --> 40:41.440 within JCPOA and the potential imposition 40:41.440 --> 40:44.430 of sanctions as it relates to that. 40:44.430 --> 40:47.470 So I'll leave that for the future 40:47.470 --> 40:49.333 to talk about after the two-plus-two. 40:50.270 --> 40:54.567 On Russia, CATSA, S-400, 40:57.550 --> 40:59.480 obviously we have this legislation, 40:59.480 --> 41:02.610 CATSA, not because of anything India's doing, 41:02.610 --> 41:05.220 anything we're doing, it's because of Russian behavior. 41:05.220 --> 41:08.660 And I went through the partial laundry list 41:08.660 --> 41:12.620 but the Congress felt the need to take action 41:12.620 --> 41:16.040 and to demonstrate not only in words and in spirit 41:16.040 --> 41:19.390 why we think this regimes activities are so troublesome 41:19.390 --> 41:21.610 but to actually take concrete action to try to have 41:21.610 --> 41:25.543 a consequence and punishment for this behavior. 41:27.470 --> 41:30.280 I think most people acknowledge it was flawed legislation 41:30.280 --> 41:32.570 for the reasons that some of our partners, 41:32.570 --> 41:35.690 friends and allies themselves might end up 41:35.690 --> 41:37.590 paying a price that was not intended. 41:37.590 --> 41:40.500 So Congress was very good at working with us 41:40.500 --> 41:43.930 to create this waiver opportunity 41:43.930 --> 41:45.710 and now we have a little more flexibility 41:45.710 --> 41:47.380 for the secretary of state and President 41:47.380 --> 41:48.933 to make those determinations. 41:50.080 --> 41:53.200 I, as I said, I cannot sit here today and tell you 41:53.200 --> 41:57.310 if India buys X then the waiver will be used 41:57.310 --> 41:58.630 or it won't be used. 41:58.630 --> 42:02.940 I think S-400 in particular is a system 42:04.410 --> 42:07.180 that's particularly troubling for a lot of reasons. 42:07.180 --> 42:11.660 And I think our strong preference, 42:11.660 --> 42:13.850 India is a friend, it's a sovereign country, 42:13.850 --> 42:15.170 they'll make their own decisions, 42:15.170 --> 42:18.250 but our preference is to seek alternatives 42:18.250 --> 42:20.610 and see if we can be a partner to India 42:20.610 --> 42:22.640 in addressing those defense needs. 42:22.640 --> 42:25.240 If they choose to go down that route, 42:25.240 --> 42:27.616 like I said, I can't sit here and tell you today 42:27.616 --> 42:29.550 that a waiver would necessarily be used. 42:29.550 --> 42:32.350 It would be a topic discussed at the highest level 42:32.350 --> 42:34.708 of our government and they would make some determination. 42:34.708 --> 42:38.375 (audience faintly speaking) 42:40.600 --> 42:44.240 Well, it'd be some weighing of the concerns 42:44.240 --> 42:46.210 that that acquisition creates 42:46.210 --> 42:49.560 and how that could impact a variety of things 42:49.560 --> 42:52.040 including the future of our defense cooperation, 42:52.040 --> 42:54.420 it could put limitations on it, 42:54.420 --> 42:56.500 versus wanting the political space 42:56.500 --> 42:58.700 and the ability to build out the strategic partnership 42:58.700 --> 43:01.083 with India at a more rapid pace. 43:02.230 --> 43:03.063 - Yes, sir. 43:05.780 --> 43:07.230 Just wait for the microphone. 43:11.280 --> 43:12.300 - [Mitsuo] Thank you for coming. 43:12.300 --> 43:15.450 My name is Mitsuo Nakai, Reagan Foundation, 43:15.450 --> 43:16.533 Heritage Foundation. 43:19.497 --> 43:22.200 In my opinion, two of the most important allies 43:22.200 --> 43:26.350 we have are Japan and India. 43:26.350 --> 43:27.590 No doubt about that. 43:27.590 --> 43:32.470 My question is do you envision 43:32.470 --> 43:37.470 trilateral summit type of things in terms of security 43:38.542 --> 43:41.640 including economic issues? 43:41.640 --> 43:42.473 Thank you. 43:45.000 --> 43:47.500 - We do have trilateral interactions 43:47.500 --> 43:48.940 with US, Japan and India. 43:48.940 --> 43:53.600 I joined my State Department colleagues earlier this year 43:53.600 --> 43:58.600 in Delhi for a trilateral discussion at our level. 43:59.530 --> 44:02.420 Taking that to a higher level is certainly a possibility 44:02.420 --> 44:06.850 because, as you say these three great democracies 44:06.850 --> 44:10.860 align on quite a bit of issues, 44:10.860 --> 44:14.420 so we'll see about the future of that interaction 44:14.420 --> 44:16.360 whether it's sustained at a high level 44:16.360 --> 44:18.010 and I think we'd be open to that. 44:24.060 --> 44:25.880 - [Kami] Yes, sir, my name is Kami Butt. 44:25.880 --> 44:27.850 I'm with the Pakistani Spectator. 44:27.850 --> 44:30.500 And you mentioned something about giving some space 44:30.500 --> 44:33.870 to newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. 44:33.870 --> 44:36.760 Do you think that your Department of Defense 44:36.760 --> 44:39.980 is willing to use its influence at IMF 44:39.980 --> 44:43.560 or other institution to give Pakistan the necessarily loan 44:43.560 --> 44:48.073 that it need to prevent its economy defaulting? 44:49.020 --> 44:52.890 As you know, Imran Khan seemed to be a man of martial virtue 44:52.890 --> 44:55.630 but he has so many limitation. 44:55.630 --> 44:59.760 He really cannot print dollar; only America can print. 44:59.760 --> 45:02.810 He cannot provide job to million of young kids 45:02.810 --> 45:04.790 who are unemployed in this country. 45:04.790 --> 45:08.940 He cannot get money to pay interest on its foreign debt. 45:08.940 --> 45:12.040 In other words, Pakistan seem to be bound 45:12.040 --> 45:15.670 to be collapsing very soon. 45:15.670 --> 45:19.230 So my second question is in the case if it happen 45:19.230 --> 45:22.020 then what role do you perceive for India 45:22.020 --> 45:24.860 because no other country has better intelligence, 45:24.860 --> 45:28.110 human intelligence about Pakistan than India does. 45:28.110 --> 45:31.310 I know your department has a very elaborate plan 45:31.310 --> 45:33.810 to recover Pakistani hundred atomic bomb 45:33.810 --> 45:36.030 if in the case Pakistan collapses. 45:36.030 --> 45:39.460 Does your department see any important role for India 45:39.460 --> 45:42.135 to help your department or help United States 45:42.135 --> 45:43.110 to cover those things? 45:43.110 --> 45:43.943 Thanks. 45:52.087 --> 45:53.910 - Upon returning to government in January, 45:53.910 --> 45:55.920 I was reminded, you no longer have to answer 45:55.920 --> 45:58.340 hypothetical questions and future questions, 45:58.340 --> 46:01.490 and so I think I'll heed that advice. 46:01.490 --> 46:03.200 There's a lot of hypotheticals there 46:03.200 --> 46:05.893 about future collapse, nuclear weapon. 46:07.471 --> 46:11.040 What I said about giving him space was really 46:11.040 --> 46:13.943 in the context of the India-Pakistan relationship. 46:14.840 --> 46:16.520 We'd certainly like to give him space 46:16.520 --> 46:18.910 to make the right decisions on a variety of things, 46:18.910 --> 46:23.760 but I think our approach of cutting assistance 46:23.760 --> 46:27.680 and pressuring Pakistan on their relationship 46:27.680 --> 46:30.480 with the Taliban, persuading them to come to the table, 46:30.480 --> 46:35.480 dealing with terrorist networks that'll be sustained. 46:35.760 --> 46:38.820 When I say give space it's not changing our approach 46:38.820 --> 46:42.980 or our policy, I really mentioned it in the context 46:42.980 --> 46:46.403 of developing opportunities between India and Pakistan. 46:47.901 --> 46:52.430 I don't have a good answer on the economic 46:53.950 --> 46:58.530 difficulties and challenges that Pakistan finds itself in. 46:58.530 --> 47:02.900 What I can say is if you look at other examples 47:02.900 --> 47:07.710 where countries went all-in or largely in with China, 47:07.710 --> 47:09.770 the results have not been particularly good 47:09.770 --> 47:11.857 and there's been an erosion of sovereignty 47:11.857 --> 47:14.150 and an erosion of control 47:15.130 --> 47:19.090 and there are many examples of that. 47:19.090 --> 47:23.590 So if our friends in Pakistan wanna talk about 47:23.590 --> 47:26.950 a way out of that or wanna talk about ways 47:26.950 --> 47:30.160 to strengthen their economy and deal with that 47:30.160 --> 47:31.700 I'm sure we'd be open to that 47:31.700 --> 47:34.530 and trying to work with Pakistan, 47:34.530 --> 47:36.120 work either bilaterally 47:36.120 --> 47:38.870 or through international institutions 47:38.870 --> 47:40.320 to try to get them on a better path. 47:40.320 --> 47:42.890 We're not interested in a failed Pakistan 47:42.890 --> 47:44.390 by any stretch of the imagination. 47:44.390 --> 47:47.580 So we want them to be successful, 47:47.580 --> 47:49.220 we want them to have sovereign control 47:49.220 --> 47:52.430 and not cede that to any outside party including China 47:52.430 --> 47:55.596 and the economic peace is probably gonna be key to that. 47:55.596 --> 47:59.263 (audience faintly speaking) 48:02.290 --> 48:03.190 - Thank you, Kami. 48:06.430 --> 48:07.362 Is that Seema? 48:07.362 --> 48:08.362 Yes, please. 48:10.868 --> 48:11.701 - [Seema] I'm Seema Sirohi. 48:11.701 --> 48:14.700 I'm a columnist for the Economic Times in India. 48:14.700 --> 48:18.780 I wanted to press you further on the question of S-400. 48:18.780 --> 48:23.060 Would the US be willing to offer something 48:24.350 --> 48:29.350 that India could bear if it doesn't want India to buy S-400 48:29.710 --> 48:33.010 since China already has got deliveries, 48:33.010 --> 48:36.610 the first few deliveries on S-400? 48:36.610 --> 48:38.743 The other question is about the quad. 48:39.590 --> 48:44.250 Do you detect a certain hesitancy on part of India, 48:44.250 --> 48:48.150 because the prime minister did not even mention it 48:48.150 --> 48:49.883 in his speech in Shangri-La? 48:54.920 --> 48:56.380 - Officials love questions that start 48:56.380 --> 48:57.590 with let me press you further 48:57.590 --> 48:59.663 'cause you thought you've addressed it. 49:03.430 --> 49:07.410 I think, let me just say at a certain general level, 49:07.410 --> 49:09.810 yes, we're willing to talk to India about 49:09.810 --> 49:13.680 meeting defense requirements and alternatives. 49:13.680 --> 49:16.880 There may not be an exact system 49:16.880 --> 49:21.340 that we can produce as the back specifications 49:21.340 --> 49:23.810 and capabilities, but you have systems 49:23.810 --> 49:27.030 not to have systems, not to have platforms 49:27.030 --> 49:29.460 but to address defense requirements 49:29.460 --> 49:31.070 and needed capabilities. 49:31.070 --> 49:34.650 So I can say we'd certainly be willing 49:34.650 --> 49:36.450 to enter into that conversation with India. 49:36.450 --> 49:38.160 And we have. 49:38.160 --> 49:40.130 How we can be a good partner and addressing 49:40.130 --> 49:41.823 what their real requirements are. 49:43.950 --> 49:46.300 In terms of the quad, I come at this 49:46.300 --> 49:48.780 from a little different perspective. 49:48.780 --> 49:50.530 My perspective, I believe the quad 49:50.530 --> 49:53.920 was born on December 26th, 2004 49:53.920 --> 49:57.490 which was the day of the great tsunami in Southeast Asia 49:57.490 --> 49:59.840 when the four countries that responded 49:59.840 --> 50:03.510 were India, Australia, Japan and the United States. 50:03.510 --> 50:05.890 And we responded because we're like-minded, 50:05.890 --> 50:10.100 we saw the tragedy unfolding and felt compelled to act. 50:10.100 --> 50:14.940 We had capability to bring to bear in a quick timely fashion 50:14.940 --> 50:17.943 and we had a willingness to cooperate with one another. 50:18.960 --> 50:22.750 So in a way it was born in reality and in an operation 50:22.750 --> 50:25.830 before it was even born in concept. 50:25.830 --> 50:30.377 I think now we're talking about this as a potential vehicle 50:32.820 --> 50:35.730 for how we can address a range of interests 50:35.730 --> 50:37.390 in the Indo-Pacific. 50:37.390 --> 50:39.820 And I think we find general receptivity 50:39.820 --> 50:42.700 particularly where we're talking about economic issues 50:42.700 --> 50:44.980 and development assistance and the like 50:46.561 --> 50:48.280 but I think it'll move at a pace and scope 50:48.280 --> 50:50.310 that all four are comfortable with 50:50.310 --> 50:53.710 and that's been the limiting factor historically, right? 50:53.710 --> 50:58.700 And sometimes it's us, sometimes it's been Japan, 50:58.700 --> 51:00.290 it's been Australia, it's been India 51:00.290 --> 51:02.420 so I think we'll work through all that. 51:02.420 --> 51:05.860 And if you stare at an iceberg 51:05.860 --> 51:07.650 you don't necessarily see the movement, 51:07.650 --> 51:09.950 but if you look away and look back again 51:09.950 --> 51:12.890 I can see how this quad discussion has moved forward 51:12.890 --> 51:14.650 and moving in the right direction. 51:14.650 --> 51:17.683 Maybe not at the pace we like, but I think we'll get there. 51:19.460 --> 51:20.293 - Yes. 51:27.270 --> 51:28.610 - [Rajiv] My name is Rajiv Goel. 51:28.610 --> 51:31.050 I started the defense practice 51:31.050 --> 51:34.120 for one of India's largest industrial groups 51:34.120 --> 51:35.940 called the Adani Group. 51:35.940 --> 51:37.263 My question is two-fold. 51:38.550 --> 51:40.400 India is a democracy. 51:40.400 --> 51:43.860 And the longevity of the administration of the party 51:43.860 --> 51:46.740 is really dependent upon the local economics. 51:46.740 --> 51:50.350 And India is going through a massive issue of employment 51:51.250 --> 51:54.080 so if any strategy needs to be succeed 51:54.080 --> 51:56.630 between the US and India it has to include 51:56.630 --> 51:59.600 the local perspectives as well, okay? 51:59.600 --> 52:01.120 You have comments on that? 52:01.120 --> 52:03.640 The second is that a lot of the forces 52:03.640 --> 52:07.943 driving the geopolitical climate is China. 52:08.830 --> 52:12.990 And China's relations with India have never been good. 52:12.990 --> 52:17.400 But Russia and Iran are gravitating towards China 52:17.400 --> 52:21.930 because they see certain, how should I say, 52:21.930 --> 52:25.833 access materializing within the geopolitical framework. 52:27.230 --> 52:32.230 So how do you plan to counter the Chinese threat, 52:32.380 --> 52:33.680 if you wanna call it that. 52:33.680 --> 52:35.520 It's not really a threat, 52:35.520 --> 52:38.800 and unfortunately China has a copy, copy-paste model, 52:38.800 --> 52:41.520 and the biggest Achilles' heel in my personal opinion 52:41.520 --> 52:45.273 is their inability to be innovative, 52:46.340 --> 52:48.680 which is where the US really thrives. 52:48.680 --> 52:51.860 So how are you going to be able to use India, 52:51.860 --> 52:53.307 because India is very strategically located 52:53.307 --> 52:56.990 particularly with respect to the Strait of Malacca. 52:56.990 --> 52:59.430 And by alienating Iran, the other choke point, 52:59.430 --> 53:02.470 which is the Strait of Hormuz has now 53:02.470 --> 53:04.370 well-materialized, in my opinion. 53:04.370 --> 53:05.990 So just your comments on that 53:05.990 --> 53:07.670 would be interesting in knowing. 53:07.670 --> 53:09.803 So two-fold, the local. 53:09.803 --> 53:11.490 - Well the second one first. 53:11.490 --> 53:14.923 You said, how are we gonna use India to-- 53:14.923 --> 53:16.286 - No. - Well that's what you said. 53:16.286 --> 53:17.119 (audience speaking faintly) 53:17.119 --> 53:20.173 Okay, well I was gonna, you went where I was gonna go. 53:22.240 --> 53:26.920 This is a subject of intense discussion at the highest level 53:26.920 --> 53:29.080 between the United States and India. 53:29.080 --> 53:31.913 And we've got to navigate 53:31.913 --> 53:34.223 all those complexities. 53:35.440 --> 53:36.750 That's being a practitioner. 53:36.750 --> 53:39.720 That's the real world that you live in. 53:39.720 --> 53:41.350 You've gotta develop policies, 53:41.350 --> 53:44.090 you've gotta come up with activities. 53:44.090 --> 53:46.130 And so we'll work through all that. 53:46.130 --> 53:48.220 It is complex, there's no doubt. 53:48.220 --> 53:52.720 And we note that India has a better relationship with China 53:52.720 --> 53:56.350 this year than last, which is last was pretty bad, 53:56.350 --> 53:58.400 and they've talked about having a normal year. 53:58.400 --> 53:59.700 We support that. 53:59.700 --> 54:01.890 By the way, we want a good relationship with China, too. 54:01.890 --> 54:05.060 And I accompanied Secretary Mattis to Beijing 54:05.060 --> 54:06.750 where they had very good discussions. 54:06.750 --> 54:09.070 We had clear areas of disagreement 54:09.070 --> 54:12.340 over the South China Sea and Taiwan and other issues, 54:12.340 --> 54:16.150 but we ultimately all want a more stable 54:16.150 --> 54:17.980 constructive relationship with China. 54:17.980 --> 54:22.980 So we'll work with our friends in India to try to navigate 54:23.050 --> 54:24.920 all that and develop common approaches. 54:24.920 --> 54:26.760 And I don't know that I can get into much 54:26.760 --> 54:29.150 specificity at this point, but I'm confident 54:29.150 --> 54:31.000 we can work through it and get there. 54:32.400 --> 54:36.190 Your first question on local politics, domestic politics 54:36.190 --> 54:38.480 being supportive of the relationship, 54:38.480 --> 54:42.020 I think all we can do, as a partner, is articulate 54:42.020 --> 54:43.930 why we think the relationship is important, 54:43.930 --> 54:48.810 what we think the capacity to work with one another may be, 54:48.810 --> 54:53.740 and articulate a future vision for the relationship. 54:53.740 --> 54:55.910 I don't think we can spend a lot of time 54:55.910 --> 54:57.920 trying to game out local politics in India. 54:57.920 --> 55:00.500 We'll have to leave that to the central government in Delhi. 55:00.500 --> 55:02.670 But I think we can make a compelling case 55:02.670 --> 55:05.436 at the national level, while this is important, 55:05.436 --> 55:09.540 and we'll rely on our friends in the national government 55:09.540 --> 55:11.593 to deal with the local politics for the most part. 55:11.593 --> 55:13.517 (audience talking faintly) 55:13.517 --> 55:14.350 Sure. 55:33.633 --> 55:34.716 - [Rajiv] Pens cannot be isolated 55:34.716 --> 55:36.980 from the economics of the country. 55:36.980 --> 55:37.813 That's all I was saying. 55:37.813 --> 55:40.390 So, therefore, if there has to be a lasting relationship, 55:40.390 --> 55:43.270 there has to be an economic element to it 55:43.270 --> 55:45.450 as well as a defense element which is what you were, 55:45.450 --> 55:46.780 right, which is where we started. 55:46.780 --> 55:48.890 So I'd just like you to amplify because, 55:48.890 --> 55:52.970 ultimately, it's the grassroots that will define 55:52.970 --> 55:54.130 the longevity of the strategy, 55:54.130 --> 55:58.693 because jobs, technology, industry is not really, 55:59.920 --> 56:02.160 India is basically a consumption story 56:02.160 --> 56:04.200 but we are not supporting that consumption 56:04.200 --> 56:08.150 with local investment in industry. 56:08.150 --> 56:12.600 So there has to be some element in your discussions, I feel. 56:12.600 --> 56:15.770 - Well, you're talking about issues 56:15.770 --> 56:18.040 that are sort of beyond my purview at the Pentagon. 56:18.040 --> 56:21.130 I can agree with you that the economic component 56:21.130 --> 56:23.010 needs to be strong and that that's key 56:23.010 --> 56:26.870 to sustaining broad support at local levels 56:26.870 --> 56:28.820 for relationship going into the future. 56:28.820 --> 56:30.490 I can tell you one of the reasons we're interested 56:30.490 --> 56:32.760 in expanding defense industrial cooperation, 56:32.760 --> 56:36.210 why we have programs, for example, 56:36.210 --> 56:38.490 we have what used to be DUIx, 56:38.490 --> 56:42.070 now DIU 'cause we're no longer experimenting. 56:42.070 --> 56:43.390 We may have the opportunity to have 56:43.390 --> 56:46.330 an Indian liaison officer there. 56:46.330 --> 56:47.930 We're looking at ways to expand 56:47.930 --> 56:49.800 defense industrial cooperation 56:49.800 --> 56:52.410 so that we can be seen on the defense side 56:52.410 --> 56:57.410 as contributing possibly to positive development in India. 56:57.440 --> 57:02.440 And we see it from the defense perspective, joint projects, 57:03.380 --> 57:06.310 collaboration between defense industry 57:06.310 --> 57:08.560 creates better opportunities for interoperability 57:08.560 --> 57:10.440 which is then enabling for training 57:10.440 --> 57:12.770 and exercising and so on and so forth. 57:12.770 --> 57:16.630 But there's clearly a domestic benefit for India 57:16.630 --> 57:19.210 if we're involved in that kind of collaboration. 57:19.210 --> 57:22.130 So from the Defense Department, 57:22.130 --> 57:25.450 I can only appreciate your comment 57:25.450 --> 57:27.230 and say that I agree it's important, 57:27.230 --> 57:29.860 but I better leave that to my colleagues elsewhere 57:29.860 --> 57:33.300 in government to really focus and drill down on. 57:33.300 --> 57:34.133 - Yes, sir. 57:36.140 --> 57:38.066 - Thank you, Randy, for doing this. 57:38.066 --> 57:39.810 (clears throat) Sorry. 57:39.810 --> 57:41.860 My name is Donghui Yu 57:41.860 --> 57:44.370 with China Review News Agency of Hong Kong. 57:44.370 --> 57:48.080 Randy, in term of the military presence 57:48.080 --> 57:52.820 and deployment in the area, how would you compare 57:52.820 --> 57:57.770 Trump administrations in Indo-Pacific strategy 57:57.770 --> 58:00.073 and Obama administration's Asia rebalancing strategy? 58:03.090 --> 58:04.410 How would you compare these two? 58:04.410 --> 58:09.410 Is there any differences or similarities? 58:09.730 --> 58:10.680 Thank you. - Sure. 58:12.570 --> 58:14.320 When I was part of the loyal opposition 58:14.320 --> 58:17.490 in the Obama administration, I was always supportive 58:17.490 --> 58:20.410 of the so called pivot or rebalance. 58:20.410 --> 58:21.610 I'm not sure they ever landed 58:21.610 --> 58:23.030 on how they were gonna brand that. 58:23.030 --> 58:26.840 But the pivot, rebalance because I certainly agree 58:26.840 --> 58:29.600 that the Pacific was a priority 58:29.600 --> 58:32.150 and over time that should be reflected 58:32.150 --> 58:36.030 in our defense posture and our capabilities 58:36.030 --> 58:38.770 and I think the Obama administration did things 58:38.770 --> 58:40.550 to move us in that direction. 58:40.550 --> 58:44.000 I think one of the biggest advantages we have 58:44.000 --> 58:46.770 is we've got Congress now resourcing 58:46.770 --> 58:49.670 the Department of Defense at a better level. 58:49.670 --> 58:52.110 Obama administration was trying to do all this 58:52.110 --> 58:54.840 during sequestration, which was damn hard, 58:54.840 --> 58:59.120 because not only are the real resources not there, 58:59.120 --> 59:02.450 there's also the perception that that sequestration 59:02.450 --> 59:06.403 created in the region, would our uptick 59:07.660 --> 59:09.820 through the pivot or rebalance be sustainable, 59:09.820 --> 59:12.270 durable given budgetary constraints, et cetera. 59:12.270 --> 59:16.050 So we've got Congress fully committed 59:16.050 --> 59:18.540 to resourcing our defense needs. 59:18.540 --> 59:19.720 We've got a very good uptick. 59:19.720 --> 59:22.100 We wanna be good stewards of that and do the right thing 59:22.100 --> 59:25.240 and prove that we're worthy and that there's payoff 59:25.240 --> 59:26.520 for the American taxpayer 59:26.520 --> 59:28.230 and that's what we're looking to do. 59:28.230 --> 59:31.380 We may not be resourced at the same level every year 59:31.380 --> 59:33.480 but we've got very good support from the Congress 59:33.480 --> 59:37.100 through programs like Maritime Security Initiative, 59:37.100 --> 59:38.720 which is a capacity-building effort 59:38.720 --> 59:40.550 throughout Southeast Asia, 59:40.550 --> 59:43.350 other programs of similar nature. 59:43.350 --> 59:46.050 So I think that's our biggest advantage. 59:46.050 --> 59:48.470 We're really working hand in glove with Congress 59:48.470 --> 59:49.853 to resource this effort. 59:52.180 --> 59:57.180 - Deepa. 59:57.585 --> 59:59.350 - [Deepa] Deepa Ollapally from Sigur Center 59:59.350 --> 01:00:01.053 for Asian Studies GWU. 01:00:02.480 --> 01:00:05.580 One of the centerpieces of course of the upcoming dialogue 01:00:05.580 --> 01:00:10.580 is the Indo-Pacific, and I wanted to raise the, 01:00:11.120 --> 01:00:15.520 one simmering crisis that's been going on since February 01:00:15.520 --> 01:00:18.210 in the Indo-Pacific, and that's the Maldives. 01:00:18.210 --> 01:00:20.840 And it seems to me that some of the concerns 01:00:20.840 --> 01:00:23.960 that you raised about free and open 01:00:23.960 --> 01:00:26.090 all come together in the Maldives 01:00:26.090 --> 01:00:30.560 given that there's cruel and authoritarian government. 01:00:30.560 --> 01:00:35.560 Chinese have basically overtaken rather starkly 01:00:35.890 --> 01:00:38.570 India's long-standing political 01:00:38.570 --> 01:00:40.300 and strategic advantages there. 01:00:40.300 --> 01:00:43.550 And so it seems to be having flipped pretty much 01:00:43.550 --> 01:00:47.790 including the Maldives returning several helicopters 01:00:47.790 --> 01:00:49.330 to India and so forth. 01:00:49.330 --> 01:00:52.720 So my question is, 01:00:52.720 --> 01:00:55.840 is the Maldives of concern to the United States? 01:00:55.840 --> 01:00:59.040 How much concerned are you on that? 01:00:59.040 --> 01:01:01.350 And what lessons, if anything, have you taken away 01:01:01.350 --> 01:01:06.350 from India's action or not action during this crisis 01:01:06.700 --> 01:01:08.810 which is you know still simmering 01:01:08.810 --> 01:01:10.730 given that there's election coming up 01:01:10.730 --> 01:01:12.690 in the end of September? 01:01:12.690 --> 01:01:17.690 So, and will that be on the agenda and the upcoming talks? 01:01:17.880 --> 01:01:19.080 - Thank you for raising this. 01:01:19.080 --> 01:01:21.623 This is an issue of concern. 01:01:23.290 --> 01:01:25.270 And as you say, it's still simmering 01:01:25.270 --> 01:01:28.950 so I don't wanna go into great detail 01:01:28.950 --> 01:01:32.660 or specificity about potential responses 01:01:32.660 --> 01:01:36.180 'cause it is a dynamic situation to some extent. 01:01:36.180 --> 01:01:40.210 I think we will, we have been discussing this 01:01:40.210 --> 01:01:43.120 with our friends in India and very well. 01:01:43.120 --> 01:01:45.523 It may come up at the two-plus-two. 01:01:46.640 --> 01:01:50.360 But I think a number of things you can count on, 01:01:50.360 --> 01:01:54.150 we need to shine a light on what's happening there 01:01:55.900 --> 01:01:59.440 because I don't think it's well-understood or well-known 01:01:59.440 --> 01:02:01.410 outside of small circles of people 01:02:01.410 --> 01:02:03.590 who deal with these issues, but there should be 01:02:03.590 --> 01:02:05.690 broader concern because it's not only 01:02:05.690 --> 01:02:07.660 about the unfortunate people there 01:02:07.660 --> 01:02:10.010 who have seen judges thrown in jail, 01:02:10.010 --> 01:02:14.103 opposition leaders jailed or exiled. 01:02:15.236 --> 01:02:19.490 It's a matter of a broader regional problem 01:02:19.490 --> 01:02:22.090 when you fold in the China piece to that. 01:02:22.090 --> 01:02:24.000 They don't have any particular concern 01:02:24.000 --> 01:02:28.230 about freedom or political liberties there 01:02:28.230 --> 01:02:29.480 and the future of the people there. 01:02:29.480 --> 01:02:34.030 They have concerns about their own influence and access. 01:02:34.030 --> 01:02:37.040 So that, we need to shine a light on all that 01:02:37.040 --> 01:02:40.100 and bring in the experiences of others 01:02:40.100 --> 01:02:42.890 and look at Djibouti, look at Sri Lanka, 01:02:42.890 --> 01:02:46.000 look at other examples where countries 01:02:47.380 --> 01:02:49.830 brought the Chinese in under certain circumstance, 01:02:49.830 --> 01:02:52.140 certain conditions and certain understandings 01:02:52.140 --> 01:02:53.930 and that quickly evolved in a direction 01:02:53.930 --> 01:02:56.620 where China was exerting undue influence 01:02:56.620 --> 01:03:00.310 and eroding the sovereignty of countries in question. 01:03:00.310 --> 01:03:01.570 Now the leader may not care. 01:03:01.570 --> 01:03:06.080 He may be making a deal that's gonna financially benefit him 01:03:06.080 --> 01:03:09.420 and ensure that he can maintain political control, 01:03:09.420 --> 01:03:12.270 but I suspect the people would care greatly. 01:03:12.270 --> 01:03:15.030 So that's why shining a light is still important. 01:03:15.030 --> 01:03:17.400 We saw in Vanuatu, for example, 01:03:17.400 --> 01:03:19.680 when stories started to emerge 01:03:19.680 --> 01:03:22.440 about the Chinese negotiating for a base. 01:03:22.440 --> 01:03:24.530 There was a backlash there. 01:03:24.530 --> 01:03:26.470 So shining a light on that is important. 01:03:26.470 --> 01:03:30.490 Beyond that, looking at particular measures 01:03:30.490 --> 01:03:32.490 and things in the toolkit looking at 01:03:32.490 --> 01:03:34.220 what we might be able to do on visas, 01:03:34.220 --> 01:03:35.870 looking at what we might be able to do 01:03:35.870 --> 01:03:40.570 on economic consequence. 01:03:40.570 --> 01:03:42.870 Those are all things that are under consideration, 01:03:42.870 --> 01:03:46.390 but as you noted it's a simmering dynamic situation 01:03:46.390 --> 01:03:48.893 so I wouldn't go into a lot of detail at this point. 01:03:54.200 --> 01:03:55.740 - [Phoenix] Hi, I'm Phoenix Huang 01:03:55.740 --> 01:03:57.310 with Hong Kong Phoenix TV. 01:03:57.310 --> 01:03:59.380 Nice to see you again, Mr. Schriver. 01:03:59.380 --> 01:04:00.870 So I have a question. 01:04:00.870 --> 01:04:04.138 Could you please give us a broader picture about 01:04:04.138 --> 01:04:06.270 how does the US and India 01:04:06.270 --> 01:04:09.280 military cooperation moved forward, 01:04:09.280 --> 01:04:12.430 and specifically on military sales 01:04:12.430 --> 01:04:15.140 that we know that India wants, 01:04:15.140 --> 01:04:18.260 wants to get the US EMAL System 01:04:18.260 --> 01:04:20.900 which is the electronic catapult system 01:04:20.900 --> 01:04:23.460 for the aircraft carrier. 01:04:23.460 --> 01:04:26.660 And also how, likely, how possible 01:04:26.660 --> 01:04:30.280 does the US want to sell the F/A-18 01:04:32.207 --> 01:04:34.540 to India for their aircraft carrier? 01:04:34.540 --> 01:04:35.373 Thank you. 01:04:38.380 --> 01:04:41.590 - I think the security assistance aspect, 01:04:41.590 --> 01:04:43.730 defense sales aspect of our relationship 01:04:43.730 --> 01:04:46.890 is going to have an upward trajectory. 01:04:46.890 --> 01:04:50.387 We certainly wanna convey to our Indian friends 01:04:50.387 --> 01:04:52.270 that we wanna be a partner of choice 01:04:52.270 --> 01:04:55.283 when it comes to their defense and security needs. 01:04:56.220 --> 01:04:57.610 There are several 01:05:00.990 --> 01:05:03.310 prongs to that overall approach. 01:05:03.310 --> 01:05:05.580 We've gotta get these enabling agreements in place. 01:05:05.580 --> 01:05:07.940 So there are certain things you're talking about 01:05:07.940 --> 01:05:10.540 that we're not in a position to do right now 01:05:10.540 --> 01:05:12.210 because the enabling agreements aren't there. 01:05:12.210 --> 01:05:13.273 We need to do that. 01:05:14.230 --> 01:05:19.000 We need to make clear where we can provide 01:05:19.000 --> 01:05:22.200 capability and alternatives to what they're considering now 01:05:22.200 --> 01:05:24.360 and we had a previous discussion 01:05:24.360 --> 01:05:26.230 about their air defense needs 01:05:26.230 --> 01:05:29.360 so clarifying what we can do as an alternative 01:05:29.360 --> 01:05:31.480 and being a good partner there. 01:05:31.480 --> 01:05:34.320 We need to build confidence and trust over time. 01:05:34.320 --> 01:05:38.700 So we've gone from zero defense sales, 01:05:38.700 --> 01:05:39.740 I forget the exact timeline, 01:05:39.740 --> 01:05:42.603 a decade ago or so to $18 billion. 01:05:43.500 --> 01:05:47.310 But we're still growing, comfortable with one another, 01:05:47.310 --> 01:05:51.950 learning about our very complex FMS system 01:05:51.950 --> 01:05:56.293 and how we support those programs. 01:05:57.603 --> 01:06:01.460 So again I think the trajectory will be upward. 01:06:01.460 --> 01:06:03.330 I don't wanna get into specific details 01:06:03.330 --> 01:06:04.963 about the systems you're asking about. 01:06:04.963 --> 01:06:08.350 That'll all be discussed and worked through. 01:06:08.350 --> 01:06:11.290 I think on the on the exercise training side, 01:06:11.290 --> 01:06:13.210 we're gonna see an uptick in the, as I said, 01:06:13.210 --> 01:06:15.960 the complexity scope of those exercises 01:06:15.960 --> 01:06:18.020 and our ability to do that 01:06:18.020 --> 01:06:19.940 in a multilateral environment as well, 01:06:19.940 --> 01:06:22.430 bringing in other countries to those exercises. 01:06:22.430 --> 01:06:26.220 So overall we're very bullish, as I said earlier, 01:06:26.220 --> 01:06:29.020 and defense security cooperation will be a part of that. 01:06:37.320 --> 01:06:39.937 - [Ramesh] Yeah, my name is Ramesh Dishpande. 01:06:39.937 --> 01:06:40.770 One question. 01:06:40.770 --> 01:06:44.050 Today's Wall Street Journal carries an article 01:06:44.050 --> 01:06:47.520 saying that both China and Russia are working hard 01:06:48.360 --> 01:06:51.610 to surpass US conventional defense capacity, 01:06:51.610 --> 01:06:55.673 now they want to create almost equal situation there. 01:06:56.520 --> 01:06:58.460 And there the element of space defense 01:06:58.460 --> 01:07:01.210 is assuming a lot of (mumbles) with China. 01:07:01.210 --> 01:07:03.640 India has made good progress on the space side, 01:07:03.640 --> 01:07:04.970 okay, they're going good. 01:07:04.970 --> 01:07:08.700 Do you see any potential for India and US 01:07:08.700 --> 01:07:12.960 to cooperate on developing space-based defense strategy? 01:07:12.960 --> 01:07:14.070 Thank you. 01:07:14.070 --> 01:07:15.390 - Very good question. 01:07:15.390 --> 01:07:19.820 So first point I would make is you've 01:07:21.130 --> 01:07:24.500 articulated the main reason we produced 01:07:24.500 --> 01:07:26.600 the National Defense Strategy that we did. 01:07:27.670 --> 01:07:32.670 Pillar number one is to make great power competition 01:07:33.780 --> 01:07:36.880 a priority on how we approach our defense, 01:07:36.880 --> 01:07:40.640 posture and requirements and doctrine, et cetera 01:07:40.640 --> 01:07:43.153 and prepare to deal with fair competitors. 01:07:44.810 --> 01:07:47.500 Having that in our National Defense Strategy 01:07:47.500 --> 01:07:50.920 is very empowering for bureaucrats like me, 01:07:50.920 --> 01:07:54.480 but for our services, for our combatant commands. 01:07:54.480 --> 01:07:56.080 So we're thinking long and hard 01:07:56.080 --> 01:08:00.360 about how to be prepared for whatever 01:08:00.360 --> 01:08:02.650 China and Russia may do on the conventional side 01:08:02.650 --> 01:08:04.530 as well as the strategic side. 01:08:04.530 --> 01:08:08.350 So it's been an effort that has enjoyed 01:08:08.350 --> 01:08:10.290 very senior leadership. 01:08:10.290 --> 01:08:12.790 President Trump endorsed the National Security Strategy 01:08:12.790 --> 01:08:13.623 which is talked about. 01:08:13.623 --> 01:08:16.140 China is a strategic competitor, 01:08:16.140 --> 01:08:18.260 Secretary Mattis' National Defense Strategy 01:08:18.260 --> 01:08:20.010 and you'll see a steady flow of that, 01:08:20.010 --> 01:08:22.950 our National Military Strategy will be coming out 01:08:22.950 --> 01:08:25.560 at some point in the not-too-distant future. 01:08:25.560 --> 01:08:26.800 So that's the general point. 01:08:26.800 --> 01:08:30.020 The specific point, I think, we'd be very interested 01:08:30.020 --> 01:08:35.020 in exploring the possibilities in the area of space, 01:08:35.390 --> 01:08:38.787 I'm sure you're following the developments on our side 01:08:38.787 --> 01:08:42.310 and the interest in creating a space possibly, 01:08:45.550 --> 01:08:49.650 possibly a separate service is what Secretary Mattis 01:08:49.650 --> 01:08:51.520 will discuss with the Congress. 01:08:51.520 --> 01:08:54.600 But a space force and a separate command 01:08:54.600 --> 01:08:59.500 is probably the interim step that's being done for a reason. 01:08:59.500 --> 01:09:01.100 It's being done because we realize 01:09:01.100 --> 01:09:03.710 the growing challenges in space 01:09:03.710 --> 01:09:05.900 and having good partners with capability 01:09:05.900 --> 01:09:08.853 is truly gonna be of interest to us as we go forward. 01:09:11.000 --> 01:09:11.833 - Yes. 01:09:14.914 --> 01:09:16.460 - [Su] Thank you, my name is Su Rin. 01:09:16.460 --> 01:09:18.900 US in the security firm in cyber force. 01:09:18.900 --> 01:09:23.900 Is is cyber security a mutual topic of discussion 01:09:24.990 --> 01:09:26.720 that you plan to have in this two-plus-two 01:09:26.720 --> 01:09:28.773 or I guess in a similar forum? 01:09:30.390 --> 01:09:33.340 - Yeah, I don't know how specific 01:09:33.340 --> 01:09:36.210 or what level of detail we'd get into on cyber security. 01:09:36.210 --> 01:09:40.400 But I think if you talk about regional security challenges 01:09:40.400 --> 01:09:42.660 and you obviously gravitate towards 01:09:42.660 --> 01:09:46.550 some common shared concerns about China 01:09:46.550 --> 01:09:49.360 and North Korea for that matter, 01:09:49.360 --> 01:09:51.210 there's certainly a cyber component to that. 01:09:51.210 --> 01:09:54.360 So it's something that we're, 01:09:54.360 --> 01:09:56.500 again looking broadly for partners 01:09:56.500 --> 01:09:58.300 who have not only the shared concerns 01:09:58.300 --> 01:10:02.750 but capabilities and ideas about best practices. 01:10:02.750 --> 01:10:04.170 We need to do better on cyber. 01:10:04.170 --> 01:10:06.540 We're gonna have another strategy paper coming out 01:10:06.540 --> 01:10:08.323 on cyber through the department. 01:10:09.270 --> 01:10:10.950 We have created a cyber command 01:10:10.950 --> 01:10:12.860 so again I think it's an area 01:10:12.860 --> 01:10:15.560 where we need strong partners with good ideas 01:10:15.560 --> 01:10:18.880 and I think we'll be compelled to talk about that 01:10:18.880 --> 01:10:20.290 either in this forum or elsewhere 01:10:20.290 --> 01:10:23.313 given the challenges we face from China and Korea. 01:10:24.320 --> 01:10:25.288 - If I may just add to that. 01:10:25.288 --> 01:10:27.800 We've actually had a dialogue under the rubric 01:10:27.800 --> 01:10:30.350 of Homeland Security for many years. 01:10:30.350 --> 01:10:32.420 But the interesting question to consider 01:10:32.420 --> 01:10:34.970 is whether there is a defense component 01:10:34.970 --> 01:10:38.380 particularly as our efforts at interoperability 01:10:38.380 --> 01:10:41.948 and integration begin today whether we need to bring that 01:10:41.948 --> 01:10:44.170 under the specific rubric of defense. 01:10:44.170 --> 01:10:45.350 So that's something to think about. 01:10:45.350 --> 01:10:46.570 - Yeah, I think there could be. 01:10:46.570 --> 01:10:48.093 And we were, 01:10:49.930 --> 01:10:51.500 the expression we were trying to fly 01:10:51.500 --> 01:10:52.720 while we were building the plane 01:10:52.720 --> 01:10:55.300 and this mean cyber is something 01:10:55.300 --> 01:11:00.300 that we aren't particularly organized well for 01:11:01.230 --> 01:11:02.200 but we're trying to get better 01:11:02.200 --> 01:11:04.270 in the creation of Cyber Command 01:11:04.270 --> 01:11:07.380 and thinking of the defense components of that 01:11:07.380 --> 01:11:09.347 has now positioned us, I think, to talk to partners 01:11:09.347 --> 01:11:11.283 in the defense space about it. 01:11:26.420 --> 01:11:27.930 - [Sullivan] Hi, Sullivan Gassman. 01:11:27.930 --> 01:11:30.670 I'm with the International Energy Partnership. 01:11:30.670 --> 01:11:33.740 You mentioned how important it is 01:11:33.740 --> 01:11:38.740 that we give space to India given the, excuse me, Pakistan, 01:11:39.380 --> 01:11:42.060 given their recent elections on certain areas. 01:11:42.060 --> 01:11:46.350 I actually wanted to ask you a bit about how our strategy 01:11:46.350 --> 01:11:49.050 in India can be affected by our own elections 01:11:49.050 --> 01:11:53.670 just given that every four years there's a chance 01:11:53.670 --> 01:11:55.630 our leadership, who determines our approach 01:11:55.630 --> 01:11:57.400 and meeting our objectives and even the 01:11:57.400 --> 01:11:59.430 objectives themselves can change. 01:11:59.430 --> 01:12:01.270 So yeah, I just wanted to ask you a bit 01:12:01.270 --> 01:12:06.270 about how that timeline during Bush to Obama, 01:12:06.290 --> 01:12:08.563 Obama and Trump affects your strategy. 01:12:10.460 --> 01:12:12.083 - Well, where I said it doesn't, 01:12:12.083 --> 01:12:14.200 it doesn't enter in the calculus much 01:12:14.200 --> 01:12:17.050 'cause we've seen consistency, 01:12:17.050 --> 01:12:19.700 understanding the value of this relationship 01:12:19.700 --> 01:12:22.160 and trying to really push the envelope 01:12:22.160 --> 01:12:24.053 of where the potentials are. 01:12:25.450 --> 01:12:27.850 And I would add, in Congress, one of the, 01:12:27.850 --> 01:12:30.133 it used to be the largest, I don't know if it still is. 01:12:30.133 --> 01:12:34.640 It's the largest caucus in Congress is the India caucus, 01:12:34.640 --> 01:12:35.860 and it's bipartisan. 01:12:35.860 --> 01:12:40.200 And I've participated in some discussions with them 01:12:40.200 --> 01:12:42.150 and with Secretary Mattis. 01:12:42.150 --> 01:12:45.670 And when you go into one of those meetings 01:12:45.670 --> 01:12:48.450 it's standing remotely. 01:12:48.450 --> 01:12:52.320 So that leads me to think that this is not a partisan issue, 01:12:52.320 --> 01:12:55.070 it's not a one administration versus another issue. 01:12:55.070 --> 01:12:57.140 There's large consensus in the United States 01:12:57.140 --> 01:12:59.530 about wanting to build this relationship out 01:12:59.530 --> 01:13:01.950 and gives me confidence that we do that 01:13:01.950 --> 01:13:04.843 no matter the outcome of future elections. 01:13:04.843 --> 01:13:06.450 - And the same is true in India as well, 01:13:06.450 --> 01:13:09.363 which is good reason for, yes. 01:13:15.020 --> 01:13:16.270 - [Benjamin] Thank you very much. 01:13:16.270 --> 01:13:19.430 Benjamin Tur, no current affiliation. 01:13:19.430 --> 01:13:21.780 Could you say something about 01:13:22.770 --> 01:13:26.400 your comment on Iran about 01:13:27.250 --> 01:13:30.620 possible US collaborate, 01:13:30.620 --> 01:13:35.620 US-India collaboration or lack of it in the Middle East? 01:13:36.400 --> 01:13:39.923 I'm thinking specifically of Egypt, 01:13:41.400 --> 01:13:45.973 Palestine, Israel, Syria, Turkey. 01:13:48.183 --> 01:13:52.300 - Yeah, I think the conversations 01:13:52.300 --> 01:13:54.140 that I've been involved in the preparations 01:13:54.140 --> 01:13:57.670 we're making have largely focused on the Indo-Pacific. 01:13:57.670 --> 01:14:02.510 I think Secretary Mattis, Secretary Pompeo 01:14:02.510 --> 01:14:04.580 obviously have global responsibilities 01:14:04.580 --> 01:14:07.530 and think globally in a way that I don't always do 01:14:07.530 --> 01:14:11.050 and as a assistant secretary with regional responsibilities. 01:14:11.050 --> 01:14:14.300 So I would assume if those topics do come up 01:14:14.300 --> 01:14:18.740 at the two-plus-two or beyond we would have interested 01:14:18.740 --> 01:14:21.000 parties on our side to have that discussion, 01:14:21.000 --> 01:14:24.130 because we see the US-India relationship 01:14:24.130 --> 01:14:28.510 is really grounded by shared vision, shared interest 01:14:28.510 --> 01:14:33.510 come from two large democracies. 01:14:33.630 --> 01:14:38.190 So if we can partner with one another in those areas 01:14:38.190 --> 01:14:39.690 I'm sure our leadership would be interested 01:14:39.690 --> 01:14:40.990 in having that discussion. 01:14:41.920 --> 01:14:43.300 - We're gonna take one last question 01:14:43.300 --> 01:14:45.200 and that goes to the young lady there. 01:14:48.639 --> 01:14:49.472 - [Katie] Thank you. 01:14:49.472 --> 01:14:51.830 Katie Wong with NTDTV. 01:14:51.830 --> 01:14:54.530 Recently, DOD released the annual 01:14:54.530 --> 01:14:56.954 congressional report on China. 01:14:56.954 --> 01:14:58.810 This report seems quite different 01:14:58.810 --> 01:15:01.600 from the reports we have seen before. 01:15:01.600 --> 01:15:04.360 So can you share more of your thoughts 01:15:04.360 --> 01:15:06.430 while preparing for this report 01:15:06.430 --> 01:15:08.363 and the methodology and so on? 01:15:11.000 --> 01:15:13.680 - Yeah, I'm not sure I would've shared the characterization 01:15:13.680 --> 01:15:16.680 but it's interesting that you note that. 01:15:16.680 --> 01:15:20.050 I think what's different is China continues to develop, 01:15:20.050 --> 01:15:24.500 improve, change so our reports reflect that. 01:15:24.500 --> 01:15:27.980 We try through the China military power report 01:15:27.980 --> 01:15:32.980 to do a very objective non-politicized description 01:15:33.340 --> 01:15:36.480 of what China is doing to advance its capabilities. 01:15:36.480 --> 01:15:39.340 I'd date myself if I said Joe Friday, just the facts, 01:15:39.340 --> 01:15:42.140 but that's, if you know that reference 01:15:42.140 --> 01:15:45.540 that's how we approach the China military power report, 01:15:45.540 --> 01:15:46.463 just the facts. 01:15:47.450 --> 01:15:50.170 But I think the facts are that China has been making 01:15:50.170 --> 01:15:52.550 rapid progress in certain areas. 01:15:52.550 --> 01:15:54.240 That's what you get when you devote 01:15:54.240 --> 01:15:56.660 double-digit increases to your defense budget 01:15:56.660 --> 01:15:59.510 for over a decade now, almost two decades, 01:15:59.510 --> 01:16:01.770 you get improvement and you get advancements. 01:16:01.770 --> 01:16:05.410 And so the power report looks at things 01:16:05.410 --> 01:16:06.700 that previous ones didn't. 01:16:06.700 --> 01:16:09.840 The hypersonic, the developments in hypersonics, 01:16:09.840 --> 01:16:12.650 anti-ship ballistic missiles and a range of things 01:16:12.650 --> 01:16:14.980 we didn't have to talk about a decade ago. 01:16:14.980 --> 01:16:17.550 So I wouldn't have characterized it that way, 01:16:17.550 --> 01:16:19.477 I just would've said we're reporting the facts here 01:16:19.477 --> 01:16:20.977 and that's what the facts are. 01:16:23.770 --> 01:16:26.540 - Randy, let me thank you for, 01:16:26.540 --> 01:16:27.780 not just taking the time, 01:16:27.780 --> 01:16:29.910 which of course I'm very thankful for, 01:16:29.910 --> 01:16:32.700 but for the extraordinary effort 01:16:32.700 --> 01:16:37.080 and commitment that you brought to this position in the job 01:16:37.080 --> 01:16:40.510 at a time when there is considerable flux 01:16:40.510 --> 01:16:43.610 in the United States, in the international community 01:16:43.610 --> 01:16:46.220 and to be able, in the face of those circumstances, 01:16:46.220 --> 01:16:48.973 to sort of stay in the course and do the work 01:16:48.973 --> 01:16:52.040 that you guys are doing diligently, you and your staff. 01:16:52.040 --> 01:16:54.290 I do really wanna thank you as a citizen. 01:16:54.290 --> 01:16:55.302 - Thank you. 01:16:55.302 --> 01:16:57.510 - And of course I wanna thank you on behalf of Carnegie 01:16:57.510 --> 01:16:59.150 for spending the morning here with us. 01:16:59.150 --> 01:17:02.450 You're welcome anytime you wanna come back. 01:17:02.450 --> 01:17:05.160 - Well, let's do this again. - And run the gauntlet again. 01:17:05.160 --> 01:17:06.530 - Let's do this again. 01:17:06.530 --> 01:17:07.863 - We would love that. - Yeah. 01:17:07.863 --> 01:17:08.696 - We would love that. - Appreciate it. 01:17:08.696 --> 01:17:11.270 - I thank all of you for coming here this morning. 01:17:11.270 --> 01:17:12.113 Stay tuned. 01:17:13.210 --> 01:17:17.140 (audience applauding) 01:17:17.140 --> 01:17:18.690 Mr. Schriver, give us a preview 01:17:18.690 --> 01:17:21.210 of what is likely to happen in the next week. 01:17:21.210 --> 01:17:23.360 And I'm sure at some point, we'll have an opportunity 01:17:23.360 --> 01:17:25.970 to pick up the threads and continue this discussion again. 01:17:25.970 --> 01:17:27.690 So thank you very much and have a good day. 01:17:27.690 --> 01:17:29.690 Thank you. - Thank you, appreciate it. 01:17:29.690 --> 01:17:31.577 Thank you. - Let's do it again.